Narrow or Broad? Questioning the Scope of Public Reason

dc.contributor.author	Ciszewski, Wojciech
dc.contributor.organization	Uniwersytet Jagielloński	en
dc.date.accessioned	2017-07-26T14:42:51Z
dc.date.available	2017-07-26T14:42:51Z
dc.date.issued	2016
dc.description.abstract	This paper considers a fundamental issue set against the backcloth of John Rawls’s political theory, namely the issue of the proper scope of public reason. The concept of the scope of public reason refers to situations when publicly accessible reasons have moral priority over other normative considerations. The case is worth considering because, although making several remarks, Rawls’s position on the problem is ambiguous. In the paper, the author reconstructs the accurate scope by invoking two criteria: person oriented and issue oriented. The philosophical discussion on the subject is dominated by two interpretations of the breadth of public reason; however, the author believes we may indicate four plausible answers to the stated question.	en
dc.identifier.issn	2082-9469
dc.identifier.uri	https://open.icm.edu.pl/handle/123456789/12736
dc.language.iso	en
dc.publisher	Towarzystwo Doktorantów UJ	en
dc.rights	Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne 3.0 Polska	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/pl/	*
dc.subject	political liberalism	en
dc.subject	public reason	en
dc.subject	political justification	en
dc.subject	John Rawls	en
dc.subject	constitutional essentials	en
dc.title	Narrow or Broad? Questioning the Scope of Public Reason	pl
dc.type	article	en