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## THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF FRANCE IN WHITE PAPERS ON DEFENSE. CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

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France after World War II was in a difficult situation. This involved a loss of position, not only as a superpower in the world but in Europe.

Superpower, the global position of France, decided to rebuild, after the new president was elected in June 1959, Gen. Ch. de Gaulle. According to his conception of a foreign policy for France it should have a global dimension, supported by the independent French defense not only as a conventional but also nuclear power.

Gen. Ch. De Gaulle took the position that France having regard to its independence in the political, military, economic and cultural center should not submit to any of the blocks.

Independence in the foreign policy of France was understood as the freedom to determine their own place in the world, freely determine their fate, the defense of vital national interests and full freedom in the choice of ends, means and methods of foreign policy.

The basis of his independent foreign policy was the idea of the size of France. The size of France, was expressed not only in its great power, political and military position in the world, but also as to discover, maintain and expand, through appropriate conduct of foreign policy, in the political, military, economic, and cultural and scientific.

With the concept of independence it is closely related to safety.

Security is the foundation of independence, provided that the security of France itself must provide the basis of its power. The state must be strong to be safe and independent.

Defending the independence and sovereignty of France, must be based on the French economic and military potential, and in case of war, France must be able to defend itself and in its own way. This approach to the independence and security became the basis for the development of the military doctrine of France. The doctrine of an independent national defense of France was developed in the mid sixties, and presented for the use of French society and the international environment in a White Paper on Defence in 1972.

Based on the provisions contained in the French military doctrine which was formulated in 1976 by General Lucien Poirier, the theory of three French national security circles.

The first main group of concern to defend the independence and sovereignty of France, was coverage that included the European territory of France, known as the “national sanctuary” for the defense you need to use all forces and military means, including nuclear deterrence.

The second group of national security, flowed from the first and was related to the European security and maintenance of political and military stability on the continent of Europe. The second circle divided Europe and was narrowed down to the nearest environment of France, the European allies and NATO solidarity was to attack the French in case of State (s) adjacent to the aggressor. In the event of a conflict within the second circle of safety, France, bearing in mind not allowing the attacker to his territory, was ready to provide assistance to political, economic, and get involved militarily in the country attacked with the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The third sphere of security was due to the role that France wanted to play as a power in the world, and embraced it: the defense of the French overseas departments (DOM – départements d’outre-mer) and the overseas territories (TOM – Territoire d’outre-mer), the armed interventions in defense of French interests in African countries that are linked to France

by the various bilateral agreements, marine defense and ocean routes providing access to global French energy<sup>1</sup>.

Conceived by Gen. Ch. de Gaulle's vision of France's far-reaching security policy was realistic, since it recorded the reality of the bipolar division of the world. It was adapted to the existing status quo in Europe and the world, based on four pillars, which were to sustain the size and independence of France:

- independence of the military, based on his own force de frappe and not participate in NATO military structures;
- Relative independence from the United States;
- Controlling the process of European Economic Integration as a Means of Strengthening their international position and the role of France;
- Maintaining the position of the first partner of the Soviet Union, while careful collaboration with the European Socialist countries in the framework of European policy, based on the concept of "Europe of Homelands".

By the end of the eighties the leaders of France, bearing in mind the idea of independence Gaullist French security policy, based on the bipolar division of the world, deftly maneuvering, trying to achieve the political and military rivalries of the two superpowers for their own benefit. At the same time pay attention to minimizing the costs France would have to pay. J. Stefanowicz, responsible for the French security policy until 1989, the strategy defines as "the triangle of error"<sup>2</sup>, involving the ambiguous formulation of foreign policy goals: independence, symbolized by having their own nuclear capability, the formula by deterrence for weaker and stronger, supporting NATO and controlling it by the presence of its political structures, lifting, depending on the situation, the idea of creating a separate defense of a united Europe, but once the defense had the

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<sup>1</sup> L. Poirier, *Des stratégies nucléaires*, Paris 1982, s. 374; P. Boniface, *Les mutations de la politique militaire de la France*, [in:] *L'Europe et la sécurité internationale, Memento défense et désarmement*, Bruxelles 1997, s. 156–187.

<sup>2</sup> J. Stefanowicz, *Polityka bezpieczeństwa Francji u progu XXI wieku*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo państw Europy. Koncepcje i problemy lat dziewięćdziesiątych*, ed. B. Łomiński, Katowice 1997, s. 87.

strengthening of NATO as a European pillar, sometimes replacing the alliance can be a force on the European continent<sup>3</sup>.

### GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE FRENCH SECURITY POLICY AFTER 1989

Changes that have occurred in Central Europe and the Soviet Union itself substantially influenced French foreign policy and required a fundamental shift, long-term vision developed by the followers of Gen. Ch. de Gaulle. After the collapse of the socialist system, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe and the world had radically changed the geostrategic situation. The security of France and Western Europe no longer threaten the communist bloc. The disintegration of the bipolar system of politico-military, began to form conditions for the formation of the multi-polar order.

This resulted in a change in the current international position of France which had developed during the US-Soviet rivalry. French foreign policy had disappeared, one important advantage, which results from the Franco-Soviet cooperation, initiated by Gen. Ch. de Gaulle in the early sixties, implying hope that will reduce the U.S. influence in Europe. The French also lost the sense of nuclear capabilities, which was one of the important determinants of the superpower position of France in Europe. The unification of Germany, and especially to obtain their sovereignty, France were deprived of the possible influence of their policies, as one of the four powers, which decided in solving the "German problem". Increased fears that Germany economically developed, lacking control of the four powers, take action to build a strong position in Europe and thus threaten the current role of France, particularly in the EEC. Limiting the right to minimum security threats in real conditions in Western Europe, from the weak in the early nineties of the Soviet Union and then Russia, created the

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<sup>3</sup> R. Aron, *Les rapports russo-américains et les rapports franco-russes. Convergence ou contradictions ?*, Paris 1967, s. 7; P. Hassner, *Les politiques envers l'Est*, [in:] *Les politiques extérieures européennes dans la crise*, A. Grosser ed., Paris 1976, s. 62; after: R. Kuźniar, *Doktryna wschodnia w polityce zagranicznej Francji 1958–1981*, Warszawa 1981, s. 65.

possibility that France finally managed to convince Western countries of the French conception of its own European defense, limiting the role of NATO and the oppressive hegemony of the United States. The above conditions and the condition of France led the executive bodies to rethink foreign policy in the field of security.

### THE WHITE PAPER ON DEFENSE – 1994

At the beginning of 1992 the French government appointed a commission consisting of around fifty senior civilian and military officials representing the thirteen ministries in order to analyze the political and military situation that had occurred since 1990 in Europe and worldwide.

The main attention was focused on Europe. It was estimated that some of the European countries were no direct or immediate threat to French territory. It was noted that in Europe there was still great potential for the military, conventional and nuclear. There is a lack of stability in the territory of the former Soviet Union. In the area of Central and Eastern Europe, despite the transition to a new equilibrium an outbreak of armed conflict is possible. As an example the situation in Yugoslavia. Another area of interest to the Commission was Africa and the Middle East. Estimated that the existing economic underdevelopment, demographic imbalance, and the appearance of signs of anarchy, can not only undermine the delicate balance, but lead to the outbreak of armed conflict, which will affect the strategic situation of France<sup>4</sup>.

Made in the analysis were the basis for a new military doctrine in France, which was published in 1994 as the “White Paper on Defense.” Compared to the previous doctrine of the 1972 changes that were made taking into account the new situation in Europe and worldwide. Still based on the security policy of France were the two main assumptions: independence and national sovereignty, and solidarity with our allies. Independence and sovereignty of the results of the foundations of the French

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<sup>4</sup> *Compatibilité des politiques et des systèmes nationaux avec les organisations internationales, Comités 29ème session, DGA, Paris 1994.*

security policy and the fact that the possession of nuclear weapons of its own doctrine and its use.

Solidarity with our allies is the responsibility of the French authorities, political membership in NATO and the participation of French units in peacekeeping operations and numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises within the Alliance. In comparison to the White Paper of 1972, the new book has a modified perception of national interests of France. They were varied by introducing a new division: the vital interests, strategic interests, the interests associated with the rank of France in the world and its international responsibilities as a great power. It was emphasized that the primary foreign policy goal is to protect all these interests, but only some of which France intended to defend all of which are under its control measures, including the use of armed force. A novelty was also not to specify the boundary between the interests of vital and strategic interests. It is the finding that both will be defended with equal determination. Decisions concerning the assessment of whether it is a viable business or strategic interest was left to the political factors. As regards the protection of national interests resulting from the superpower position of France in the world was sufficient policy measures<sup>5</sup>.

The White Paper on Defence in 1994, three areas had been maintained for the security of France, and here also in comparison with the theory of three circles had undergone major adjustments:

- The defense of the vital interests of France, which expresses itself in maintaining the integrity of national territory (metropolitan and overseas territories), sea and air defense of the frontier zone, to ensure full sovereignty and to protect the population.
- Strengthening the European course of defense by giving it its own dimension in the field of security and defense. Keeping peace on the European continent, especially in eastern and southern Europe and the Mediterranean. Ensuring freedom of the major sea lanes of communication in particular: the Mediterranean, Red Sea and the North Indian Ocean.

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<sup>5</sup> *Livre Blanc sur la Défense de 1994*, s. 25–26.

- Defending the interests of France from its responsibilities in international forums related to membership of the UN Security Council<sup>6</sup>.

Analysis of the White Paper on Defense of the French policy objectives of security (defense policy) confirms that France is in a revised political-military situation in Europe and the world, and will continue to pursue its imperial policies begun in the early sixties by Gen. Ch. de Gaulle. President J. Chirac expressed this when he became President on the 31<sup>st</sup> of August 1995 at the annual meeting of French ambassadors in Paris<sup>7</sup>.

Referring to the achievements of France in the past, said among other things, that it is “a unique country that has given to the world and who still has much to offer the country, embodying the values that have become universal values, and who intend to stay in the front line against injustice, intolerance and war, and finally the country, which has assets of cultural, economic, military, allowing it to influence the course of events”. In conclusion the statement added that “France will retain its position as a global power only because of its consistent will, adaptability and imagination, with a clear vision of the changes taking place in the world and a pragmatic approach to them”<sup>8</sup>.

In February 1996, President Jacques Chirac decided to professionalize the armed forces, their reduction. The purpose of the changes was to adapt the defense potential of France to a new strategy. Changed the relationship between conventional forces and nuclear deterrence, for over three decades underpinning defense doctrine. their Nuclear component has been reduced to a strategic missile located on submarines and aircraft-borne.

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<sup>6</sup> Ibidem

<sup>7</sup> *Discours de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République Française, à l'occasion de la réunion des ambassadeurs*, Palais d'Élysée, 31 août 1995; [www.elysee.fr](http://www.elysee.fr).

<sup>8</sup> Ibidem, s. 64–72.

## **WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, 2008**

Since 1994, the date of publication of the second White Paper on defense, the world had changed a lot, especially considering globalization. Increasingly rapid dissemination of information, exchange of goods, services, people, with both positive and negative effects on our environment, economic, social and political but also the situation of national security and international law. The hierarchy of power status, power is changing and will continue to evolve. The world is more dangerous but has become less predictable. There are new types of threats such as cyber-terrorism, health crises, ecological.

The current new White Paper on Defence and National Security, defines strategic analysis for the next 15 years or until 2025 as a consequence of the need for new policies in the field of defense and security<sup>9</sup>.

Throughout the design stage of the White Paper on Defence and National Security in 2008 it was accompanied by close cooperation with Parliament. Members of the Commission were specially appointed with two members of the National Assembly and Senate. The draft White Paper on Defence was presented in the parliamentary committees behind closed doors with the interior minister, foreign affairs and defense ministers. Effects of work were sent to President N. Sarkozy and the Prime Minister. Parliamentary debate on the White Paper on Defence and National Security was conducted under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of France from 23rd June 2008. Along with work on the new document were conducted extensive consultations including approximately 40 public meetings with representatives from various political parties, civil society structures, experts from home and abroad, particularly from Germany, Great Britain, Spain, Italy and Belgium (a total of 52 people representing different nationalities). It could be accessed on the web, allowing about 25 thousand people to present their views on the new defense strategy. Websites devoted to the White Paper on Defence recorded about 250 thousand inputs.

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<sup>9</sup> *Livre blanc sur la défense et sécurité en 2008*, La documentation Française, s. 10.

The new White Paper on Defence of 2008 compared to the White Paper of 1994 it substantially expands the security interests of France, not limiting them to matters relating solely to affairs on defense. It defines national security strategy, which refers to the “common threats and threats that may endanger the lives of citizens”. An important novelty is that operational objectives are jointly determined, from now on internal security measures such as civil and military missions in the protection of citizens will be jointly coordinated. Such a joint coordination of military and civil means has become a fundamental principle of the new strategy<sup>10</sup>.

The National Security Strategy lists five functions / operations strategy, which the defense and security forces should learn:

- Knowledge and prediction.
- Prevention.
- Nuclear deterrence.
- Protection.
- Intervention.

Knowledge and anticipation of a new strategic action, placed as a priority (need for capacity adjustment, security and defense systems to new challenges and new types of threats). The combination of these five steps must be flexible and should evolve and adapt to changes in the international environment. Therefore, the White Paper will be updated regularly before each new pass every 6 years on planning law (*loi de programmation*), delineating the directions of the state defense system and determining the associated costs.

Nuclear deterrence remains an essential cornerstone of national strategy. It is the ultimate guarantee of security and independence for France. One of its tasks is to prevent the aggression of the origin of the state against the vital interests of the state. To meet the broad range of threats in a globalizing world, the credibility of deterrence is based on the possibility of using a wide variety of different means at the disposal of the Head of State. Even if France is not threatened today, no direct threat of aggression, the

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<sup>10</sup> Commission Livre blanc, [http://www.defense.gouv.fr/livre\\_blanc/les\\_reperes/le\\_nouvel\\_environnement\\_geostrategique/un\\_concept\\_nouveau\\_la\\_resilience\\_\\_1/un\\_concept\\_nouveau\\_la\\_resilience](http://www.defense.gouv.fr/livre_blanc/les_reperes/le_nouvel_environnement_geostrategique/un_concept_nouveau_la_resilience__1/un_concept_nouveau_la_resilience).

ability of France to maintain independence, vital national interests must be ensured. France has taken and will take initiatives related to nuclear deterrence. It is particularly active in the fight against proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and devices for delivering such weapons<sup>11</sup>.

The White Paper of 2008 also expresses support for the development of a European defense and security policy. It is contained in a number of specific objectives for building a “Europe of defense” for the coming years.

The French President presenting on the 17<sup>th</sup> of June 2008 conclusions of the White Paper on Defence, alongside many of the issues closely concerning France’s defense policy objectives for 2008–2025, promised to return his country to the military structures of NATO. He also stressed that a return to NATO will not be complete because it will not be subordinate to nuclear deterrence, which will remain under the command of the French. Spoke against the fairly widespread opposition to the views of the European Union – North Atlantic Alliance. France needs of both organizations, which should not compete but complement each other.

The decision to reintegrate France from NATO’s military structures (formalized during the NATO summit in Strasbourg / Kehl on 3<sup>rd</sup>–4<sup>th</sup> of April 2009) was used, as argued, on the 17<sup>th</sup> March 2009 before the National Assembly Prime Minister François Fillon, “granting the defense of Europe, the true weight “and the calm of European partners, who have been” at every step in the defense of Europe saw as a backward step the cooperation within NATO.

The White Paper on Defence of 2008 classifies risks in terms of their likelihood and their impact.

The White Paper introduced important institutional changes. It has created the National Council on Security and Defence, chaired by the President of France. Council’s tasks include: developing a strategic framework for military planning (including the participation of French soldiers

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<sup>11</sup> Hiérarchisation des risques et des menaces sur le territoire national en 2008, Commission Livre blanc, [http://www.defense.gouv.fr/livre\\_blanc/les\\_reperes/le\\_nouvel\\_environnement\\_geostrategique/hierarchisation\\_des\\_risques\\_et\\_des\\_menaces\\_sur\\_le\\_territoire\\_national\\_en\\_2008\\_\\_1/hierarchisation\\_des\\_risques\\_et\\_des\\_menaces\\_sur\\_le\\_territoire\\_national\\_en\\_2008](http://www.defense.gouv.fr/livre_blanc/les_reperes/le_nouvel_environnement_geostrategique/hierarchisation_des_risques_et_des_menaces_sur_le_territoire_national_en_2008__1/hierarchisation_des_risques_et_des_menaces_sur_le_territoire_national_en_2008).

in foreign operations), nuclear deterrence and crisis management at international and national levels. He has also created the General Secretariat of Defence and National Security (he will take over the powers of the General Secretariat of National Defense). The Secretariat reports to the Prime Minister of France. The Secretariat consists of: The Department of Strategic Affairs, International and Technology, Department of Security and Defence and responsible for preventing cyberterrorism Agency Information Systems Security. They have already announced the latest revision of the White Paper, it is caused by events that took place in the world, including the economic crisis, the Arab spring and the issue of preparing a new loi de programmation for the years 2013–2018 and to establish cooperation between France and Great Britain by signing the Treaty of the 2nd November 2010 about defense and security.