

GLOBAL DILEMMAS OF SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Edited by Aleksandra Wilczura



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Edited by Aleksandra Wilczura

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PREFACE

The book in your hands is an outcome of International Conference “Global Dilemmas of Security and Development in the Middle East” organized on November 9-10, 2010 at the Jagiellonian University by faculty members and PhD students of the Institute of Middle and Far East (www.orient.uj.edu.pl), the Department of Arabic Studies, Orient Project Foundation, Golden Desert Foundation and “Studia Bliskowschodnie-The Middle East Studies” Academic Magazine (www.studiabliskowschodnie.pl) with invaluable support of the Kapiszewski Center for Bridging Cultural Boundaries (www.kapiszewskicenter.org).

The conference was a part of wider educational and cultural project *Living Ideas for Peace* which included numerous screening of movies, exhibitions of Professor Andrzej Kapiszewski’s photographs from the Middle and Far East and another international conference, dedicated to thought and legacy of Edward W. Said – „Saidism in the XXI Century” (www.saidism.pl). The inspiration behind both conferences was a firm conviction that both conferences – peace thought of Edward W. Said and development and security in the Middle East – are two sides of the same coin.

Security and development are two very vast and mutually interconnected subjects. The latter cannot exist without the former, regardless of if we have economic growth in mind, measured by GDP (Gross Domestic Product) or refer to HDI (Human Development Index), a marker, which is more commonly used today to measure socio-economic growth. The modern concept of safety today does not only include traditional elements such as lack of war, military potential or territorial integrity, but encompasses also matters of political system, demography and ecology as well as humanitarian, cultural, religious and technological issues. Safety, like development, has to be seen more like a process than a fixed state. Both are dynamic in nature, and their level changes depending on many internal and external variables.

Applying these terms to the region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) one has to point out that this region has traditionally been considered particularly unstable and thus prone to change, but also characterized by certain permanent characteristics and slowly emerging new traits. Historically, it is the region of two major Muslim empires – Ottoman and Persian. It was also a region sphere of influence of former European colonial empires. Finally, a place that became a battlefield for Cold War struggles, and subsequently, upon the fall of the Iron Curtain was penetrated by world’s biggest superpower – the United States of America, rapidly losing its dominance over the region in the beginning of the XXI century.

The Arab Spring that broke out in December 2010 in Tunisia did not dramatically change many issues related to the issues of security and development of countries of the region. One needs to explain that the overwhelming majority of articles in this book were written before 2011, which allows the reader to get acquainted with the “pre-Arab Spring” state of research on the subject. However, most of the problems plaguing the region had not undergone major changes, but rather just exacerbated. One can call it more of an evolution than revolution.

The Cold War period left the MENA region with a set of old problems, on which a new layer of challenges emerged. They are not identical for all countries. Countries that have energy resources face different problems than those that do not. There are many other factors, which does not mean that we cannot distinguish certain common denominators such as the deficit of democracy, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, dependency on the United States of America, social and economic disproportions, degradation of natural environment, drinking water shortages, demographic problems, poverty and illiteracy, unequal access to education and health care, but also changing cultural patterns and a growing discontent regarding the role of religion in the public sphere. These are only some of the problems. Not all of them were discussed in this book, which can only testify to the complexity of security and development issues in the MENA region.

The book is divided into three thematic parts: international security and policy of world’s super powers towards the MENA region; issues of democracy and civic society and dimensions of social and economic growth. They cannot, of course, be seen as a comprehensive studies but rather serve as inspiration for further academic inquiry. It can be of interest to students or to anyone interested in the MENA region.

Part one comprises of articles devoted to policies of the U.S. and Russian towards MENA region, as well as issues vital to international security as Pakistan-Iran relations or foreign policy of Turkey, which had by 2010 emerged as a local super power. It also analyzes American-Qatar relations as well as the influence of Washington’s foreign policy on the stabilization of Egyptian autocracy. Part one includes additionally the issue as relevant to maintaining international equilibrium as migration of Christian caused by military conflict in Iraq, which after the Arab Spring became a regional problem.

Part two is devoted to issues of democratization and development of civil society, related to deficit of democracy. It includes articles dedicated to an analysis of Kingdom of Jordan’s political system, which has successfully incorporated elements of political pluralism into traditionally undemocratic rule of Hashemite dynasty, and well as perspective of democratization in Egypt, the most populous country of the region, to which the Arab Spring in 2011 and 2012 brought a difficult transition. Problems of civil society were also addressed in context of non-Arab countries of MENA region – Iran and Turkey.

The last part is dedicated to the complex subject of socio-economic growth of the MENA region. Articles touch upon issues as current as relevant problems as changes in ownership structure in relation to Arab online media outlets and changes in patterns of youth behavior. Both chapters are particularly valuable because they adopt a compara-

tive approach towards the subject. The last article of the book, a text on dilemma of Egypt's economic growth, which for years progressed on the expense of large part of society and contributed to the explosion of public discontents, sheds light on the process characteristic not only for the country itself.

The book would not have been possible without the generous support shown throughout the whole process of organization of this conference of Professor Andrzej Mania (Vice-Rector of the Jagiellonian University), Professor Bogdan Szlachta and Professor Andrzej Dudek (Deans of Faculty of International and Political Studies of the Jagiellonian University), Professor Adam W. Jelonek, Professor Leszek Korporowicz, Professor Krzysztof Kościelniak, Professor Jerzy Zdanowski, Dr Łukasz Fyderek, Dr Hayssam Obeidat, Dr Ewa Trojnar, Dr Joanna Wardęga and Agnieszka Mielczarska (Faculty of the Institute of the Middle and Far East of the Jagiellonian University), Professor Maria Kapiszewska (Vice-Rector of the Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University), Professor Hieronim Kubiak, Professor Tadeusz Paleczny, Professor Adam Bieniek, Professor Soli Sahvar and Dr Ido Zelkovitz from the University of Haifa, students and PhD students of the Institute of the Middle and Far East and the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Jagiellonian University, Wojciech Wiśniewski and the Academic Circle of Students of International Relations JU (KSSM UJ), Gabriela Hurkot, Jan Kirschenbaum, Katarzyna Gorgoń, Michał Moroz and Ewa Pacuł for support during the whole editorial process.

At the end I must also record my deepest gratitude for Karolina Rak and Michał Lipa, friends of many years, excellent editors and the best conference coordinators. Without them and the authors of all articles preparing this publication would not have been realized.

Aleksandra Wilczura

I

THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND GREAT
POWERS' POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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QATAR AND THE UNITED STATES: PUNCHING WITH THE HEAVYWEIGHT²

The relations of the United States to Qatar are in many ways typical of Washington's approach to all the other Arab Gulf states, so a focus on Qatar will reveal the general contours of the American presence in the region. Of course all bilateral relations also incorporate unique characteristics, and those that are particular to Qatar highlight Washington's engagement with a small state that has skillfully carved out an influential role for itself in the region and the Arab world. A focus on Qatar can also bring to light the exigencies of a successful relationship with a great power, the smaller power all the while maintaining a high level of sovereignty, freedom of diplomatic maneuver, and national integrity. Before narrowing the analysis exclusively on the relations of the United States to Qatar, this relationship must be placed in the context of the evolution of the American involvement in the Gulf. Calling this body of water by the shortened version, the "Gulf," already avoids any dispute about whether to use the adjective "Persian" or "Arabian" and indicates the balance American policy is obliged to take when considering its interests on both shores. Nevertheless, in common usage the American habit is to use the term "Persian Gulf." Even though the *U.S. Navy Style Guide* now suggests using the term "Arabian Gulf," prompting Tehran to express its "strong opposition and dismay" over the "unwise act" by the U.S.³

It is common to view the American interest in the Gulf as a relatively recent phenomenon, but the origins of its involvement are found much farther in the past. The first presence, minor though it was, occurred during the dominance of the Ottoman

¹ Steven Ečovich, associate professor of the Department of Political Science and History, the American University in Paris, France. The author of numerous publications on international relations of the Middle East.

² A previous study on U.S. relations with Qatar was published in Polish: Steven Ečovich, „Stosunki Kataru ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi,” in *Państwo Katar: Gospodarka – Polityka – Kultura*, ed. Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska, Robert Czulda (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Ibidem, 2009).

³ The *U.S. Navy Style Guide* is available at http://www.navy.mil/submit/view_styleguide.asp. Reports of the hostile Iranian response are found all over the Internet. For example: "Iran Protests U.S. Navy Use of 'Arabian Gulf'," *Al Arabiya News*, December 1, 2010, <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/12/01/128141.html> (accessed January 3, 2011).

Empire. It was during the later British hegemony there that the United States gradually ramified its presence and successfully competed with the United Kingdom – and eventually displaced it. In these years nearly all of U.S. diplomatic and consular activity that was not delegated to the British was assured by a young American diplomat who traveled around the region essentially working out of his briefcase.⁴ Even though U.S. interests were considerable when Britain withdrew in 1971, the Americans were not really prepared to accept direct responsibility for the security of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. Extensive relations existed only with Iran and Saudi Arabia. The military capabilities of the U.S. in the Gulf were rather insignificant. There were few politicians, officials, or even business leaders, apart from those in the oil companies, who had intimate knowledge of the region. However, over the years, commercial and strategic interests and political expectations all increased, and even boomed beginning in the 1980s. In the early going, religious motivations also played a role, although this dimension has dropped out of the policy equation.

Even if early American diplomacy was centered strictly on commercial relations, strategic and political imperatives necessarily intruded on policy. As previous hegemon in the Gulf had discovered, when commercial interests expand, strategic imperatives and responsibilities are brought into play and become impossible to avoid. Year after year, decade after decade, American engagement increased until finally the United States had replaced Britain not only commercially, but also politically and militarily. But unlike previous “protectorates,” the United States today shares a weighty external presence in the Gulf with other powers, although it remains the preponderant outside power. This is partly because an important goal of American policy was to guarantee the unimpeded flow of Middle Eastern oil that fueled the economic recovery of a devastated Western Europe following World War II. And of course oil remains a vital strategic resource. Although most of the smaller countries in the Gulf may not easily admit it, they are integrated into a new *de facto* American protectorate. In the absence of U.S. support, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the Emirates, Oman, and even Saudi Arabia would probably come under unbearable pressure and perhaps not long survive. History has clearly shown that their larger and more populous neighbors – Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Egypt – have all been tempted by territorial expansion in the Arabian Peninsula.⁵ In a confidential 2010 American diplomatic cable made public by WikiLeaks, we read that the Emir of Qatar points out “that any progress toward regional peace had come about due to American involvement.”⁶

⁴ The young diplomat was Patrick N. Theros, who would later become ambassador to Qatar (1995-1998). Conversation with former Ambassador Theros in Doha, May 5, 2009.

⁵ For an overview of the history of the U.S. presence in the Gulf see Michael A. Palmer, *Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992* (New York: The Free Press, 1992). For a briefer presentation see J.E. Peterson, “The Historical Pattern of Gulf Security,” in *Security in the Persian Gulf: Origins, Obstacles, and the Search for Consensus*, ed. Lawrence G. Potter, Gary Sick (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 7-31. For a history of the Ottoman presence see Frederick F. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

⁶ WikiLeaks, “Senator Kerry's Meeting with Qatar's Amir,” (Reference ID 10DOHA70, classified CONFIDENTIAL), February 23, 2010, <https://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10DOHA70.html> (accessed January 3, 2011).

So, the United States' involvement in the Gulf, as its presence in Qatar, is shaped by all these American interests. But it is also shaped by traditional American pragmatism as well as its democratic ideology – and some would say naiveté, or rather a popular imagination of the Middle East that has been characterized as “Orientalism” in American style.⁷ But could not all of these factors be found in the actions of all great powers? In any case, every civilization has its own unique “grammar” – as the famous French historian Fernand Braudel put it.

U.S. Relations with Qatar

Shortly after Qatar gained its independence from the United Kingdom in September 1971 the United States was among the first countries to recognize it. The U.S. embassy was opened in March 1973. The first resident U.S. ambassador arrived in July 1974. However, U.S. relations with Qatar did not fully blossom until after the 1991 Gulf War. Ever since, the bilateral relations have been generally strong and continually flourishing despite the occasional spat. Indeed, since the late 1990s Qatar has emerged as an important ally of the United States, most notably as a host to major U.S. military facilities for command, basing and equipment pre-positioning. Today it is easily said that the ties of all sorts – diplomatic, economic, military, and cultural – between the U.S. and Qatar are excellent. Qatar and the United States coordinate closely on regional diplomatic initiatives, cooperate to maintain security in the Gulf, and enjoy extensive economic links, especially, of course, in the hydrocarbons sector. The small country holds the third largest proven natural gas reserves in the world and oil reserves that are expected to last for as many as 40 years. This is not to say that the Americans always agree with the actions of the Qatari government or that they are thoroughly pleased with Qatari domestic policy, or the degree of its commitment to democracy and political liberalization. Qatar also does not accept uncritically American actions, whether in the Gulf or the wider Arab and Muslim world. But of course no two nations who share good relations are always in agreement.⁸

Economic Relations

In terms of the longest running American interest in the Gulf, its economic interest, the relationship with Qatar has been rather positive. Trade between the United States and Qatar has been increasing since the 1990-91 Gulf War. Exports to Qatar have exceeded \$2 billion annually for several years, reaching \$2.72 billion in 2009 (consisting mostly of machinery and transport equipment). The imports from Qatar are mainly

⁷ For a recent discussion see Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

⁸ For general presentations of U.S. policy in Qatar see U.S. Department of State, *Background Note: Qatar*, last modified January 7, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/qatar/195943.htm>, Christopher M. Blanchard, “Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations,” *CRS Report for Congress*, last modified January 24, 2008, <http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL31718.pdf> and the 2010 update by Christopher M. Blanchard, “Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations,” *Congressional Research Service*, last modified May 5, 2010, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA520652>.

fuel and fertilizers. Although the bulk of Qatar's trade is with a few European countries and Japan, several U.S. firms are active in developing Qatar's oil and gas resources. On the American side, ExxonMobil and an affiliate of Qatar Petroleum are engaged in a joint project to build a large liquid natural gas terminal on the Texas coast, as well as two others in Italy and Wales.⁹

The U.S. Commercial Service considers that the Qatari government has done a good job in helping its business community establish credibility.¹⁰ The service considers that when plans and projects are announced they are usually realized and that contracts are awarded in a generally efficient and transparent manner. It also esteems that by transforming hydrocarbon wealth into modern health facilities, tourism infrastructure, and western-style education institutions, the Qatari Government aims to engender a forward-looking and highly skilled population. In U.S. eyes Qatar has liberalized its trade and investment climate in line with its WTO obligations by reducing tariffs, removing unnecessary restrictions and barriers to trade, and providing foreign investors increasing opportunities. Qatar has also played a laudable institutional role in free trade by helping to instigate and then hosting the Doha Round of trade negotiations.

So, Qatar's business framework is viewed favorably. American companies report that the customs clearing process is generally problem-free and that doing business with Qatar Petroleum and other public sector entities is generally transparent and efficient. When disputes do arise, it is possible to resolve them satisfactorily. U.S. firms also report that industrial standards that are applied in Qatar are favorable to U.S. exports. For Americans it helps that there are well-capitalized financial institutions in Qatar, a stable currency and no foreign exchange controls. Furthermore, the laws permit up to 100% of foreign ownership in agriculture, manufacturing, health, education, tourism, power, and projects involved in Qatar's natural resources. All of this is very appealing to investors. It can be said that policy in Qatar is made with business in mind, which coincides with the American outlook and interests.

However, some growing pains have accompanied the impressive Qatari growth and development. In some areas, the country's economy is growing faster than the evolution of necessary laws and procedures affecting business. The United States Commercial Service judges that sometimes Qatari regulations are not widely published and are at times enforced with little or no consultation with the private sector. Although critics have complained of a lack of transparency in government procurement, Qatar was ranked 19 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, making it the best performer in the Middle East and ranking slightly above the United Kingdom (20), the United States (22), France (25) and Poland (41). Qatar's rating has been steadily climbing over the past few years.¹¹

⁹ U.S. Department of Commerce, "TradeStats Express – National Trade Data," <http://tse.export.gov> (accessed January 3, 2011) and "Shakeout of Gulf LNG Projects Begins as ExxonMobil, BP Shelve Plans," *Natural Gas Intelligence*, last modified August 28, 2006, <http://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/15226-shakeout-of-gulf-lng-projects-begins-as-exxonmobil-bp-shelve-plans>.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ See Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index 2010*, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results. (accessed January 3, 2011).

Cultural Relations

Qatar sees the development of a world-class educational system as key to its continued success and long-term future. As a result, hundreds of Qataris study in the United States. Qatar has also invited American universities to set up campuses in Qatar. For example, Cornell University has established a degree-granting branch medical school campus in Doha, and other universities including Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon University, the Virginia Commonwealth University School of Design, the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, and Northwestern also have branch campuses in Qatar's well-funded "Education City" complex. Other than a successful education policy with the United States, Qatar has been absorbing and transforming to its own needs a post-modern American and Western culture. For example, the Mall in the heart of Doha stands as a citadel to icons of U.S. commerce: Starbucks, KFC and McDonald's line the atrium leading to the Cineplex, where Qataris can watch the latest American movies. Qatar is also very open to western visitors, and security experts consider Qatar one of the lowest crime countries on earth. It is worth noting that since September 2005, Qatar has donated \$100 million to victims of Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. Gulf states.¹²

American Ideology and Qatar

The American vision of Qatar, at least its official public vision, can be found in its annual human rights reports issued by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State. The American human rights reports are an evaluation of another country's performance in the democratic institutions dear to the people of the United States. It is required by law that the "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" must be submitted annually by the U.S. Department of State to the U.S. Congress.¹³ In a way these reports judge other countries through the prism of American values and institutions. The successive recent reports on Qatar note that while there are improvements in the overall human rights' practices, a few serious problems remain.

The introduction of the 2007 report evaluates the general political situation in Qatar by stating that "Citizens lacked the right to change their government peacefully." This is not very accurate, as there have been peaceful and stable transitions of power, but they have certainly not been open to all citizens. The U.S. State Department report for 2008 rectified this by noting that "Citizens lacked the right to change the leadership of their government by *direct ballot* [my emphasis]." This was refined in the 2009 report by modifying the end of the sentence to "by election." In Qatar the competition for power has been peaceful, but limited to contained struggles within the extensive Al-Thani family, which includes a number of legitimate male heirs to the office of ruling emir, as well as to other high level positions.¹⁴ To the extent that the demands of

¹² "Final Gifts Announced for \$100 Million Qatar Katrina Fund for Hurricane Victims," Newswire.com, <http://www.mmdnewswire.com/final-gifts-announced-for-100-million-qatar-katrina-fund-for-hurricane-victims-1096.html> (accessed January 3, 2011).

¹³ All available on the website of the U.S. State Department.

¹⁴ For a more complete description and analysis see the sections on Qatar and the Al Thani family in

political realism create a preference for friendly stability in a regime, American policy has not pushed the Qatari rulers too hard along the road to democracy. It might be said that the U.S. policy here is one of gentle and quiet encouragement along the road to prudent liberalization. The imperative is that the movement to democracy should not precipitate instability and uncertainty in a country that is largely, but not systematically, favorable to the United States.

Even though legislation is generally made by the Emir issuing decrees, this is nevertheless usually done after consultation with leading citizens, a traditional arrangement that has been formally institutionalized in the 45-member Advisory Council (Arabic: *Majlis al-Shura*) that assists in the formulation of policy. The composition of the Advisory Council has been opened to a measure of democratic choice as the current Qatari constitution requires that two-thirds of its members be directly elected. Women have the right to vote in the elections and to run for office. The other third of the members are still appointed by the Emir. The new constitution gives the Advisory Council oversight authority over the Council of Ministers (Arabic: *Majlis al-Wuzarā'*) and can review budgets and propose legislation. It is also empowered to issue motions of no-confidence against government ministers, which then must be approved by a two-thirds vote. Another institution that has been opened to democratic elections is the Central Municipal Council, which has advisory and monitoring powers in relation to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Agriculture. The 29 members of the Central Municipal Council have four-year terms and have been elective since 1999. Even if the franchise is rather limited and very few women run for office, these steps toward democratic elections are saluted by the Americans – especially since the government-appointed Qatar National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) and informal observations by diplomatic missions uncovered no apparent irregularities.¹⁵ These local elections were significant enough in the eyes of Americans to be reported in *The International Herald Tribune*.¹⁶

Human Rights

So, with this in mind it is possible to place in proper context the American criticisms of the lack of Qatari democracy. For example, recent U.S. human rights reports note that the Qatari government continued to restrict civil liberties, such as freedoms of speech (including the Internet), press, assembly, and association. Furthermore, although the constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, U.S. diplomats note that these rights were restricted in practice. Thousands of non-citizens were apprehended and held without charges or legal justification awaiting deportation, some for more than 3 years. The condition and legal status of non-citizens in Qatar is a continuing

Michael Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).

¹⁵ See also “Qatari municipal elections, 2007,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qatari_municipal_elections,_2007 (accessed January 3, 2011). In the 2007 elections 3 women and 122 men ran for 29 seats. About 28,000 citizens of the 174,000 Qataris were able to vote, and overall turnout was 51.1%. Of the 3 female candidates, one was elected.

¹⁶ “Qatar’s municipal balloting seen as democracy test ahead of parliament elections,” *International Herald Tribune*, March 31, 2007.

source of preoccupation in American eyes. This is all the more so because only about one in five persons living in Qatar are its citizens. The situation of non-Qatari residents and workers is a worry shared by other countries, as well as by international NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.¹⁷

Amnesty International finds it positive that Qatar's constitution prohibits discrimination, that the government has made women's rights one of the key issues in its political discourse over the past 12 years, and that Qatar has acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. However, the human rights group notes that Qatar attached wide-ranging reservations to the Convention which appear incompatible with its object and purpose and that in domestic legislation and practice discrimination against women remains, as the report puts it, "rife" in the country.¹⁸

Freedom of Expression

In the realm of freedom of speech and of the press, the U.S. Human Rights reports usually note that the government limited these rights in practice. Journalists and publishers continue to exercise self-censorship due to political and economic pressures when reporting on government policies, material deemed hostile to Islam, the ruling family, and relations with neighboring states. While the 7 daily newspapers are not state-owned, which is appealing to American values, owners are members of the ruling family or have close ties to government officials. Foreign newspapers and magazines were reviewed and censored for objectionable sexual, religious, and political content. This, of course, can easily be viewed as acceptable since many countries, including democracies, also prohibit to differing degrees the same kind of material. There were no specific reports of political censorship of foreign broadcast news media or foreign programs, although foreign movies were censored. State-owned television and radio reflect government views. However, callers to a popular morning show on the state-owned radio station frequently discussed topics such as government inefficiency and the lack of responsiveness to citizens' needs. The respected American NGO Freedom House, in its "Freedom of the Press Report" for 2010, rated the Qatari media as "not free." In its commentary accompanying its rating all of the above concerns are discussed. The 2010 report lets us know that in July 2009, Robert Menard, the director of the Doha Center for Media Freedom – an institution launched in 2008 to promote freedom of speech and protect embattled journalists – resigned claiming government pressure. Qatari observers alleged mismanagement by Menard and criticized him as having pursued an agenda that jeopardized Qatar's diplomatic relationships. The Center remains active.¹⁹ Also, the government-supported Qatar Foundation continued to

¹⁷ The most recent Amnesty International Report on this and other topics regarding Qatar is *Qatar: Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review* (February 2010). Neither Amnesty International nor Human Rights Watch focus exclusively on Qatar, but raise the issue for many other Gulf states. For example see "UAE: Meetings Should Address Migrant Workers' Rights," Human Rights Watch, January 20, 2008, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/01/17/uae-meetings-should-address-migrant-workers-rights> (accessed January 3, 2011). The 2010 Freedom House report on Qatar is at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010&country=7902> (accessed January 3, 2011). Other years may be accessed from this website too.

¹⁸ *Qatar: submission to the UN universal periodic review: 7th session of the UPR Working Group of the Human Rights Council* (February 2010): 3.

¹⁹ Blanchard, "Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations," (2008): 10.

fund the “Doha Debates,” a series of public debates among non-citizens on internationally controversial topics broadcast by the BBC. During the year several Qatari writers whose work appeared in regional and international media outside of Qatar reported that their work was deliberately banned from appearing in the local press. In some cases all of the work from the author was banned; in other cases specific articles deemed to be critical of the government were banned.

A discussion of the media in Qatar cannot be complete without mentioning the international satellite channel Al-Jazeera, based in Doha. The Arab language channel focuses its coverage and commentary on international news topics. Al-Jazeera and the government claim that the channel was independent and free of government influence, but it must not be lost to view that the channel is government-subsidized. This may help to explain why the channel, at least the one in Arabic, avoids criticizing government policies. Freedom House notes that Al-Jazeera covered local news only when it contained an international component. The English language channel, which went on the air in November 2006, is different, allowing more freedom of expression. In English, Al-Jazeera covered in-depth some government policies, particularly labor practices. It even aired an investigative documentary entitled, “Blood, Sweat, and Tears,” which highlighted forced labor practices in the Gulf, with several references to Qatar. However, giving credence to the editorial staff’s claim of independence, the documentary was also shown on the Al-Jazeera Arabic channel.

Al-Jazeera is recognized as having changed the global media context by bringing to it a specifically Arab point of view and therefore challenging the previous dominance of Western television stations. This may be viewed a significant achievement for Qatari public diplomacy, and a positive image of Qatar that goes beyond the Arab world. It is not necessary to have the cable made public by WikiLeaks to learn that Al-Jazeera serves Qatari diplomacy. The public study by the Congressional Research Service on Al-Jazeera made in 2003 notes that “Al-Jazeera, although functionally independent, could be said to indirectly serve the foreign policy goals of Qatar.” The 2009 cable simply puts it less delicately, that the station has proved itself a “useful tool” for its “political masters” and is a “substantial source of leverage for Qatar, one which it is unlikely to relinquish.”²⁰

American diplomacy now also tracks the freedom of religion practiced in other countries. The U.S. human rights reports note that even though Islam is the official religion of Qatar, Washington finds it positive that freedom of worship is protected under the constitution, although proselytizing by non-Muslims is prohibited and sanctioned. Both Sunni and Shi’a Muslims practice Islam freely. Among non-Muslims, only Christians (which of course is the dominant religion in the United States) have requested and been allowed to rent space for public worship. Adherents of other faiths, however, may privately practice their religion without harassment. However, the religious tolerance shown in Qatar exceeds acceptable bounds for the United States when extremist views

²⁰ Jeremy M. Sharp, “The Al-Jazeera News Network: Opportunity or Challenge for U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East?,” *CRS Report for Congress*, updated July 23, 2003, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/r131889.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2011). The leaked cable was published in “U.S. embassy cables: ‘Al-Jazeera ‘proves useful tool for Qatari political masters,’” *The Guardian*, December 5, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/214776> (accessed January 3, 2011).

are freely aired. For example, there is an American concern that Qatar hosts a number of conservative Islamic clerics, including Dr. Yusuf Al Qaradawi, who holds controversial views on the conditional legitimacy of suicide bombing and whose critiques of Israel and the United States are reported to have manifested extreme virulence. It should be noted that the cleric is also viewed with unease and skepticism by a wide range of observers other than Americans.²¹

Security Relations with Qatar

The United States has always been concerned with the security of Qatar. As a smaller country in the Gulf, however, Qatar and others took a back seat to the primary focus of American policy in the region which was on Saudi Arabia and Iran – the so-called “twin pillars” strategy. With the collapse of the Iranian pillar due to the Khomeini revolution, the American strategy evolved into a containment of the new and hostile regime in Tehran.²² During this turbulent period U.S. security relations with Qatar could be characterized as “proper” and generally serene. But beginning in 1988 the United States and Qatar engaged in a dispute over Qatar’s clandestine procurement of American-made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. The quarrel brought to a halt planned economic and military cooperation and Congress banned arms sales to Qatar. The Stinger issue was settled when Qatar destroyed the missiles in question in 1990 and then allowed coalition forces to operate from Qatari territory in the deployment leading up to the 1991 Gulf War. Both sides agreed to cooperate militarily in the face of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm assured Qatar that the United States could be a desirable and dependable security partner, leading to significant bilateral military relations.

The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait threw fear into the small Gulf states. As with its neighbors, the aggression of Saddam Hussein led Qatar to significantly alter its defense and foreign policy priorities. For example, whereas Qatar had supported Iraq financially in its 1980-88 war against Iran, Qatar quickly joined the anti-Iraq coalition after the invasion of Kuwait. A strong political and economic supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Qatar went as far as to condemn the support given by the PLO to Saddam Hussein. Even more drastically, Qatar’s previous opposition to superpower presence in the Gulf turned into an open willingness to permit the air forces of the United States, Canada, and France to operate from its territory. This ad hoc cooperation was formalized on June 23, 1992 when Qatar and the United States signed a bilateral defense cooperation agreement.

Over the last 15 years Qatari-U.S. defense relations have expanded to include cooperative defense exercises, equipment pre-positioning, and base access agreements. However it is France that has provided approximately 80% of Qatar’s arms inventory, at the expense of U.S. weapons systems. But Qatar has drawn closer to the United States by

²¹ See footnote 14 on page 5 of Blanchard, “Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations,” (2008 and 2010): 15-16.

²² For a discussion of the evolution of U.S. policy towards Iran and its dilemmas see Steven Ekovich, “Iran and New Threats in the Persian Gulf and Middle East,” *Orbis* 48, no. 1 (winter 2004).

welcoming the Forward Headquarters of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). In 2008, \$81.7 million was authorized to build new Air Force and Special Operations facilities. The close defense cooperation has not, however, prevented Qatari officials from occasionally criticizing American military operations in the Gulf.²³ Nevertheless, the criticism has been rather muted, as Qatar and the other states in the Gulf depend on American and Western arms and defense guarantees. With a possible Iranian nuclear weapon on the horizon, the Arab countries of the Gulf have even accelerated their build-up of conventional weapons. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait, bought \$37 billion worth of U.S. weapons in the last 4 years, with the majority of the purchases coming in just the last 2 years. And the deals already under negotiation for the next 4 years are expected to total \$123 billion. Those numbers don't include arms purchases from countries other than the U.S.²⁴

Qatar and U.S. Terrorism Concerns

There have been American concerns regarding alleged support for terrorist groups by some Qataris, including members of the royal family. For example, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, royal family member and Qatari Interior Minister, Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalid Thani, provided safe haven and assistance to Al Qaeda leaders during the 1990s, including for Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the suspected mastermind of the September 11 hijacking plot. In January 1996, FBI officials narrowly missed an opportunity to capture Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, where he held a government job at Qatar's Ministry of Electricity and Water. There is a suspicion that he was tipped off by a high ranking member of the Qatari government. Former U.S. officials and leaked U.S. government reports state that Osama Bin Laden also visited Doha twice during the mid-1990s as a guest of Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalid. During a January 1996 visit to Doha, Bin Laden reportedly "discussed the successful movement of explosives into Saudi Arabia, and operations targeted against U.S. and UK interests in Dammam, Dharan, and Khobar, using clandestine Al Qaeda cells in Saudi Arabia."²⁵ According to other accounts, Interior Minister Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalid welcomed dozens of so-called "Afghan Arab" veterans of the anti-Soviet conflict in Afghanistan. More recent concerns regarding possible support for terrorism by prominent Qataris have focused on the late Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, who may have transited Qatar after September 11, 2001 and perhaps benefited from a safe house and financial support provided by a member of the ruling Al-Thani family. Any discussions by Clinton, Bush and Obama Administration officials with the government of Qatar regarding these allegations have not been made public.²⁶

²³ Blanchard, "Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations," (2008 and 2010).

²⁴ Frida Ghitis, "World Citizen: Arabs States Building Arsenal for War with Iran," *World Politics Review*, October 14, 2010, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/print/6701> (accessed January 3, 2011).

²⁵ Memorandum from the Department of Defense to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence partially reprinted in Stephen F. Hayes, "Case Closed," *Weekly Standard*, November 24, 2003, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/378fmxyz.asp> (accessed January 3, 2011).

²⁶ The sources for these accounts can be found in Blanchard, "Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations," (2008): 11-13 (footnotes 35 to 40) from which I have drawn this material.

Overall, though, American concerns about Qatari complicity in terrorism have been counterbalanced over the years by Qatar's counterterrorism efforts and its broader, long-term commitment to host and support U.S. military forces being used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. has also provided some counterterrorism aid to Qatar to support the development of its domestic security forces.²⁷ In short, the U.S. State Department has characterized Qatar's counterterrorism support since 9/11 as "significant," even though increased information sharing is sought.²⁸

Qatari Diplomacy and the United States

While some Gulf countries are content simply to rely on an American security guarantee, Qatar has given an added proactive dimension to its security policies by adopting a sophisticated, inclusive foreign policy that engages a diversity of political players. In so doing, Qatar has achieved significant regional weight beyond its size as well as giving itself prominent international diplomatic stature. As George Abraham, international affairs analyst for Al-Jazeera puts it: "For a thumb-sized nation, Qatar packs an unlikely diplomatic punch."²⁹ For Harvard professor Joseph Nye, "Qatar has managed to find an important diplomatic niche between the West and the Arab nationalist mainstream, which it backs up with its considerable financial resources."³⁰ Financial assets are of course an important source of hard power, to use a term coined by Nye. But it also must not be lost from view that Qatar's strong defense relations to Washington also give it clout.

The Emir of Qatar has been able to use the bold positioning of his nation to play a significant role in recent regional crises. For example, Qatar played a crucial and impressive role in bringing the armed confrontation between Israel, Hezbollah and Lebanon to a successful dénouement. Writing about the Qatari leader's role, a commentator recently wrote in the Beirut-based *Daily Star*: "Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani enjoys the trust of the different parties in the Middle East because of his willingness to talk to the Syrians, Iranians, Israelis, Hamas and Hezbollah." In November 2007, Qatar was able to coax Arab states to attend President George W. Bush's Middle East peace summit in Annapolis, Maryland. However, a month later, in a gesture that displayed its independence, it upset the United States by inviting the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has excoriated the existence of Israel in virulent terms, to a summit in Doha. American diplomats have also objected to what they consider biased cover-

²⁷ This is the gist of a cable released by WikiLeaks, "Qatar: 2009 CI/KR Response for S/CT," (Reference ID 09DOHA214, classified SECRET/NOFORN), March 26, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09DOHA214_a.html (accessed January 3, 2011).

²⁸ WikiLeaks, "Visit of Qatar's Prime Minister to Washington," (Reference ID 09DOHA733, classified SECRET/NOFORN), December 21, 2009, <http://wikileaks.dugumkume.org/cable/2009/12/09DOHA733.html> (accessed January 3, 2011). The same concerns can be found in already existing public reports (*Country Reports on Terrorism*) that U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide to Congress on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation. The reports since 2004 can be found on the website GlobalSecurity.org.

²⁹ George Abraham, "Qatar is a diplomatic heavy-hitter," *Al-Jazeera*, July 21, 2008, <http://www.al-jazeera.com/focus/2008/07/200872164735567644.html> (accessed January 3, 2011).

³⁰ *Ibid.* See also Janine Zacharia, "For Qatar, Relations with West Are a Balancing Act," *International Herald Tribune*, March 4, 2008.

age on Al-Jazeera, which is largely financed by the Qatari government. They also have complained that Qatar isn't joining with other Arab governments to pressure Syria to stop interfering in Lebanon. Even though Qatar failed to play a conciliating role in the recent armed conflict in Gaza by convoking an Arab summit, it was nevertheless in a credible position to make the attempt to bridge the two camps of the Arab and Muslim world provoked by the fighting.³¹ Qatar's diplomatic efforts at reconciliation have ranged farther afield to Yemen and even Sudan.

One of the most remarkable characteristics of Qatari diplomacy has been its official and relatively open relations with Israel. Until the recent Israeli military incursion into Gaza, Qatar had cultivated limited diplomatic and trade relations with Tel Aviv. Israeli actions in Gaza led Doha to put an end to the entente. However, in 2010 Qatar twice offered to restore trade relations with Israel and allow the reinstatement of the Israeli mission in Doha, on condition that Israel allow Qatar to send building materials and money to Gaza to help rehabilitate infrastructure, and that Israel make a public statement expressing appreciation for Qatar's role and acknowledging its standing in the Middle East. Israel refused, on the grounds that Qatari supplies could be used by Hamas to build bunkers and reinforced positions from which to fire rockets at Israeli cities and towns, and that Israel did not want to get involved in the competition between Qatar and Egypt over the Middle East mediation. *Haaretz* reported that there was an debate inside the Israeli government over whether or not to accept the Qatari demarche, but that in the end "the issue was removed from the agenda due to American opposition."³² It can be argued that Doha undertakes to maintain its links with Israel in order to better cultivate relations with the United States, and thus contribute to the consolidation of Qatar's political standing and security in a stormy region. Or it can be argued that the economic incentive is the prime impetus, as Qatar strives to sell some of its plentiful natural gas to Israel.³³ However, neither of these two explanations is sufficient for what is a patently controversial policy in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Since the United States' commitment to the existence and security of Israel is unshakable, the Qatari relation to Israel is no doubt viewed positively in American eyes.

The independent streak in Qatar's diplomacy appears to be viewed rather benevolently by the United States, even though the Qataris sometimes stand apart from the Americans. The peculiarly independent attitude of Qatar led Washington to support the candidacy of Qatar for a non-permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council in 2006. Another illustration of the success of the Emir's diplomatic positioning was the Israeli support for the seat. Qatar has in recent years definitely managed a delicate balancing act between the United States, which bases troops there, Israel, which until

³¹ "PLO says Qatar using Gaza war for political gain," Agence France Presse, January 16, 2009.

³² See the report and debate in Barak Ravid, "Israel rejects Qatar bid to restore diplomatic ties," *Haaretz*, May 18, 2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-rejects-qatar-bid-to-restore-diplomatic-ties-1.290866> (accessed January 3, 2011) and Haaretz Editorial, "A shameful rejection," *Haaretz*, May 20, 2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/a-shameful-rejection-1.291142> (accessed January 3, 2011). A good, accurate summary of Qatar-Israel relations is also at Blanchard, "Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations," (2010): 21-22.

³³ Uzi Rabi, "Qatar's Relations with Israel: An Exemplar of an Independent Foreign Policy," *Tel Aviv Notes*, Moshe Dayan Center, October 7, 2008, [http://www.dayan.org/sites/default/files/Qatar\[1\].pdf](http://www.dayan.org/sites/default/files/Qatar[1].pdf) (accessed January 3, 2011).

recently had a commercial office in Doha, and the two countries' arch-foes Syria and Iran. It is natural that Qatar is obliged to engage in diplomacy that manages tensions with its powerful Persian neighbor on the other side of the Gulf, and the Americans recognize this. In a cable recently leaked by WikiLeaks we find U.S. diplomats proposing that the Qatari Prime Minister should be assured that "We especially value consultations with you on Iran. We recognize your national need for a working relationship with Iran, given the natural gas reserves you share with Iran."³⁴ We discover in several of the leaked cables the Americans asking for Qatari suggestions on how to deal with Iran. Similar advice is sought on how to approach Syria. In another leaked cable the needed reassurance is proffered in the other direction, toward Washington. The Qatari Prime Minister finds it necessary to reassure the Americans that in Qatar's dealings with Iran "They lie to us, and we lie to them."³⁵

The fact that the Emir's government maintains relations of trust, although sometimes tenuous, with so many players with such diverse and even opposed interests is undoubtedly useful to American diplomacy. "Qatar definitely practices the maxim of holding your friends close, and your enemies even closer," says Patrick N. Theros, a former U.S. ambassador to Qatar and currently president of the U.S. Qatar Business Council.³⁶ In June 2009, U.S. Ambassador to Qatar Joseph LeBaron added his view of Qatari policy: "I think of it as Qatar occupying a space in the middle of the ideological spectrum in the Islamic world, with the goal of having doors open to it across that ideological spectrum. They have the resources to accomplish that vision, and that's rare."³⁷ Qatar provides an example of how a small wealthy state can skillfully put together a sophisticated, independent foreign policy agenda that differentiates it from larger and more powerful neighbors, while simultaneously gaining prominence in the region and upgrading its international profile. This has been resoundingly demonstrated by Qatar being awarded the World Cup games for 2022.

In short, relations between Qatar and the United States are very good in all domains, even if there are occasional political frictions. But these frictions have not shattered the generally healthy relationship. The Obama Administration has not voiced public concern about Qatar's foreign policy and, like the preceding Bush Administration, has sought to preserve and expand military and counterterrorism cooperation. As the latest Congressional Research Service study made available to American legislators makes clear, "Today, Qatari-U.S. relations remain cordial and close."³⁸ Qatar is a small country that up to now has skillfully played all sides to its advantage, while favoring no major power exclusively – including the United States.

³⁴ WikiLeaks, "Visit of Qatar's Prime Minister to Washington," (Reference ID 09DOHA733), quotation comes from 3.

³⁵ WikiLeaks, "Qatar's Prime Minister on Iran: 'They Lie to Us; We Lie to Them'," (Reference ID 09DOHA728), December 20, 2009, <https://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09DOHA728.html> (accessed January 3, 2011).

³⁶ Abraham, "Qatar is a diplomatic heavy-hitter."

³⁷ Quoted in Carrie Sheffield, "Tiny nation, global clout," *The Washington Times*, June 24, 2009, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/24/tiny-nation-global-clout/?page=all> (accessed January 3, 2011).

³⁸ See also summary of Blanchard, "Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations," (2010): 13.

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RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAN: TIME FOR A CHANGE?

For many years, Iran and Russia have each used their alliance against the West as leverage in their own negotiations with United States and European Union. Russia held out against U.N. sanctions while it continued work on Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant and negotiated military contracts with Iran for hardware like the S-300 missile system. For Russia, it has been a specific card in its negotiations with the United States, while Iran has wanted to show the world it has a big supporter against the West and not another enemy in the Middle East.

But in June 2010, the relationship between Russia and Iran started to fracture, with Ahmadinejad making speeches reminding the Russians how harmful it would be for Moscow to turn its back on Tehran. And after Medvedev's trip to Washington, relations between the United States and Russia seemed the warmest they had been in nearly a decade. Russia and the United States made a number of deals regarding everything from Russian support in Afghanistan to U.S. assistance in Russia's modernization process. They seemed to have reached some sort of understanding, and in the end Russia agreed to the U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran.

Since Vladimir Putin took office first as Russian Prime Minister in 1999 and then as President in 2000, there have been a number of ups and downs in Russia's relations with Iran. But today Russia seems to need the United States more, and - given that "the Obama administration pays less attention to the post-Soviet neighbors" - to need Iran a little bit less. Of course, Russia retains a significant interest in preserving cooperative ties to Iran. Additionally Moscow is uneasy about the Islamic Republic's emergence as a genuine regional power on the borders of the Russian Federation and other parts of what Russian officials still describe as the "post-Soviet space." Russia's authorities seem to like having the Islamic Republic kept "in a box."

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Overview of bilateral relations. Importance of Iran in Russia's Foreign Policy

Russian elite vision of Iran has been incorporated in the general view of the Russian relationship with the Muslim world. Soon after the end of the Soviet Union and even before increasing numbers of Russian intellectuals became disenchanted with the West, especially the United States, and looked for alternative geopolitical alliances. The Muslim world, with Iran at the center, became one of the possible alternatives.

Two major trends in the approach to Iran have dominated the Russian politician. The first emphasizes the strategic importance of Russia's rapprochement with Iran and is supported by Russian Nationalists, (sometimes defined as Eurasianists). For these groups, an Iran-Russia rapprochement would not be a temporary use of Iran as a bargaining chip in dealing with the West, but a permanent alliance. The second group believes that Russia should use Iran as a bargaining chip in dealing with the United States and as a useful trade partner, but not a permanent ally. Supporters of this view usually see Russia either as a self-contained country or as close to the West.²

Russia's relations with Iran were characterized by economic, territorial and political aggression. Under the Shah, Iran was an American ally in the containment of the Soviet Union. Following the Islamic revolution, relations were still not easy because the Soviet Union was a main arms supplier to Iraq during the war with Iran. Relations began to improve during the Gorbachev period when the Soviets sold weapons to the isolated Islamic Republic. Throughout the 1990s, the two countries found many common interests (aiding Armenia in its war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, resolving the 1992 Tajik civil war and opposing the Taliban). Besides, Iran has not intervened in conflicts in southern Russia, such as in Chechnya. But Russia had become more uncomfortable with some of Iran's activities since the election of Ahmadinejad as President in 2005. Russian officials have condemned Ahmadinejad's comments on Israel and the Holocaust. Nevertheless, by 2006 ties between the two countries were so good that President Vladimir Putin said: "Iran is our long-standing and, without any undue exaggeration, historical partner. Over the past few years our countries' relations have developed increasingly quickly."³ So why is Iran so important for Russia?

- Good relations guarantee that Iran does not support Muslim rebels fighting the authorities in southern Russia;
- Iran and Russia are able to cooperate on the exploitation of the resource-rich Caspian Sea basin;
- In Putin's second term, Russia has become more active in the Middle East and Islamic world, both to gain political influence and to increase trade.
- Russia views Iran as a regional power that could dominate the Gulf region

² Dmitry Shlapentokh, *Russian Elite Image of Iran. From the Late Soviet Era to the Present*, September 2009, Strategic Studies Institute, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB936.pdf> (accessed January 5, 2011).

³ Vladimir Putin, "Beginning of meeting with the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad," June 15, 2006, Shanghai, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Meeting, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23645> (accessed January 5, 2011).

- Russia and Iran are part of an effort to examine the idea of creating a natural gas cartel similar to OPEC.
- Iran is a large market for Russian arms and other products. Since 2001, Russia and Iran have signed arms agreements worth between \$3-6 billion. Russia needs to ensure that the Iranian market remains unimpeded by U.N. actions.

If confrontation between the United States and Iran escalates, the Iran authorities are finding itself further pushed into an alliance with China and Russia. Iran (like Russia) views Turkey's regional ambitions with some suspicion. Russia and Iran share a common interest in limiting the political influence of the United States in Central Asia. This common interest has led the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to extend to Iran observer status in 2005, and offer full membership. Iran and Russia have co-founded the Gas Exporting Countries Forum along with Qatar.⁴ But the strength of Tehran-Moscow ties remains to be seen and tested. Russia is increasingly becoming dependent on its economic relations with the West, and is regularly becoming vulnerable to western pressures in trying to limit its ties with Tehran. Iran has also expressed its unhappiness with the repeated delays by Russia in finishing the Bushehr Reactor, delivery of S-300 missile as well as Russia's position in the Caspian Sea. Russia's growing ties with Israel and its increasing role in the Arab Israeli peace process have also been points of tension between the two countries.

Russia and Iran's Nuclear Program

One of the most important links between Russia and Iran is the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The power plant was originally due to be built with the help of the U.S. and European states some 36 years ago but it was halted after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Russia took over the project in 1995. Although the complex was supposed to complete by 2003, it has still not been commissioned. Russia wants to complete Bushehr that is reportedly valued at between \$800 million and \$1 billion. An extra incentive for Russia to have taken on the Bushehr project was that 80% of the cost was to be paid in cash. Bushehr is also an important source of employment for Russians.⁵ Russia accepts Iran's right to peaceful nuclear power but, as President Putin said, "our Iranian partners must renounce setting up the technology for the entire nuclear fuel cycle and should not obstruct placing their nuclear Programs under complete international supervision."⁶ Russia has signed an agreement to reprocess all fuel from Bushehr to ensure that this fuel could not be diverted to Iran's other nuclear program. Russia also pressed Iran to sign and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol. Furthermore, officials have also recently stated their concern about Iran's refusal to cooperate with the U.N. Security Council and the IAEA.

⁴ <http://www.gecforum.org/gecf/web.nsf/homepage?readform#> (accessed October 27, 2010).

⁵ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/bushehr-refs.htm> (accessed November 2, 2010).

⁶ Vladimir Putin, "Press Statement and Answers to Questions Following Talks with President of Israel Moshe Katsav," April 28, 2005, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22939> (accessed January 5, 2011).

We should realize the limits of Russia's Iran nuclear program support and, even more importantly, the motives behind them. The first and most understandable reason is economic. Russia's industrial complex achieve huge benefits from the sale of nuclear technology to Iran, the supply of nuclear fuel, the training of nuclear scientists. Russia's friendly game in the Security Council is not only cash driven. Energy plays a significant role, and Russians do strategic calculations about his influence and power in the Middle East. There is the privileged access that Russia gains to Iran's rich oil and gas fields, alongside with China, in exchange for playing some kind of a game (in Security Council). If for China this may come down to the raw calculus of securing energy supplies, for Russia there is also a matter of gaining a political foothold in the Gulf and ensuring that energy's game plays by Russian rules. We should not underestimate Iran's role in the Caspian oil trade and the potential benefits for Russia in setting up an energy cartel with Tehran. With Europe toying with the idea that Iran could become an alternative (and therefore a competing) supply of energy to Russia, tying Russian and Iranian energy sectors through a web of economic and political cooperative deals means that Russia achieves several objectives in one fell swoop. That's mean: to ensure it could have a role in price fixing and leveraging energy for political purposes, to neutralize a potential competitor in exchange for political cover on Iran's nuclear dealings, to earn cash in the process by selling technology to the same program it should endeavor to keep in check due to its Security Council membership. Iran is its entry point into the Middle East for Russia; it is a gateway to regaining lost influence in a key strategic region for a few reasons – energy being among the most important.⁷

But we should consider, why should Russia tolerate a nuclear weapons state next door? Possibly, Russia might not see an Iranian nuclear arsenal as an existential threat – it knows Russia ranks low in Iran's list of enemies. If anything, one could make the argument that Russia stands only to benefit from a nuclear Iran, since such development would drive oil prices upwards – it's something Russia can only welcome, since it will earn Russia both cash and influence. This does not mean that Russia necessarily welcomes a nuclear Iran. But given that Iran provides a lucrative market to Russia's nuclear and military industries, given that Iran may help Russia prevent Western efforts to reduce their dependency on Russian and Middle East energy, given that Iran helps Russia in its efforts to contain Western dominance.⁸

Iranian and Russian engineers in August 2010 began loading fuel into Iran's first nuclear power plant The operation to load uranium fuel into the reactor at the Bushehr power plant in southern Iran is the first step in starting up a facility the US once hoped to prevent because of fears over Tehran's nuclear ambitions. Iran's authorities celebrated the plant as a symbol of Iranian resistance and patience and it demonstrated that country's nuclear aims are entirely peaceful (an assertion that many governments around the

⁷ Emanuele Ottolenghi, "Russia and Iran's Nuclear Program," *Journal of Energy Security*, January 12, 2010, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=225:the-deal-that-was-not-irans-nuclear-program-and-the-future-of-negotiations&catid=102:issuecontent&Itemid=355 (accessed September 23, 2010).

⁸ Konstantin Bogdanov, "Bushehr power plant: Russia balances on the edge of a sword," RIA Novosti, August 23, 2010, <http://www.sputniknews.com/analysis/20100823/160312619.html> (accessed January 5, 2011).

world seriously question). Russians began shipping fuel for the plant in 2007 and carried out a test-run of the plant in February 2009. The Bushehr project dates back to 1974, when Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi contracted with the German company Siemens to build the reactor. The company withdrew from the project after the 1979 Islamic Revolution toppled the shah. The partially finished plant later sustained damages after it was bombed by Iraq during its 1980-88 war against Iran.⁹ It will be a few months before the 1000-megawatt light-water reactor is pumping electricity to Iranian cities. Of course Iran denies an intention to develop nuclear weapons, saying it only wants to generate power with a network of nuclear plants it plans to build. The Bushehr plant is not considered a proliferation risk because the terms of the deal commit the Iranians to allowing the Russians to retrieve all used reactor fuel for reprocessing. Spent fuel contains plutonium, which can be used to make atomic weapons. Additionally, Iran has said that IAEA experts will be able to verify that none of the fresh fuel or waste is diverted.

Military Cooperation

Russia since 1991 has been the main supplier of arms to Iran including MiG-29 jet fighters and Su-24 jet bombers, thousands of T-72 tanks, Kilo-class submarines, S-200 and Tor M1 anti-aircraft missiles. In 1995, a secret memorandum was signed by U.S. Vice President Al Gore and the Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin to stop Moscow from selling arms to Iran in exchange for allowing commercial launches by Russian space rockets of foreign communication satellites containing U.S. technology. In December 2005, Russia sold Iran 29 modern short-range Tor M1 anti-aircraft missile launchers with radars for \$700 million. The Tor M1 missiles have a range of 12 km and can hit targets 6 km high.¹⁰ In the same time it signed a deal with Iran to sell five divisions of S-300 long-range anti-aircraft missiles. There are 40 to 60 anti-aircraft missile launchers each carrying 4 missile tubes, radars and control stations worth ca. \$800 million. In December 2008, the Iranian state news agency reported that after several years of negotiations to buy S-300's, Iran and Russia had finalized a deal and that Iran would take "delivery of S-300 air defense systems from Russia soon." Together with the Tor-M1 and the older super long-range S-200 that Russia shipped to Iran earlier, the S-300's could provide the Iranians with a capability to build an air defense shield to protect its nuclear facilities against a possible U.S. or Israel air attack, and cause serious damage on the attacking force. Without the S-300's Iran does not have credible air defenses and its nuclear facilities are vulnerable to such attacks.¹¹

The delivery of the S-300 has still not occurred, in October 2009 Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, has stopped the S-300 delivery in its tracks. Russia's President sugges-

⁹ "Iran Begins Fueling Its First Nuke Power Plant," CBS News World, August 21, 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-begins-fueling-its-first-nuke-power-plant/> (accessed January 5, 2011).

¹⁰ Pavel Felgenhauer, "Tehran on the Brink of Procuring S-300 Missiles," *The Jamestown Foundation: Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6 no. 194, October 22, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35641&no_cache=1#.Vf2yM9Ltmko (accessed January 5, 2011).

¹¹ Pavel Felgenhauer, "Moscow Opens the Prospect of an Iranian Arms Embargo," *The Jamestown Foundation: Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7, no. 73, April 15, 2010, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36275&no_cache=1#.Vf2wptLtmko (accessed January 5, 2011).

tion of an arms embargo was realized, so the S-300 deal may be finally dead. Such a concession (alliance with the West against Iran) would be highly unpopular in Moscow, so Putin and Medvedev will demand serious compensation: effective moves by the U.S. administration on START-3 ratification in the Senate, on World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, and removing Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Russia has recently successfully engaged the U.S. and E.U. member states in profitable business deals. Moreover, by offering to closely cooperate over Iran, the Russian authorities might hope to weaken Western criticism of any future assertion of Russian interests in the post-Soviet space.

Russia was freezing a contract to deliver S-300 air defense missiles to Iran after the adoption of the new U.N. sanctions against Tehran. Russia agreed the deal on the missiles several years ago but has never delivered the weapons, amid pressure from the United States and Israel which fear they would dramatically improve Iran's defensive capabilities. The resolution, agreed June 9, 2010 by U.N. Security Council members including Russia, bars countries from selling Iran heavy weaponry including missiles and missile systems. Russia's failure to deliver the missiles has disappointed Iran's Islamic leadership and become a major sticking point in once strong bilateral ties. Some of Russia's officials said that while weapons sales restrictions had been expanded under the sanctions they did not include the S-300s.¹² However it does not appear that the U.N. Security Council resolution makes a distinction between offensive and defensive heavy weaponry. UN Security Council resolution ordering additional sanctions against Iran and seconded by Moscow preceded controversial statements from Russian state officials and new debates with both the West and Iran. The matter concerns S-300 complexes Iran has been expecting from Russia, weapons capable of defending Iranian military objects and nuclear sites from air raids.

Clause 8 of U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 1929 banned sales of tanks, armored fighting vehicles, large caliber artillery pieces, warships, missiles, and missile systems. No anti-aircraft complexes were mentioned in the list. On the other hand, the document urged caution on all countries in sales of "all other weapons" to Iran. Official Iran authorities were enraged by Russia's vote for the new sanctions. In late May 2010, President Mahmud Ahmadinejad advised his Russian counterpart "to take care" and be wary of following in the wake of the United States and its policy. Russia in the meantime claims that it is being "pragmatic" in the matter of Iran. The Russian-Iranian trade turnover discounting military-industrial complex barely reached \$3.5 billion whereas the trade turnover with the United States amounted to \$20 billion.

The Iranians themselves admit that Russia is not on the list of this country's ten top trade partners. Experts suspect that Russia is resolved to deny the anti-aircraft complexes to Iran and that it is of the mind to use the issue in the bargaining with the West. The West in the meantime has its own cards to play. What is important – The United States imposed sanctions on Rosoboronexport and some other Russian structures blamed for

¹² "UN sanctions mean Russia cannot sell S-300 missiles to Iran," RIA Novosti, June 11, 2010, <http://sputniknews.com/russia/20100611/159390068.html> (accessed January 5, 2011); also see Anna Malpas, "Russia moves to scrap Iran missile sale," Agence France Presse, June 11, 2010, <http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/World/Story/A1Story20100611-221656.html> (accessed January 5, 2011).

violation of the US bill on prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation to Syria, Iran, and North Korea. It was apparently Washington's response to the sale of TOR-M1 complexes to Tehran and signing of the S-300 contract. Washington lifted these sanctions May 2010.¹³

Russia's support of the sanctions against Iran was associated with the desire to put relations with the U.S. on a new footing. Russia's stance on the Iranian question began to change not at a certain moment, but exactly after Obama announced rejection of plans to deploy missile defense elements in Poland and the Czech Republic in the Fall of 2009. This was appraised in Russia as a change in the American approach. After that, the whole process of coordinated movement toward sanctions and a planned change in the Russian position was a process that stemmed from work on a broader range of Russian-American relations, which had notably improved. The result of this was Russia's agreement to support the U.S. on questions of the sanctions.

Russia has grown tired of the fact that Iran is constantly trying to use it as an instrument in its policy of putting the world community at odds. The proposals that were made to Iran at the end of last year in the name of Russia, France and the U.S. on export of uranium and its enrichment in the Russian Federation or France, with return of fuel, were rejected by Iran. And this was an insult to Russia. When Brazil and Turkey made a similar proposal, Iran accepted it.¹⁴ This added to the negativity in the relations between Moscow and Tehran, which were becoming ever more strained. As for the confusion arising in the Russian mass media over whether the deliveries of the S-300 air defense system to Iran are being repealed in connection with the sanctions, or not – no one is planning to deliver them anywhere. Russia's position is clear here – Russia will not supply the S-300 to Iran. But Russia is ready to limit itself, proceeding from the general situation and understanding that the fulfillment of this contract is controversial and confrontational. But at the same time, Russia wants to limit itself, and does not want someone else to limit it. That is, Russia wants to avoid a formal ban on deliveries of the C-300 to Iran.¹⁵

The decision of U.N. Security Council will evidently cost the domestic military system – both in financial terms and in terms of repute. Contracts such as this require a recompense to the buyer when for some reason the merchandise never materializes. Considering the recompense, unilateral termination of the contract might cost Russia \$1.2 billion. Besides, Iran just might stop buying weapons and military hardware from Russia and turn to China instead. Moreover, Iran has the ability to respond to the Russian decision and hurt it back. Cooperation with Russia within the framework of the peaceful nuclear program is rather unlikely to stop of course. Contacts in the sphere of aircraft construction meanwhile are unlikely to survive the latest development. Ne-

¹³ Yelena Suponina, Aleksander Lomanov, "Sanctions against Iran: Will Russia Deliver S-300 Complexes to Tehran? [in Russian: Оружейный заморозок: Россия тщательно просчитывает сотрудничество с Ираном]," *Vremya Novostei*, no. 101, June 11, 2010, <http://www.vremya.ru/2010/101/5/255831.html> (accessed January 5, 2011).

¹⁴ Zvi Magen, "Russia-Iran Relations: Is There a Change?," *INSS Insight* 186, (June 10, 2010), <http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=2193> (accessed July 23, 2010).

¹⁵ Fyodor Lukyanov, "For the US, the Desire To Show Iran Who Is Boss Is a Question of Prestige," *America-Russia.net*, July 2, 2010, www.america-russia.net/eng/security/247106916?user_session (accessed October 14, 2010).

gotiations over procurement of additional TU-204 passenger planes from Russia are as good as wrecked. Contract termination for political reasons may challenge Russia's image as a reliable and conscientious arms merchant.¹⁶

Economic Cooperation

In addition to their trade and cooperation in military and energy, Iran and Russia have also expanded trade ties in many non-energy sectors of the economy, including an agriculture agreement in January 2009 and a telecommunications contract in December 2008. In July 2010, Iran and Russia signed an agreement to enlarge their cooperation in developing their energy sectors. Features of the agreement include the establishment of a joint oil exchange, which with a combined production of up to 15 million barrels of oil per day has the potential to become a leading market globally. Gazprom and Lukoil have become increasingly involved in the development of Iranian oil and gas projects.

For Russia, Iran is a regional power and an important trade partner. Russia needs Iran, for arms sales, as well as maintaining the security of Russia's southern borders; Iran needs Russia for military equipment, energy security and political protection at the UN and IAEA. On February 20, 2008, Gazprom Chairman Alexei Miller held talks in Tehran with Iranian Oil Minister Gholam-Hossein Nozari. While little was released about the meeting, the pair agreed to increase Russian involvement in developing Iran's massive South Pars and North Kish offshore gas fields in the Persian Gulf. They also agreed to Russia laying oil and natural gas pipelines. Further agreement was apparently reached on mutual cooperation in the oil and gas sectors in the Caspian Sea. Gazprom also agreed to build a gas reservoir in Iran as well as a refinery in Armenia. Moving swiftly ahead, the two sides agreed to hold expert-level meetings.¹⁷ Iran values its relationship with Russia, in terms of energy, defense and regional security issues, dubbing Russia a "strategic neighbor." In 2009, Russia was the 7th largest trading partner of Iran, with 4,81% of all exports to Iran originating from Russia. Iran is one of the most important weapon customer next to India, Algeria, China, Venezuela, Malaysia and Syria. Russian exports to Iran in 2008 – mostly conventional weapons, military equipment and cars – reached \$3.3 billion.

Russia, Iran and the Great Powers in Middle East

Today's Russia poses no serious threat to Western World. On the wider international level, Russia is largely an irrelevant force. But in combination with other Russia gains much more importance. On its own, Russia is not a center of power; it lacks ideology,

¹⁶ Ruslan Pukhov, "Sticking Point. An update on the S-300 contract with Iran [in Russian: ПВО преткновения: История с поставкой российских зенитных ракетных систем С-300ПМУ-1 в Исламскую Республику Иран]," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, June 30, 2010, http://www.ng.ru/politics/2010-06-30/3_kartblansh.html (accessed January 5, 2011).

¹⁷ John C.K. Daly, "Analysis: Russia, others eye Iran ties," United Press International, February 29, 2008, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Industry/2008/02/29/Analysis-Russia-others-eye-Iran-ties/87841204305764/ (accessed January 5, 2011).

vision and the economic power to stimulate a global movement. Iran on the other hand is an ideological and clear alternative to the established world order. Russia fully realizes this fact and uses its non-hostile relationship with Iran as a bargaining chip against the West. Russia needs economic and political concessions from the West in order to maintain itself as a functioning state. At present, Russia realizes that backing Iran provides much greater profit than abandoning it. Russian society is still strongly nostalgic about the days when the Soviet Union was a great power and Russia enjoyed pride of place in the global system. Today Russia is barely relevant. Consequently, partnering with Iran gives the Russian leadership an opportunity to portray itself to its nation as being relevant to the most powerful nations in the world and retrieve its lost prestige. The current Russian authorities aim to restore Russia's prestige on the world stage. However, it also knows that if it blends into the Western dominated world order it will simply be regarded as last among equals. Therefore, backing Islamic Iran and blackmailing the West with its partial support for Iran gives Russia an opportunity to be regarded as special, because Iran is point of interests of every power in the world.¹⁸

It is necessary to say that the United Nations (American) sanctions that are in effect against the Russian companies and institutions practically do not hinder their operations and has rather a symbolic nature. The contract on supply of S-300 to Iran worth \$800 million was another matter. The agreement was signed a few years ago but under pressure of the U.S. and Israel Russia permanently postponed fulfillment of the deal. It is believed that if Iranians get such modern air defense missile systems they will be able to defend their nuclear objects from air strikes reliably.¹⁹

Russia's close ties to Iran, Syria and the others countries of Middle East are a source of concern for the United States and other Western governments. Russia's foreign policy in the Greater Middle East should not be seen as hostile to the United States. Rather, Russia is pursuing a defensive foreign policy meant to further its economic interests and prevent itself from becoming a target of the region's radical movements. Russia is not working very hard at pressuring Iran to halt its nuclear program.

However, for Russia the matter is far more complex. Not only has Russia benefited from Iran's non-involvement in the Caucasus, but it has also taken advantage of U.S.-Iran hostility, since this has resulted in the U.S. blocking Iran from serving as an export route for Caspian Basin oil and gas, thus allowing Moscow to exercise both economic and political leverage over the former Soviet republics in the region. There is high probability that, Russian government sees relations between itself, the U.S., and Iran as a zero-sum game. It believes that U.S.-Iran relations will eventually improve, and when this occurs, Russia expects that Iran will prefer working with the U.S. rather than with Russia. Russia has been less than cooperative on sanctions because it doesn't believe they will actually work. From the Putin's perspective, Iran is highly likely to acquire nuclear

¹⁸ Mehdi Sanaei, "Iran-Russia Relations and Existing Circumstances," *Iran Review*, June 19, 2010, http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran_Russia_Relations_and_Existing_Circumstances.htm (accessed September 10, 2010).

¹⁹ Aleksander Reutov, "S-300 in exchange for Resolution [in Russian: C-300 в обмен на резолюцию]," *Kommersant*, May 24, 2010, <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1374513> (accessed January 5, 2011).

weapons and therefore Russia's interests will not be served by joining an antagonizing effort to prevent Iran from doing so.²⁰

Russia's cooperation with Iran will not only serve as an important determinant of bilateral relations, but also influence future international equations. Independent countries are growing in power and new players have entered international political scene. Therefore, the existing structure of the United Nations Security Council and international relations, which has led to dominance of a hegemonic system on the world, cannot provide solutions to all problems as that structure was suitable for conditions of past decades and is no good for a modern world (crises in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan can't be solved within that framework). Therefore, permanent members of the Security Council are not able to solve international issues on their own and they should not only respect the will of other countries, but also take advantage of their potentials in international relations. Such countries like Iran, Turkey and Brazil are new potential, independent players which are willing to do their part in international relations and the way should be paved for them. Russia is now at a crossroads. Russia owes its power to its position between East and West. Cooperation between Russia and Iran is a determining factor for both countries' policies and the Islamic Republic expects Russia to cooperate with it in international scene. On the other hand, those relations are also of high importance to Russia. It is very important for Russia to act in a balanced way in its relations with Iran and Middle East policy. The cooperation between Iran and Russia has promoted both countries' positions in international scene. It is true that Russia's relations with the European Union and the United States have changed and those countries are trying to attract Russia as a strategic partner to put pressure on Iran.

Cooperation between U.S. and Russia in the Middle East is difficult because Russia has little interest in helping the United States solve its Middle East problems. But Russia shouldn't forget that Chechnya is located less than 900 km from Tehran. One-seventh of Russia's citizens are Muslim – a population with ties to Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and other parts of the Arab world. Radicalism and political turbulence in the Middle East inevitably resound in Russia. For both Russia and the United States, the ongoing battle against terrorism is the one of the national security priority. Russian leaders view Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq as training grounds for anti-Russian terrorists. Russia also shares the U.S. interest in nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and has supported rounds of U.N. sanctions against Iran. The Obama administration has consented to Russia's role in supplying low-enriched uranium to fuel the Bushehr nuclear power plant and transferring the spent fuel from Iran. However, the United States no longer sees Bushehr as a nuclear proliferation risk; there are still broader U.S. concerns about whether Iran's nuclear fuel could eventually be used for military purposes. Although Russia and U.S. have competitive energy interests in the Middle East, both benefit from placing regional stability and nonproliferation above short-term profits. Indeed, stability in the Middle East is a prerequisite for maintaining reliable energy markets in the region. Russia's interest in energy cooperation with Iran

²⁰ Mark N. Katz, *Russian Policy in the Greater Middle East: Trying to Keep out of Trouble*, Kennan Institute, May 10, 2010, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/russian-policy-the-greater-middle-east-trying-to-keep-out-trouble> (accessed January 5, 2011).

– for example, in the development of Iran's vast reserves of natural gas and oil refining will be impossible to pursue at acceptable costs if nuclear concerns continue to grow.²¹

Conclusion

We must understand that Russia was not and is not an ally of Iran. Russia and Iran are associated by rather complex relations, when each of the parties tries to get the maximum benefit while giving as little as possible. From the Iranian side this is entirely obvious, and from the Russian such an approach is also present. Therefore, we should not think now about the fact that the U.S., by urging Russia to support the sanctions, is thereby cleverly putting it at odds with Iran so as to later edge Russia out of all the markets. This is, of course, a pretty picture, but in reality there is no opportunity by which the U.S. could suddenly announce that it is drastically changing its course, that it is ready for agreement with Iran, etc. Because for the Americans, Iran is a principle question for an entire series of reasons.

It is a question of global leadership. Iran does not intend to retreat. It is prepared to string everyone along and to maneuver in every possible way, but for Iran it is a question of honor and prestige to retain the opportunity of having its own nuclear program, up to a military one. They do not necessarily want to have specifically a bomb, but they do want to retain all the possibilities for this. Therefore, it is impossible to imagine now that Iran would suddenly make a sharp turn and say let discuss it. There are absolutely no grounds for this. Especially since Ahmadinezhad is a man with whom the Americans simply cannot discuss anything at all. That situation is also dangerous for Russia, because Iran is going to challenge not only American leaderships but also Russian sphere of interests.

²¹ Martin B. Malin, Evgeny Artyukov, „A Reset in the Middle East,” *Moscow Times*, August 16, 2010, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/a-reset-in-the-middle-east/412419.html> (accessed January 5, 2011).

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IRAN-PAKISTAN COOPERATION AFTER 1979 REVOLUTION

Pakistan-Iran relations have a long tradition, dating back to ancient times. Influence of Persian culture is visible for example in transcription of the official language of Pakistan – Urdu in Persian alphabet (*Nastaliq*). Iran was the first country which internationally recognized the creation of Pakistan in August 1947.² The two countries also shared a strategic cooperation with the United States, which took institutional form in common membership in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Friendly relations with Iran were perceived by Pakistani analysts as a strategic national interest, which had given the possibility to involve the whole possessed military resources to defend against potential Indian aggression.

The positive image of Iran in Pakistani society also has been an important factor.³ The pursuit of rapprochement with Iran was also the result of Indian policy, based on so-called “theory of circles” (described in the work *Artashastra*, written by an Indian politician and philosopher Kautilya, who lived in the 4th century BC), assuming that the neighboring countries of India are their potential enemies, and in turn their neighbors are a natural allies. To protect against the risks encirclement by hostile countries, Pakistan is forced to maintain the best relations with its western neighbors, so as to prevent India to implement their strategies.⁴

Pakistan and Iran joins the common fear of the threat of national separatism in Balochistan. Balochis minority, in fact, resides in both countries and their efforts represent a significant threat to their territorial integrity.⁵ For these reasons, during the reign

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² Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, “India and Iran: Emerging Strategic Cooperation?,” *IPRI Journal* 3, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 49, <http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/arts2003.pdf> (accessed January 5, 2011).

³ Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy. A Reappraisal* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 138.

⁴ Ghani Jafar, “Paksitan-Iran Relations: the Security Scenario,” Institute of the Strategic Studies Islamabad, March 12, 2009, http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1299825707_23286088.pdf (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁵ Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for Inter-

of Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran, relations between the two countries can be described as friendly. Of particular importance was Iran's support for Pakistan during the two wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Tehran supplied the ammunition to Pakistan and spare parts imported from the U.S. tanks and aircraft, which in some ways enabled the longer resisting the forces which have an Indian numerical superiority.⁶

Pakistani relations with Iran have dramatically deteriorated in 1979. There has been an impact of two important events – the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The change of government in Tehran resulted in a total transformation of the strategic situation in the region. From the main U.S. regional ally, Iran became their declared enemy, which also implies a reception consistently pro-American policies of Pakistan's president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1924-1988), in spite of continued human rights abuses by his regime.

On the other hand, the Islamic Revolution was a kind of catalyst of Islamisation policy, which started in Pakistan in the 1980s. It made the fundamental theological difference between the two countries (Iran is a country inhabited mostly by Shiites, and Pakistan – by Sunni Muslims) even more important than it was before. A confrontation was inevitable. First sign of the change was establishing Sunni religious taxes which discriminated Pakistan's Shia minority. Radical Sunni groups called government in Islamabad to recognize the Shiites as “non-Muslims” (as it has been done in case of Ahmadijja community, whose leader stated that it was the last prophet of Islam, which was the blasphemy from the Sunni point of view).⁷

It provoked violent protests of Tehran. Also, the policy pursued by the Pakistan government after the takeover by the Taliban in Afghanistan was seen in Iran as a menace, since the new government in Kabul was a radical Sunni and fought against the Khazars, who adhere to Shias. A dramatic symbol of the strained bilateral relations was an accusation by Tehran that Pakistani officers had participated in the attack on the Iranian Consulate General in the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif.⁸ These misunderstandings in relations with Pakistan have sought to be used by India, although the support given by Iraq during the war from 1980 to 1986 for some time made it difficult to develop a common position.

India and Iran share a kind of community of interests, in case of the possibility to export Iranian natural gas and oil there. Rapidly growing Indian economy needs raw materials. Iran needs market to sell their raw materials which would allow them to bypass U.S. embargo. The natural transit route for this type of business is through Pakistan. So natural and strategic interest of Iran is some kind of normalization of relations between Islamabad and New Delhi.

An important field of Iran-Pakistan cooperation is nuclear power industry, in particular, the transfer out of relatively simple in use and also cheap method of uranium enrichment

national Peace, 2005), 168-169, [http://www.pakhtunkhwa.pk/sites/default/files/Publications/Pakistan%20between%20Mosque%20and%20Military%20by%20Hussain%20Haqqani%20\(1\).pdf](http://www.pakhtunkhwa.pk/sites/default/files/Publications/Pakistan%20between%20Mosque%20and%20Military%20by%20Hussain%20Haqqani%20(1).pdf) (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁶ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords. Pakistan: Its Army and the Wars Within* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 308.

⁷ Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 22-23.

⁸ *A History of Pakistan and its Origins*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 144-145.

technology using centrifuges. Pakistan developed this technology recently. Both countries more or less simultaneously – in the 1970s announced the need to possess nuclear weapons. Iran has observed growing threat from the Soviet Union and the simultaneous lack of confidence in a possible the U.S. assistance in case of communist aggression.⁹ This was obviously related to the U.S. failure in Vietnam. Pakistan had chosen the “nuclear option” because of the similar reasons. Pakistan has been fully aware of the imbalance of conventional forces in comparison to India, which threatened their territorial integrity.¹⁰

The experience of the war of 1965, and no active U.S. reaction against India, led to the far-reaching skepticism with regard to the possible involvement of Washington in the next Indo-Pakistani conflict. The first idea to implement nuclear weapons into Pakistani arsenal had been made by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928-1979). As a foreign minister in Ayub Khan’s government he published a book *The Myth of Independence*, in which he argued that in the future war with India, Pakistan should consider the option to possess their own nuclear deterrence possibility.¹¹ The problem became vital after a defeat in the 1971 war against India, during which the U.S. did not provide any military help to Pakistan. It was considered in Islamabad as one of reasons of the defeat and the loss of half of the Pakistani territory (now Bangladesh). Pakistani historians ignore the fact that serious commitment of American diplomacy has prevented India from offensive on the Western Front and liquidation of the Pakistani state.

Both Iran and Pakistan have opted for a similar method based on the acquisition of the so-called “dual-use technology,” but rather quickly the Western states, involved in prohibition of proliferation, discovered true intentions of Tehran and Islamabad, and limited the possibility of building plutonium-based installations. It forced both countries to reorient research towards the use of uranium as the basic fission material. It is also important that both countries possess the uranium ore resources.¹²

From the legal perspective Iran’s international situation has been difficult. During the period of close cooperation with the U.S., Tehran signed Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on July 1, 1968, and ratified it a year later.¹³ So Iran has to camouflage their nuclear weapons program from IAEA as made for purely peaceful purposes. This way was than acceptable under the existing nonproliferation regime. Article 4 of the Treaty guarantees to parties a right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.¹⁴

Pakistan is not a party to the NPT (as well as India and Israel), and therefore was not formally in any way restricted. The difficulty in obtaining nuclear technology is fact that all countries, which could share such know-how, were parties of the NPT. During a meet-

⁹ See Jafar, “Paksitan – Iran Relations: the Security Scenario” and Steve Weissman, Herbert Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East* (New York: Times Books, 1981), 237.

¹⁰ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Myth of Independence* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969), 85.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² George Perkovich, „Could Anything Be Done to Stop Them? Lessons from Pakistan’s Proliferating Past,” in *Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War*, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 59-60.

¹³ “Signatories and Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists, December 3, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt3.htm> (accessed January 5, 2011).

¹⁴ Robert Zarate, “The Three Qualifications of Article IV’s ‘Inalienable Right,’” in *Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)*, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 219.

ing with Pakistani physicists, which took place in January 1972, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced that his country will acquire nuclear weapons. He used colorful metaphor: “even if its citizens have to eat grass and leaves.” At the same time he announced a creation of the National Nuclear Command, designed to coordinate work and research.

The first step towards gaining their own fissile materials and training of staff was the construction of an experimental nuclear reactor. This was possible thanks to \$350.000 worth technology gained from the USA in 1955.¹⁵ More advanced reactor – the Karachi Kanupp has been opened in December 1972 under the U.N. program of support of nuclear energy for developing countries *Atom for Peace*.¹⁶ This reactor could produce about 10 kg of plutonium annually.¹⁷ It has the power of 120 MW.¹⁸ It was covered by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, but it could be bypassed easily. Besides, it gave the possibility of training of specialists to maintain more devices already built in-house.

In 1974 U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution proposed by Pakistani delegation declaring South Asia nuclear free zone. The main idea was to protect Pakistan against the further expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal. It was adopted, despite the fact that India and Bhutan voted against.¹⁹ The Islamic Revolution in 1979 cut off Iranian legal possibility of import dual-use technology from the West.

In December 1979 the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan. The Pakistani territory has become a base for the Afghan Mujahideen. In exchange U.S. turned blind eye for the policy pursued by Pakistani president General Zia ul-Haq. The United States seemed not to notice the efforts leading Pakistan to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. U.S. Congress adopted the so-called Pressler Amendment requiring the U.S. President to monitor this matter and pursue an annual certificate, confirming that Pakistan has no nuclear weapons. No certification meant automatic economic embargo, particularly the supply of military equipment.²⁰ During the war in Afghanistan, President Reagan always granted Pakistan the certificate. But just after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, his successor, George W. Bush refused to do so.

The person who helped to acquire relatively cheap and effective uranium enrichment was Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan (1936-), a metallurgist, formerly working in Almelo, a Dutch part of European Urenco corporation, producing equipment needed to enrich uranium for West European nuclear plants.²¹ The activities of Dr A.Q. Khan contradicted 10 common axiom that only the most economically and technologically developed countries can afford to have nuclear weapons based on uranium technology.²² In 1975

¹⁵ Volha Charnysh, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Program,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, September 9, 2009, http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/proliferation/pakistan/charnysh_pakistan_analysis.pdf (accessed January 5, 2011).

¹⁶ Zian Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, M.V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the US–India Nuclear Deal,” in *Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War*, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 172-177.

¹⁷ Perkovich, „Could Anything Be Done to Stop Them?,” 63.

¹⁸ Gord L. Brooks, *A Short History of CANDU Nuclear Power System*, Ontario Hydro Demand/Supply Plan Hearing, January 1993, <https://canteach.candu.org/Content%20Library/19930101.pdf> (accessed January 5, 2011).

¹⁹ Charnysh, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Program.”

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Nawaz, *Crossed Swords. Pakistan*, 552-553.

Dr A.Q. Khan established contact with Pakistani intelligence ISI. This was probably just after 1974 Indian nuclear test.²³ A year later he decided to return to Pakistan, taking with him technical documentation of centrifuges. He has got them when he worked as a technical translator from German into Dutch. Formally, one cannot call this "theft," because Dr A.Q. Khan was formally acquitted of those charges by the Dutch court.

Contrary to popular belief he is not a nuclear physicist, or an "inventor" but just a polyglot, who thanks to his language skills (characteristic of the inhabitants of sub-continent), gained access to top secret materials. The fact that a person from Pakistan, who holds contacts with diplomats of his country, who occurred out to be intelligence officer, was able to obtain access to such top secret materials is quite mysterious. The explanation could be that the counter-intelligence officers apparently were focused mostly on Warsaw Pact spies' hunting in those times.²⁴

Pakistan's uranium enrichment technology has been based on purely legal components that could be purchased in the U.S. or European countries. To buy sensitive components, Abdul Qadeer Khan used contacts established during his studying time in Germany. He also tried to use companies in countries with more liberal export law, such as Malaysia or the United Arab Emirates (mainly in Dubai) for this purpose.

In April 1979 in a town of Kahuta (near Islamabad) uranium enrichment plant has begun to work. It was later named the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). On March 28, 1979 German TV ZDF revealed how Dr A.Q. Khan acquired advanced nuclear technology.²⁵ Israeli experts estimated that Pakistan would be able to possess 2 nuclear warheads over the next 2 years, and till 1981 it would be able to perform nuclear test.

For a country with such a low GDP as Pakistan the acquisition of nuclear technology is very serious challenge for its budget. It is therefore likely to have been made to generate adequate funds abroad. Nuclear cooperation with Iran dates back to 1987, when the secret agreement was concluded between the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and its Iranian counterpart in order to exchange research efforts and experiences.²⁶ The talks, which were confidential and probably resulted in signing a secret agreement took place in Dubai (United Arab Emirates).²⁷ Another contract provides for the sale of centrifuges to Tehran and spare parts for them in 2000 as well as construction plans of P1 centrifuges and uranium enrichment plant.

There is evidence that President Zia knew about the activities of Dr Khan and restricted it in this way, so Iran would be unable to produce the bomb in the near future.

²³ Christopher Ford, "Nuclear Technology Rights and Wrongs: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Article IV, and Nonproliferation," in *Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)*, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 306.

²⁴ Douglas Frantz, Catherine Collins, *The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets... and How We Could Have Stopped Him* (New York: Twelve, 2007), 34.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Bruno Tertrais, "Khan's Nuclear Exports: Was There a State Strategy?," in *Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War*, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 17-22, also see Anthony H. Cordesman, Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, *Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Options if Diplomacy Fails*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Draft, last modified: April 7, 2006, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060407_irannuoptions.pdf (accessed January 5, 2011).

²⁷ Bruno Tertrais, "Pakistan's Nuclear Exports: Was there a State Strategy?," Paper Prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 20 July, 2006, <http://www.npolicy.org/files/20060720-Tertrais-PakistanNuclearExports.pdf> (accessed January 5, 2011).

Tehran appeals intensified during the Iran-Iraq war, but the president of Pakistan did not revise his position. In the same 1987, Dr A.Q. Khan, to the consternation of the Pakistani politicians, in an interview said that Pakistan is able to produce a nuclear warhead. In fact, in 1983 so-called "cold explosion" has been done.²⁸ It was device able to start a chain reaction, but without the fissile material mounted. It was serious evidence that Pakistan has both enriched uranium and the technology needed to build nuclear weapons.²⁹ Formal evidence Pakistan has its nuclear weapons were test explosions held in 1998.

The last decade of the XX century was a period of increased activity of Pakistanis seeking financial support for their nuclear program. The Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg (1931-) continued cooperation in this field with Iran, which takes back to the time of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. This sphere of Pakistani foreign policy was performed by the army independent from government policy and probably without even informing civil prime minister. Whether the civil authorities knew about it or not, remains unexplained till now. During a meeting with Iranian President Rafsanjani in 1999, the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1953-2007) refused to sell nuclear technology to Iran for the approximately \$4 billion, despite the fact that the president relied on the allegedly existing prior agreement in this matter.

However, the head of Pakistan's nuclear program, Dr A.Q. Khan had cooperated closely with specialists from Tehran with the knowledge and support of the highest commanders of the armed forces. The specificity of that time Pakistan was the head of the government received information about the state of the nuclear program, nor from his advisors, or the military, but from the U.S. ambassadors in Islamabad.

Pakistan's policy towards Iran has been generally very inconsistent. On one hand Islamabad officially backed the U.S. position against Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait in 1991. On the other hand because of sanctions, the United States imposed on Pakistan under the "Pressler Amendment," it was necessary to closer cooperate with Tehran in order to obtain funds to continue nuclear research.³⁰ The effect of the agreements was to sell to Iran 500 second-hand P-1 centrifuges.³¹ Also the aluminum covers for centrifuges had been sold to Iran. Pakistan already had replaced them by more technologically sophisticated and therefore more effective ones made of high quality steel (*nota bene* Pakistan since then has been a major exporter of surgical steel).³²

The trade was initially neglected by the CIA, because it was claimed that Iran received the outdated and thus useless components, which could not make any use. According to analysts from Langley, Iranians were disappointed with the transaction and focus on the search for contacts in the states of the former Soviet Union.³³ Only in

²⁸ Adrian Levy, Catherine Scott-Clark, *Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy* (New York: Walker & Company, 2007), 86.

²⁹ Charnysh, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program."

³⁰ Levy, Scott-Clark, *Deception: Pakistan*, 134-137.

³¹ Pervez Musharraf, *Na linii ognia. Wspomnienia [In the Line of Fire: A Memoir]* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2007), 252.

³² William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, Raymond Bonner, "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network," *The New York Times*, February 12, 2004, page A1, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/world/a-tale-of-nuclear-proliferation-how-pakistani-built-his-network.html> (accessed January 5, 2011).

³³ Frantz, Collins, *The Nuclear Jihadist*, 202.

retrospect, it turned out that the analysis was completely wrong. In 1995 Dr Khan had sold Tehran plans for the more modern and more durable type of P2 centrifuges (modeled on the solutions of the German G-2).³⁴

Some sources indicate that through the network of Dr A.Q. Khan Iran has received one or even more of these modern centrifuges, which would mean that it can produce up to thousands of these highly efficient devices.³⁵ Comparing the similarity of the solutions applied, there are indications that Pakistani experts also participated in the construction of the Iranian reactor at Khushab.

Bruno Tertrais, a French expert on proliferation, also quotes a very interesting episode of the negotiations of Pakistan-U.S. agreement, relating to the supply of arms to Pakistan. The Chief of Army Staff, General Aslam Beg had blackmailed the Americans that in case of their refusal to “cooperate,” Pakistan would sell its nuclear technology to Iran.³⁶ During his visit in Tehran, General Aslam Beg received an Iranian proposal of sale some ready-made and operational atomic bombs or warheads, but refused to do so. He declared only a will for further cooperation and know-how in exchange for Iran’s support for the Pakistani position on disputed area of Jammu and Kashmir.

Iranian dissidents from NCRI claimed that Dr A.Q. Khan sold to Iran for a “research” unknown quantity of highly enriched uranium, but it was not sufficient to produce a bomb.³⁷ The previously mentioned French expert said that at the end of the 1990s “trade” contacts between representatives of the two sides have intensified and then took place with the full knowledge and acceptance of the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

At that time, Tehran offered to Islamabad US\$4 billion for the next supply of centrifuges. Acting under pressure from American diplomats, however, the Pakistani prime minister tried to halt this activity, which was supposed to be one of the reasons for her dismissal by the president, at the request or under pressure from the Chief of Army Staff. The official argumentation was corruption allegations.³⁸ Strengthening cooperation with Iran was part of the strategic concepts of General Mirza Aslam Beg. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan has ceased to be an important U.S. ally. It left room in a vacuum of strategic threat to India. The Supreme Commander of the Pakistani armed forces sought to achieve a rapprochement with Tehran, which was to lead eventually to the conclusion of a treaty of mutual defense. Of course, such an agreement would have clearly anti-American character.³⁹

General Aslam Beg officially supported the position of Iran in the war with Iraq. Immediate benefit was the possibility to buy from them cheap oil supplies, and weapons and ammunition. He was famous of his “original” strategic concept. He planned to use of Afghan territory as a strategic depth in case of open war with India. Pakistani troops (especially Air Force) would withdraw there and would prepare a counterattack at the

³⁴ Levy, Scott-Clark, *Deception: Pakistan*, 256.

³⁵ Cordesman, Al-Rodhan, *Iranian Nuclear Weapons?*

³⁶ Tertrais, „Pakistan’s Nuclear Exports: Was there a State Strategy?“

³⁷ Cordesman, Al-Rodhan, *Iranian Nuclear Weapons?*

³⁸ Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism. Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror* (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), 142.

³⁹ Tertrais, „Pakistan’s Nuclear Exports: Was there a State Strategy?“

enemy. Achievement of rapprochement with Iran would certainly have negative impact on the traditionally very close relations with Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

The way how the centrifuges were delivered to Iran undiscovered, to this day remains a mystery. According to one version there were to be delivered via a company registered in Sri Lanka, belonging to Buhary Sayed Abu Tahir Scomi (acting as Mr. Tahir) and having its center in Dubai. In the transaction also participated arrested in 2003, Dr Khan's deputy, Dr Muhammad Farooq. He was also responsible in KRL for international contacts, including the purchase of Nodong II missiles technology from North Korea.⁴⁰ Sri Lankan company also brokered the purchase of precision rings used in centrifuges, which were ordered by "Dr Khan's network" in Malaysia.⁴¹ This country is more technologically advanced than Pakistan. Malaysian liberal law allows for the implementation of such orders of dual-use technology. We do not know whether Dr Khan sold Iran "only" on the centrifuges, and their production technologies or full know-how needed to produce nuclear warheads.

In 1998, Pakistan has begun work on the use of plutonium to produce nuclear warheads.⁴² Plutonium reactor in Khushab is able to produce 1910-1915 kg of plutonium annually, enough to produce 2-3 heads. Two more reactors New Lab belonging to the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology are under construction. After signing an agreement on nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and India, Pakistan concluded an agreement with China to build two nuclear power reactors using plutonium. However, the program has been postponed because of the global crisis. However, it means that at Pakistan carries out work on a much sophisticated and therefore, more lethal nuclear weapons. There is therefore a menace that those weapons also would be the subject of sale.

There is a clear evidence of cooperation in the field of nuclear energy between Pakistan and Iran. In 2003 Libya decided to cooperate fully with the IAEA and the abandonment of their nuclear program. The condition was to provide full documentation and access to facilities and equipment for the nuclear experts of the Agency. During visits to facilities in the vicinity of Tripoli, a group led by Olli Heinonen found out that some of them had KRL label. Libyans also revealed their contacts with companies settled formally in Dubai, and whose colleagues confirmed their contacts with Dr Khan. A comparison of equipment acquired from the Libyans to those seen in the laboratory at Natanz in Iran clearly indicated the same source of origin.

In the 24 February 2004 IAEA report, the experts clearly stated that the components (including the P-1 centrifuges) were made using the same technology as Libyan ones.⁴³ Despite denials from Tehran, it was also suggested that the documentation for the production of P-2 also came from Pakistan. In this situation, the Secretary of State Collin Powell warned President Pervez Musharraf (1943-) of serious consequences if Islamabad fails to take action to stop Dr A.Q. Khan. The President of Pakistan in his own interest

⁴⁰ Simon Henderson, "Nuclear Spinning: the Iran-Pakistan Link," Iran Watch - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, December 11, 2003, <http://www.iranwatch.org/library/winep-nuclear-spinning-the-iran-pakistan-link-12-11-03> (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁴¹ Bill Powell, Tom McGirk, "The Man Who Sold The Bomb," *Time*, February 6, 2005, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1025193-5,00.html> (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁴² Charnysh, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program."

⁴³ Frantz, Collins, *The Nuclear Jihadist*, 332-333.

had to act very gently. On the one hand he had to satisfy the expectations of Americans, on the other hand he could do nothing what could lead to proof Dr Khan's relationship with the national authorities (civil and especially the military).⁴⁴ Also the internal situation required a lot of delicacy. Losing the popularity of the president could not afford a confrontation with a man who had been created a national hero in Pakistan, a man who gave the country "the Bomb." Thus, any lawsuit did not go in the game.

Dr A.Q. Khan, though gave the Pakistani television fiery speech in which pleaded guilty as a perpetrator of the spread of nuclear technology. He also expressed his belief that he acted solely on his own initiative, and religious motives, stating that the whole Muslim community (Arabic: *ummah*) has been granted an effective means of deterrence in the form of atomic weapons.⁴⁵ The key role of ideological factor as the motivation of A.Q. Khan activities was also mentioned by IAEA head, Mohamed El Baradei.⁴⁶ The next day after the TV-interview, A.Q. Khan was placed under house arrest, in which remained until February 2009.⁴⁷ The Iranian foreign ministry officially denied that Iranian technology of uranium enrichment, has been purchased on the black market, but confirmed that foreign experts participated in development process.

It does not seem possible that Dr Khan's activities took place without the knowledge of the official factors in Islamabad and it was only a private initiative, undertaken with religious motives. The practice named by Mohamed El Baradei, "nuclear Wal-Mart" could not exist without the acquiescence of Pakistani secret services.⁴⁸ There are evidences that this cooperation took place between the ISI and the Revolutionary Guards without the knowledge of both the Iranian President and the Prime Ministers of Pakistan.⁴⁹

The role and importance of the Iran-Pakistan cooperation for the Iranian nuclear program is difficult to evaluate. A major obstacle is that the Pakistani authorities did not allow IAEA experts to interview Dr A.Q. Khan.⁵⁰ The result is that his point of view is known only through the mass media. Probably the main suspect had enough time between the discovery of its participation in the Libyan nuclear program, and similar in case of Iran, so his colleagues in Dubai have destroyed all evidence of their commercial relations with Tehran.⁵¹ The result is the knowledge possessed by the IAEA, although important, is not essentially a procedural nature. So it could not be used against anyone in Pakistan.

Cooperation in the field of exchange of nuclear technology between Pakistan and Iran is documented by the Pakistani as well as independent foreign experts. Therefore, it should be regarded as a fact. Iran has now centrifugal technology that allows relatively cheaply to enrich uranium up to 90%, enabling the construction of a nuclear warhead.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 336-337.

⁴⁵ Seymour M. Hersh, "The Deal: Why is Washington going easy on Pakistan's nuclear black marketers?" *New Yorker*, March 8, 2004, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/03/08/040308fa_fact (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁴⁶ Frantz, Collins, *The Nuclear Jihadist*, 334.

⁴⁷ Peter Crail, "Abdul Qadeer Khan Freed From House Arrest," Arms Control Association, March 4, 2009, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_03/AQKhan (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁴⁸ Mark Lander, "UN Official Sees a 'Wal-Mart' in Nuclear Trafficking," *The New York Times*, January 23, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/23/international/23CND-NUKE.html> (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁴⁹ Levy, Scott-Clark, *Deception: Pakistan*, 334.

⁵⁰ Cordesman, Al-Rodhan, *Iranian Nuclear Weapons?*

⁵¹ Frantz, Collins, *The Nuclear Jihadist*, 335.

Current technological development does not require a “hot” nuclear test to check capability to use such weapons. If Iran acquired from Pakistan and technical plans for nuclear warhead (for which there is no direct evidence, but there is a strong possibility, as the Iranian Shahab-3 missile is identical to the Pakistani nuclear capable Ghauri, and this in turn is a “clone” of the North Korean Nodong-2), it can construct them without even having to perform nuclear test.

There are signs that indicate that Islamabad and Tehran’s cooperation has reached a new level. The present Iranian nuclear program should be compared with Pakistani one, because we are aware now how Pakistan acquired its own and we can guess how Iran could follow the same way. Many similarities that exist, especially as regards the application of centrifuges, it allows to assess at what stage is Tehran now.

Another stage of Iran-Pakistan cooperation in concept of trans-Asian pipelines. There is an idea of building such pipelines connecting Iran’s gas fields with customers in India and China. USA strongly opposes the project of IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) pipeline because it would make the U.S. embargo ineffective and even obsolete. From Pakistani point of view building such a pipeline would be not only the way to get another source of income, but also the way of political and economic pressure on India.

From New Delhi perspective the pipeline transiting Pakistan’s territory also has an advantage: the perspective of income would rationalize Pakistan’s policy towards India. Eventual war would deprive Pakistan of the gains. Another possible pipeline could be built from Iran to China. It is called Karakorum Pipeline. Iran would gain even more because of growing Chinese need of raw materials (which is connected to Chinese project of developing its western provinces). From Pakistani perspective such pipeline would tighten its strategic relations with Beijing. But there is one serious obstacle: the situation in revolting Balochistan. Pakistan traditionally accuses India of supporting Balochi irredentism, but there is no serious evidence for that.

Pakistan and Iran share some common interests as e.g. an idea of Trans Asiatic pipelines and nuclear weapons cooperation. But ideological factor (Shia-Sunni clashes) disturbs to establish closer relations between these two countries. A perspective of friendly cooperation depends on evolution of internal situation both in Iran and Pakistan. If Pakistan became religious Sunni state, there would be no chance for cooperation with religious Shia Iran. If Pakistan remains some way secular, there is a very good prospect for the future cooperation. Building pipelines would give the chance to develop faster and to resolve some important social problems which are one of the reasons of popularity of radical politicians in both countries. Another problem is perspective of nuclear Iran, but it extends the subject of this presentation.

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AMERICAN IMPACT ON THE STABILIZATION OF THE EGYPTIAN AUTHORITARIAN RULE BEFORE 2011

The Egyptian Political System before 2011

The Egyptian political system of the last three decades was often labeled as semi-authoritarian as on the institutional level it included a set of democratic features (such as multiparty elections to the parliament).² The real character of the regime was, however, far from the Dahl's polyarchy³. In fact, those democratic elements were purely a facade and served the mere purpose of legitimization of the authorities.⁴ From the 1950s the real political power has been in the hands of the president (in 1981-2011 it was Muhammad Hosni Mubarak (1928-) who came to power after the assassination of Anwar as-Sadat (1918-1981))⁵ and his political environment – military and intelligence officers as well as other prominent members of National Democratic Party.

During this period the Egyptian authoritarianism was perceived as stable thanks to the strong ties between the state and the economy. It efficiently employed a complex

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² Bruce K. Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1-31.

³ Robert A. Dahl, *Demokracja i jej krytycy* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1995), 310-311.

⁴ Marina Ottaway, "Evaluating Middle East Reform: Significant or Cosmetic?," in *Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World*, ed. Marina Ottaway, Julia Choucair-Vizoso (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008), 1-15; Michele Dunne and Amr Hamzawy, *The Ups and Downs of Political Reform in Egypt*, in *Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World*, ed. Marina Ottaway, Julia Choucair-Vizoso (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008), 17-44.

⁵ Anwar as-Sadat was murdered on October 6, 1981 in assassination led by a group of army officers employed by one of the fundamentalist religious organizations. The assassination was followed by a statement that as-Sadat had been responsible for degradation of Muslim culture and had lacked qualifications to rule the country. The attack took place during an army parade. The assassins having caused a malfunction in one of the parading trucks used the moment of confusion to open fire and killed the president on the spot. Mass arrests followed the assassination as well as death sentences for the assassins and imprisonment for people related with the assassination. See Jerzy Zdanowski, *Bracia Muzułmanie i inni* (Szczecin: Glob, 1986), 142-146.

network resulting in a large number of regime's beneficiaries, what provided considerable support for the president and his party, not to mention numerous machinations and vote rigging to guarantee absolute domination in parliamentary elections. The first cracks in the foundation of this political system appeared as a result Islamist movements as well as secular opposition, increasing in strength both inside and outside the parliament and demanding real democracy, abolishment of emergency law and abidance to human rights. The regime condoned moderate contestation that the authoritarian ways of exercising power were slowly being balanced by pluralization of political life. Pressures came from many different groups across the Egyptian society – Islamists, secular opposition, students, non-governmental organizations (mainly acting as human rights activists), lawyers and judges supporting independent judicial system, journalists, business people as well as the progressive wing of National Democratic Party.

Since the beginning of the 1990s the government continued to strengthen its position towards the society. On the other hand those times were also marked with activation of political opposition, which was realized by parliamentary successes of Islamists (being able to cope with political repressions), as well as increased political awareness among the Egyptian youth and generational changes within the ruling party. It all led to polarization of state-society relations.

Legitimization of power, typically for authoritarian states, was not the strongest suit of the Egyptian regime. Whereas Gamal Abd an-Naser (1918-1970) held high prestige among the Egyptians, his successors have been having more severe problems in validating their supremacy. During Mubarak's presidency different methods were employed to deal with this issue. First of all, emphasis on Islam as an important factor in shaping national policy, limited liberalization of the political system, extensive democratic rhetoric often according to notions such as rule of law or constitutionalism. Foreign affairs, including policy aiming at settling the Palestinian issue, were also employed as one of the important methods of validating Egyptian elites' authority. So was (less officially) control over information and religious institutions.⁶

There were many factors influencing persistence of the Egyptian authoritarianism. Internally, the most important were expanded bureaucracy, hegemonic political party and the army. In this essay, however, emphasis will lay on the external factors, which had significant impact on the whole spectrum of what affected stability of the political system. Namely, the issue of the remaining pages is the considerable economic, technological, logistical and political support given to the Egyptian authorities by the United States. It is worth emphasizing that it was one of the main reasons why the Egyptian authorities exploited the terrorist threat, using it both as means for gradual liquidation of the indicated political freedoms and to obtain support from Washington.

⁶ More on the functioning of the political system of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Islamist opposition see Maye Kassem, *Egyptian politics. The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule* (Boulder-London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); Tamir Moustafa, *The Struggle for Constitutional Power. Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jerzy Zdanowski, *Współczesna muzułmańska myśl społeczno-polityczna. Nurt Braci Muzułmanów*, (Warszawa: Askon, 2009).

The American-Egyptian Relations before 2011

American governments have been continuously providing the Egyptian regime with funds and goods in exchange for their support for the American interests in the Middle East and Northern Africa. American aid has ensured this strategic alignment with Egypt as a loyal ally in realizing American foreign policy. Obtaining privileged position in the relations with the United States became possible after the previous change of the political course made by Anwar as-Sadat in the early 1970s.⁷ Especially after the Yom Kippur war (1973), when Cairo began peaceful negotiations with Israel (established and finished with the active mediation of the U.S. diplomacy). The achievement of peace between Egypt and Israel was the way to achieve two main goals of Washington's Middle Eastern strategy – security of Israel as the main priority of the American Middle Eastern policy and protection of the oil deliveries from the Gulf.⁸

According to Gilles Kepel the peace with Egypt paralyzed all potential military offensives against Israel. From that moment any effective war without Egypt was actually not possible. This is the reason why the Camp David agreement – which sealed the Egyptian-Israeli peace in March 1979 – was widely regarded as a great success of the American diplomacy. Washington assured the victory for Israel because – as Kepel said – it “has bought” its main opponent (pulled out from its former alliance with the Soviet Union).⁹

The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, as well as establishing a closer relationship with Washington, greatly rearranged priorities within the Egyptian foreign affairs, what indirectly resulted in being ruled out from Arab League for many years. Despite the difficult position and occasional tensions – as in 1982 when Israel, having taken advantage of the Egyptian peace treaty, invaded Lebanon (the treaty guaranteed security of Israeli western border) – the Washington-Cairo-Jerusalem triangle survived until the first decade of XXI century. The relations between these three countries also endured the 1990's and the first years of XXI century with American invasions on Iraq, Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations and the war with terrorism.¹⁰

Not before the presidency of Mubarak, who maintained his image as a great reformer and the one to stabilize the sphere of Egyptian political life, did Egypt return to Arab League while maintaining alliance with the USA and Israel. It secured its strong position among Middle Eastern and North African countries but also triggered unrest among a large part of Egyptian society and resulted in boost of terrorist activity. Terrorism, however, was skillfully used by the government to strengthen its control over the

⁷ See Michał Lipa, Aleksandra Wilczura, “The political implications of liberalization of the Egyptian economy,” in *Transformation in Poland and in the Southern Mediterranean: Sharing Experiences*, ed. Katarzyna Żukrowska (Warszawa: Szkoła Główna Handlowa, 2010), 244-257.

⁸ Peter Calvocoressi, *Polityka Międzynarodowa 1945-2000* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 2002), 427-442; Georges Corm, *Bliski Wschód w Ogniu. Oblicza Konflikty 1956-2003* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, 2003), 273-277 and Jerzy Zdanowski, *Historia Bliskiego Wschodu w XX Wieku* (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 2010), 196-205.

⁹ Gilles Kepel, *Fitna. Wojna w Sercu Islamu* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, 2006), 36.

¹⁰ Michael Doran, “Egypt,” in *Diplomacy in the Middle East. The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers*, ed. L. Carl Brown (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 116-119.

society and extend the scale of repressions towards political opposition. Thanks to the American aid, Egypt succeeded in modernizing and greatly expanding the army, which not only served as a fundament of authoritarian rule, but also was one of the most important elements of Middle Eastern balance of power. Cairo played an important role in mediating in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Egyptian diplomacy succeeded in rebuilding its position in the Arab World and at the same time maintaining very good relations with the USA and proper with the State of Israel.¹¹

Supporting Egypt was also beneficial to the USA – especially in the times of the Cold War. On one hand the Egyptian regime was in desperate need for help in order to rescue its drowning economy and was forced to open itself to Western and international aid. On the other hand, internal reforms and, to some extent liberalization, as well as improving laws of private possession were necessary to attract foreign and domestic investors, who had preferred to do business abroad, usually in the counties of the Persian Gulf, without the fear of nationalization and bounds of extensive bureaucratic apparatus. In order to realize such economical open-up to international free market – Cairo did not have a choice and had to become one of the key-allies of the United States in the Middle East and North Africa.¹²

In the following years Egypt started to receive the second largest (after Israel and as a non-NATO state) support for the military and economic purposes. Americans began to render the financial aid to Egypt in 1975 with the transfer of \$370 million for the purpose of the Egyptian economy. American aid for Egypt was successively growing and amounted \$943 million in 1978. Subsequently (in 1979) it reached – after a signature of the peace treaty with Israel – the sum of \$1.1 billion for economic purposes and \$1.5 billion for military expenses. In next 20 years the American financial assistance for Egypt – for both economic aims and the army – reached the average sum of \$2.2 billion annually. At the end of XX century Washington began to reduce this economic support by about 5% per year in order to decrease the subsidizing of the Egyptian economy about 50% within the next 10 years. It was related to the strategy called „aid to trade,” where the military support has remained on the level of \$1.3 billion. Thereby, in 2008 the scale of the financial support for the Egyptian economy amounted only \$411 million. Until 2008 – within more than 30 years – Washington transferred to the Arab Republic of Egypt more than \$66 billion. It is proper to mention that Americans did not use an appropriate financial encouragement to support the political reforms during the Cold War, because Washington was afraid that successful establishment of political freedoms would force the communists to double their efforts in Egypt.¹³

¹¹ Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “The Foreign Policy of Egypt,” in *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, ed. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder-London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 107-106.

¹² Eberhard Kienle, *A Grand Delusion. Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt* (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 131-153; Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak*, 133-218; Robert Springborg “An Evaluation of the Political System at the End of the Millennium,” in *Egypt in the Twenty First Century: Challenges for Development*, ed. M. Riad El-Ghonemy (London-New York: Routledge-Curzon, 2003), 191.

¹³ Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak*, 4-6; Denis J. Sullivan, “Bureaucratic Politics in Development Assistance: The Failure of American Aid in Egypt,” *Administration & Society* 23, no. 1 (1991): 29-53, <http://aas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/23/1/29> (accessed December 20, 2010).

Fiscal Year	Economic	Military	IMET	Total
1948-1997	23,288.6	22,353.5	27.3	45,669.4
1998	815.0	1,300.0	1.0	2,116.0
1999	775.0	1,300.0	1.0	2,076.0
2000	727.3	1,300.0	1.0	2,028.3
2001	695.0	1,300.0	1.0	1,996.0
2002	655.0	1,300.0	1.0	1,956.0
2003	911.0	1,300.0	1.2	2,212.2
2004	571.6	1,292.3	1.4	1,865.3
2005	530.7	1,289.6	1.2	1,821.5
2006	490.0	1,287.0	1.2	1,778.2
2007	450.0	1,300.0	1.3	1,751.3
2008	411.6	1,289.4	1.2	1,702.2
Total	30,320.8	36,611.8	39.8	66,972.4

Table 1: Recent U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt (USD – in millions).¹⁴

The Egyptian-American alliance cannot be reduced to the notions of Egyptian financial benefit, the Cold War or the security of the State of Israel, despite the fact that those three might have been the most important factors. In the eyes of Egyptian entrepreneurs the alliance with the USA resulted in including the Egyptian market in the world system of free economy. In turn, American diplomats have gained an important mediator in their talks with other Arab countries. The Egyptian authorities, as such ally, served as an extension of American and (to a lesser extent) Israeli interests in the Arab world and by doing so secured its own political position, for Anti-American environments also threatened the Egyptian regime itself.

During the next few years it also resulted in easing tensions between Israel and some of the countries like Morocco and Jordan.¹⁵ However, the Egyptian president had bigger ambitions – to free himself from his dependence on Washington by working on establishing relations with Europe. Moreover, the Egyptian army, vastly expanded and modernized thanks to the American aid, once again became a potential threat to Jerusalem or at least strengthened the position of Arab countries in case a confrontation with Israel occurs. What is worth to note is that Egypt achieved this without jeopardizing its alliance with the USA or its eastern neighbor and fulfilling all of its contracted obligations.¹⁶

The American attitudes towards Mubarak’s regime began to change after the fall of the Soviet empire. However, not before 9/11 have the Americans fully realized that it was the deficit of democracy what favored the terrorism.¹⁷ Issues of democracy and

¹⁴ Jeremy M. Sharp, “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,” *Congressional Research Service*, last modified May 12, 2009, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/124082.pdf>.

¹⁵ Hinnebusch, “The Foreign Policy of Egypt,” 108.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 108-112.

¹⁷ More on this issue in Dalia Dassa Kaye, Frederic Wehrey, Audra K. Grant, Dale Stahl, *More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World* (Santa Monica-Arlington-Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2008), 29-55, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG772.pdf (accessed December 10, 2011).

human rights had rarely been brought under debate in the context of the Middle East before that. The democratization of the Middle Eastern countries became one of the priorities of American foreign affairs after the Americans have felt on their own skin where to lead the social attitudes caused by Arab authoritarianisms. Therefore, the Administration of George W. Bush added another goal to the American Middle Eastern strategy – democratization of the Arab states.¹⁸ Americans acknowledged officially, that deficit of the political pluralism and lack of the democratic mechanisms of the power alternation favor the development of the extremist version of Islamism, as well as terrorism. They have also started to believe, that the democratic states should be more favorable to the United States. Condoleezza Rice – supporting the idea of democratization – ascertained in that time, that “for 60 years the United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in the Middle East – and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of the people.”¹⁹ Thereafter, as recorded in The National Security Strategy from March 2006, an aim of the American diplomacy is “to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”²⁰ It has been based on this notion that democratic states are more stable, richer and more diplomatic in relations with their neighbors than non-democratic countries. The actions did not take long to follow the words and in the period from 2002 until 2006 the American government transferred \$400 million to the Middle East Partnership Initiative, seeking ways to increase political involvement of civil society and reinforce the independent judiciary. Then the Congress spent another \$250 million for the similar purposes. Moreover, from 2001 to 2005 the general budget for promotion of democracy in the Middle East was expanded from \$27 million to \$105 million. Most resources have been directed to Iraq, where the idea of forced democratization did not bring the intended results. It is proper to emphasize that this amount was a drop in the bucket and looked rather poorly when compared to huge expenditures for military purposes. The statements both by the U.S. President Barack Obama and the Secretary of the State in his government Hillary Clinton suggest that the promotion of democracy will not be discontinued but will take different forms.²¹

In the first years of XXI century the American Congress was heated up by a debate whether aiding Cairo should depend on Egyptian progress in securing civil rights and liberties or rather securing the border with Gaza Strip. The main issue of the debate was illegal transit of goods including arms and explosives for Hamas militants in support of their armed struggle with the Jewish state. Many Congressmen reckoned that the American aid was not efficient in advocating liberal reforms in Egypt. It was suggested that treaties should be re-negotiated and made strictly dependent on fulfilling American demands. For instance, in 2008 it was proposed that the military aid should be lowered by a few millions of dollars until the Egyptian authorities succeed in imple-

¹⁸ More on the issue of American promotion of democracy in Andrzej Kapiszewski, *The Changing Middle East. Selected Issues in Politics and Society in the Gulf* (Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza AMF, 2006), 13-47.

¹⁹ Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak*, 7.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 7-11.

menting necessary respect for freedom and civil rights, securing independence of Egyptian judiciary and severely restraining weapon smuggling to the Gaza Strip. Despite Egyptian public opinion's protests and comments, warning that imposing unreasonable conditions on the Egyptian side might jeopardize the mutual relations, the Congress agreed to decrease the aid.

However, in the face of growing tensions in Palestine, Cairo had the advantage of exclusiveness in mediating in not only the conflict between the Israeli State and Palestinian Autonomy, but also the internal Palestinian conflict between Hamas and Fatah. Despite common doubts the U.S. government still allocates about \$1.3 billion annually for Egyptian military purposes (military aid is divided into 3 general components: acquisitions, upgrades to existing equipment, and follow-on support). It is estimated that about 30% of these funds are allocated in acquiring American military systems in order to replace old Soviet equipment. Moreover, Egypt benefits from a project called Excess Defense Articles. Egyptian officers also actively participate in Egyptian-American military trainings.²²

The most evident shift in American foreign policy towards Mubarak's regime since 1998 applied to the greatly reduced economic support. At the same time the U.S. government also lessened its support for Israeli economy, however, funds allocated in Israeli military have been relatively increased. It provoked tensions on the Egyptian side, which was receiving the same amount of money for military purposes (with prices of arms having been raised Egypt was *de facto* getting less support). At the same time the budget of the Egyptian Armed Forces was expanding over the years and reached \$4.5 billion in 2010.²³ The reasons of such a shift in American foreign policy can be found in the emphasis that the Americans wanted to put on civic reforms and education in order to stimulate civil society as well as processes of democratization and securing human rights. On the other hand Egyptian economy was itself – from the global crisis' and the macroeconomic point of view – undergoing a dynamic growth and did not need as much help as before. The Americans preferred to allocate the resources in intensifying trade and providing the growing Egyptian market with access to American goods and services.²⁴

Conclusion

In the first years of XXI century the biggest challenge for American diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa was to agree the strategic alliance with Egypt and promotion of civil rights and liberties. Pro-democratic postulates were gaining more and more notability in the Egyptian public opinion eventually resulting in the eruption of protests in January 2011. With the secular (liberal) opposition growing in strength the issue of democratic reforms could no longer be ignored. The Egyptian public opinion could not be as easily swayed by the supposed treat of the Muslim Brotherhood (at the

²² Sharp, "Egypt," 1-30.

²³ Michał Lipa, „Pat nad Nilem,” *Polska Zbrojna*, March 13, 2011, 50.

²⁴ Sharp, "Egypt," 29-30.

time the most organized political opposition), whose actions for decades served the government as a convenient excuse for delaying democratic reforms. Young political activists demanded that the U.S. put more pressure on the Egyptian authorities, for whom democratization at that point was almost a certain ticket to losing all political power. In that perspective the Egyptian regime had no other way to escape the American pressure than to claim it „an external interference in Egyptian domestic affairs.”²⁵

This tendency, which we could observe in the actions of the U.S. government, seems to be aimed at the opponents of Arab – and the Egyptian – democracies. Time will tell whether the American administration has truly redefined the goals of its foreign policy in the long term. The support for the Egyptian army seems to calm the situation and provide loyalty of the Egyptian executive irrespectively of who is its actual leader (Mubarak or any other person representing the non-democratic elite) as long as the safety under the American umbrella is guaranteed. However, to turn on the democratic machine is to risk that – at least at the beginning – the political power is ceased by groups unwilling to cooperate (namely the Islamists), neither by realizing American personal recommendations nor by taking into account American interests in the long term.

It is hard to say whether this was a deliberate turn of events, but it cannot be denied that the American influence on the stabilization of the Egyptian authoritarianism has been gradually decreased in previous years. As the opposition grew in power the American government – knowing the public sentiments – must have realized that further support for the Egyptian authoritarian regime did not agree with their real goals. Arab societies tend to voice their demands of democratization and equal access to political power more and more openly, therefore supporting autocrats would not only disagree with the American image of a model democracy but also not serve its policy well. When the Americans realized that further support for a non-democratic regime is no longer of any benefit, they started to increase their support for democratic reforms and reinforcing the structures of civil society. However, it does not mean that the U.S gave up their role as an ally and supporter of Egypt as a state. It rather gives a signal that the one to be put aside is Mubarak and his regime. In the coming years it can be assumed that the U.S. government will continue to support democratic transformation of the largest Arab country and maintain good relations with the elites of Egyptian military and intelligence. A controlled and gradual democratization is to be expected – with army and security sectors as its key actors.

²⁵ Ibid.

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MIGRATION OF CHRISTIANS OUT OF IRAQ – SITUATION AND PERSPECTIVES

Since American troops invaded Iraq in 2003, the public opinion has regularly been receiving alarming reports on systematic deterioration of living conditions among the representatives of ethnic and religious minorities in the country – Christians, Yazidis, Mandaeans, as well as Turkmen, Shabaks, Baha'is, Yarsanis (Arabic: *Ahl e-Haqq*), Faili Kurds and others. For centuries, Iraq had been regarded as a rare example of successful and peaceful cohabitation and various national and religious groups in the Middle East. Recently, however, it has been gradually losing its syncretic character.

According to records of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, among 1.8 million Iraqis currently exiled in neighboring Jordan, Syria and other countries of the region, 30% are representatives of the minorities mentioned above. This article strives to present a brief review of the present situation of Iraqi Christians based on the reports of international organizations and Arabic sources.

Christians are the largest non-Muslim religious minority in Iraq, comprising currently about 2.3% of Iraqi population – predominantly the native Assyro-Chaldeans. Christians are traditionally divided into the Chaldean Catholic Church (originating from Nestorianism and maintaining full communion with Rome), the Assyrian Church of the East (as followers of Nestorius separated doctrinally from the Roman Catholic Church), the Syriac Church (Catholic and Orthodox rites), the Armenian Church (Catholic and Apostolic Orthodox), and other smaller religious communities (including Protestants, Presbyterians, Anglicans). The vast majority of Iraqis are Muslims comprising currently around 97% of Iraqi population.²

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² The largest Muslim minority in Iraq are the Turkmen - about 3-4% of the population. Turkmen are both Sunni and Shiite, followed by Kurds (Kurdish *feyli*) and Shabaks who are predominantly Shiites. The Iraqi religious mosaic is complemented by gnostic Mandaeans (Sabaeans), monotheistic Yazidis, Yarsanis as well as Baha'is and a small group of Jews. There are also a few communities of immigrants or refugees from abroad the biggest of which is the Palestinian diaspora numbering about 15 thousand people (35 thousand

Iraq always has been the homeland for the faithful of the Chaldean, Assyrian and Syriac Churches – a place from which the faith, tradition and culture of their fathers have originated. They live mainly in the north – the region of Kirkuk, the Nineveh plains, as well as Baghdad, Basra and their surroundings. The Christians of the East use traditionally Neo-Aramaic dialects.³ They derive their origin from the oldest civilizations of the Fertile Crescent, proud to trace their history back to the earliest Christians in the Middle East.⁴ In recent decades, for temporary political purposes, a part of Assyro-Chaldeans was arbitrarily counted by Iraqi authorities as Arab or Kurdish nationalities. This does not change the fact that most Iraqis are aware of their distinct ethnicity.

Also the ethnic and religious Armenian minority has been residing in Iraq long before the advent of Christianity there. After the genocide committed by Ottoman Turks in 1915 against Armenians, a new wave of Armenian immigration came to Iraq, settling in areas of Kirkuk, Mosul, Zakho, as well as Baghdad and Basra, where a number of Armenian villages, schools and churches were built.⁵

The number of Christians in Iraq decreased during the last 20 years from 1.4 million to about 600-700 thousand (a drop from 7% to 2.5% of the total population).⁶ A constant process of collective emigration of indigenous Christian communities has been observed, especially in recent years, they are still being regarded as pro-western coalition allies and targeted by extremists. The Christian exodus is triggered, as in the case of other ethnic and religious Iraqi minorities, by numerous acts of terror against them. Reports of independent non-governmental organizations are filled by statistics updating year by year the numbers of destroyed churches (burnt down, blown up, etc.), attacks targeting clergymen and worshippers during participation in religious ceremonies, murders of religious leaders, abductions for ransom (including children), lawless evictions into the street, forcing payment of *jizya* or conversion to Islam, rapes, intimidations, demolishing private property, forced marriages, etc. Similar repressions involve not only Christians but also to varying extent representatives of other Iraqi minorities.⁷

Today one can certainly put the thesis that Iraq as a country is unfortunately drifting towards Islamic monoreligiousness and authoritarianism of two dominant cultures – Arabic and Kurdish. On the one hand it is understandable that in the era of political

in 2003). Some of them settled in Iraq in 1948, others were already born in place. *CIA World Factbook* (data of March 2008), and the report by Minority Rights Group International, "Assimilation, Exodus, Eradication: Iraq's minority communities since 2003," February 2007.

³ More on this in an article by Maciej Tomal, „Nowoaramejski – język irackich chrześcijan i żydów,” in *Niemuzulmańskie mniejszości Iraku: historia, kultura, problemy przetrwania*, ed. Michael Abdalla (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2008).

⁴ Affas Bahnam Fadil, *Al-Hadara al-Masihyya fi-l-Iraq 'abra al usur [Christian culture in Iraq across the ages]* (Melbourne: [publisher not identified], 2008).

⁵ Qazangi Fu'ad Yusuf, *Al-Masihyya fi-l-'alam al-'arabi [Christianity in the Arab World]*, Amman: Maktabat Amman - Al-Ma'had al-Maliki li-d-Dirasat ad-Diniyya, 2007).

⁶ Harald Dörig, *Die Flucht religiöser Minderheiten aus dem Irak und die Haltung Europas: Zentrale Veranstaltungen des Landes Thüringen zur Interkulturellen Woche Meinungen 27 September 2008* (Erfurt: Der Ausländerbeauftragte beim Thüringer Ministerium für Soziales, Familie und Gesundheit, 2008).

⁷ Abbèd Zuhayr Kadim, „Mihnat al-adyan fi-l-'Iraq,” *Al-Nasra* 40, no. 3 (Amman: Al-Ma'had al-Maliki li-d-Dirasat ad-Diniyya, 2007): 20-23, <http://208.112.119.94/nashra/nashraopening2.htm> (accessed January 3, 2011).

uncertainty of the future, both Arabs and Kurds are trying to strengthen their own influence and secure as many rights as possible in their areas of dominion, and to defend the interests of their own communities. However, this usually happens at the expense of indigenous minorities, including Christians, who – due to their small number and other factors – are actually left defenseless.

According to the estimates of the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement for year 2007, over the past years half of the population of Iraq's ethnic minorities and religious groups has already left the country.⁸ Some of them have lived in Iraq for 2 millennia or more. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Baghdad Andreos Abouna (1943-2010) reported that since 2003 half of all Iraqi Christians have emigrated abroad.⁹ An independent report by The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) entitled "Minorities in Iraq" from early 2009 informed that 60% of Iraqi Christians were forced to flee their homeland escaping to other places in the country or abroad.¹⁰ Only every hundredth displaced person returned home after some time. Attempts to stop this exodus have failed despite strong lobbying and assistance from foreign Iraqi Christian diasporas and NGOs.

These data are confirmed by the statistics of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. According to them, since 2003 till 2006 hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have emigrated abroad to neighboring countries.¹¹ Up to 30% of the refugees were representatives of Iraqi minorities.¹² In Syria, 44% of Iraqi refugees who came to the country after December 2003 are – according to U.N. figures – Christians.¹³ Jordan also has also been hosting bigger waves of Christian emigrants – e.g. the highest proportion of Iraqi migrants to Amman in the first months of 2006 was Assyro-Chaldeans. In total, it is estimated that recently 2 million Iraqis found themselves in exile, including 1.4 million in Syria (which is approximately 8% of the total Syrian population),¹⁴ 750 thousand in

⁸ IRIN, "Iraq: Minorities living tormented days under sectarian violence," IRIN News, January 4, 2007, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/62981/iraq-minorities-living-tormented-days-under-sectarian-violence> (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁹ Simon Caldwell, "Half of all Christians have fled Iraq since 2003, says Baghdad bishop," Catholic News Service, 8 August 2006, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1680062/posts> (accessed January 5, 2011).

¹⁰ Mokhtar Lamani, "CIGI Special Report: Minorities in Iraq – the other victims," The Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 2009, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/minorities_in_iraq_final.pdf (accessed January 5, 2011).

¹¹ UNHCR, "Iraq displacement," *UNHCR Briefing Notes*, November 3, 2006, <http://www.unhcr.org/454b1f8f2.html> (accessed January 5, 2011).

¹² See IRIN, "Iraq: Minorities living tormented days under sectarian violence."

¹³ The article was based on an unpublished report of the UNHCR High Commissioner; see Mark Lattimer, "In 20 years there will be no more Christians in Iraq," *The Guardian*, 26 October 2006, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/06/religion.iraq> (accessed January 5, 2011).

¹⁴ According to a report on Iraq 2008 published by Prof. Harald Dörig who participated in a study visit in Iraq called "Missio" in autumn 2007, there already existed in Syria communes with no Syrian inhabitants, but only Iraqis. Till October 2007, Iraqis were allowed to travel to Syria without visas. Daily over 2,000 Iraqis entered Syria, so finally Damascus introduced visa regime. Iraqis can apply for Syrian visa only in Baghdad where security situation remains tense. It is worth noting that refugees in Syria are granted the status of visitors (*wafideen*) - it is normally expected from a visitor to leave the country after a certain time. Iraqi refugees in Syria struggle to receive work permits. At the same time prices of real estate and food significantly rose in Syria due to high demand from Iraqis. Almost all Iraqi newcomers live in rented flats, or, a minority of them, in pilgrimage centers. There are no refugee camps similar to the Palestinian camps in the Middle East. Iraqis finance their stay with their own savings, receive remittances from their families

Jordan,¹⁵ and tens of thousands in Egypt and Lebanon. At the same time, according to the information of the Iraqi Red Crescent, 46 thousand people, mainly Arabs, returned from their exile to Iraq mostly from Syria and Iran. Among returnees no representatives of ethnic minorities or religious minorities were registered: Christians, Mandaeans or Yazidis.¹⁶ According to UNHCR, another 1.46 million people have been internally displaced in Iraq since March 2003 till the end of 2007.¹⁷ Some of them, in the face of inadequate living conditions or a total lack of shelter may ultimately decide to emigrate abroad. Iraqi ethnic and religious minorities constitute only 5% of the country's population but as much as 20% of the displaced Iraqis.¹⁸

Minorities fall victim to the lack of stability in the country particularly because of their own ethno-religious background. Christians are stereotypically associated with the West, with the multinational coalition forces in Iraq, including in particular the Americans. Yazidis were declared by Muslim extremists as "unclean." Mandaeans, for whom the mere fact of carrying weapons is a violation of their religious law, are limited in self-defense when facing acts of violence. Followers of Baha'i remain without the right to Iraqi citizenship, freedom of movement and freedom to profess their faith. Even the Iraqi Palestinian community, once favored by the Baath Party for political purposes, is now targeted by the extremists.

Ethnic and religious communities living in particularly inflammatory or economically attractive regions of Iraq (including oil-rich areas) such as Mosul, Basra and Kirkuk have found themselves in the middle of political struggle waged between the Kurds, Sunni and Shia Arabs. Originally, many Iraqi minorities openly supported the overthrow of the Baath regime by Americans in 2003, in the hope of a groundbreaking improvement of living conditions in Iraq. However, the current political situation,

in Iraq, or work illegally, including children. Every three months, one family member (usually the father) has to visit Baghdad in order to extend the residence permit. See Dörig, *Die Flucht*, 10.

Compare with Harald Dörig, "The flight of religious minorities from Iraq – Impressions from a journey with a delegation of experts to countries of asylum in the Middle East," in *Asylum for Iraqi Refugees – Background Information The situation of non-Muslim refugees in countries bordering on Iraq*, ed. Klaus Barwig, Otmar Oehring (Aachen: Pontifical Mission Society-Human Rights Office, 2009).

¹⁵ Next to Syria, Jordan has received the biggest number of Iraqi refugees (13% of its population). Initially, the Jordanian authorities allowed them to stay for 6 months. For a longer time, about 2-3 thousand Iraqis crossed the Jordanian border daily. Unlike in Syria, the Iraqi refugees needed visas from the beginning to enter Jordan. Only 150 thousand wealthier Iraqis received directly long-term residence permits, other refugees (with the *wafideen* status) are expected to leave the country after a certain time. Since July 2007, the Iraqis would receive only single 3-month visas without the possibility of renewal. Male Iraqis at the age of 15-35 in principle are not issued visas for security reasons, but the Jordanian authorities make a number of exceptions for Christians. After a 3-month period, refugees continue their stay in Jordan illegally, which is subject to a 1.5 euro fine for each day of illegal stay, due on the day of exit. According to the UN Office for Refugees in Amman, the Jordanian authorities, however, tolerate illegal refugees and do not deport them. In the course of the legal stay in Jordan Iraqi refugees have the right to take up employment. However, local labour market is saturated, with a high level of unemployment. Iraqis who work illegally risk imprisonment and deportation. Most Iraqi feel little hope about returning to their country. Their favourite destination countries include the U.S., Australia and Europe. *Ibid.*, 10-11.

¹⁶ "UNHCR Second Rapid Assessment of Return of Iraqis from Displacement Locations in Iraq and from Neighbouring Countries," UNHCR The Refugee Agency, (February 2008): 3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Kathryn Westcott, "Iraq's rich mosaic of people," BBC News, 27 February 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2783989.stm (accessed January 5, 2011).

lack of security and the functioning of many old and new discriminatory legislative acts make their life in Iraq in many respects worse than in the days of Saddam Hussein.

Dozens of international reports appeared worldwide describing the plight of Christians living in Iraq, and the risks associated with it. While undoubtedly all Iraqis irrespective of religion and nationality fall victim to extremism, much of hatred and violence is intentionally inflicted on ethnic and religious minorities, including Christians.

One of the main reasons why Christians have become the target for numerous acts of violence is that from the beginning they have willingly committed themselves to collaborating with foreign companies pouring into Iraq, humanitarian aid organizations, non-governmental organizations working to build the structures of civil society, etc. They were often employed in paramedical services as well as aid centers and various assistance facilities. From the beginning a natural target for the suicide bombers have been people cooperating directly with the coalition forces – translators, humanitarian workers, entrepreneurs, civil service staff supporting the army, journalists, etc. The violence against Christians has intensified after the lecture delivered by Pope Benedict XVI in Regensburg in September 2006 in which the Pope referred to the history of the theological discourse concerning the mission of the Prophet Muhammad.

None of the social groups has escaped assassinations, kidnappings and executions. In 2005 the extremists abducted the Catholic Syrian archbishop of Mosul. The Assyrian Orthodox bishop of Baghdad was assaulted in the Iraqi capital. The chairman of the Christian Democratic Party of Iraq became a victim of extremists.¹⁹ Many have been repeatedly kidnapped (also for ransom) and killed, including priests, nuns, monks and other clergymen, as well as Christian officers serving in the Iraqi army, government officials, activists of political parties, academics, representatives of the better-paid professions: doctors, engineers, lawyers. In 2006 at the Baghdad Technical University Christian students became victims of violent attacks by their fellow students for “sympathizing with Americans.”

Attacks against Christian churches and monasteries are often carried out during worship ceremonies on Sundays or public holidays.²⁰ In recent years, a number of churches and religious facilities have been completely destroyed or damaged, including the (antique wooden) Roman-Catholic church of Saint George in Baghdad, the Chaldean church of Saint George in Baghdad, the Assyrian church of Saint Matthew in Baghdad, the Armenian church of Saint Paul in Mosul, the Chaldean church El-Tahira where the archbishopric of Mosul resided, the apostolic nunciature in Baghdad, and dozens of others. In many churches religious services had to be held behind shut doors for fear of extremists and pillage.²¹

Regular kidnappings for ransom have for many years plagued Christian merchants and other Christians working traditionally in the tourist sector, restaurants and hotels.

¹⁹ Magdalena Lewicka, „Iraccy Asyrochaldejczyca a process demokracji Iraku,” in *Niemuzulmańskie mniejszości Iraku: historia, kultura, problemy przetrwania*, ed. Michael Abdalla (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2008), 262.

²⁰ IRIN, “Iraq: Minorities living tormented days under sectarian violence,” 9.

²¹ “Wad’ al-’aqalliyat al-masihyya fi-l-’Iraq,” *Al-Nasra* 40, no. 3 (Amman: Al-Ma’had al-Maliki li-d-Dirasat ad-Diniyya, 2007): 24-28, <http://208.112.119.94/nashra/nashraopening2.htm> (accessed January 3, 2011).

Attacks have targeted beauty salons, music stores and audio-video outlets, recording studios, facilities with dance floors, casinos, etc.²² Since 2003, 95% of repeatedly plundered and bombed liquor stores in Baghdad, Mosul and Basra have been closed (Christians and Yazidis were the only ones allowed by Saddam Hussein's regime to trade with alcohol).

Many Christians received threatening letters, propaganda leaflets and bullying text messages (sms). Their apartments have been hounded by extremists. In Mosul, Islamic preachers have urged local residents to take out Assyro-Chaldean property because – as explained – “Christians were to leave Iraq as quickly as Jews did in the past.” Owners rejecting to sell their homes or shops were threatened with death. As a result of 2 major waves of persecution against Christians in 2006 and 2008, thousands of families fled Mosul to Ankawy (by Erbil) and other parts of Iraqi Kurdistan. Christian women not wearing the *hijab* and long sleeves have been threatened with death, similarly to beardless men.

What adds to the long list of risks arising from the lack of security is the inability to participate freely in public life, including the exercise of civil rights. During elections representatives of minorities were attacked, intimidated and held back from voting in many other ways. For example, during the elections of 2005 in the district of Nineveh only 93 of 330 polling stations were opened. Ballot boxes and voting cards did not arrive in time. A report of U.S. State Department *International Religions Iraq Freedom Report 2006* informs that in this way a hundred thousand Assyrians have been deprived of their voting rights. There have been numerous cases of counterfeiting, armed intrusions into the polling stations, destruction of ballot boxes with votes and other forms of intimidation of voters.²³

The new Iraqi constitution, adopted through a referendum in 2005, came to being with a disproportionately small participation of Iraqi minorities. Recognized in various ways to be progressive, the constitution is not clear about the role of Islam in the future Iraqi state, which puts a question mark on many issues related to religious freedom. Despite the fact that Christians of various rites living in Iraq have traditionally been regarded by the ruling Muslim majority as the People of the Book (Arabic: *Ahl al-Kitab*), the new authorities of the country have not offered them sufficient protection against extremists violence.²⁴ According to a field study carried out in northern Iraq by a Canadian organization Center for International Innovation (November-December 2008), all enquired representatives of national minorities declared that they would not think of emigration if the new Iraqi Constitution guaranteed them equal civil rights. They added however that they did not believe that this was possible.²⁵ Other reasons to emigrate listed by the participants of the survey included the following: lack of primary education opportunities for their children, lack of access to higher education, no pros-

²² Marta Woźniak, „Exodus mniejszości asyrochaldejskiej z Iraku po 11 września 2001 r. w mediach anglojęzycznych,” in *Niemuzułmańskie mniejszości Iraku: historia, kultura, problemy przetrwania*, ed. Michael Abdalla (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2008), 241-257.

²³ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, *International Religious Freedom Report 2006 Iraq*, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71422.htm> (accessed January 5, 2011).

²⁴ IRIN, “Iraq: Minorities living tormented days under sectarian violence,” 8.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

pects of employment, lack of social assimilation in the living environment, high level of frustration and lack of interest in their situation from the outside.

The Christians seeking protection cannot always rely on the reconstructed Iraqi security forces, army, police or other bodies of justice. According to a human rights report of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq UNAMI from December 2006, a high degree of corruption within the security forces has been reported.²⁶ They are partly being formed without the participation of the ethnic minorities. What is more, Arab Sunnis and Shiites, use their own paramilitary militia to secure their own rights.

A separate issue is the restitution of the property lost during the rule of the Baath Party. This concerns primarily the northern part of the country which for decades has been subjected to systematic Arabization and – recently – Kurdification.²⁷ While for Arabs and Kurds themselves the issue of returning home from displacement and recovering their property is an extremely complicated and sensitive matter in both legal and practical terms, for Iraqi minorities it borders on the impossible. The rights of religious communities, including Christians, have become one of many bargaining chips in the political struggle between Arabs and Kurds fighting to have their lost lands returned to them. Still in the population censuses carried out between 1987 and 1997 Assyrians were forced to choose between the Arabic or Kurdish nationality. Later, under a state decree issued in 2001 the nationality of many Assyrians was administratively re-registered into the Arab one which was followed by a forced displacement of these new “Arab” Assyrians into the strategic economic region of Kirkuk. Now, after 2003, in the era of planned restitution of land, religious and ethnic minorities have come under new pressure, this time from the Kurds. Reports of NGOs have informed that in the region of Kirkuk and the Nineveh plains local minorities are being forced to identify themselves as Kurds and to support Kurdish political parties, so as to strengthen Kurdish demands in the struggle to recover lands lost in favor of the Arabs.²⁸ In the Nineveh plains, representatives of ethnic minorities seldom have a chance to find a job without joining the Democratic Party of Kurdistan.²⁹ In addition to that, it is not infrequent for armed paramilitary forces to mete out justice on their own. Often the motives of these crimes are issues related to the recovery of lost property.

Christians and many other Iraqi minorities facing deteriorating living conditions can opt for one of the following: lobbying in Iraq and abroad for their wider representation in government bodies able to provide for their basic needs and guarantee their rights, striving to create special autonomous districts for their own protection, trying to flee abroad to settle down in Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iran or European countries. On the other hand, the option of staying in Iraq and continuing the fight for their rights could be justified by the hope that the situation of Iraqi minorities may gradually improve

²⁶ UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), *Human Rights Report*, May 1-June 30, 2006, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/May-June06-new_en.pdf (accessed January 5, 2011).

²⁷ See Piotr Pochyły, “Kurdowie iraccy wobec inwazji na Irak w 2003 roku,” *Studia Bliskowschodnie* 1 (2011): 122-134.

²⁸ IRIN, “Iraq: Minorities living tormented days under sectarian violence,” 17.

²⁹ Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project, *Report: An Assyrian Administrative Unit: Ending the Exodus of Iraq's Most Vulnerable*, February 8, 2006, www.aina.org/reports/isdppb20060802.pdf (accessed January 5, 2011).

along with the awaited overall normalization of the situation in the country. Unfortunately, a large number of people no longer have the strength to fight and decide to leave Iraq,³⁰ in particular because they feel completely excluded from the political process. There is also little hope that stabilization might be achieved through dividing Iraq into three autonomous regions – Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish, a frequently recurring idea.

Facing this situation, the Iraqi Minorities Council has officially put forward the more and more popular idea to declare the relatively peaceful area of the plains of Nineveh inhabited by Iraqi minorities an autonomous district subordinate directly to Baghdad, not to the Kurdish authorities.³¹ This concept gained more publicity after the Kurdish parliament voted in May 2009 to reject the proposal to amend the electoral law for municipal councils by introducing a quota of 23 seats restricted for non-Kurdish minorities into it. At the same time, Assyrian communities on their part continue to lobby for the so-called Assyrian Administrative Area where representatives of various ethnic and religious minorities could find a place to live. Both ideas are plausible from the perspective of the Iraqi constitution. It may be the only solution to stop the exodus of minorities from Iraq. Reports of international organizations show that the only hope for survival of ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq could be to further decentralize the national administration - giving the minorities a degree of geo-political autonomy as a counterweight to the idea of strengthening the hegemony of the Kurds in Kurdistan or of returning to the authoritarianism of Baghdad. However, from the perspective of Kurdish nationalist and their interests in northern Iraq, the implementation of the idea of autonomy for the Nineveh plains - an area of great strategic importance for the Kurds – is totally out of the question. Kurdish authorities in the region pursue an extensive (though never officially announced) policy of subduing the Assyro-Chaldean community using various (legal and illegal) means in order to tighten the Kurdish political monopoly over the entire area of northern Iraq.

In Western Europe and the U.S. there emerged an idea to create quotas for receiving a number of Iraqi refugees (the so called resettlement plan). In April 2008, the head of the German diplomacy Wolfgang Schäuble advocated for this pan-European solution. The E.U. legal mechanism (yet unused) has already existed since July 2001. It has been defined in the Council Directive 2001/55/EC “on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof.” The E.U. Directive states that “cases of mass influx of displaced persons who cannot return to their country of origin have become more substantial in Europe in recent years. In these cases it may be necessary to set up exceptional schemes to offer them immediate temporary protection.” Article 5 of the Directive provides that the process of receiving displaced persons should be initiated by the European Commission (based on proposals submitted by Member States), and the

³⁰ Sahatit Bassam, *Kanīsat as-sarq ‘ala as-salīb, w: An-Nasra, Al-Ma’had al-Maliki li-d-Dirasat ad-Diniyya Amman*, nr 38, 1/2007.

³¹ Conference on Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Iraq, Draft recommendations, Amman, Jordan, July 2006 was included in the report of IRIN, see IRIN, “Iraq: Minorities living tormented days under sectarian violence,” 30.

decision is adopted by a qualified majority by the European Council. Next, according to Article 25, “Member States (...) shall indicate – in figures or in general terms – their capacity to receive such displaced persons.”³² This applies to displaced persons who have not yet arrived in the E.U. – for example Iraqis living in Iraq or in other non-E.U. countries, like Syria and Jordan. The displaced persons receive a permit for a fixed period, which may be extended, or retrained for an indefinite period.

This EU solution seemed close in early 2008. However, following the intervention by the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (who opposed in July 2008 the mass emigration of skilled workers during the reconstruction process in Iraq) it was shelved in autumn 2008. Nevertheless, indecisiveness of the European Union does not necessarily impede the implementation of the resettlement idea by individual Member States on a national basis.

A touch of optimism can be found in the UNHCR report from the first half of 2008.³³ The number of people forced to migrate inside Iraq itself has been gradually decreasing since September 2007 thanks to a slight security improvement in the regions of Baghdad and other provinces including the flashpoint Al-Anbar district, as well as due to the process of ethnic homogenization taking place in some regions of northern Iraq.

All in all, looking from the perspective of recent years, there exists a real danger that the current situation will lead to a loss of the rich cultural heritage and traditions of Iraq which has always been the pride of all Iraqis. Although religious and ethnic minorities living in Iraq have survived a history of dozens or perhaps hundreds of years of war and persecution, the current ongoing conflict in Iraq may now be their last.³⁴

³² “Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof,” *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 212, vol. 44, (August 7, 2001): 12-23, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2001:212:TOC> (accessed January 5, 2011).

³³ “Iraq displacement,” 3.

³⁴ Al-Gamil Sayyar, “Al-Masihyyun al-Iraqiyyun: qira’a fi-l-mustaqbal,” *Al-Nasra* 40, no. 3 (Amman: Al-Ma’had al-Maliki li-d-Dirasat ad-Diniyya, 2007):15-19.

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THE CONCEPT OF “STRATEGIC DEPTH” AND THE FUTURE OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

The purpose of this paper is to make a contribution to the understanding of the new doctrine of Turkish foreign policy implemented after the electoral victory of the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP*) in November 2002. In this article the AKP political platform is analyzed as a moderate pro-Islamic party because of its past connections toward the Islamic National Outlook Movement of Necmettin Erbakan.²

Since the concept of “strategic depth” is currently one of the main factors that has an impact on the usefulness of the geostrategic position in the region, in the theoretical framework of Turkish foreign policy it is supposed to be based on the agenda of “a zero problems policy with neighbors.” This new political doctrine was the brainchild of Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Chief Foreign Adviser to the Turkish prime minister and since May 2009 Turkey’s foreign minister.

The concept of “strategic depth” is based on the idea of taking full advantage of Turkey’s political and strategic position between Europe and Asia. According to the basic principle of this policy – which was first presented in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s book published in 2000³ – Turkey possesses a “strategic depth” thanks to its geographical position, one that gives it geostrategic potential. This fact makes Turkey best positioned

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² In literature on the topic, all the Islamic political parties were connected to the political thought of N. Erbakan and known as the organizations of the National Outlook Movement tradition (*Millî Görüş Hareketi*). It should be noted that on this point, the first party was the National Order Party (*Millî Nizam Partisi*), second, the National Salvation Party (*Millî Selamet Partisi*), third the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*) and fourth the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*). After the Virtue Party was shot down by the Constitutional Court, a group of MPs and some party administrators left it in order to found a new political organization which became the Justice and Development Party. This is one of the reasons that most of the first tranche of politicians – known as moderate leaders – from the AKP came from Erbakan’s National Outlook Movement. Moreover, radicals from this tradition established the Felicity Party (*Saadat Partisi*) which represents ideas of political Islam and a vision of a much more religious oriented state. In essence, this party could not receive a relevant position in the Turkish Grand National Assembly because it was not able to pass 10% of the electoral threshold during the elections.

³ See Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu* [Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position] (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2000).

to play an active role in regional politics in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia.⁴ Furthermore, as is well known to observers of Turkish politics, the location of this state and its military strength in the whole region, gives much evidence that Turkey is a country which is able to bridge East and West.⁵ It is one of the factors on which the concept of “strategic depth” is based and on the multi-dimensional foreign policy approaches toward the Euro-Asiatic areas and regions such as the Balkans, North Africa, the Middle East and the Southern Caucasus. This fact emphasizes the potential for Turkey to play an important and effective role as the “order-instituting country” because of its regional location.⁶

The first way Turkey can achieve this is to become a “problem solver,” especially regarding peace building in the Middle East. The second way is by contributing to stability initiatives in the Balkans, and the third way is by developing regional cooperation with the Central Asian states. Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, Turkish foreign policy should demonstrate a commitment towards cooperation with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in searching for security and legitimacy in accordance with the values of democracy and human rights, both basic pillars of the modern western world.⁷

Yet, my argument is that under the current Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkish foreign policy has entered into a new phase of becoming one of the significant players on the international stage, particularly in the Balkans, the Middle East and Southern Caucasus.

Nevertheless, if EU member countries renege on support for Turkey’s accession into The European Union, Turkey could potentially align itself with the Muslim states including the Islamic Republic of Iran, instead of seeking a closer rapprochement with EU countries. However, if Turkey’s accession to the EU is successful, the geopolitical reality is that the EU’s borders will greatly expand and meet Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Subsequently, the EU member states would all benefit, as they would obtain access to the gas from the Caspian Sea⁸ and to the oil fields in Iraq. Therefore Turkey’s integration into the EU would have important implications regarding its energy security.⁹

In my view, a concept of “strategic depth” and its implication for Turkish foreign policy can be analyzed as the “political sign” for the states of the Euro-Atlantic block

⁴ William Hale, “Turkey and the Middle East in the ‘New Era,’” *Insight Turkey* 11, no. 3 (2009): 144.

⁵ The idea that Turkey is regarded as a bridge country between Europe and Asia, or between East and West is often criticized by Turkish scholars and diplomats. Turkey is a country of transcontinental passage – because it lies between the two continents – and is the most important key for understanding of the geostrategic position of this state. The phrase that Turkey is a “Sleeping Giant of the Middle East” is only a metaphor and should not be analyzed as an oversimplified statement.

⁶ Hale, “Turkey and the Middle East,” 144.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 144.

⁸ See Bülent Aras, Emre İşeri, “The Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline: From Opera to Reality,” *SETA Brief* 34. (July 2009), http://www.la.utexas.edu/users/chenry/oil/2009/SETA_Policy_Brief_No_34_Bulent_Aras_Emre_Iseri_The_Nabucco_Natural_Gas_Pipeline_From_Opera_to_Reality.pdf (accessed January 5, 2011).

The Nabucco Gas Pipeline is the only way for the EU to reduce the import of gas from the Russian Federation and thus diminish Moscow’s capacity to put undue pressure on these European countries. Nabucco is the new energy bridge from Caspian Region and the Middle East to the European consumer markets. See: www.nabucco-pipeline.com.

⁹ See Gökhan Bacık, “Turkey and Pipeline Politics,” *Turkish Studies* 7, no. 2 (June 2006): 293-306.

that Turkey is able to develop a significant position in the region between Europe and Asia, independent from the EU and the United States. But Turkey's future accession to the EU is not certain due to the fact that the negotiating process is still in progress and it is not helped by an increasing opposition to Turkish accession from certain member countries.

The Turkish pro-Islamic AKP government's pro-EU agenda, it can be argued, serves as a strategy to undermine the political dominance of the secular military establishment in order to advance their own political will. The democratization process, according to the regulations of the European Commission, can be regarded as an instrument for the reconstruction of the political system which could have the additional impact of weakening the classic check and balance mechanism in the Turkish political structure.

Under such a system, which possesses a strong authoritarian political culture, drastic reforms could have an implication for the transformation of the political system that would also happen with the reduction of the role of the Kemalist political establishment. This is one of the reasons why the new government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in power for the second time after the election in 2007, has an alternative if the European governments do not accept Turkey into the EU. But this "pro-Islamic alternative" could be an obstacle for international security in the Middle East, particularly with increasing political agitation against the State of Israel. It would then be hard for Turkey to play an unbiased role as power broker in the Middle East peace process. Thus, this scenario could be politically stimulated by the fact that the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, along with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, whose opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU is well known, would prefer that Turkey be a country with a majority Muslim population and become a "privileged partner" of the 27 member block. Moreover, the increasing popularity of the right wing political parties in Western Europe does not help Turkey on its EU accession trajectory. If European states totally turn their backs on Turkey's EU membership aspirations, the geopolitical situation could be altered quite significantly and would have an impact on the entire security situation throughout the Middle East.

Understanding the Justice and Development Party: Political Elites Strategy

The Turkish Prime Minister, despite his political collision with the secular establishment, is a politician who maintained significant influence regarding the development of Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,¹⁰ the one who was put on trial because of the violation of article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code, is a leader who

¹⁰ He started his political carrier as a youth member of the Islamic National Salvation Party led by Necmettin Erbakan. The party was shut down after the military intervention in 1980 but in 1984 he joined the Welfare Party and quickly became the head of its Istanbul branch. After the 1994 local election he was elected to the position of the mayor of the Istanbul municipality. For an overview of the ideological transformation of Recep T. Erdoğan according to Turkish prominent scholars see: Metin Heper, Şule Toktaş, "Islam, Modernity and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan," *Muslim World* 93 Issue 2 (April 2003): 157-185. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan behaves as an authoritarian person and in his political speeches he all too easily uses the techniques of manipulations because he knows the nature of Turkish society.

still has an influence on the development of the domestic policy of modern Turkey. According to this article 312 which prohibits “inciting people to hatred based on religion and race” R.T. Erdoğan, after his trial, was sentenced to jail for 10 months (he served just 4 months and paid a fine) and was banned from politics for life. The reason that he was prosecuted, according to article 312, was that he made a political speech on December 6, 1997 and organized a meeting set up by the Welfare Party in the city of Siirt in the Kurdish populated area in the south eastern region of Turkey. During his speech he used a quotation from the well-known Turkish poet Ziya Gökalp: “minarets are bayonets, domes helmets; mosques are our barracks, and the believers are soldiers.”¹¹

Despite the fact that he was banned from political life, he became a founder member of the AKP on August 14, 2001. The party was composed of modernizers, those who broke from the Islamic traditional core of the National Outlook Movement of the Virtue Party, dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 2001 for being a political center of anti-secular activities.¹² After the landslide victory on November 3, 2002, the AKP came to power with a parliamentary majority and under the patronage of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, his close colleague Abdullah Gül (who has held Presidency since August 28, 2007) took prime ministerial office.

The new parliament introduced amendments to the constitution to allow R. T. Erdoğan to take part in future elections after the Election Board’s decision that this procedure could be done according to the rules of Turkish Electoral Law. He was duly elected to the Parliament on March 11, 2003 and within an hour Prime Minister A. Gül submitted his resignation and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was promptly asked by the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer to form a new government.¹³

It was noted by scholars of Turkish politics that R.T. Erdoğan was able to change his political strategy in order to survive a regime where the political parties were not playing by the rules of Kemalist values, and could easily be dissolved by the Constitutional Court.¹⁴ In the past, the reigning head of the Turkish government was an active politician of the Islamic political parties, the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party as well as being a close friend of N. Erbakan, the Prime Minister who was forced to resign from office under pressure of the National Security Council during the “28 February military memorandum” in 1997.¹⁵

¹¹ Hootan Shambayati, “A Tale of Two Mayors: Courts and Politics in Iran and Turkey,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36, no. 2 (May 2004): 266-269.

¹² See: *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006).

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ See: Ergun Özbudun, “Political Origins of the Turkish Constitutional Court and the Problem of Democratic Legitimacy,” *European Public Law* 12, Issue 2 (2006): 213-223. For more details concerning dissolutions of the pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey by the Constitutional Court see: Dicle Kogacioğlu, “Dissolution of Political Parties by the Constitutional Court in Turkey: Judicial Delimitation of the Political Domain,” *International Sociology* 18, no. 1 (March 2003): 258-276.

¹⁵ For the political rise of the Welfare Party and February 28 decisions of the National Security Council see: Mehran Kamrava, “Pseudo-Democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities: The Rise and Demise of Turkey’s Refah Party,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 2 (November 1998): 275-301; M. Hakam Yavuz, “Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere and the February 28 Process,” *Journal of International Relations* 54, no. 1 (Fall 2000): 21-42.

Moreover, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, at the beginning of his political carrier, was greatly influenced by Sheikh Mehmet Zahid Kotku, the leader of the Islamic Congregation (*İskenderpaşa cemaati*) of the Nakşibendiya Order. The Istanbul branch of this religious movement resisted the Kemalist view on modernization and westernization of the secular Turkish Republic.¹⁶ Since the Islamic political parties were also gaining electoral support from the National Outlook Movement (an umbrella organization above them) the leaders of the newly established AKP could easily have used those political structures to mobilize Turkish citizens during the election campaigns. Moreover they are currently gaining big support from the ideological and structural base of the Fethullah Gülen Movement which owns newspapers, political journals, TV channel, and educational facilities in Turkey and even throughout much of the world.¹⁷ It also has interests in a broad spectrum of lucrative businesses in Turkey and therefore has access to a lot of money for developing and promoting the political aspirations of the movement.¹⁸

Fethullah Gülen, the founding member of this organization, owes a great deal of his knowledge to the teaching of the Islamic thinker Said Nursi (1876-1960). The followers of these two men are from one of the largest and richest religious communities in Turkey. Hence, the politicians of the AKP are using such religious networks in Turkey in order to have an ideological impact on Turkish society. This is one of the reasons that the new ideological shift of R.T. Erdoğan known as the "conservative democratic party" or "moderate pro-Islamic agenda" was only a tactical move to secure the existence of his political organization and consolidate an electoral base of followers of the AKP ideological platform in Turkey.¹⁹

Thus, it should be correct to agree with the prominent Turkish scholar İhsan D. Dağı that "the Justice and Development Party adopted a discourse on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as a means to protect itself against the power of the Kemalist/secularist center" and the party "leaders developed a similar attitude toward the value of human rights as their political parties were closed down, leaders banned from political activities, and associations and foundations intimidated".²⁰ The political

¹⁶ Włodzimierz Julian Korab-Karpowicz, "Turkey under Challenge: Conflicting Ideas and Forces," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 95.

¹⁷ For example, the Fethullah Gülen followers established more than 200 schools in 52 countries and there are 125 private schools in Turkey. The youth that is studying and receiving scholarships from these communities could be the future loyal activists or supporters of the Justice and Development Party. Islamic Movements in Turkey are responsible for educational processes that are part of long distance indoctrination projects for the development and consolidation of the loyal community members. The graduate students, sponsored by the Islamic Movements, can work in the strategic ministries and state institutions. For example, on June 19, 1999, the ATV television channel broadcast a video where F. Gülen was telling to his supporters during the closed meeting to infiltrate state institutions to secure its political goal. Such a method is typical of the Islamic Communities that are playing according to non-violent rules.

¹⁸ Filiz Başkan, "The Fethullah Gülen Community: Contribution or Barrier to the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 41, no. 6 (November 2005): 851.

¹⁹ Compare with William Hale, "Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts," *Turkish Studies* 6, Issue 2 (June 2005): 293-310. The concept to refer to the ideological backgrounds of the conservative democrats was introduced to the Justice and Development Party political agenda by the close adviser to the Turkish Prime Minister professor of political science Yalçın Akdoğan.

²⁰ İhsan D. Dağı, "The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics and Human Rights Discourse in the Search for Security and Legitimacy," in *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006), 96. It is well known in Turkish academics circles that professor İ. D. Dağı is the husband of the Justice and Development Party MP

elites close to R.T. Erdoğan²¹ realized that only by playing according to the rhetoric of human rights' standards and the rule of law, could they continue to exist in an old structure dominated by the establishment and anchored to the ideology of Kemalism and to military officials, the majority of whom are strictly against the consolidation of liberal democracy in Turkey.

Such a power struggle in the case of their national politics opens a gap for the transformation of the Turkish political system and further creates a struggle between the two different camps of political elites. For example, during the Presidential campaigning in the Parliament, General Mehmet Yaşar Büyükanıt, at that time the Chief of the Turkish General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, published on the official website a statement on April 27, 2007 called the 'e-memorandum' where he openly criticized the candidature of Abdullah Gül saying that "the problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism." This was analyzed as another example of the differences between the secular and pro-Islamic political agenda in the mid-term of the Constitutional Court decision concerning the legality of the first round of A. Gül's presidential election. The strategy of the opposition, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP*) the political organization that stands for the secular values of the Turkish Republic, was to open the case against the voting procedure in the Constitutional Court. The decision of the court was in favor of the opposition and declared that the balloting had to be repeated.

The Presidential crisis began with the lack of a constitutional majority for Abdullah Gül, because the quorum of two-thirds was not obtained in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Prime Minister made a decision to dissolve Parliament and hold an early election. On July 22, 2007, the general election took place, the favorite to win being the AKP which, on 28 August 2007, with support from the National Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP*) obtained the constitutional majority (in the third round of balloting) and elected Abdullah Gül to the office of the 11th President of the Republic.

For the first time in the modern history of the Turkish Republic, the office of President is in the hands of a politician of Islamic background and persuasion. Furthermore, for the first time in the history of the secular Turkish state, the first lady, Hayrünnisa Gül, is 'covered' and wears a headscarf. The swearing-in of Abdullah Gül was not attended by General M.Y. Büyükanıt and the opposition parties also boycotted this ceremonial event.

After this election, Turkey's institutional structures changed sharply and came out in support of the people from the AKP during the nomination procedure and for vacancies in the civil service. It should be noted at this point that Turkish bureaucracy

Zeynep Dağı and from this he can be seen as close to the flow of information concerning party politics in Turkey. Also he is a columnist working for *Today's Zaman* newspaper that belongs to the Fethullah Gülen Movement.

²¹ The political elites close to the Prime Minister were in the past connected to the National Outlook Movement tradition. Many MPs that entered Parliament after the 2007 election have not been able to work actively in the political structures of parties that were connected to the N. Erbakan's thoughts. But because of the authoritarian political culture in Turkey intraparty and state decisions are in the hands of an over-centralized hierarchy of the Justice and Development Party leaders.

is highly politicized and whenever a new political party comes to power, loyal followers of the new government are given promotion or jobs in state institutions. After A. Gül was elected to the office of President, AKP appointed many loyal civil servants to strategic positions in state institutions, because the head of the state is constitutionally responsible for such nominations, for example, the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the National Intelligence Organization (M.I.T). Hakan Fidan's²² appointment to Deputy-Undersecretary of Turkish Intelligence due to the fact that he is favored by the President is evidence of this. This therefore implied that a similar criterion would be used for appointing the personnel to diplomatic missions in foreign countries. Such positions would be given to the loyal followers of the government in power and moreover they could be recruited from the Fethullah Gülen community. Furthermore, the political strategy of the AKP leaders is based on the plan to consolidate a strong political organization that can take over strategic institutions and help eliminate political opposition in the future by using such institutional bodies as the police, prosecutors, and the Judiciary. The current Ergenekon investigation that was launched in June 2007 could be looked at in such a light.²³

In addition, the timing of the investigation overlapped with the Justice and Development dissolution case that is regarded as a "Judicial Coup d'État" and the core of the secular establishment's strategy to undermine the position of this political organization. After nine months in power, R.T. Erdoğan's Chief Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeal, Abdurrahman Yaşınkaya, petitioned the Turkish Constitutional Court on March 14, 2008 to close the AKP on the grounds that it had become "a focal point for anti-secular activities" and was acting against the constitution. The indictment sought not only the dissolution of the party but recommended that 71 politicians, including the Prime Minister and President, be banned from politics for 5 years. During the dissolution case the Public Prosecutor concluded that the Justice and Development Party "ignored the fact that religious symbols cannot be used in a secular system and that they attempted to change gradually the secular, judicial structures and give it a new shape."²⁴

On July 30, 2008 the Constitutional Court rejected most of the demands of the prosecutor and did not dissolve the party. Many EU officials expressed relief that Turkey's highest court had decided not to ban the ruling AKP on a charge of Islamist activities. Some observers argue that the Ergenekon case was used as a tool for the elimina-

²² According to the Minister of Defense of the State of Israel Ehud Barak, the new head of Turkish Intelligence Service is a pro-Iranian agent who might pass Israeli secrets to Iran. See: "Turkey warns Israel over Barak's remarks targeting Fidan," *Today's Zaman*, August 4, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkey-warns-israel-over-baraks-remarks-targeting-fidan_218071.html (accessed January 5, 2011).

²³ According to Commission of the European Communities *Turkey 2010 Progress Report*, the investigation into the alleged criminal network Ergenekon and the probe in to several other coups plans remain an opportunity for Turkey to strengthen confidence in the proper functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law. However, proceedings in the context need to respect fully due judicial process and the rights of the defendants. Turkey still needs to align its legislation procedure and grounds for closure of political parties with European standards. Commission Staff Working Documents, *Enlargement Strategy and the Main Challenges 2010-2011* (Brussels X, SEC 2010), 7.

²⁴ European Stability Initiative, "Turkey's Dark Side: Party Closures, Conspiracies and the Future of Democracy," *ESI Briefing*, April 2, 2008, 20, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_104.pdf (accessed January 5, 2011).

tion of the Kemalist oriented political and military elites that were in the past strictly against the AKP policy in Turkey.²⁵

The main core of the Ergenekon issue is that the secular political elites that established a secret criminal organization in Turkey were planning to overthrow the democratically elected AKP government using terrorist attacks and sabotage.²⁶ The documents that were discovered by the public prosecutor, for example the Sledgehammer Operations,²⁷ gave the judiciary bodies a new range of evidence concerning the army war games that were being considered to topple the democratically elected government. Even if organizations such as Ergenekon existed in the Turkish political spectrum and the “criminal network of the depth state” is a reality, then the investigation could have been used for the elimination of the Kemalist elites that are at the center of the secularist tradition in modern Turkey. This is one of the reasons why the political strategy of the AKP elites, from my point of view, is based on the idea that after the interception of certain powerful elements in the country, they were able to transform the political system to a more religious oriented state using the democratization tool as a curtain for showing people a more visible role of Islamic ideology.

In essence, when the transformation is made according to the rule of law, the secular establishment could be so weak that the force of political Islam would eventually win the last battle. Thus, this argument can be paradoxical for the diplomats, scientists and politicians that are close to politics in Turkey, especially after September 12, 2010 referendum that introduced 26 democratic amendments to the Constitution.

Nonetheless, this foreign policy turnaround is evidence of the Turkish shift towards cooperation with Middle Eastern countries and this can be seen as a signal for the European Union and the United States that Turkey should be regarded as a country of transcontinental passage, as its geostrategic position implies, and can hold its strong position as a global player between Europe and Asia.

The Concept of the “Strategic Depth” and the Turkish Middle Eastern Politics

The masterminded foreign policy paradigm of Ahmet Davutoğlu is based on the argument that the Turkish Republic should play a dominant and active role in the territorial area that was under the rule of Ottoman sultans for almost six centuries. In such a framework the concept of “Strategic Depth” is largely based on the intellectual thinking of the Neo-Ottomanist school of thought that was introduced into Turkish foreign policy by Turgut Özal, the first Turkish president in the post-cold war era. The main aim of the Neo-Ottomanist Movement was to propose that the active politi-

²⁵ Interview conducted by the author of this article with Gareth H. Jenkins, the Republic of Turkey, Istanbul, February 14, 2010 (author’s archives).

²⁶ For more on the Ergenekon case see: Gareth. H. Jenkins, *Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation*, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, Johns Hopkins University, Silk Road Paper, August 2009, 9-78, <http://www.isdp.eu/gareth-jenkins.html?task=showbib&cid=5756&return=> (accessed January 5, 2011).

²⁷ For example on the one of the Sledgehammer Operations see translation of the official military document: Naval Major Levent Bektaş, *Operation Cage (Kafes) Action Plan*, Special Operations Force Command, Istanbul, 300950 C March 2009, Code Number KF-O3.

cal role the Turks played in the regions that were the territorial part of the Ottoman Empire, emphasized the ideological shift from the doctrine of Kemalism.²⁸ Hence, the authoritarian secularist Kemalist establishment is close to the political model of the first Turkish Republic during the period of the Özal Motherlands Party (*Anavatan Partisi*) and introduced more approaches to the Turkish-Islamic amalgamation based on the argument that the Muslim religion and Turkish nationalism are indivisible elements of the reality of post-Ottoman heritage. Thus, in summary, as an excellent observer of Turkish politics, Alexander Murinson has noted "the origins of this doctrine can be traced to Turgut Özal's neo-Ottomanism, and the multi-dimensional foreign policy of N. Erbakan and A. Davutoğlu's innovative approach to geopolitics."²⁹

The neo-Ottoman politicians' views are closely linked to the idea that the Turkish Republic should play the role of the political leader of the Muslims and the Turkish speaking nations in Eurasia. The Ottoman heritage is the key to understanding the geographical and geostrategic positions of modern Turkey. The main thesis of the concept or doctrine of the "strategic depth" is predicated in geographical and historic depth. According to Ahmet Davutoğlu "this geographical depth places Turkey at the center of many geopolitical spheres of influence" [because the Turkish nation] "is a society with historical depth, and everything produced in historical depth, even if it is eclipsed at a certain juncture in time, may manifest itself again later."³⁰ He defines the concept of historical depth as the main characteristic of a state that is "at the epicenter of [political and historical] events." In his view, eight former empires: Britain, Russia, Austro-Hungary, France, Germany, China, Japan and Turkey are cited as having historical depth. In such a framework of analysis his conclusions are based on the argument that all these countries experience similar circumstances of ethno-nationalism, separatism and anti-imperialist insurgency in the geographical parts of their territories.

Ahmet Davutoğlu's model of the Turkish position in the world is also based on the concept of "land basis" that includes the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, already in the natural sphere of Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, he stresses that the Black Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Basra are the strategic places for the extension of the Turkish maritime basin. Professor A. Davutoğlu introduced the idea of the "continental basin" that allows Turkey to gain "strategic depth in Asia, and projection into Europe and Africa."³¹ It is his view that "in terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. As a large country in the midst of Eurasia's vast landmass, it may be defined as a central country with multiple regional identities. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey's diverse

²⁸ According to Morton Abramowitz and Henri J. Berkey the Kemalists and the military establishment are convinced that the AKP have started "to consolidate its position in the Muslim world even at the expense of its traditional alliance with the West." For more on this subject: "Turkey's Transformers," *Foreign Affairs* 88, Issue 6 (November-December 2009):118-128.

²⁹ Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 6 (November 2006): 947.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 952.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 951-952.

regional composition gives it the ability to maneuver in several regions simultaneously. In this sense, it controls an area of influence over its neighbors.”³²

Thus, the theoretical concept of “strategic depth” is anchored in the five main pillars as:

- (i) Pro-democratic reforms that will secure the development of human rights protection for achieving stability and security in the Turkish political system. In the words of A. Davutoğlu, “if there is not a balance between security and democracy in a country, it may not have a chance to establish an area of influence in its environs;”³³
- (ii) “zero problems policy toward the neighbors”;
- (iii) active and complementary actions on the international level and with the neighboring regions and beyond (the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia);³⁴
- (iv) multi-dimensional in terms of taking full advantage of geopolitical positions that have a relevant impact for developing international cooperation on the bilateral level.

According to A. Davutoğlu “such a policy views Turkey’s strategic relations with the United States through the two countries’ bilateral ties and through NATO, and considers its membership process with the EU, its good neighborhood policy with Russia, and its synchronization policy in Eurasia as integral parts of a consistent policy that serves to complement the other.”³⁵ This pattern of Turkish foreign policy should also be connected with the two different determinants of political strategy at an international level, such as; (a) multi-vectored in terms of building good partnerships in the global arena with the European Union, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and other important actors in the processes of international relations; (b) multi-faceted in terms of political instruments used, soft power, military power and capacity, and active civil and military intelligence roles in the neighboring countries;³⁶ (c) Strategy of rhythmic diplomacy that will be based on Turkey’s leading role in international organizations on bilateral and multilateral dimensions.³⁷

In such a scenario Ahmet Davutoğlu emphasizes that “Turkey’s aim is to intervene constantly in global issues using international platforms that signify a transformation for Turkey from a country strategically placed between two continents, to a global power. It should also be stressed that this transformation will be the result of the performance of all parties involved in foreign policy. Turkey’s success is not only the result of its state policies; it also benefits from the activities of its civil society, business organizations, and other groups, all operating under the guidance of the new vision.”³⁸

³² Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” *Insight Turkey* 10, no. 1 (2008): 78.

³³ *Ibid.*, 83.

³⁴ Adam Szymański, “Turkish Foreign Policy in 2007-2009: Continuity or Change?,” *SinAN Working Papers* no. 3 (September 2009): 4.

³⁵ Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision”, 83.

³⁶ For example, after H. Fidan was appointed to the post of deputy undersecretary of the Turkish MIT Prime Minister Recep T. Erdoğan said: “I believe the organization should become more active in foreign intelligence;” see: “Turkey warns Israel over Barak’s remarks targeting Fidan.”

³⁷ Szymański, “Turkish Foreign Policy in 2007-2009”, 4.

³⁸ Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision”, 83.

Since the concept of "strategic depth" is close to the ideas presented by the politicians that were against the classic foreign policy paradigms of the Kemalist establishment, we can see this shift as the new political feature in Turkey's power struggle. Thus, it would not be an oversimplification to say that the Turkish state is entering a new phase of much more Islamic foreign policy orientation. However, there are some scholars who argue that nothing has changed and the idea of "peace at home, peace abroad" as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk noted, is a basic principle of Turkey's international role as a regional player.

The main political strategy of the current government is based on the idea that Turkey is trying to be more connected to the Muslim states in a regional arena and to the leading powers in the global arena. Looked at this way, the leading powers should not only be seen as the countries that are members of the EU and NATO but as important states in their own right. However, in a public statement, A. Davutoğlu said that Turkey "has been involved in intense activity in the Middle East with mediation between Israel and Syria; in Lebanon and Iraq; between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, and in the Caucasus. We would like to continue this activity as an EU candidate country that holds accession negotiations in parallel with the EU. But developments with neighboring countries don't let us wait."³⁹

The first sign of Turkey's Foreign Policy shift came after the parliament rejected the vote to open Turkish territory for the second front during the U.S.-led Iraqi military intervention in March 2003.⁴⁰ Traditionally, certainly since the Cold War, Turkey was a close ally of the U.S. within the military structures of NATO. However, the Turkish government was, as usual, suspicious of the U.S. policies towards the Kurdish region in northern Iraq and this was brought on by the fact that the Turkish authorities did not participate in the secret meetings between the Kurdish leaders from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party and U.S. officials.⁴¹ The idea to establish an independent Kurdish state in the region was strictly rejected by the authorities in Ankara. As Adam Szymański has rightly noted, "the discontent of Turkey, which feared the emergence of an independent Kurdish state, was also fueled by the resolution of the American Senate to divide Iraq into three parts. The Americans in turn were displeased with Turkey's rapprochement with Syria and Iran."⁴²

The second crisis began on the first days of July 2003 when 11 Turkish intelligence officers were captured in the Northern Iraq city of Sulaymaniyah by Americans on the

³⁹ Davutoğlu cited in: "Ankara to EU: Deeper strategic ties depend on progress in negotiations," *Today's Zaman*, September 13, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_ankara-to-eu-deeper-strategic-ties-depend-on-progress-in-negotiations_221486.html (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁴⁰ Quite interesting is the information that was published on the website of *Today's Zaman* newspaper on October 25, 2010 referring to the database taken from the WikiLeaks documents after they were declassified. Turkey is mentioned in 128 of 391,000 confidential documents and in one document, the terrorist PKK is referred to as "freedom fighters." The documents refer to a PKK group captured in Fallujah in 2004 as "freedom fighters who are citizens of Turkey." The timing of this document came shortly after Turkey's Parliament decided not to allow the U.S. to deploy troops in Turkey to attack Iraq. See: "Leaked documents show US military sees PKK as 'freedom fighters,'" *Today's Zaman*, October 25, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_leaked-documents-show-us-military-sees-pkk-as-freedom-fighters_225349.html (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁴¹ See: Erik L. Knudsen, "The Quagmire of Northern Iraq: The Clash of United States, Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish Interests," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no. 4 (2003): 30.

⁴² Szymański, "Turkish Foreign Policy in 2007-2009", 7.

evidence of a secret report stating that they were preparing an assassination of the local Iraqi Kurdish officials.⁴³

In the case of security issues in Northern Iraq, Turkish civilian and military officials are aware of the activities of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in the Qandil Mountain training camps and the cross border terrorist action that could be launched on Turkish soil. On October 17, 2010 the Turkish parliament extended for another year the mandate to the government to launch cross-border military operations into Iraq. This issue was first brought up in parliament in 2007, and it was extended twice in 2008 and 2009.

Moreover, there is a political issue concerning the status of the Turkish minority in the oil rich city of Kirkuk. In the first case some Turkish officials and scholars argue that the U.S. government, using its intelligence agencies, was delivering weapons and ammunition to the PKK terrorists in Iraq.⁴⁴ In the second case Ankara is trying to be a guarantor of the minority rights of Turkmen in Kirkuk, as a typical mechanism of preparing the background for the implementation of ethno-political strategies. As William Hale suggested, “the Kirkuk issue remained as another unsolved problem between the Iraqi Kurds, on the one hand, and the government of Iraq, plus Turkey, on the other.”⁴⁵

The Iraqi military intervention of the U.S. led campaign against the mad man of the Middle East, Saddam Hussein (that was legitimized by the argument that he possessed weapons of mass destruction) was not welcomed by Turkish society. This is one of the reasons why it would be correct to agree with Ian Lesser that “one of the leading aspects of recent change in Turkey’s security policy has been the role of public opinion in the evolving concerns of security elites.”⁴⁶ Traditionally, foreign policy issues had an impact on national politics and the electoral support of the party in power. Politicians from the AKP are using emotional attitudes from the past for establishing a stable and loyal electoral base. The transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic and the Sèvres syndrome (the suspicion of the foreign powers towards Middle Eastern states) in Turkish society gave much evidence for such a policy.⁴⁷

After the invasion of Iraq, the Turkish government shifted to a new international relationship with their counterparts in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Recep T. Erdoğan in 2008 became the first Turkish Prime Minister to visit Baghdad in 20 years. Furthermore, there is an increasing cooperation between Ankara and officials in the Kurdish city of Arbil, *de facto* capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government. In January 2010, the Iraqi Cabinet approved the opening of a Turkish General Consulate in Arbil. The young Turkish diplomat, Aydın Selcen, was appointed by the Turkish Foreign Ministry to hold the post of consul-general. The visit of the head of

⁴³ Gareth Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 172.

⁴⁴ See: Helin Sari Ertem, “Partners in Conflict: The PKK Issue in Turkish-American Relations,” *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies* 17 (2006): 57-98.

⁴⁵ Hale, “Turkey and the Middle East,” 147.

⁴⁶ Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey in a Changing Security Environment,” *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 1 (2000): 184.

⁴⁷ See: Michelangelo Guida, “The Sèvres Syndrome and ‘Komplo’ Theories in the Islamist and Secular Press,” *Turkish Studies* 9, no. 1 (March 2008): 38.

the Iraqi local administration in Ankara, Massoud Barzani, was another further step to begin a process of the normalization of bilateral relations. During his speech at Ankara at the beginning of June 2010 he mentioned that, "the relationship between Turkey and the Kurdistan region has been on the right track and what this visit will provide is more impetus and will expand and broaden the areas of cooperation in different fields and be more efficient and effective."⁴⁸ The value of trade between the local Kurdistan administration and Turkey reached more than \$9 billion by the middle of 2010.⁴⁹

Other political decisions that were not met with enthusiasm in Washington are related to the close contacts of the AKP government with Syria⁵⁰ and Iran⁵¹ that are the part of the "zero problems policy with the neighbors." In July 2003 the 6th Turkish-Syrian Protocol was signed as a first step in normalizing international relations between the countries. Previously, the frosty relationship between Ankara and Damascus had arisen over the PKK camps in Syria and supporting the Kurdish insurrection in Turkey by ensuring that the leader of this organization, Abdullah Öcalan (until 1998 he was based in Syria) was not captured by the Turkish intelligence agency.

The emergence of the new Turkish-Syrian relationship appeared with the first visit (for 57 years) of Syrian President Bashir el-Assad in Ankara in January 2004. Moreover, Recep T. Erdoğan went to Damascus to uphold good relations with his counterpart in December 2004. These events led to the signing of a free trade agreement and recognition of Turkish boundaries by the Syrian government, cooperation within the framework of the water issue concerning the exploitation of the Tigris and Asi rivers and acceptance of the political strategy toward Iraqi territorial integrity, and teamwork according to similar interests concerning the Kurdish issue.⁵²

⁴⁸ "The full text of Iraqis Kurdish Regional Government's leader Massoud Barzani's speech at ORSAM," *Today's Zaman*, June 7, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/todays-think-tanks_the-full-text-of-iraqi-kurdish-regional-governments-leader-massoud-barzanis-speech-at-orsam_212374.html (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁴⁹ "Turkey Wants to Integrate Iraqi Kurdistan Region Through Economy," *Iraqi-Business News*, May 19, 2010, <http://www.iraqi-businessnews.com/2010/05/19/turkey-wants-to-integrate-iraqi-kurdistan-region-through-economy/> (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁵⁰ The frosty relationship between Washington and Damascus was intensified when Syria adopted its anti-American stance during the preparations to strike out Saddam Hussein's regime in late 2002. Damascus accused Washington of having a hidden agenda towards the new American order in the Middle East. During the American led Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Syrian officials strongly supported Saddam Hussein. The U.S. administration accused Syria of aiding Iraq by smuggling weapons and ammunitions into that country. For more on the development of the U.S.-Syria international relations see Eyal Zisser, "Syria, The United States, and Iraq-Two Years After the Downfall of Saddam Hussein," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 9, no. 3 (September 2005).

⁵¹ After the Islamic revolution in Iran under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 the political relations between two countries enter the era of cold tension. From that time, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not cooperate with the U.S. administration and in general with the Western block. In January 2002, American President George Bush gave his famous speech referring to the concept of "an axis of evil." In that speech he mainly referred to Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the countries that support terrorism and are threats to the security of the United States. Since 2003 the U.S. administration has alleged that Iran is trying to obtain nuclear weapons under the program of developing atomic energy. Moreover, in August 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected to the post of Iranian President and he was re-elected in June 2009. From that moment the U.S. government has been trying to change the political situation in Iran and to stop the nuclear program by using economic and political sanctions. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 mainly refers to the Iranian nuclear program. For more on this subject see objective analysis and effective solutions of the RAND Corporation: www.rand.org.

⁵² Szymański, "Turkish Foreign Policy in 2007-2009," 8.

In the case of the Syria-Israel dispute over the Golan Heights, the Turkish government in 2008 was trying to play the role of facilitator between the two countries. Syria and Israel have been technically at war since the State of Israel annexed the Golan Heights following the 1967 Six-Day War. Actually the political cooperation between Syria and Turkey increased dramatically after Ankara cancelled entry visas and both countries signed an accord called “High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council Agreement” in September 2009. A similar bilateral mechanism was established between Baghdad and Damascus in August 2009.⁵³ On the level of military cooperation, the dialogue between Turkey and Syria had developed and was taking the form of joint military maneuvers (April 27-30, 2009) on the common border in an apparent bid to improve security. It was the first time that an important member of NATO was to carry out joint military maneuvers with an Arab country.

This was not welcomed with enthusiasm by the Israeli state’s officials. Furthermore, Recep T. Erdoğan was advocating the idea of establishing regional cooperation between Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. The main aim is to create a free trade zone, complete with unrestricted (visa-free) travel that would be a Middle Eastern equivalent of the European Union. Other political decisions were made at the highest level during the Syrian and Turkish meeting in October 2010. Both countries have agreed to develop strategic cooperation in the Middle East, including fighting with PKK terrorist activities.⁵⁴

The problem with PKK terrorist activity was also one of the common goals of forging closer ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The PKK issue mainly refers to insurrection and sabotage in the eastern parts of Turkey. In the case of Iran, they have a PKK branch founded in May 2004 called the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). It promotes violent activity against the Islamic government in Tehran and in the Kurdish provinces of this state. These two radical organizations share a similar political agenda – based on the idea of establishing an independent Kurdish State – that is not welcome by officials in Ankara and Tehran. Thus, these two countries are completely aware of the terrorist actions that are targeting not only the security forces but also the civilian population.

In July 2004 the Turkish Prime Minister, during his visit to Tehran, signed many official documents which opened a common cooperation between security forces and intelligence agencies, to achieve the same goal in the fight against the PKK/PJAK alliance. From that moment, both countries have frequently exchanged tactical intelligence information concerning those organizations. Moreover, they are looking to prepare cross border military action to fight together insurrection and violent activity.⁵⁵ The “memorandum of understanding” that was signed in February 2006 by Turkish and Iranian officials confirms this counter-terrorism cooperation. In December 2009, Turkish and Iranian military forces coordinated operations that were launched against the PKK along the Turkish border with Iraq and Iran. The security agenda is also stimulated

⁵³ “Turkey, Syria sign strategic deal, lift visa,” *Today’s Zaman*, September 17, 2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/latest-news_turkey-syria-sign-strategic-deal-lift-visa_187372.html (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁵⁴ “Turkey, Syria cement security cooperation, Iraq’s stability,” *Today’s Zaman*, October 12, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkey-syria-cement-security-cooperation-iraqs-stability_224139.html (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁵⁵ Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey*, 176.

by the increasing rate of trade and particularly the gas supplies from Iran to Turkey. Moreover, after the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the office of president, his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gül congratulated him and wished him success in the job. In October 2009 Prime Minister Recep T. Erdoğan went on the official visit to Tehran. Both sides had common interests in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. One month later, President M. Ahmadinejad visited Turkey to take part in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)⁵⁶ Economic Summit in Istanbul.

The economic factor is one of the most important in the case of growing cooperation between Ankara and Tehran. Bilateral trade increased from \$1 billion in 2000 to \$4 billion in 2004 and up to \$5 billion by the end of 2006 and currently trade volume is \$10 billion. For example, Turkey's imports from Iran reached \$5.3 billion in the January to September period of 2010. Turkey's exports to Iran during the first nine months of 2010 reached almost \$2 billion.⁵⁷ This data shows how both countries cooperated together despite the sanctions of the United Nations Security Council that were implemented in order to delay the Iranian nuclear program.

Turkey and Brazil, the two non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, voted against the draft resolution for sanctions against Iran on June 10, 2010. The Turkish permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan, said at the Council meeting, "we are deeply concerned that adopting sanctions will negatively affect the momentum created by the diplomatic process." He also added that "our voting against the resolution should not be construed as indifference to questions regarding the nature of Iran's nuclear program."⁵⁸ In the broader sense, the decision to vote against the UN sanctions could be regarded as a tactical move to implement a "zero problem policy with the neighbors" towards the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Turkey is now the main political mediator between Iran and the Western block. Thus, Ankara is trying to secure its good relations with Tehran for the development of the national interest of Turkey. Besides the pressure from the U.S., under the government of the AKP Turkey is the leading independent foreign policy maker in the Middle East. In addition, Turkey and Iran signed, in May 2010, a deal to which Iran has agreed to send low-enriched uranium to Turkey in return for enriched fuel for a research reactor. According to Ahmet Davutoğlu, the peaceful use of nuclear energy is every country's right "and Turkey is against nuclear weapons and wants a region free of them." The Turkish Foreign Minister is against UN sanctions because by the time they are lifted, trade between the two countries will have risen to \$30 billion per annum.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Since 2004 Turkish Professor Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu is a chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

⁵⁷ "Imports from Iran to Turkey up by 130.7 percent," *Today's Zaman*, October 28, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/latest-news_turkeys-imports-from-iran-up-by-1307-percent_225564.html (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁵⁸ "Brazil, Turkey vote against UN Security Council draft resolution on Iran sanctions," English. news.cn, June 10, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-06/10/c_13342188.htm (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁵⁹ "Turkey followed Obama's letter in Iran deal, FM says," *Hürriyet Daily News*, June 10, 2010, <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkey-followed-obama8217s-letter-on-iran-deal-fm-says-2010-06-10> (accessed January 5, 2011).

In the case of Turkey's relationship with the State of Israel, the first signs that the friendship between these old allies was cooling were connected to the visit of Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal to Ankara. At the end of January 2006 Hamas won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council and was able to form a government. The Western powers were trying to isolate Hamas believing it would deter political violence in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. On February 16, 2006 Khaled Meshaal, in charge of a five man delegation, was hosted by AKP's top leaders in Ankara.⁶⁰ This was not welcomed by state officials in Israel, the U.S. and the EU because they believe that Hamas is a terrorist organization. The Turkish Prime Minister suggested that Hamas is not a terrorist organization but is only defending its territory and he made some references about Israeli politics and the Palestinian issue. Scholars of Turkish politics saw this statement as a typical way of gaining electoral support for the AKP's political agenda.

The Palestinian uprising and the ongoing efforts to establish a Palestinian state is a very sensitive topic for Turkish society. It should be born in mind that political attitudes concerning the Israeli-Palestinian power struggle are not sympathetic to the Israeli approach. Moreover, it is not an oversimplification to say that the younger generation in Turkey is vehemently opposed to the Israeli stance on the Palestinian issue, despite the fact that most Arabs do not respect Ottoman heritage in the Muslim world.

Another turning point in Turkish-Israeli foreign relations appeared during the attack, code-named "Operation Cast Lead," that was launched by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 – January 2009. The main aim of this military intervention was to halt Hamas's missile attacks on Israel's civilian population.⁶¹ The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep T. Erdoğan, harshly criticized IDF military operations on the grounds that it was using white phosphorus shells to target the civilian population.⁶²

The Israeli response touched a sensitive issue for Turks saying that the State of Israel would recognize the First World War massacre of Armenians as genocide.⁶³ Soon after, during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Prime Minister Recep T. Erdoğan behaved in a harsh manner to the President Simon Peres on the common panel Mr Erdoğan said, "when it comes to killing, you know very well how to kill. I know well how you hit and kill children on beaches."⁶⁴ After he left the meeting and said that "for him Davos is over" all the Turkish journalists left the conference hall and he was greeted like a hero in Istanbul by his supporters and enemies of Israeli policies toward the Palestinians issue.⁶⁵ Once more the Prime Minister strengthened his electoral base in Turkey in favor of AKP's political platform just before the local election of March 2009.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey*, 176.

⁶¹ Efraim Inbar, "Israeli-Turkish Tensions and Beyond," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 8, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 40.

⁶² "Erdoğan publicly slams Israel again," *The Jerusalem Post*, January 13, 2009, www.jpost.com

⁶³ Adam Szymański, "Crisis in Turkey-Israel Relations," *PISM Bulletin* 18 (94) (February 3, 2010): 182.

⁶⁴ "Erdoğan's Davos Outburst Is Nothing New," *Forbes*, January 30, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/30/erdogan-turkey-davos-opinions-contributors_0130_asli_aydintasbas.html (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Szymański, "Crisis in Turkey-Israel Relations," 182.

In terms of military cooperation, the Davos crisis was possibly responsible for blocking Israeli participation in NATO's military maneuvers called "Anatolia Eagle" at Konya Air Force Base in October 2009. This decision was welcomed with enthusiasm by the Turkish supporters of Recep T. Erdoğan and his intense views on Israeli-Turkish foreign relations concerning the recent "Operation Cast Lead" in the Gaza Strip.

In the case of increasing anti-Israeli political orientations among Turkish society the next provocation prepared by the state-controlled television channel TRT1 did not help to reduce the rising temperature between these two countries. Firstly, the TV presented Israeli soldiers and agents of Mossad as murderers. Secondly, the Turkish media showed a popular movie named *Volley of the Wolves: Ambush* where the Israeli intelligence agents from Mossad were presented as officers spying inside Turkey and kidnapping Turkish babies. There is no doubt that it was a typical political provocation led by AKP's officials to deteriorate Turkish-Israeli foreign relations. Thus the TV issue "directly provoked a diplomatic incident in January 2010 that was widely covered by the international media. Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon received the Turkish Ambassador, Ahmet Oğuz Çellikol, in a humiliating manner."⁶⁷

The next turning point in Turkish-Israeli foreign relations is based on events that happened during the "Mavi Marma ship accident" on May 31, 2010. The main aim of the "Gaza Freedom Flotilla" was to pass the naval blockade of the Gaza Strip by IDF for the transportation of humanitarian aid and large sums of money for the Palestinians. This political action was coordinated by the Free Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms, and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), organizations that do not support Israeli policies towards the Palestinian issue.

The controversial idea for breaking Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip was to bring in military action led by IDF from the Shayetet 13 unit to stop the flotilla raid. During the fights between volunteers and IDF soldiers 9 Turkish activists mainly from IHH were killed. Since the military intervention was launched on the international waters in the Mediterranean, the Turkish officials from the AKP openly criticized the military action and accused Israel of being a "state of terrorism." In response to this accusation there are some quite interesting statements from the leader of the Israeli opposition, Tzipi Livni. According to her, "at a specific stage, Turkey acted to exploit a political vacuum with the goal of provoking [Israel] and providing legitimacy for Hamas."⁶⁸

Most recently the tactical cooperation between the Turkish National Intelligence Organization and Israeli Mossad has been suspended. The two agencies have stopped sharing intelligence information and joint operations. Furthermore, during the last meeting of the Turkish National Security Council the State of Israel was viewed as a threat to stability in the Middle East. The change in this document should be seen as a signal that the Turkish military, since General Işık Koşaner was appointed to the post of Commander of Turkish Armed Forces by President A. Gül, is becoming more loyal to the civilian government of the pro-Islamic AKP.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ "Livni: Gaza flotilla mission was Turkish provocation," *Today's Zaman*, October 26, 2010, http://www.todayzaman.com/diplomacy_livni-gaza-flotilla-mission-was-turkish-prvocation_225446.html (accessed January 5, 2011).

Conclusions

The political situation concerning Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East shows that under the government of the AKP the country has entered an era of a much more independent approach towards this region. The Middle Easternization of Turkish foreign policy is a political fact and will have an impact for the future development of security in the Middle East. There is no doubt that the increasing opposition in the EU block against Turkish accession to this political structure is pushing Turkey to find different solutions for this country's future role in world affairs. The concept of the "Strategic Depth" and new pragmatic foreign orientation led by the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu are just the first steps to a much more pro-Islamic perspective for Turkey towards the Middle Eastern countries.

From this perspective, if the EU totally slows down the negotiation process with Ankara, the whole stability in the region will be challenged. Thus, in the searching for stability and development in the Middle East, Turkey should be as close as it can be to the political structure of the EU membership states. The Turkish membership in the EU is still an open question but the negotiations have been in progress since 2005.

The U.S. administration should understand that Turkey is a strong political player in the Middle East and without the much closer ties to NATO military structures in the long term, this state can behave as a disloyal ally. In such a scenario, the decisions that will be made during the NATO Lisbon Summit on November 19-20, 2010 concerning the plans for the deployment of a "Missile Shield" on Turkish territory could be another sign of the Turkish changes in its foreign policy orientation.

II

PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY & CIVIL SOCIETY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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**IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE IN THE ARAB WORLD?
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN CONTEMPORARY EGYPT
AND INFLUENCE OF WESTERN POWERS
ON EGYPTIAN DEMOCRACY**

The crisis of legitimacy

The Arab states are facing a chronic crisis of legitimacy, often relying on inducement and intimidation in dealing with their citizens. When the Arab states were newly independent, their regimes depended on traditional forms of legitimacy or won legitimacy through fighting for independence or building of the State. But traditional regimes were soon challenged by Arab nationalists or leftwing ideologies. Regimes try to maintain their legitimacy by mobilizing people around calls for unity, liberation, justice and development. These also relied on their leaders' charismatic popular appeal. Several regimes developed the concept of "the eternal mission" (unity, liberation, modernization, Islamisation, development, socialist transformation, etc.) to justify legitimacy built on the custodianship of the people and not its representation. In addressing the mass of people, they concentrate on the legitimacy of their achievements in specific areas such as economy, peace, prosperity, stability, or safeguarding of values and tradition.² Paradoxically, some regimes have recently resorted to the discourse of democratic legitimacy and the language of civil society and human rights. According to one Arab thinker, democratic discourse has become a new "salvation myth." Most regimes nowadays bolster their legitimacy by adopting a simplified and efficient formula to justify their continuation in power. They style themselves as the last line of defense against fundamentalist tyranny or against chaos and collapse of the state. This formula is called "the legitimacy of blackmail."

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² *Arab Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World*, United Nations Development Program, <http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2004e.pdf> (accessed January 6, 2011).

The authoritarian state in Egypt is the model of the “black hole state” (this name was used in AHDR 2004)³, because the executive apparatus resembling a “black hole” which converts its surroundings social environment into a setting in which nothing moves and from which nothing escapes. This increasing centralization of the executive is guaranteed in the constitutional texts of certain states which vest wide powers in the head of state. The latter becomes the supreme leader of the executive, the council of ministers, the armed forces, the judiciary and public services. The parliament is a bureaucratic adjunct of the executive that does not represent the people whose mistrust in it continues to grow. The executive uses the ordinary and extraordinary judiciary to eliminate and tame its opponents. By denying its citizens access to political space, the Egyptian regime reinforces the authority of the Islamic establishment in the public sphere. The courts here have adopted in almost every instance conservative interpretations of the Quran and Sharia. The president Muhammad Hosni Mubarak allows religious institutions to control the judiciary and the society. Limitations on freedom of opinion and expression in Egypt are compounded by the martial law that grants extensive powers to government officials. There have been numerous incidents of newspapers and magazines being censored on religious grounds. In addition to books and periodicals, blasphemy and religious insult have been used to curb freedom of speech on the Internet.⁴ Combination of religion and modern education has proved dangerous to the religious establishment and the government that relies on it for legitimacy, because in the world of mass literacy, mass marketing and communication, the authority of *ulema* is permanently challenged.

The Role of the Political Parties

According to the *Freedom House Report*, only 7 Arab countries were designated as partly free, namely Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, and Yemen. The Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa can be characterized by the anomaly which consists in the absence of solid correlations between political pluralism and the democratic rule. Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia do not allow or recognize political parties. Various interests come into play in these countries but the disparate groupings are not permitted to express themselves publicly.⁵

In the Arab world, political parties are weak. Single-party regimes in many countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen have recently been able to open their political systems to a multi-party formula. Autocratic Arab regimes try to consolidate their power by giving their people and the outside world the illusion that they are democratizing. Indeed, the authoritarian model remains unchanged: the state machin-

³ Ibid.

⁴ Jo-Anne Prud'homme, “Policing Belief: The Impact of Blasphemy Laws on Human Rights,” *A Freedom House Special Report*, October 2010, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Policing_Belief_Full.pdf (accessed January 6, 2011).

⁵ Denis J. Sullivan, Kimberly Jones, “Countries at the Crossroads 2007: Egypt,” *Country Report*, Freedom House, 2007, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2007/egypt> (accessed January 6, 2011).

ery, the government, and the ruling party are indistinguishable. The multi-party system serves to legitimize the power of the ruling party. The development of Arab political parties can be divided into 3 phases: the first being the national-liberation phase, the second – the ideological and populist phase, and the third - the rise of Islamic parties.

The faith-based parties were formed in response to the demands of the urban slums. Repressive regimes not only banned political parties but also severely restricted freedom of assembly and activity of non-governmental organizations. This is why the mosque has become one of the very few public spaces able to escape the total control of the autocratic regimes. Many of the faith-based movements later develop into political parties. It was a result of policy of Anwar as-Sadat (1971-1981). He began his rule by starting cooperation with Islamic groups. In 1971, he declared the Principles of Islamic Sharia the main source of legislation. This move provided a political basis for the Islamic transformation of the Egyptian state. The *hijab* and *niqab* became widespread. At government administration offices, it is common for the officials to spend most of their workdays performing ritual ablutions and praying.

Propagators of extremist thoughts are granted freedom to spread their ideas by all means available. Establishment of political parties is subject to the approval of a dedicated committee. According to the Parties Law, a new party must meet certain criteria in order to be eligible. The most important criterion is not to contradict the principles of Sharia law. Egyptian nationalism and patriotism were replaced by Pan-Islamism.⁶ At the time, the number of religious schools increased to 7 thousand with no less than 1.5 million students. In contemporary Egypt, 1.9 million students are enrolled in various stages of religious education. The Ministry of Endowments builds and runs new mosques and covers the costs of privately built mosques that became integrated under its auspices. Some 8-10% of Egyptian Muslims participate in religious life by studying, teaching, preaching or attending to other activities that support religious affairs. The most persecuted minority in Egypt are Copts who suffer from this religious transformation of the state. In the process of Islamisation of Egypt, the media play a major role.⁷

The strong Islamic opposition probably gives legitimacy for authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak. Sunni Islam dominates social, cultural, and political life in Egypt. State discrimination arises from the attempted enforcement of one concept of the faith, institutionalized in an executive order. The government has tried to dictate that all mosques be licensed and all sermons monitored. Imams are appointed and paid by the government, but many private mosques continue to operate with their own religious leaders who are not loyal to the state.⁸

The case of Egypt

The experience of Muslim societies with Western imperial rule contributed to the authoritarian nature of modernizing regimes in the Muslim world. Western coloniza-

⁶ Adel Guindy, „The Islamization of Egypt,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal* 10, no. 3 (September 2006): 94.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Sullivan, Jones, “Countries at the Crossroads 2007: Egypt.”

tion was in its most an act of state sanctioned violence. After independence, the republican political system was replaced by military regimes or one-party states in the second part of the XX century. This monarchical authoritarian democracy was the heritage of the colonial rule, not the Islamic concept of power. By the 1960s, military rule had become a common replacement for the parliamentary regimes of early independence, but the military was considered a stage in the process of modernization. It resulted in conception the authoritarian road to democracy where this kind of political system can provide post-colonial societies with political stability and economic development. But from the present point of view, the change of political system leads to authoritarianism with a democratic facade.⁹

Egypt has neither a functioning democracy nor a ruling regime willing to contemplate the possibility of peaceful transfer of power. The state party, The National Democratic Party, has been in power since its establishment in 1978. Political parties in Egypt are part of the authoritarian power structures and are tolerated as long as they do not pose a threat to the regime's control. They legitimize and help to maintain the existing structures of authoritarianism by regularly participating in a manipulated electoral system. Egypt has 24 legal political parties, yet all are largely ineffective, unpopular and marginal. No one could be considered a serious contender for political power. Parties in Egypt suffer from polarization and fragmentation. They have not got clear social and economic programs that address the needs and expectations of the majority of the population. President Nasser was distrustful of the liberal experience and its party dynamic. He also believed that the Egyptians were not ready for democracy. The regime also exercises full control over the institutions of the civil society.

A multi-party system was restored in the mid-1970s. It was a decision from above, not a product of a civil society. President Sadat tried to create his own political system and to build a new basis of legitimacy. He set the conditions and devised the necessary legal constraints to ensure continued state control over the parties. He denied recognition to parties based on religion, class, region or profession. He also banned the formation of parties that had existed before the July 1952 revolution. Political parties must not undermine the issues of national unity, commitment to the socialist achievements of the revolutionary system, social peace, not to oppose the peace treaty with Israel, the principles of the Islamic Sharia (defined as Islamic laws).

The single-party system in Egypt marginalized the role of parliament, suppressed pluralism and dissent and eroded people's confidence in party life. Sadat envisioned a loyal, marginal and controlled opposition. He, therefore, developed a restrictive legal framework to ensure that the opposition would not step out of line. Mubarak has added restrictions for civil society organizations, syndicates and the press. Mubarak heads the executive and at the same time he is the head of the ruling party, the NDP which controls the parliament. At presents, the status of party life in Egypt is not too conducive to promoting a genuine democracy.

According to the Freedom House, the year 2007 brought significant negative developments. Egypt showed a decline for several reasons: repression of journalists; suppres-

⁹ John O. Voll, "Islam and Democracy: Is Modernization a Barrier?" *Religion Compass* 1 no. 1 (2007): 91.

sion of the political opposition, including both democratic parties and those aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood; and further restrictions on the independence of the judiciary. The government of Egypt refuses to recognize the Brotherhood as a party, movement or social service organization; most observers consider the organization to be tolerated by the regime. The Muslim Brotherhood currently holds the largest bloc of opposition seats in Egypt's parliament.

In 2005, the president undertook a political reform when he announced an amendment to the constitution that resulted in Egypt's first direct multi-party presidential elections. But the authority of the Egyptian government is not rooted in the will of the people. While Egypt holds regular elections these are neither free nor fair in conduct or law. Citizen suffrage is guaranteed by the constitution and participation in public life is considered a national duty. Despite the government's authoritarian oversight and one-party hegemony, Egypt has a vibrant civil society, with more than 16,000 registered NGOs.

In the Arab countries, NGOs play the role of opposition to authoritarian regimes. That is why we could treat them like political parties. Moreover, often they are more discredited by government than parties because are supported by foreign funding.¹⁰ NGO (the Land Centre for Human Rights) plays also important role in defending the interests of groups, which suffer from structural adjustment: peasants and workers. This organization documents abuses of the law and seeks redress, compensation for the peasants whose land has been returned to former owners. The Centre for Human Rights Legal Aid (CHRLA) defends workers who were unfairly dismissed from their jobs. This type of work brings the NGOs near to the role of leftists parties.¹¹

U.S. Democracy promotion

The History of U.S. support for democratic reform in Egypt precedes the Bush administration. Between 2003 and 2005, the Bush administration heightened its emphasis on political reform and coupled democracy assistance with pro-democracy diplomacy, tying U.S. concessions, including a free trade agreement, to progress on key democratic reforms and freedoms. Egypt represents a successful U.S. supported example of transitional democratic Arab state. It receives the third largest contribution of monetary aid from the U.S. in the world after Iraq and Israel. External U.S. pressure on Egypt catalyzed the "Arab Spring" and led to a brief proliferation of independent newspapers, new bloggers and other encouraging signs of a robust emerging polity.

But with the situation in Iraq deteriorating and substantive gains won by Islamist forces in Egypt's parliamentary elections and subsequently in Palestine, the United States decided that democratic reform was too risky a proposition, abandoning Arab democrats once more to the autocratic regime in the name of stability. The Egyptian regime quickly capitalized on the shelving of Bush's freedom agenda by amplifying

¹⁰ *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, ed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney, Michele Penner Angrist (Boulder-London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 194, <http://meis.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/17845/KeshavarzianPublicationAuthoritarianism.pdf> (accessed January 6, 2011).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 202.

domestic repression. Despite marked cooling of relations, Egyptian cooperation on U.S. Strategic interests, including on Iraq, did not stop. The Obama administration has mostly continued the Bush-era program. However, some analysts believed that the Obama administration is headed toward eliminating democracy assistance to Egypt in favor of efforts to aid development. The argument is that the exclusive focus on development would lead to concrete advancement in social, economic and educational spheres, creating an informed and engaged citizenry that could more effectively drive democratic reforms.¹²

Under the Mubarak's regime, sectarianism has witnessed unprecedented growth, culminating in acts of violence against religious minorities and marked by the government's unwillingness to substantively address inequalities or extend the equal protection of the law to all religious minorities. Since the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, Egypt has been ruled by martial law that suspends the fundamental rights of the people. Meanwhile, the Mubarak regime derives its international legitimacy from false political dualism that offers the international community only two choices for Egyptian governance: the current regime, or Islamic extremists. In reality, more than 77% of Egyptians refused to vote in the last parliamentary election because they were not offered a middle way. The regime has destroyed all secular, liberal political parties that might present a stronger appeal to the population. While Mubarak is perceived abroad as a key role in regional stability, the corruption of his regime and its continued repression of the Egyptian people are undermining that very stability and security. While moving to limit the power of opposition parties, the government also clamped down on two other historically oppositional sectors of civil societies: the professional associations and the trade unions.¹³

Despite the right to form syndicates, the government has taken measures to control syndicates of professionals, including lawyers, doctors and teachers. The right to assembly is abused. Likewise the right to form, join and participate in trade union activity is restricted. Workers may form unions, but the state exerts significant influence through the General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions, which all unions must belong to and which is closely tied to NDP. Egypt has two types of state military or security courts. Additionally, one of the March 2007 amendments allows the state to refer defendants to any judicial body authorized by law. The government can thus try, without judicial review, civil rights activists, Islamist opponents, and secular political, and secular political opponents, as well as gay men and feminists. Egypt has failed to ensure the enforcement of basic civil and political rights guaranteed by law. Prosecutors, as agents of the authoritarian state, lack independence from the government, including its security forces. Egypt is not a military dictatorship but Mubarak seized power from the secret police apparatus, the intelligence services and the NDP.

¹² Dina Guirguis, "Promoting Democracy in Egypt," *Eurasiacritic*, July 2009, http://www.copticassembly.com/showart.php?main_id=2441 (accessed January 6, 2011).

¹³ Vickie Langohr, "Too much Civil Society, Too Little Politics? Egypt and Other Liberalizing Arab Regimes," in *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, ed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney, Michele Penner Angrist (Boulder-London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 200.

There is no effective, democratic, civil control of the police or the military. The military is dominant power of the state.¹⁴ The United States assert that Egypt is not ready for democracy from the beginning of the Nasser regime. Stability in the state is more important than democratic values. According to this concept, the military regime was better to undertake key social reforms needed to stimulate economic development. Democratization could produce a period of transition, which leads to instability. Political instability could jeopardize economic prosperity and undermine oil interests of the U.S.¹⁵ This view of democratization was enforced by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when the authoritarian regime were perceived as a guarantee of American security and economic interests.

From the other point of view, the repressive regime led to increasing popularity of terrorist ideologies and radical social movements. In other words, absence of democracy has led directly to Islamic extremism. That is why the strategy of freedom and human rights was essential for American policy towards Egypt during the presidency of George Bush. As a consequence, promoting democracy was the best way to eliminate the source of terrorism in the region. This view was adopted by the Arab intellectuals and activists who produced Arab Human Development Reports. Reports from 2002 to 2005 were focused on regional problems: lack of freedom and abuse of human rights, lack of equality of women's rights and inadequate educational system.¹⁶ Democratic reforms are the only way to involve Islamic groups in the political process and reduce social conflicts. The Egyptian society seems to be ready for democratic change. Public opinion in Egypt supports democratic values, understands the role of freedom of speech in the process of development.¹⁷

Political parties

Forming a political party is technically possible but legalization of a strong and effective party is practically impossible. The party life in Egypt has functioned under the martial law and other restrictive laws. This law gives the president the power to arrest and detain citizens for long periods of time and to ban demonstrations and meetings. These restrictions confine the activity of the parties to their headquarters and limit the parties' ability to communicate their programs and mobilize public support. Parties are required to obtain the approval of the state security before holding public meetings, distributing party materials or organizing peaceful demonstrations. But such approval has been an exception to the rule.

The regime has used the martial law to detain members of associations and movements so participation in political life or other activities is dangerous to the average people. Most parties have to confront many problems before they can operate legally.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Bruce K. Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 3.

¹⁶ Ibid., 11.

¹⁷ *Islam, Gender, Culture, and Democracy: Findings from the Values Surveys and the European Values Survey*, ed. Ronald Inglehart (Willowdale: de Sitter Publications, 2003), 13.

For instance, each party must publish its list of founders in two daily newspapers before applying to the Parties Committee. Political parties depend on the subscriptions of their members and subsidies they receive annually from the government. That is why the parties are not able to run their offices, provide services or recruit members.¹⁸

Despite these structural problems, there are political parties in Egypt that try to have some political representation: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Ghad Party, the Wasat Party, and the Karama Party. They represent the main ideological and political streams within the Egyptian society: Islamism, liberal nationalism, Arab nationalism and socialism. The Ghad Party is an off-shot of the Wafd Party, the Wasat of the MB and the Karama Party is a part of the Nasserite Party. They were established in protest against weaknesses and ineffectiveness of the mainstream movements.

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the oldest movements in Egypt. It has a nation-wide organizational structure, social program and support of different social groups. After 2005 parliamentary elections the MB seems to be a main opposition force. Despite the repressions, periodical arrests of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime tolerates its presence in the parliament and in the public life. This has resulted in loyalty of the secular opposition groups to the regime which, on the one hand, presents itself as the defender of a secular orientation of the Egyptian society and, on the other, as the suppressor of Islamic threat.¹⁹ But the Muslim Brotherhood is not a typical Islamic movement. They respect the fundamental democratic values, public freedoms, and accept political pluralism and free elections. They understand the role of human rights in the modern society and sovereignty of the people. They cooperate with other political forces representing other ideological streams. In its message to the West, the Second Deputy of the General Guide asserts the MB's respect for all religious and political groups and lack of hostility towards the West. But the question remains whether the Muslim Brotherhood will commit to its assurances of tolerance and understanding of democratic rules once it has seized power?²⁰

The Ghad Party

This party represented a middle way between the ruling NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood. It was declared legal in October 2004. But it did not apply all recruitment criteria. Unfortunately, the party's Program contests the hegemony of the ruling party. That is why only 3 months after the Ghad party became legal the regime arrested one of its leaders, Ayman Nour, on charges of foreign party funding.

¹⁸ *Political Parties and Democracy: The Arab World*, ed. Kay Lawson, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, vol. V (Santa Barbara-Denver-Oxford: Praeger, 2010), 12.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 18.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

The Wasat Party

This party was formed by young members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the mid-1990s. It is an Islamic party which tries to separate political functions from religious proselytizing. The Wasat Party wants to gain the support of a large portion of the Egyptian population. It treats Islam as a cultural framework for all Egyptians, including the Copts. Hence, the party's Program provides equal rights for Muslims and non-Muslims; the right of all citizens to take posts of their choice and, last but not least, peaceful co-existence with other cultures. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, it accepts the fundamental democratic values of legitimacy of government and handover of power: the sovereignty of the people, political pluralism, equality between men and women, freedom of expression, respect for human rights. The principles of the Sharia are for this party a founding block for development and progress of the Egyptian society.²¹

The Al-Karama Party

The Karama Party is an off-shoot of the Nasserite Party. It was established in 2004. However, the regime denied official approval for its activity. The party publishes a weekly newspaper and its leader Hamdeen Sabbahy won a seat in the 2005 parliamentary elections. The party's program is based on social justice, social equality of workers and promotes development and social advancement of poorer classes. According to Emad El-Din Shahin, this political party represents genuine political orientations in the Egyptian society and poses a serious threat to the ruling party. Bruce K. Rutherford, the author of *Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World* asserts that the capacity of an authoritarian regime to control the economy and the society has declined because a new institution has come to prominence in the state, namely independent judiciary and civil movements that could challenge the state's authority. He refers to this form of rule as a hybrid regime that shares the characteristics of both an autocratic order and a democratic system.²²

²¹ Ibid., 23.

²² Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak*, 16.

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MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, A POSSIBLE SUCCESSION POWER IN EGYPT?

In the wake of social uprisings in the entire Middle East, many politicians, scholars, journalist and ordinary citizens around the globe started to raise the concerns about the future political situation in Egypt with the Mubarak's regime gone. Egypt throughout the history was a cradle of civilizations, science and technologies in the Middle East. The most prominent religious scholars were stemming from Egypt that was bringing about the radical changes in the sphere of cultural, technological and religious reforms. No major decisions are made about the social, economic and security issues in the Middle East without the leading role of Egypt. The changes that happen in Egypt are always reverberated in the rest of the Arab world. Even though Egypt's role might be diminished after the four unsuccessful for the Arabs, Israeli-Arab wars where Egypt was an architect of those wars. Egypt is still viewed as a leader of the Arab world in the politics, diplomacy and culture e.g. for the USA it was enough to secure the support from Egypt only to implement its policies in the Middle East.

Throughout the Mubarak's reign that was heavily supported economically by the U.S. administration. Mubarak was proved to be not only pro-American ally but is also a secularist. The civilians always question the peace treaty with Israel when it comes to the growing discontent of the Mubarak's rule and his mishandling about socio-economic issues. The Muslim Brotherhood in this sense always reasserts its unwavering position toward both corrupt Mubarak's secularist state and the peace agreement with Israel as a deal with "Devil." With the ouster of Mubarak, there is a vivid power vacuum in the political scene in Egypt with the only credible in the sight of population and socially powerful Muslim Brotherhood as a main contender to fill in the power vacuum and assume its complete and so long anticipated leadership in Egypt. If they succeed in the upcoming presidential elections scheduled in September 2011, then there will be Shari'a law imposed and intensified import of Egypt's "Islamic revolution" to the rest of the Arab world. It can be resulted in the Islamization of the entire Middle East and increasing tensions with Israel with peace treaty broken and huge political and military support to Hamas to restart a violent resistance against Israel. This

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paper is going to assess the perceived threats posed by the Muslim Brotherhood across the world and the Middle East in particular in terms of undermining the democratic process.

The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest political opposition not only in Egypt but also in the whole Arab world; it managed to establish its daughter affiliates throughout the Arab world as a political opposition force against secular regimes in Arab states. In sum, the main pillar tenets and goals of the Muslim Brotherhood include creation of Islamic state where the Shari'a laws (as a main source of legitimacy in the sight of Allah and devout Muslims) could be introduced and effectively exercised, moreover it implies the promotion of Islamic values across the world including the West with all possible means including violence if needed.²

Meanwhile, Muslim Brotherhood officially renounced violence many years ago in exchange for legitimating its organization and granting political rights. As of now, Muslim Brotherhood is a banned organization in the Arab world and Egypt as well. The history showed that banning such a powerful religiously based political group has brought to nothing. Even Mubarak himself realized that to eliminate Muslim Brotherhood is impossible and constant crackdown produced little results.

In 2005 parliamentary elections a banned Muslim Brotherhood members contested elections as separate individuals and managed to enter parliament with significant number of seats (88 out of 450).³ The elections showed that Muslim Brotherhood had a tremendous public support. It feared the authorities. If elections were free and fair then the MB would definitely take the majority of parliamentary seats and seize the whole power. From 2006 until 2011, Mubarak's regime resumed the persecution of MB with a new and vigorous zeal. It included arbitrary detention, cracking down all Muslim Brotherhood gatherings, harassing and intimidating MB leaders.

Nevertheless, Muslim Brotherhood proved to be very resilient. In fact, the answer it has huge public support is not only they traditionally adhere to the Islamic values and propagating Islam, even though Egypt's majority population are Muslims, but because they run too many charities, schools, clinics for free for ordinary citizens. MB also is volunteering in many social activities e.g. helping poor and needy, working, cleaning the streets, mobilizing and organizing youth group and so-called vigilant groups to prevent looting and any other public disorder. That was clearly seen in the recent social unrest, where MB mobilized the volunteers to protect the people's properties.

Thus, Muslim Brotherhood is regarded as a social and caring organization and already won public support and most significantly trust among locals. It has never been involved in any corruption allegations and scandals. The reputation they built that way, additionally gives them the score. Unlike many other radical Islamic movements,

² Joel Campagna, "From Accommodation to Confrontation: The Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak Years," *Journal of International Affairs* 50, no. 1 (Summer 1996).

³ tBob Pit, "Mohamed ElBaradei says Muslim Brotherhood threat is a myth that has been perpetuated and sold by the regime," Islamophobia Watch, January 30, 2011, <http://www.islamophobiawatch.co.uk/mohamed-elbaradei-says-muslim-brotherhood-threat-is-a-myth-that-has-been-perpetuated-and-sold-by-the-regime/> (accessed March 1, 2011). See also Tanya Somanader, "Opposition Leader ElBaradei: Threat of Muslim Brotherhood Is A 'Myth' Lacking 'One Iota Of Reality,'" Think Progress, January 30, 2011, <http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/01/30/141496/opposition-leader-elbaradei-threat-of-muslim-brotherhood-is-a-myth-lacking-one-iota-of-reality/> (accessed March 1, 2011).

MB is not necessarily propagating for an immediate acceptance and enforcement of Islamic laws, while rejecting democratic values. Not MB is applying all methods to be an efficient and flexible force. According to some experts in the Middle East, Muslim Brotherhood has initiated an unprecedented move; to Islamize the modernity, but not modernize Islam, i.e. they adopted western style language to undermine the West, and in other words the kind of democracy that exists should be Islamized as well.⁴

It is fully known that throughout the decades. It was later revealed that MB was not dormant; by contrast, they were so dynamic that expanded their set of operations to the West. MB has already established its network in the USA. It has links, to be more precise, Western NGOs run by Muslims are linked to MB. Their relations include funding MB activities in the ME. In addition, they have business operations and possess overseas assets; they effectively make money out in the West to support their cause to Islam elsewhere in the world.

Moreover they are covertly mobilizing American Muslims to establish an effective Islamic Movement within the USA and ultimately launch jihadist movements with violent resistance against the infidel state and the creation of an Islamic state in the United States.^{5,6} More stunningly, some experts are blowing the whistle that MB already infiltrated American government and parliament and are lobbying the laws in favor of American Muslims as well changing American foreign policies to be more benign towards Muslims states and the ME in particular.⁷ All these statements suggest that MB is formidable force and not only in Egypt and ME but in the West as well. If they have so much purported influence in both Middle East and the West, then it would be much easier to seize political power provided if the upcoming elections would be free and fair, where there are such predictions that in the forthcoming presidential elections the contest will be unprecedentedly democratic. Taking into account that there is no a dominant group or even a political figure to be considered a worthy opponent against Muslim Brotherhood.

M. ElBaradei sometimes is viewed to be an influential figure in Egypt, but he is no than merely a meritocrat who lacks experience in public administration and lack of knowledge about real situation in his native country, since he was long absent for more than 25 years living and working abroad. Ayman Nour another potential leader to be considered as strong. The head of the pro-democratic El-Ghad party (Arabic: Tomorrow's party) is viewed a true democrat and convicted reformist. His imprisonment by Mubarak's regime gave him more popularity and public support, but later it was revealed that he had some contacts with American administration, which undermined his reputation and subsequently his popularity and support among locals.⁸

⁴ Kristen Stilt, "Islam Is the Solution": Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," *Texas International Law Journal* 46, no. 1 (Fall 2010).

⁵ Douglas Farah, "The Muslim Brotherhood in America Defined as 'Threat Organization' in DOD Memo," Analysis of Muslim Brotherhood's General Strategic Goals for North America Memorandum, September 7, 2007, <http://blog.douglasfarah.com/article/245/the-muslim-brotherhood-in-america-defined-as-threat-organization-in-dod-memo.com> (accessed March 1, 2011).

⁶ „FBI Chief: Muslim Brotherhood Supports Terrorism,” IPT News, February 10, 2011, <http://www.investigativeproject.org/2581/fbi-chief-muslim-brotherhood-supports-terrorism> (accessed March 1, 2011).

⁷ See: Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

⁸ Joshua Hammer, "The Contenders: Is Egypt's Presidential race becoming a real contest?," *The New Yorker*, April 5, 2010, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/04/05/the-contenders> (accessed March 1, 2011).

Therefore, what are the potential threats that MB can pose and what are the fears if Muslim Brotherhood comes to power? Moreover, what are the possible plans of MB for the foreseeable future? First many branded Muslim Brotherhood is purely non-democratic, moreover, it is anti-democratic, since they support Sharia law. An Islamist group that have extensive links to religious terrorism, at least not in conducting terrorist acts, since they officially renounced violence, but inspiring the would-be terrorists.

Following the mass protests in Egypt's main cities. Many started to raise concerns who were behind those uprisings i.e. whether it was a middle class citizens driven by a dire socio-economic problems and demanding more decent jobs, higher wages and for more democratic reforms i.e. the lift of the emergency law with more political rights and civil liberties or it was a call for creation of an Islamic state with the Sharia laws in place. According to the general mood of protesting people and the chanted slogans. There were clear demands for democratic reforms with freedom of speech and political rights as main precondition for change with Mubarak's immediate resignation. However, regardless the clear position from the public for non-Islamic state, but for more democracy. The experts doubted that this "mob" in the squares actually know what they want.

There were some suggestions that Muslim Brotherhood is directly involved in organizing the street protests. Nevertheless, it has not been proved that MB was involved. However, MB is very prudent organization. They perhaps realized that if they join the mass protests then they should be at the forefront of the revolution. That would cause some suspicion and it would be definitely clear that revolution in Egypt is bearing non-democratic features. The support for Mubarak's resignation would not follow from the USA, Europe; by contrast, they would intervene somehow to prevent Mubarak's step-down. This case-scenario did not fit Muslim Brotherhood, who decided to stay behind abstaining with only general support with people. However, in times of trouble they were quick in mobilizing youth vigilant groups when it came to lootings and social turmoil proving once more that they are the only force in the country to be able to restore the social order and whom people more or less obey.

As for now the arrangements to keep Muslim Brotherhood off power is skillfully implemented with Mubarak's fall, the military junta took over, effectively marginalizing MB from the political scene. There is no perhaps doubt that Mubarak leaving the place allowed the military to come just for the sake of preventing MB to replace him. Nevertheless, they promised (military junta) that they are not going to stay for good, but for a limited time and scheduled the presidential elections this September 2011 to hand over all political power to a freely elected civilian. However, according to some analysts, Muslim Brotherhood has managed to strike a deal with the military. It says that to maintain social order the military acquiesced to some concessions to Muslim Brotherhood in exchange to keep people off streets until presidential elections are commenced.

The aftermath of revolution still shows that public insecurity is very fragile with renewed religious clashes (Copts vs. Muslims) and military cannot cope with them unless they are aided by Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, the state security and ministry of interiors are still under great danger since all of them had been involved in decades of suppressing, arbitrary detaining and arresting both ordinary citizens and Muslim Brother-

hood members. They gained a nationwide hatred with their facilities burned and ruined in almost all Egyptian cities. To save somehow this situation they might approach Muslim Brotherhood who can influence public and not instigate them against both the state security and ministry of interiors altogether. As far as public security is concerned, the military should cooperate with Muslim Brotherhood to keep things in order and without MB involvement, it would be difficult to reach any social compromise.

Nevertheless, assume taking into account Muslim Brotherhood's powerful influence and provided that presidential and parliamentary elections are free and fair. Even if MB takes over political power, there is little chance that they will start acting counter U.S. policies in the region and against Israel in particular, since Egypt is one of the largest aid recipient countries in the world with more than \$1.5 billion comes from the U.S. administration to sustain and prevent Egyptian socio-economic and security collapse. However, it can be easily dismissed such assumption when something similar happened in the Gaza Strip. Where in 2006 U.S. assisted in free multi-party elections there, which ultimately brought Hamas to power, then the USA and Europe instantly severed all funds and aid to the Palestinian people and hostilities against Israel resumed with more intensity, while people of the Gaza Strip faced an imminent humanitarian crisis.⁹

Conclusion

Assessing all possible risks, one thing is clear that Muslim Brotherhood became as powerful as never before and will do everything within legal framework at least to fight for power, using this power vacuum opportunity and its influence. Military junta's mandate will expire soon and with it most likely the emergency law as well, which additionally will tighten Muslim Brotherhood grip on power and reinforce its activities. Moreover, taking into consideration that neither politician nor secular political party has so much support and influence among the public as MB does. It has all requisites to efficiently compete in the upcoming both presidential and parliamentary elections. If Egyptian elites as well as the West want to preserve Egypt to be at least secular state friendly to Israel, they will and do everything to keep them out of political life, but it depends to what extent the elections will be free and fair. The top decision makers in both the West and Egypt realize that their chances for win are perhaps not so high. If this is a case then the deliberate rigging of election results in favor of the secularists might be expected with the West turning a blind eye and pumping up more funds for support. However, MB is also not dormant and will do everything to be included in political decision-making processes. As for now to ignore such a powerful force is tantamount of suicide for a smooth and stable power transition.

⁹ John McCain, "Interview: John McCain on the Dangers of the Muslim Brotherhood: They Should Be Excluded from any Transition Government," *Spiegel Online*, February 6, 2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/john-mccain-on-the-dangers-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-they-should-be-excluded-from-any-transition-government-a-743819.html> (accessed January 7, 2011).

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TOBACCO REBELLION. IRANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE MOVE

“The past is full of protest,
but only some protests left footprints.”³

The sentence quoted above accurately describes a very general notion and the nature of human societies regardless of time and place. It is, however, particularly true for the Middle East. Riots, rebellions and uprisings have long been a part of history of Islamic civilization, as evidences of its vivid historical narratives. Despite the knowledge of names, dates and political aftermaths (and contextual outline of historical realities), that one can glean through studying of the primary sources, we cannot say much about the participants of these events or psychological and rhetorical strategies they would employ to deal with the issue of utmost importance to all military conflicts: the sacrifice of life.

Based on the superficial descriptions alone, it is difficult to understand why some social groups would often align with others to oppose a much stronger enemy. Sociologists have long wondered what constituted the “social glue” that held them all together and how did they construct their definition of common enemy? What emotion did it derive from: anger, fear or maybe sense of triumph? There are no simple answers to these questions. Scholars adhering to resource mobilization school⁴ point at the theory

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³ Elisabeth S. Clemens, Martin D. Hughes, “Recovering Past Protest: Historical Research,” in *Methods of Social Movement Research*, ed. Bert Klandermans, Suzanne Staggenborg, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 201.

⁴ Among the classical theorists, we refer mainly to Charles Tilly. For this scholar the relationships between the social actors and political power are the basis for the mobilization of resources at the disposal of the social movement. Collective actions are located in the situation of dynamic conflict, taking place in the context of major social processes, such as modernization and centralization of the state. For the

of *political opportunity structure*, a specific set of goals which “appears” before participants of a protest and drives their actions. Social movements tend to “use” (often very complicated) configurations of the *political opportunities* to achieve their aims. Therefore, it seems that participants of protests act as a rational collective entity; a force aiming to take advantage of weaknesses of the state in order to rise against it. However, the critics of this theory have long recognized, it is based on an underlying assumption that there is a constant search for *political opportunities*. Protest participants are attributed with motives that are far too rational, so deeply rooted in the rationale of *political opportunity*, which supposedly is the only reason for protests to emerge.

What the theory ignores or purposefully omits, is a vast sphere of emotions and beliefs (stemming from ideology and culture) of protest participants. It stands on the verge of vilifying social groups involved in dynamic movements, stating that they are always “only seeking opportunity” to achieve political goals, realize their own interests, take control over resources, etc.⁵

Critics of the notion argue that emotions and culture are important elements of all protests. Social groups never operate in isolation from their cultural beliefs and superstitions. Moreover, one can hardly underestimate the potential of emotions experienced by a collective to become the very cause or “the last straw” for the outbreak of a protest and the most potent catalyst of its dynamics. Emotions boosted by various factors, like the violation of taboos, colonization, state repressions, etc., very often become the main cause of mass protests that have little regard towards rationality of *the opportunity structure*, or in other words, the calculated chances for success. Contemporary history provides many examples. In August 1980 in the city of Gdynia, Poland a mixture of different emotions laid foundation for the strategy of the social movement and eventually brought about an outbreak of a strike. Fear, sense of pride, laughter, booing the opponents, public reading of the working-class poetry, rallies in the support of the detainees – all served as initial “tools” to unite the strikers and later were used to mobilize millions of people.⁶

theoreticians of resource mobilization school the most significant issues are social structures and their historical dynamics. In his early writings Charles Tilly neglected issues related to culture and mobilization of emotions. He focused only on the major social processes and the protests they caused. For the subsequent analysis he included the sociological concepts such as identity and storytelling. See: Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Charles Tilly, *The Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1995). Theoretical studies: Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Charles Tilly, *Stories, Identities, and Political Change* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publ. 2002), Charles Tilly, *Social Movements 1768-2004* (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2004).

⁵ It is worth to point out the proposals of American scholars, gathered around Jeff Goodwin. In the book *Passionate Politics* they review all the major theoretical propositions devoted to “work of emotions” in social movements. The authors criticize the school of resources mobilization for a too narrow approach to the subject of protests mobilization. The success and dynamics of the protest is determined not only by the socio-political environment of the movement, but also the cultural attitude towards the objects or phenomena that are the subject of the protest. The cultural perspective, therefore, cannot see the deep structural causes of the protest, but it allows observation of the movement in the process of “becoming.” See: *Passionate Politics. Emotions and Social Movements*, ed. Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, Francesca Polletta (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001).

⁶ In his excellent article “Fear, Laughter, and Collective Power: The Making of Solidarity at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, Poland, August 1980” Colin Barker describes the process of rising of the protest movement under the influence of emotions. Shared emotions engaged workers and created a framework

A year earlier, in a different part of the world, a revolutionary movement came to power in a society stirred by radical religious sentiments, which fed on opposition to violating moral norms, condemnation of Western political and economic domination. Street rallies incorporated traditional rites of martyrdom and the 40-day mourning rhythm, after which the protests erupted anew. In revolutionary Iran emotions not only moved the crowds, but also prevented the protests from dyeing out.

Is it possible to combine the theory of *political opportunity* with the counter arguments of its critics? In other words, can emotions and culture be a part of the *political opportunity structure*? It seems that if we examine the general structure of political protests without taking culture and emotions into account, we somewhat limit our understanding of causes and course of a protest. On the other hand, overemphasizing emotions condemns its analysis to only focus on the uniqueness of a protest. Therefore, omitting one of these categories (emotions or rationale) does not allow to fully explain the phenomenon of mass mobilization. When must keep in mind while analyzing the process that both rational structures and emotions are cyclical in character.

The analysis of culture and emotions within research of social movements is complementary part of historical structural analysis. "Culture is everywhere, but it is not everything. We can only see it clearly by contrasting it with biography, strategy and resources. At the same time we cannot understand those other dimensions of protest without defining culture crisply. If culture is defined too broadly, it will encroach on the territory property left to these other factors. If we ignore culture, as many scholars have, these other variables are forced to do much work, stretching beyond their natural limits."⁷

Analysis of culture enables us to understand the role, that emotions play in the process of protest mobilization, as it is seen from the inside. Stressing structural factors emphasizes the opposite – it allows us to explain what components of the external environment of the movement (social resources, political processes, historical context, etc.) boost or impede its strength, catalyze or inhibit the process of social mobilization, allow the movement to succeed or doom it to failure.

In order to create a comprehensive model of the protest, one needs a theory, which could connect the above-mentioned aspects of analysis, such as the concept of historical civil society. Basing on a relatively well-documented historical event – protest known as the tobacco rebellion in Iran (1891-1892) – we will attempt to conduct a draft analysis of mobilization of civil society's emotions within the context of Iranian *political opportunity structure*.

for the articulation of their claims. Emotions also helped to survive the moments of collective crises. They not only supported the bond, produced by the shared discourse of righteous indignation of state power, but also allowed to control the area of the shipyard, surrounding the strikers: shared meals, meetings, food supply channels and avoidance of external control - they all created a symbolic space of representation through action. "Here [at the Shipyard] the center of partial new social order began to be created, symbolically represented through practical action" – the author wrote. See: Colin Barker, "Fear, Laughter and Collective Power: The Making of Solidarity at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, Poland, August 1980" in *Passionate Politics. Emotions and Social Movements*, ed. Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, Francesca Polletta (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001).

⁷ James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest. Culture, Biography and Creativity in Social Movements* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), xii.

Mobilization in Civil Society

The term *civil society* emerged relatively early in the history of social sciences – its origins can be traced to the Age of the Enlightenment. Since then its meaning has evolved, as it was used by philosophers and thinkers of various schools and backgrounds to describe different aspects of the complex social and political reality of the Western world. However, the history of the concept itself is not the main subject of this article. This article will refer to two main definitions of the term referred to, with the latter considered more important.

The concept of civil society was normative idea used usually by leaders of social movements or dissident intellectuals in countries ruled by authoritarian regimes.⁸ As such, it constituted an integral part of many modern political projects, particularly those focusing on repairing the existing socio-political relations. Civil society was a postulate frequently mentioned while constructing social and political programs that aimed at overcoming repressive policies of the State and establishing democratic governments. The second definition of the term *civil society* uses it in analytical context. For the purpose of this article, the term *civil society* will be defined by its definition from the past, that is, one that does not consist only of social associations (organizations, trade guilds, etc.), but also of primary groups (family as well as traditional religious and neighborhood associations). This analytical definition entails a set of characteristics of historical civil society.

The general meaning of *civil society* can be understood “as a set of organized groups/associations, whose members deliberate or act collectively to accomplish common goals.”⁹ Thus, civil society is a social entity linked by networks of trust, based on the exchange and redistribution of resources as well as on cooperation and moral protection of its members by religion. The civil society protects its resources and moral order from external interference of the State or other forces which could threaten its existence. The latter feature of civil society is closely connected to the subject of this article: civil society has the capability to mobilize resources for political protest (political contestation, riots, rebellion and revolution) against the government.

The pre-modern civil society of Persia was divided into 3 traditional layers: merchants, craftsmen and the *ulema* – the guardians of Islamic law and morality. These were 3 major groups of the Persian civil society since the Safavid dynasty (1501-1722), which had established the power of Shiite Persia. The doctrine of *ijtihad* gave the *ulema* monopoly on interpretation of the sacred texts and the power to legitimize state authorities. The status of religious defenders of morality supported their function as the *de facto* leaders (*riyasat*) of the Shiite civil society. Therefore, an informal hierarchy of power, which exercised real authority in all major cities, was headed by the *ulema* with highest religious authority called *Marja’-e taqlid*.¹⁰ The position of *Marja’-e taqlid*

⁸ See Adam B. Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

⁹ Grzegorz Ekiert, Jan Kubik, *Civil Society From Abroad: the Role of Foreign Assistance in the Democratization of Poland*, Working Paper of Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

¹⁰ Masoud Kamali, *Multiple Modernities, Civil Society and Islam: The Case of Iran and Turkey* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 2006), 97.

was granted on the basis of charisma and piety of a particular scholar. They served as recognized authorities of the community and guardians of its religious foundations (*vaqf*). The wealth gradually accumulated by the *ulema* made them independent from the dynasties at power and allowed them to maintain numerous religious schools. They also had the right to collect taxes (*zakat*) and possess land untaxed by the State, what granted them a significant economic independence.

As *ulema* relationship with the State was at risk due to possible changes in power and potential loss of privileges, a strong, institutionalized administrative hierarchy was not formed in Persia. The religious authority of the *ulema* in the Shiite community did not correspond with the development of “office charisma,”¹¹ also because of their strong relation with the *bazaar* merchants. For centuries, the *ulema* were able to create and maintain strong networks of trust with artisans and merchant families. The *ulema* not only exercised their authority as judges and teachers, but also entered into marriage with the merchant families, legitimized commercial operations and settled internal disputes. The lack of continuity of dynastic power in Persia strengthened the *ulema*’s relationships with merchants and the traditional institution of *bazaar*, which was the source of financial resources, allowing to maintain an alternative center of political power.

Merchants financed public buildings, schools, religious buildings and *bazaars*, as well as protection of trade routes. It should be emphasized that “(...) especially during the reign of the Safavids, many religious buildings, such as mosques, madrasahs and other clerical centers, were built in the bazaars.”¹² The relationship between the *bazaar* merchants and the State was founded on the monetary loans the merchants gave to rulers. Some of them held high position at court – members of the wealthy merchant families occupied offices of viziers and advisors. In order to protect their businesses against the activities of the State, which threatened the interests of the community (refusal to repay the loans, increasing taxes or opening trade routes for Christian merchants), they needed religious legitimacy for their economic activities. Once the state authorities turned away from the civil society, as had been the case in end of rule of Safavid dynasty, the position of *ulema* strengthened. *Bazaar* merchants turned towards the *ulema* and strengthened their relationship with networks of religious foundations. The threat of rebellion and refusal to return loans to court or withdrawing of financial support for the rulers in the face of war were most commonly used arguments in negotiations with the State.

The institutionalization of the relations of the civil society and the State was threatened by cyclical ruptures of relations. The discontinuity of dynastic power was a result of lack of fixed codes of laws pertaining rules of succession. The death of each successive ruler was followed by a break of existing relations with the civil society and rebellion outbreaks among the tribes residing on the Persian peripheral territories, which tried to use their powers to seize the vacant throne. New rulers had to build new networks of

¹¹ In Iran, the “office charisma” – charisma belonging to the office, not to the individual – has developed after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Through the centuries, the charisma was available only to individuals and had to be developed during the life of a Shiite scholar. More about different types of charisma, see: Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

¹² Kamali, *Multiple Modernities*, 99.

relations with the civil society, usually through marriages and distribution of privileges, which took many years.

The resource mobilization process in pre-modern Persia was based on the protest strategies, well-established in the Shia tradition and involving two major groups of the civil society: urban crowds with the students of Quranic schools at the forefront (*tollab*) and groups of urban poor organized as informal militias (*luti*), affiliated with the *ulema* or merchant guilds. *Luti*, the pillars of local communities, were involved in all activities associated with maintaining order in urban areas, collection of taxes and protection of property. Frequently, urban thugs were also hired to incite local parties and cause riots in the cities. *Bazaari* merchants and the *ulema* (with the support of local *Luti*) organized in guilds and pious foundations in major cities in Persia, mobilized urban leaders and neighborhood groups, to protest and delegitimize political power in case of emergency or conflict with the State. Protest in pre-modern times, however, was strictly local in nature and did not go beyond the city's or region's borders.

Social movements of the first half of the XIX century made reference to traditional religious symbols and were of "negative" in nature and strategy. Protest meant pulling out from negotiations with the State and the "passive defense" as well as the boycott of the State rather than innovative strategies aiming at changing the situation by putting forward conditions. Towards the end of the century, the religious symbolism was replaced by more organized social movement strategies. The Tobacco Rebellion was first instance in the modern history of Iran, which combined the old protest tactics with common mobilization against Western commercial concessions and dependence on foreign powers. It was also the first mass social uprising, that encompassed the whole country. The tobacco protest was a prelude to the Constitutional Revolution in 1906.

Protests in the pre-modern Persia were based on a set of repeated measures, which Charles Tilly called "weak repertoire": "some repetition occurs from one episode to another, because habit and limited imagination make repetition easier than innovation; casual conversation and walking through crowded street often conform to this model."¹³ The protest repertoire was limited to established forms of effective resistance against the State.

The modernization process of the XIX and early XX centuries brought about a change in structure of relations between the political authorities and civil society. Traditional economic and political interference of the State provoked sharp opposition to its arbitrary political decisions. The coalitions of the *ulema* with the *bazaar* merchants and other urban groups were part of the *traditional mobilizing structure* in the Iranian society. During the protests, this primordial *political opportunity structure* became a major factor in social movement activity. That coalition, a foundation of all social protests for centuries, has survived in Iran for a long time and withstood the modernization process. Urban classes have not changed their coalitions even during the revolution in 1979, but modern brought a fundamental change in their scope.

Modern protest strategies are innovative and resemble "strong repertoire," described by Charles Tilly in the work *Contentious Performances*. "Strong repertoire" is, according

¹³ Charles Tilly, *Contentious Performances* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 15.

to Tilly, a “dramatized action” and aims to mobilize social classes by using speeches, notifications, reports and newspaper articles. “In something like the style of theatrical performers, participants in contention are enacting available scripts within which they innovate, mostly in small ways; parliamentary debates and classroom oral reports frequently proceed in this manner.”¹⁴ Modern protest repertoire mobilizes both the centers and the provinces. The availability of printing and newspapers “objectivized” the socio-economic situation in the country and allowed the social mobilization process of much wider social strata. By the end of the XIX century other modern social classes also emerged – a modern intelligentsia, administrative classes and military elite, which ideologically supported the protest movement and allowed the movement to formulate clear and distinct demands from the State.

The two protest repertoires listed here correspond with the distinction between *political opportunity structure* and mobilization of social movement by using emotions and religious symbols (culture). The “weak repertoire” includes mechanisms for mobilization by stirring emotions, and is a direct response to the actions of the State. It does not involve innovative strategies and attempts to constitute parliamentary representation. The “strong repertoire” is implemented mostly by modern civil society groups, which are able to clearly formulate demands and political ideas. The emphasis put on one of these factors depends therefore on the stage of historical development of the civil society and changes over time.

In the pre-modern era the defensive reaction against the violation of local religious laws resulted the collective protest. With time, however, the civil society groups begun to see the benefits of seeking new forms of protest and achieving planned political goals, which was a result of increasingly frequent and systematic contact of civil society and the State. A “defensive” and direct response to the cultural and economic threat, which has its source in emotions, became a less effective response in the world of modern institutions.

Tobacco Regime on „the muddy ground” of Iranian Civil Society

In the Kajar era (1794-1925) Persia came into the sphere of influence of world economy. After a defeat during the war with Russia in the first half of the XIX century and humiliating treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmenchai (1829) Persia suffered from unfair sanctions on the sale of commercial licenses and concessions. Local trade was exposed to fluctuations on global market and experienced and in demand for cotton and opium, commodities most sought after by European merchants. Sole dependence on the cultivation of opium was one of the major causes of famine that plagued rural areas in the period of 1872-1896. As a result, rapid reorientation of agriculture towards the cultivation of low-processed products caused deep social stratification. The State and the local landlords benefited from the trade with the Great Powers and grew richer while time, agricultural regions grew poorer.

The class of landowners, government officials and some merchants, who maintained contacts with western companies gained enormous profits from trading goods, which

¹⁴ Ibid.

could be exported tax-free. Local manufacturers could acutely feel the lack of the basic products. Handcraft products and agricultural products which until then had to supply only for the demands of local villages and the nearest towns, were driven out by low-processed goods, grown in an industrial way and exported to Western markets.

Shah Nasir ad-Din's search (1848–1896) for funding led to the sale of commercial licenses on a large scale. On March 8, 1890 the Shah granted Major Gerald Talbot the monopoly on tobacco trade throughout Persia for 50 years. In return, the central treasury was to receive 15.000 pounds per year. Major Talbot's Company was required to purchase all tobacco sold in Persia and pay for it in cash. Articles of the monopoly (Tobacco Regie) agreement informed the tobacco growers and traffickers that they must comply with the Regie officials as well as report the amount of produce stored and adjust to the possibility of a quick sale of stocks. At the request of the Company, in consultation with the Persian government, cultivation of tobacco had to be controlled to reduce or increase the limit of crops suitable for sale.

The government ignored any signs of protests of the merchants and tobacco growers against the British monopoly. It justified the introduction of the concessions by a possibility of reaching enormously high profits by Iranian merchants. Sir Henry Drummond Wolff – a British minister in Tehran – was very positive towards the possibility to strengthen the Iranian economy through tobacco sale. Merchants and cultivators were to earn a lot of money thanks to the supervised sale of their tobacco. On April 3, 1890 he wrote the following words in his letter to Lord Salisbury:

It will be perceived that this concession is very much in favor of the cultivator. He is to be paid in cash for his tobacco and is entitled to advances on his crops. At present he is obliged to accept all kinds of payments for the produce he sells and his borrowings can be negotiated only at a very high scale. I have little doubt that when the system is explained and in operation the agriculturalists will find that they are greatly benefited by the Regie. The concession also gives the Regie the right of making advances on growing crops besides tobacco which will be of great advantage to cultivators who are now ground down by the exactions of native usurers.¹⁵

From the very beginning, there was a threat of Russian boycott of the actions of the tobacco monopoly. Russia claimed the treaty agreement from 1829 guaranteed her commercial concessions in Persia. Upon reselling the monopoly on opium trade to the Russians the concerns about the British tobacco died down ceased. Major Talbot's Company was launched under the patronage of the Shah's army. The Company established its offices in several Persian cities and hired workers. Royal officials were sent forth to the provinces to oversee the accuracy of the contracts fulfilment.

The arrival of the company employees raised concerns among traders and cultivators across Persia. The hostile attitude towards strangers has already been present in Persia since the murder of a Russian playwright Alexander Gribojedow, an envoy in charge of

¹⁵ Wolff to Salisbury, Tehran, April 3, 1890, after: Ann K.S. Lambton, "The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to Revolution," *Studia Islamica* 22 (1965): 121.

controlling of the treaty provisions, by Teheran mob. Gribojedow and his Cossack brigade broke into houses of Tehran notables and abducted women who they considered to be Christian slaves. The act violated the basic religious taboo of private home space. The drunken escapades of Cossacks aroused fury of the *ulema* and set the crowd against the Russians. Since the Gribodojew's expedition, the mood in Iran was very hostile towards foreigners. The earlier economic crisis¹⁶ – of which the *ulema* accused the foreign powers as well as court's enormous expenses on foreign travels, which were considered by them as insulting Islam – fostered the hostility. The Shah was increasingly accused of impiety (*kufr*) in discussions in the *bazaars* and mosques.

Protests stirred by the emergence of the Tobacco Company took a different dimension than previous rebellions against the violation of local trade agreements. Until that time, licenses granted to the foreign powers did not include convenience goods. Until 1891, all licenses included products and minerals that were not the main source of income of Iranian merchants or have never been previously exploited. A public announcement about the sales of Persian tobacco, the commodity used by most of the Persian population, to western company was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the protests. There was a need for organizational framework to successfully generate negative emotions of protesters to into a consolidated social movement united against the withdrawal of the tobacco monopoly.

The news of actions taken by the government and the British Company has set the *bazaar* and the *ulema* in the state of readiness in the largest cities of Persia. The merchants from the city of Shiraz were first to protest. The Grand Vizier Amin as-Soltan ordered the merchants to surrender unconditionally to the Tobacco Company and to retreat from the city main square. In the first phase of the protests was the Shah and the merchants came to an agreement and the protesters agreed to leave the square. However, government's further action forced them to re-mobilize and the Shah became a scapegoat for crowd's demands.

The arrival of the envoy of the Company, who came to Shiraz to supervise the execution of the contract, triggered its anger. Merchants from other cities were also outraged by the fact that tobacco would be bought by the envoy of the Company and called for their replacement with Persian representatives. The British were convinced that sending their representatives to the major cities will not lead to rebellion and it is a better solution than to use the mediation of Persian merchants. After the first protests they realized that they made a mistake by leaving the monitoring of contracts to speculators and middlemen.

The Company went on to explain the merchants that protests were caused by prejudice the locals harbored towards foreigners. The economic aspect was essential to their understanding of the problem. The British could not understand why the merchants could rebel against the concession, which would bring them profit. They seemed to miss the connection between the exclusion of Christian merchants from the regime of the concession and the growing condemnation of the Shah. European ambassadors and

¹⁶ In the second half of the XIX century the Persian currency, associated with the global silver market, was diminished as a result of the drastic decline in the price of silver.

manufacturers interpreted the reason of Iranian merchants' discontent as mere ambiguity of trade rulers and downside income. They discussed the problem with provincial governors and merchants from the court circles. In the letter from May 6, 1891 the British consul in Tabriz asked the representative of the British Kennedy company:

I understand that the reasoning promulgated by the most enlightened Persians here is somewhat after following manner. They say that the Regie will certainly endeavor to make profit of at least one toman a year ahead. They then estimate the population of Persia at say 5.000.000 and (as tobacco is almost as much an article of daily consumption in Persia as bread) they consider it is putting the case very moderately if they calculate the smoking population at 2.5 million. This would bring the Regie 2.5 tomans or about £780.000 per year while the Shah only received £15.000 a year and one fifth or 20% of the profits (and they say the Regie will certainly not let the Shah know the real profits). They then compare this with the Ottoman Regie, which they say, pays £800.000 a year to the Turkish Govt. besides a certain percentage of the profits, and finally draw the conclusion that, as Persia produces more Tobacco than Turkey and of much superior quality it is impossible that such an apparent injustice can be permitted to exist (...).¹⁷

While the Tobacco Company negotiated terms of the contract with the Shah's closest advisers and province managers, the Shah resorted to other means to cut down the protests. He ordered the Shiraz governor to remove a local influential religious scholar (*sajjed*) and escort him to Karbala – the Shia Holy Shrine in Iraq. The scholar's extradition under the escort of soldiers led to a violent protest. Urban crowds clashed with the troops of the Shah, which convinced the company management to negotiate with the merchants. New theories sprang out, explaining the behavior of the crowd by religious fanaticism and the recognizing the need to convince the *ulema* about the good intentions of the Company.

The Company representative met with representatives of the merchants and assured them of their intentions. Paton wrote about this in his letter to Kennedy, dated May 9, 1891:

They [the merchants] thought that the whole concern was to be taken out of their hands and put into the hands of Europeans thus taking from them the means of livelihood and flooding the country with foreigners, to which of course they objected. These impressions Mr. Evans assured them were premature. He told them that the Regie had no wish to bring foreigners here so long as the work could be carried on satisfactorily by the natives and that it would depend entirely on themselves whether Europeans were brought here or not. The Regie would employ as many of them as possible if they prepared to work on their terms, which he assured them would be reasonable. He pointed out that the Company was wealthy and they were bound to succeed with or without them.¹⁸

¹⁷ Extract of dispatch from Mr. Paton to Mr. R.J. Kennedy, incl. in Mr. Kennedy's dispatch no. 123 of May 11, 1981 to the Marquis of Salisbury after: Lambton, "The Tobacco Regie," 128.

¹⁸ Paton to Kennedy, Tabriz, May 9, 1891, incl. 1 in Mr. Kennedy's, no. 128 of 20 May, 1891, cited after: *Ibid.*, 131.

Meanwhile, riots against the company broke out in other cities. In Tabriz actions against the Shah commenced when the population of the city learned about the arrival of Company's representatives in the city. The letters preceding tobacco collections from the merchants were rejected those who would sign on to work for the company was threatened with death by the *ulema*. Posters appeared throughout the city, calling for the expulsion of Europeans from the town and a boycott of the Shah's orders. The protests strengthened along with celebration of the holy month Muharram. There were rumors that the highest *mujtahid* declared *jihad* against the Tobacco Regie. The *ulema* sent the petition to the Shah, demanding the cancellation of concessions and the restoration of old order. In the whole town there were prayers and requests to join the rebellion against the infidels who stole tobacco from the merchants and violated religious orders of Islam.

Students of religious schools soon began to arm themselves, and set up special units to warn the residents about arrival of officials. The close cooperation of the *ulema* and the *bazaar* merchants began at that time. Secret organizations (*anjomans*) united all sections of civil society. They were involved, among other activities, in printing posters and leaflets delegitimizing the order imposed by Western companies. They accused the Shah of the betrayal of the Iranian national interest during the second phase of the protest. Groups of modern intellectuals and merchants, not directly interested in the tobacco trade, also joined the protest.

Incited by calls from Shiraz and Tabriz, other cities joined in mass mobilization. The same mechanisms of mobilization of civil society, embedded in the traditional framework of protests, such as: *bast*,¹⁹ *taqiya*,²⁰ fatwa, religious symbolism or martyrdom and petitions, appeared everywhere reminding the Shah of his role as the defender of religion and community. However, traditional repertoire of protest has transformed, in the new historical context, into a strong *political opportunity structure* in which the mobilization of emotions had become the major tool of the opposition.

The protest grew much faster than the previous ones also owing to the use of then-modern technical inventions. A concession, granted to Julius Reuter in 1872, allowed building a telegraph network connecting the largest Persian cities. Telegraphic commu-

¹⁹ *Taqiya* is a practice of hiding the religious beliefs in order to avoid repressions. The tradition of this form of resistance is very long and comes from the times of Prophet Muhammad. The Shiite clerics justified the use of this tactics in life-threatening situations, experienced by the members of the Shiite community. With time *taqiya* was transformed into a collective strategy, enabling a secret cooperation of societies and achieving political goals through murders or attacks. Ajatollah Chomeini declaimed the usage of this strategy in the fight against Reza Shah, which, paradoxically, may be indicative of a modern movement he was leading. Chomeini much more preferred open public political activity. It was his decision that made public martyrdom the symbol of the fight with the executioner. More on this topic in: Stephen C. Poulson, *Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Iran: Culture, Ideology, and Mobilizing Frameworks* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2005), 55.

²⁰ *Bast* (seeking sanctuary) is a strategy to adapt the space of mosques and holy shrines for the public expression of resistance. *Bast* gives the participants of the movement the possibility to discuss political matters in a relatively safe (not exposed to repression) way. The act of *bast* means inclusion in the dialogue with the political authority of the figure of a mediator in a Shia cleric. It protects against the ruler's anger particularly those, who shut their *bazaar* booths in protest against the extradition of a recognized authority. *Bast* is the strategy similar to the European forms of occupation of the factories, the popular strategy of sit-ins, or a purposeful occupation of space, considered symbolic for the social movement. More on the subject, see: *Ibid.*, 57.

nication between the cities facilitated the exchange of information on the activities of the Tobacco Company and the coordination of the protest.

From Protest Event to Social Movement

Charles Tilly noted that the fundamental change that had taken place with the advent of the XIX century was shift from local rebellions against the central government opposing the levy of taxes or military mobilization – to protests and revolutions aiming at taking control over the State.²¹ In Iran of the XIX century the need to take control did not yet mean overthrowing the existing political system, but an attempt to wield influence over decisions of the State. This need crystallized during the Constitutional Revolution in 1906. The Revolution, in which modern intelligentsia also participated, showed the potential and capability of civil society to organize the institution of parliament (*Majlis*). However, some dozen years earlier the protest of a ‘defensive’ character dominated over the protest of a “positive” character, i.e. one that had to persuade the government to acknowledge demands of civil society and to establish stable institutions for negotiating political decisions.

Largest cities of Persia: Tehran, Isfahan and Mashhad joined the protests in their second phase. The issuing of the *fatwa*, prohibiting the use of tobacco throughout Persia was the protest’s turning point. The fatwa became a symbol of *ulema*’s leadership over the whole movement and confirmed the title of Mirza Hasan Shirazi, as *Marja’-e taqlid* of the Shiite community (Source of Emulation). The respected mujtahid was not the only grantor of the fatwa. As its impact was to be stronger than the fatwa previously issued, it was supported by the respected merchant Malek al-Tojjar and Hasan Ashtiyani, the prominent *ulema* from Tehran. The *fatwa* was as follows: „In the name of God the Merciful, the Forgiving. Today the use of tunbaku and tobacco, in whatever fashion, is reckoned as war against the Imam of the Age (may God hasten his glad advent).”²²

When the fatwa came through the telegraph, the Persian merchants announced *bast* and closed their booths at the *bazaar*. At this stage, the *ulema* did not try to convince merchants to return to work, but they jointly supported the granting of symbolic asylum in shrines and mosques. The crowd gathered in the squares and threw the pipes: *qalians* and *chopuqs* into the burning fires. The clashes occurred when the Shah, agitated by the *fatwa* and widespread activity of the crowds (and the prospect of loss of the concessions, as indeed happened shortly afterwards the most violent clashes with military troops), threatened mujtahid Ashtiyani to remove him from the country, supporting his decision by the Shah’s role as defender of Muslims. In his letter, full of anger and threats, the Shah pointed out to the mujtahid the misunderstanding of the situation in the country by saying:

Do you know that no one can rise against the government? Do you know that if – God forbid – there was no government, those same Babis of Teheran would cut off your

²¹ Charles Tilly, “Does Modernization Breed Revolution?,” *Comparative Politics* 5, no. 3 (1973): 446.

²² Poulson, *Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Iran*, 85.

*heads? Do you know that if the government were not there your wives and children would fall into the hands of the Russian Cossacks, the Ottoman soldiers, the English army, the Afghans, or the Turkomans? It is a pity that you, with your knowledge and intelligence, should give your reason into the hands of few tullabs, ruffians and scum of the city and act according to their desires.*²³

The letter was a thinly disguised ultimatum for Ashtiyani threatening him that if he does not cease to incite the crowd against the rightful rulers, the country will be ruled again by reign of violence the people of Iran knew from ancient times. In response, agitated crowds surrounded the palace and the army opened fire. Several demonstrators were killed but Ashtiyani was spared from extradition. Just like a few months earlier, in the case of the *sayed* from Shiraz, condemnation to exile was thwarted, but in the second phase of defiance, protests have already reached nationwide proportions and threatened to paralyze of trade throughout Persia.

When the envoys of the Tobacco Company began their attempts to enforce collecting of charges they were bound to receive by the concessions, the *bast* proclaimed by the merchants resulted in a drastic increase in a number of people in the streets, raising slogans against the radical foreign domination and calling for the abolition of the concession.

The activities of the crowds in the second phase of the protests, however, were already, in comparison to the first phase, coordinated and had a specific purpose, which was the withdrawal of the tobacco monopoly from the country. While the activity of *bazaar* merchants in coalition with the *ulema* led to mass mobilization, a new form of political organization gained prominence in the streets of Tehran and other cities. Their activity was rooted in the old concept of *taqiya*, transformed into a political and intellectual movement.

It is difficult to assess a real role of the secret societies during the tobacco rebellions. Certainly it was not as big as during the constitutional revolution. The *anjomans* were a new form of revolutionary organization in Iran. This term can be translated as "society."²⁴ The *anjomans* were social circles, gathering first the intellectuals and reformists, who discussed philosophy and created alternative political concepts. Then they became associations, which along with the development of the tobacco movement lost their exclusive character and allowed the representatives of the merchant class and the *ulema*, who were in favor of reforms into their ranks. During the protests the *anjomans* functioned as public associations and discussion circles, and in the XX century they had already established themselves as political parties. Becoming more than just a form of radical modernist association, they became an extension of the public sphere, despite their initially secret nature.

Members of these philosophical circles began to publish and distribute tobacco press during tobacco process, which facilitated political discourse and manipulated the crowds by posters playing on their emotions of the most influential papers, like *Qanun* (*The Law*), were printed abroad. The influential Adamiyat association, publisher of

²³ Ibid., 88.

²⁴ Ibid., 89.

Qanun, inspired by the views of Saint Simon and Auguste Comte, spoke in favor of constitutional ideas and made reference to Islamic religious norms to emphasize greed and dishonesty of the Shah.

The propaganda actions of the *anjomans* involved covering of the tobacco concession advertisements with their own posters calling for a boycott. The first poster appeared shortly before the announcement of the general prohibition on the sale and use of tobacco in Tabriz:

*Ulema of the town! Law is the law of religion and not the laws of Europeans! Woe to those Ulema who will not cooperate with the nation! Woe to those who will not spend their lives and property! Any one of the Ulema who will not agree with the people will lose his life! Woe to anyone who may sell one muskal of Tobacco to the Europeans! Woe to the Europeans who wish to enforce these customs of the Infidels! We will kill the Europeans first and then plunder their property! Woe to the Armenians who will be killed and will lose their property and their families! Woe to those who will keep quiet! We write this in answer to the Notice!
Curses on the father of anyone who may destroy this notice.²⁵*

The specific language of these posters mixes religious threads with references of imagined Iranian nation. It is also more radical in its emotional expression and threats directed at the enemies than other leaflets and letters of the time. Most importantly, the poster is a combination of all political and religious topics functioning then. It refers to the national solidarity, which, in those days, was still a new concept, unknown to many people. Finally, the poster confirms the coordination of protests between the merchant guilds and the *anjomans* associated with them, due to the explicit hostility towards Armenians and direct calls (under the threat of undercover attacks) for the *ulema* to support the boycott of the tobacco concession.

Many posters of similar kind appeared in the streets of Persian cities. The Russians were wrongly accused of fabricating them, because they protected the Armenians rather than attacked them. Posters and leaflets were anonymous and their content indicated the emergence of modern social and political power, deeply embedded in the networks of trust of the civil society – the power, which was not free from calls to extreme political violence.

Anonymous letters, sent to the Shah and his closest advisors were one of other important elements of *anjomans's* activities. Stephen Poulson writes that:

While the letters written by the members of the ulema are generally respectful in tone, the letters written by members of the anjomans were anonymous and threatened violent action. They often employed Qur'anic verse as simile to demonstrate that God would sanction violence against individuals who subjected the Islamic faithful to the will of the foreigners.²⁶

²⁵ Ibid., 91.

²⁶ Ibid., 92.

The letters are thought to be authored by members of groups organized around a person of Jamal al-Din Afghani, a well-known dissident, writer and modernist philosopher, as one of his followers murdered reigning Shah Naser al-Din some dozen years later. Mirza Kermani explained his violent action as a religious act, and thus validated the use of violence against political enemies. The Tobacco Movement brought to the narration of political life the concept of political violence, but the rhetoric of punishment for deeds committed by political leaders has long been present in the Shiite strategies of political resistance.

An open call for political assassination was a radically new element of Iranian public space. For the first time a social movement openly threatened its opponents and those who could potentially support it, that in case of opposition the movement will resort to attacks and killings. The threat had become the official tactics of including violence in the protest toolkit, which brings to mind the activities of modern terrorist organizations. A fundamental change in the “economics of the emotions” of the social movement occurred in that period. While in the first half of the XIX century violence was still a natural consequence of the protest and exploded in an uncoordinated manner under the influence of strong emotions or in response to the political repressions and injustice; in the second half of the XIX century it began to manifest itself as part of a deliberate strategy of intimidation. Extreme emotions become another valuable resource in the *opportunity structure* of the social movement. Movement began to perceive politics in its contemporary form. It seems that the acceptance of political murders was fairly common, though, as Stephen Poulson writes, its role began to decline after the success of the Tobacco Movement²⁷.

During further mobilization (in 1906 and during the Islamic Revolution in 1979) tactics of political assassination were not as clearly-defined during street protests. The tactics, however, manifested itself in the phase after the protests, in the form of competition between the members of various political groups for seats in the parliament, political leadership and the ideological shape of the future political system. Violence became a strategy of social movement and state apparatus during the student protests again on the streets of Iran in 1999.

*(...) In 1999, Iranian security forces employed violence in a „pre-emptive” strike against students at Tehran University in an attempt to prevent them from becoming more active. Some students responded with their own escalation in violence and engaged in street battles with Iranian security forces.*²⁸

Conclusions

The Tobacco Rebellion ended with the Shah’s resignation from the tobacco concession and the success of the Tobacco Movement. But this success brought a response from the State regime. Political repressions began. The Shah used bribery to win the

²⁷ Ibid., 98.

²⁸ Ibid., 96.

favor of social classes, which, under certain financial conditions agreed to collaborate because of the weaker attachment to the idea of civil society. These were the *ulema* families, the elites of the landowners and merchant families, privileged in the poorly institutionalized state hierarchy. The repressions affected radical modernists, pro-reform *ulema*, impoverished merchants and conservative groups, led by the radical youth studying in madrassas and their pious teachers.

In the context of Iranian socio-political relations, there was a possibility or even a necessity to have a coalition of radical reformers and the reactionary Islamic scholars. Modern reformers turned protest events into a social movement; they incorporated collective and secret violence (individual threat of attack) in the framework of the process of mobilization. They also used modern means of communication for persuasion and intimidation, and above all to manifest the presence of crowds in the public sphere. It was a weapon so effective that it permanently entered the repertoire of collective actions. Despite of the fact that the true revolutionary consciousness did not yet exist in Iran, its “birth” was rushed, so that the “people” (“nation”) could operate as an independent historical entity and “independently” formulate political claims.

The structural contradiction between the expectations and interests of indigenous and modern social classes was rarely noticed because of lack of channels of articulation of political demands. The classes acted together and needed their resources, mobilization structures and leaders to transform outrage into collective action. In the periods of protests the public sphere opened up for discussion and filled with dozens of newspapers, cafes raged with political passion, and religious language of the people intertwined with the modernist rhetoric of the intellectuals charmed with Emil Durkheim, and seeking recipes to overcome the authoritarian culture of political Persia.

However, the intellectuals and classes of modern experts were too weak to independently lead the crowds. Iranian civil society retained its “organic” character and cooperated to mobilize against illegitimate political power. Moreover, only such comprehensive and general mobilization of the civil society, based on the resistance rooted in everyday material goals (“trade unionism”) rather than in a “revolutionary consciousness,”²⁹ guaranteed the success of the movement in condition of limited access to the government institutions. The situation repeated itself in subsequent revolutions in Iran.

In the 1970s the *ulema* did not need secular intellectuals to construct revolutionary discourse. They had enough time to develop a coherent political and religious doctrine (*velajat-e faqih*) justifying the new order of power, to finally be able to act as independent leaders of the civil society. The Islamic Revolution completed a significant period in the history of Iranian civil society, the period of “politicization” of masses and institutionalization of religious leadership.

Today we witness the birth of a new wave of social movements and mobilization against political power of religious leaders. The protest cycle has entered a new phase in which the emotions clearly lost its explicitly religious expression. It seems that they are now being replaced by slogans, similar to those the Solidarity Movement coined 30 years ago in Poland.

²⁹ James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

The issue of “work of emotions” in social movements and “the game of emotional tensions” between the parties of social conflicts still remain relatively little known. It is one of the areas of “silence” in the theory of social movements, the area, which is commonly referred to as “unspoken.” A team of American scientists attempted to describe further the categories of emotions in the analysis of the political process in 2001. They defined anew the contentious politics as:

*public, collective, episodic interactions among makers of claims when a) at least some of the interaction adopts non-institutional forms, b) at least one government is claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims, and c) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.*³⁰

Until then no one made an effort to analyze case of protests in countries outside Europe. This area of scholarship has been neglected because existing power relations were considered too complex for analysis not based on institutional patterns. Nowadays the position of scholars of social movements and contentious politics in the Middle East seems to be much better, for the information on informal interactions of protesters with political power has become much more accessible thanks to the development of electronic media, mass media and general opening up of Islamic world to the dialogue with the West. Protests in Arab countries, which we have witnessed recently, will surely bring us tremendous research material. Let's take advantage of it to leave a lasting mark on scholarship's history.

³⁰ Ron R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 54.

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ON THE ISLAMIZATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

In 1996, French diplomat Eric Rouleau declared that Turkish foreign policy (TFP) has been Islamized.² Rouleau based his assertion on the Islamist Welfare Party's new foreign policy, which was indeed interwoven with truly Islamist threads, such as calls for the dinar to become the common Islamic currency, the erection of an Islamic common market, and the forging of an Islamic political unity.³ However, the Islamist Welfare Party-led coalition government was forced by the army to resign in 1997. Then a series of nationalist and secular parties without any Islamist agenda governed Turkey until 2002. Unsurprisingly, the same Islamisation claim resurfaced with the rise of the AKP after the 2002 elections.⁴ Briefly, the Islamisation thesis is that, in parallel with developments in Turkish domestic politics, TFP is abandoning its traditional pro-Western leanings and assuming a new Islamic dimension as its axis tilts in favor of the Middle East; this constitutes a threat to the West.

Indeed, since the AKP's rise to power in the 2002 elections, TFP is significantly unlike the one that was in place since the beginning of the Cold War. Despite the fact that Turkey is still a member NATO, it is increasingly a more active member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC); it has over the years upgraded its relations with Syria as well as with other Arab states, and has acquired a permanent-observer seat in the Arab League. There have also been public demonstrations of the growing rift with Israel on the foreign policy and military fronts, of publicly tendered help to Iran in nuclear diplomacy despite Western criticism, and of good relations with Sudan, whose leader is blamed for the Darfur massacre. Additionally, Turkey has become active at the sub-state level. For example, it has developed official and semi-official connections

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² Eric Rouleau, "Turkey: Beyond Atatürk," *Foreign Policy* 103 (Summer 1996): 70-87.

³ Refah Partisi (Turkish: The Welfare Party).

⁴ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Turkish: The Justice and Development Party).

with several religious organizations such as HAMAS, deemed a terrorist organization by Western states. Symbolically, Turkey undertook a leading role in the representation of the Islamic world in the Alliance of Civilizations initiative, which, in a sense, made Turkey the “spokesman of Islamic world.”⁵ In short, Turkey’s new activism has transformed TFP in two major ways: First, Turkey has updated her former highly Western-oriented and U.S.-centered foreign policy. This has placed Turkey in a new position that is less dependent on the West; second, Turkey has replaced her traditional isolationist foreign policy position with one that has a growing Islamic orientation.

To explain the recent changes in TFP, albeit with due attention to external factors, this article studies the role of the new domestic dynamics that lie at the core of the recent changes. The ongoing transformation of Turkish politics, which is also the source of proliferation of Turkey’s foreign policy options, should be seen as a direct result of the rise of a new Muslim élite who relate differently to Islam than might be expected. The current major actors of Turkish politics have had various personal experiences of Islamic socialization. Here, the critical question is how (much) these actors influence Turkish politics in general and TFP in particular.

However, one should be mindful of the problems created when domestic matters that reference religion intrude into an analysis of foreign policy matters. This is so because traditional neo-realist analytical approaches do not accommodate such intrusions. In Waltzian terms, neo-realism assumes that the state is a rational unitary actor obliged to maximize its interests rationally, no matter what its domestic identity. For Waltz, if state preferences or regime types “enter the explanation,” we lose the ability to deduce conclusions available on systemic international relations theory.⁶ This Waltzian tenet can, of course, be faulted. For example, De Mesquita’s position rejects its premise, positing instead that “one fundamental law of international relations is that such politics is shaped by and rooted in domestic politics.”⁷ On his view, an analysis that observes only at state level neglects the major political and other stimuli that shape political procedures. The second problem is the secular mindset that dominates the study of international relations. Like other social sciences, the international relations discipline has developed in gradual but effective denial of any role to religion.⁸ As Fox correctly notes, the clash of two secular ideologies during the Cold War, liberalism and communism, consolidated the secular nature of the study of international relations.⁹

Despite the traditionally a-religious nature of the discipline, this article will analyze the relationship between Islam and TFP. We argue that the rise of a new Islamic élite is the key instigator of the recent shifts in TFP. This élite have erected new mechanisms

⁵ Ali Balci, Nebi Miş, “Turkey’s Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Turkish Studies* 9 (3) (September 2008): 400.

⁶ James D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1998): 299.

⁷ Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, “Domestic Politics and International Relations,” *International Studies Quarterly* 46 (2002): 2.

⁸ Jonathan Fox, “Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations,” *The International Studies Review* 3 (3) (Fall 2001): 53-56.

⁹ Jonathan Fox, “The Multiple Impacts of Religion on International Relations: Perceptions and Reality,” *Politique étrangère* 4, (Winter 2006): 4, http://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_PE_064_1059--the-multiple-impacts-of-religion-on.htm (accessed July 29, 2010).

through which Islamic values and concerns interact with the conduct of foreign policy. To describe the nature of this interaction, we use the Bourdieuan concept of *habitus* to illuminate how values are learned, produced and reproduced. On the *habitus* model, political behavior and change is attributable to the agent of a change or a behavior. Thus, change is mainly about the agent's socialization in an environment, and about how the agent develops and reflects certain values. Therefore, this article accepts that the Islamisation thesis about TFP is correct. However, this is not the same as the thesis that there has been an Islamist turn. Instead, the ongoing process is pretty much the expectable one, given that Turkey's current sociological dynamic is driven by a new Islamic elite and their new social coalitions. Thus, we explain on the *habitus* model how domestic change dictates certain positions in foreign policy.

Habitus versus Politicus: How does Islam Affect Politics?

Studies of Islam and Islam's impact on politics / foreign policy oftentimes fail to distinguish the different types of Islamic activity. This is so because their tendency is to lump all Islamic activities together as the same "sort of thing." This is no doubt due to the reductionist legacy of major theories, such as Orientalism and modernization theory. It is evident also that most studies treat the relationship between Islam and politics as a problematic relationship. The problem here is that propensity of these studies to call all forms of Islamic activism political Islam or Islamism is misleading, for the interaction between Islam and politics has various forms. Sami Zubaida, for instance, proposes three ideal types of Islamic activism – conservative, radical and political – as appropriate distinctions in the study of Egypt, Iran and Turkey. Zubaida carefully underlines the crucial singularities of the character of each distinguished "type."¹⁰

An analysis of TFP certainly requires the identification of ideal types to differentiate the non-Islamist forms of Islamic activism. We propose a bifurcated typology of Islamic activism: the *politicus* (political Islam or Islamism) and the *habitus*. The *habitus* model serves to identify the non-Islamist ways of Islamic activism, and more importantly, to examine the impact of Islam on the different layers of social life, including political life. As the dominant religion in the region, Islam, like any other major organized religion, affects culture, politics and other layers of social life through traditional and complex structures. Thus, on the *habitus* model, the impact of religious is a natural one. We distinguish the *politicus* and *habitus* models by observing how different Islamic groups approach:

- i) methods of achieving political power and political activism;
- ii) the maintenance of an orderly society;
- iii) the implementation of the Sharia; and
- iv) democracy. (See Tables 1 and 2 for a brief comparison of the two).

The term Islamism denotes the political manifestations of the religion of Islam.¹¹ It entails a political ideology that articulates the necessity of establishing an Islamic gov-

¹⁰ Sami Zubaida, "Trajectories of Political Islam: Egypt, Iran and Turkey," *The Political Quarterly* 71 (1) (2000): 63.

¹¹ Gudrun Kramer, "Islamist Notions of Democracy," in *Political Islam*, ed. Joel Beinin, Joe Stork (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 70-3.

ernment.¹² The extensive use of Islamism in the literature has established the misleading monolithic view that all Islamic activism is Islamism. Consequently, the question of how Islam draws society and politics into its traditional patterns has been greatly understudied. To correct this situation in the literature, we employ the Bourdieuan concept of *habitus* to refer to the non-Islamist interactions of Islam and politics.

Habitus refers to the shared tastes, habits, dispositions and forms of behavior of a group of people, all of whom are shaped during socialization by cultural conditioning. According to Bourdieu, social reality and individuals' cognitive forms have deep social origins. In other words, class *habitus* is socially learned, produced and reproduced. Unlike the *politicus* model on which the Islamic model exists externally as an essential agenda, there is no such essential agenda on the *habitus* model. The centrality of an agency that has no fixed agenda is the major component of the *habitus* model. Like Bourdieu's *habitus*, it centers on "the social agent in his true role as the practical operator of the construction of objects."¹³

Habitus refers also to the social dynamics of the traditional patterns as they affect political structures and processes. These dynamics operate within the traditional cultural milieu. Therefore, *habitus* rejects sudden and radical breaks and external political interventions that seek to redefine the link between culture and politics; it defends the existing cultural structures and patterns. As distinct from the top-down nature of political Islam (*politicus*), *habitus* refers to the bottom-up nature of non-political Islamic activism where the agency is at the center of all interaction. Unlike *politicus*, which has an Islamist political ideology as its larger, human-action-directing structure, *habitus* is without a larger ideological structure. Political Islam is therefore top-down because it imposes, or creates, a structure, i.e., the Islamist ideology, that dictates human action. In contrast, the collective strives to attain common goals from the *habitus* of its members. However, this does not mean that *habitus*-propelled social or political activism is weak or disorganized. Rather, strong internal mechanisms exist in it that promote group solidarity and social or political activism that derives from Islam, culture or both.

Platonic idealism might help us understand the differences between the two models: The *habitus* model is far from that idealism, whereas the *politicus* model associates closely with it. On the *habitus* model, Muslims practice Islam fully in their lives, and more importantly, display the solidarity of a single Muslim identity, which, in general terms, is loosely defined as Muslim-ness. Thus on the *habitus* model there is no necessary pointer to an Islamic agenda other than pietism. However, on the *politicus* model there is a clearly defined Islamic agenda to which a Muslim must adhere steadfastly. But on the *habitus* model there is an Islamic activism that operates without an Islamic political agenda. On the *politicus* model, enlightened Muslims must work toward the ultimate ideal of establishing an Islamic state, that is, towards the attainment of the unity of the *Ummah*. On the *habitus* model, all political and social references are to the agent; on the *politicus* model, all references are to the agenda. Thus, on the *politicus* model, the source of morality, and

¹² Salwa Ismail, "Being Muslim: Islam, Islamism and Identity Politics," *Middle East Report* 221, (Winter 2004): 614-31.

¹³ Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 90.

of political correctness, is in the agenda. Consequently, the agent is merely a contingent entity on the *politicus* model. For instance, Khomeini declared that the Islamic government “can unilaterally break even those contracts which it has made with the people on the basis of Sharia rules.” Yet, “it can also stop any activity – be it spiritual or temporal – whose continuation would be contrary to the expediency or interest of Islam.”¹⁴

The *habitus* model is essentially inclusive; it does not necessarily distinguish an active and practicing Muslim from an inactive and non-practicing one. Contrastingly, the *politicus* model is essentially exclusive, such that a politically active Muslim is carefully distinguished from an inactive one who is, for instance, a liberal or a leftist. The ultimate goals of the two models are different. Since the *habitus* model is agent-based, its ultimate goal defines itself in terms of its agent, who is the bringer of solidarity. In other words, on the *habitus* model, the realization of the ultimate goal (the Islamisation of the Muslim group’s own environment) is based on the collective movement/solidarity of its members. However, since the *politicus* model’s point of departure is the agenda, its ultimate goal is the collective mobilization of agents’ efforts toward the realization of an Islamic state. Table 1 summarizes the differences between the two models.

Table 1

<i>Politicus</i> (Islamism)	<i>Habitus</i>
learly anti-Western	Pragmatic; not necessarily either anti-Western or pro-Western
Ideology-based	Identity or culture-based
State/Institution-based	Socially/economically-based
Top-down	Bottom-up
Emphasizes: Unity of all Muslims under a political project	Emphasizes: a) economy and culture b) societal solidarity
Derides individuals’ identity, attempts to create a common Islamic identity	Recognizes individual identity; not really strict about creating a common Islamic identity; focuses instead on emphasizing Muslim-ness

Islamists are essentially anti-Western, and Islamism is ideology based. Islamism’s major goal is to capture state institutions (either through elections or a revolution), and subsequently, transform Muslim societies by top-down policies. Here, the Islamists’ foreign policy orientation emphasizes the unity of all Muslims under a political project. Thus, Islamism is at deep philosophical odds with the Westphalian state system.¹⁵

¹⁴ Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1993), 151.

¹⁵ Bassam Tibi, “Political Islam as a Forum of Religious Fundamentalism and the Religionisation of Politics: Islamism and the Quest for a Remaking of the World,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 10 (2) (June, 2009): 109.

On the other hand, *habitus* approaches political matters pragmatically. *Habitus* is not necessarily either anti- or pro-Western. The absence of an ahistorical agenda permits behavior on the *habitus* model to be open to cultural and local effects. Unlike Islamism, *habitus* is identity or culture based. While Islamism emphasizes the state and its institutions, *habitus* focuses on social and economic institutions. Transforming Muslim societies on a fixed-identity basis is not typically a goal of *habitus*, thus it has no necessary top-down process. *Habitus* emphasizes economy and culture, and aims to increase such ties within and among Muslim communities, both on the local and global levels. It values societal solidarity highly. *Habitus* recognizes the individual differences of Muslims, and does not try to subdue their identities with a larger political entity. Whereas *politicus* stresses the state, *habitus* prioritizes social networks.

Habitus tries to transform societies through social and political action. In this sense, *habitus* is puritanical, preaching and populist, and aims to re-Islamize society. The *habitus*-directed are willing to participate in politics, and they do not denounce democracy and Western-style political institutions. In fact, they draw a lot of parallels between Western-style democracy and some classical Islamic concepts, such as social and economic justice, equality, *shura* (consultation), *ijma'* (consensus of the Muslim community; collective decision-making), and *bay'a* (affirmations of communal loyalty, the term has since become synonymous with elections). Table 2 below summarizes the differences between the two models on some critical political, social and religious issues.

Table 2

Major Issues	<i>Politicus</i>	<i>Habitus</i>
1-Achieving political power	Committed to political activism and/or revolution; achieving political power is valued	Social and economic institutions are valued; limited political activism is compatible
2- Transformation of society	Top-down: after achieving political power, the first task is the forcible Islamisation of society	Bottom-up: transformation (Islamisation) of society is the pre-condition of Islamic rule. Islamisation has to happen from within
3-Application of the Sharia	It is indispensable; a Muslims cannot be a true Muslims unless they live by the Sharia	It is the ultimate goal; however, Islam can be fully practiced under any type of political system
4-Popular Sovereignty	Completely rejects popular sovereignty, as that is incompatible with the sovereignty of Allah	Cautiously accepts popular sovereignty, but does not completely reject the sovereignty of Allah
5- End Justifies the Means?	Yes	No

<p>6-The nature of the holy struggle</p>	<p>A. All societies today are <i>jahili</i> societies, therefore violence against secular Muslims and Muslims who do not accept the sovereignty of Allah is justifiable on Islamic terms. B. Destruction of <i>jahili</i> societies is the only way towards the Sharia. C. Usually define <i>jihad</i> narrowly, only in terms of material conflict.</p>	<p>A. The best approach to people is through enlightening them and winning their hearts and minds. Violence is not justifiable, in Islamic terms, for the establishment of the Sharia. B. Social and political activism and institution-building are the only way toward establishing the Sharia. C. <i>Jihad</i> is defined in larger perspective so far as to include personal piety and social justice</p>
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Turkish Foreign Policy as a Field of Secularization

In Turkey, relations between the state and religion have always been different from that established by the Western-style neutrality doctrine, which requires that the state neither favor nor disfavor any particular conception of the religiously defined good life.¹⁶ Instead, the Turkish state implemented an active strategy towards religion. While designating secularity as the exemplary life style and combating Islamisation, the Turkish state has tried to market a model Islam through its bureaucratic institutions, presumably to satisfy the provision of the Constitution that makes religious education compulsory. Accordingly, the government pays the salaries of more than 60,000 *imams* (prayer leaders in government controlled mosques) listed by the Directory of Religious Affairs, a constitutional institution.

The Turkish state has been a powerful agent in the fashioning of a secularist agenda on every issue, including foreign policy issues. Since the creation of the Kemalist regime in 1923, the Republican elite have carefully implemented a foreign policy agenda that always runs parallel with Turkey's domestic agenda of secularization. Foreign policy was always more than an interest-seeking activity of the Turkish elite; it was a strategy of the survival of the regime.

Kemal Atatürk should be credited with being the founding father of this policy, as his foreign policy was clearly an extension of his domestic policies. Kemalism identified a vital link between foreign policy and regime survival.¹⁷ Thus, the Kemalist notion of security envisaged foreign policy as a specific framework of values that would serve to protect the domestic regime from domestic antagonists. That is why *Batıcılık* (Westernism) was always

¹⁶ John T.S. Madeley, "European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious Neutrality," in *Church and State in Contemporary Europe*, ed. John T.S. Madeley, Zsolt Enyedi (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 5.

¹⁷ Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish foreign policy: historical framework and traditional inputs," *Middle Eastern Studies* 35 (4) (1999): 171.

a basic principle of Turkish foreign policy.¹⁸ Thus, “preservation of the *status quo*, and the country’s modernist, secularist, national regime” both played key roles in TFP, the latter values forming the ideological pillars of foreign policy making.¹⁹ The Republican élite even accepted the dilution of their personal and class interests for the sake of protecting secularism.

Because foreign policy values were firmly set in the mould just outlined, for a long time Turkey distanced specific issues accredited with a potential for de-secularization. For example, when Turkey was invited to the 1969 Rabat Meeting, which paved the way for the creation of the OIC, the Turkish president declared that Turkey is a secular state. Despite the enthusiasm of the center-right Demirel government for a Turkish presence at that Meeting, the army also publicly expressed its reservations. Turkey was represented at the Rabat Meeting of 1969 only at the ministerial level. However, facing criticism from the bureaucratic élite, the government was represented by a state diplomat at the 1970 meeting. Even so, Turkey’s representative submitted an official letter to the Rabat secretariat, warning that Turkey would participate as long as that does not clash with Turkish constitutional principles, that is, with Turkish secularism and Westernism.²⁰ Turkey did not even sign the 1972 Jeddah Declaration, the founding text of the OIC, having found uncongenial the emphasis on religion in the Charter’s preamble.²¹ Thus Turkey maintained a selective fraternization with the rest of the Middle East, one that enabled it to be active in the region, but only to the extent approved by the major Western states, especially the U.S. Thus, Turkey was active in the 1951 Middle East Command Plan along with the U.S. and the UK, despite the adverse reaction from the Arab media. Similarly, Turkey showed willingness to participate in the Baghdad Pact of 1955, another Western project.

The Kemalist alignment of foreign policy and domestic regime has a simple logic. But it is not one that is totally unknown in the Middle East. Many Middle Eastern regimes that suffer deep legitimacy or other endemic domestic problems are heavily reliant on the international system. As Marc Lynch says with reference to the Jordanian case, the survival of a regime in the Middle East can be expected to “the extent to which international and domestic debate produces consensus, and in the measure that these public spheres reinforce or oppose each other.”²² A typical Middle Eastern state requires the support of the international state system for economic, security and international-legitimacy reasons. The same can be said of the Turkish case.

However, in Turkey, unlike in the other countries of the Middle East, the legitimacy aspect has dominated other factors. In exchange for Turkey’s collaboration with the West, the Western actors recognized the secular élite as the only legitimate political actors. On that consensus of the secular Turkish élite and the West, any deviation (Islamic or communist) from the secularist position constituted a threat to both. On this

¹⁸ *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, 2001-2012*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 49.

¹⁹ Esra Gürkaynak, Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner, “Decision-making Process Matters: Lessons Learned from Two Turkish Foreign Policy Cases,” *Turkish Studies* 5 (2) (Summer 2004): 43.

²⁰ *Türk Dış Politikası*, 792.

²¹ Hüseyin Pazarıcı, “Türk Dış Politikası ve Hukuk,” *Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi* 7 (2) (Spring 2008): 121.

²² Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 6.

contract, the secular élite in Turkey secured the position of being the only legitimate agents of the Western world. Therefore, for long years, both the West and the Kemalist élite took much the same approach to the various international political issues. Meanwhile, the Turkish Islamic groups' radically anti-Western Cold War discourse helped the Republican élite consolidate their monopoly on the Western-ally position.

Maintaining this monopoly was crucial for the perpetuation of the Republican élite's position as the uncontested power in Turkey. Indeed, the Sword of Damocles that hovered over this élite was the possibility that an alternative elite with the capacity of 'speaking' with the West might emerge. The established harmony between this élite and the West (mainly the U.S.) was clearly evident during the period in government of the Islamist Welfare Party-led coalition in 1996. That government's revisionist foreign policy agenda, which prioritized close relations with the Islamic world (mainly with Iran and Libya), was equally protested by the U.S. and the Turkish secular élite. While the U.S. publicly demanded the cancellation of Turkey's energy deals with Iran, a leading Turkish general publicly opined that Iran should be declared a terrorist state. And the Turkish army signed several strategic agreements with Israel, despite the Islamist government's reservations.²³

Political Islam in Turkey: A Fact or an Exception?

Various Islamist groups have emerged in Turkey since the beginning of the Cold War. The most prominent of them was certainly Necmettin Erbakan's movement, *Milli Görüş*,²⁴ which always resurfaced under a new name, as it was repeatedly banned by the authorities for being Islamist (The Turkish Constitution prohibits the establishment of political parties based on religion and ethnic origin, which rules out Islamist and Kurdish parties). Erbakan deserves to be called by the name Menal Lutfi gave him, "the father of political Islam" (*Abu al-Islami Siyasiyyah*), for his *Milli Görüş* manifested political Islam in its discourse, agenda, membership and leadership structure.²⁵ Erbakan is a fine example of Islamism on two major levels. First, he represents the basic ideological tenets of Islamism. As an Islamist, he does not refrain from bringing the self/other distinction into his political rhetoric, even to the point that he condemns "those who do not serve his party" as undesirables from a religious perspective.²⁶

Like Khomeini and other Islamists, Erbakan defines "true Muslim-ness" as inseparable from "correct political behavior," and thereby adds a new dimension to the traditional Islamic requirement of pietism. "Other parties have members, but we have believers" is a typical Erbakanian Islamist discourse.²⁷ Thus, on Erbakan's view, "true Muslim-ness" equates with being at one with "the Islamist party."

²³ Cengiz Candar, "Türkiye-İsrail: Kan davası mı?," *Radikal*, June 4, 2010, http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/cengiz_candar/turkiye_israil_kan_davasi_mi-1000630 (accessed January 5, 2011).

²⁴ The term *Milli Görüş* in Turkish literally means national outlook which does not necessarily connote the ideology or policies of the far-right Nationalist Action Party in Turkey.

²⁵ Menal Lutfi, "Türkiyya min Atatürk ila Erdoğan: Ellezi Yuhibbehu Etrak ve Yehafehu Etrak," *Asharq Alawsat*, Shavval 25 1428 (25 October 2010).

²⁶ Sebnem Gumuscu, Deniz Sert, "The Power of the Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45 (6) (November 2009): 956.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 975.

In a recent statement, Erbakan declared that the Felicity Party, the party of the *Milli Görüş*, differs from all other parties as it truly represents what Islam demands.²⁸ Thus, for Erbakan, serving the party is tantamount to *jihad*.²⁹ As Azmeh says, an Islamist party never considers other parties its equals. Instead, it declares itself *the* party that strives for the continuance of the Islamic cause.³⁰ Second, on the practical level, Islam is the major point of reference for Erbakan in social, economic and political projects. Erbakan also promotes an Islamist agenda, to wit, the establishment of a common Islamic currency, and the creation of an Islamic union. He condemns the interest-based banking system and Western imperialism, both of which he sees as hand-in-hand with Zionism. He champions “a new Muslim world” constructed on “an Islamic NATO, an Islamic UN, and an Islamic common market.”³¹

Erbakan was toppled in 1997 by the Turkish army backed by various secular groups, including the secular media and political organizations, in what might be called an indirect coup against the government (indeed, many analysts of Turkish politics dubbed this event a postmodern coup). At that time, Erbakan had problems with controlling his own party, and a splinter group, known as “the young,” among them future prime minister R. Tayyip Erdogan, left to join a new party with a more liberal agenda. As Erbakan was banned from politics by the Turkish Supreme Court, he has since become a kind of spiritual leader. Erbakan’s Virtue Party gained 15.4% of the vote in the 1999 elections, but his Felicity Party, the successor of the Virtue Party, won only 2.49% of the vote in 2002, and 2.34% in 2007 elections.³²

Worse, a new intra-party tension came to the fore in 2010 between the traditionalist hardliners and the reformists. Like the first group who left the party in the late 1990s, a second reformist group has recently become critical of Erbakan’s old-fashioned Islamism. In return, Erbakan strongly criticized the new party leadership for deviating from the principles of *Milli Görüş*, and demanded its resignation. This short tale clearly demonstrates that Erbakan’s Islamist parties lost their significance in Turkish politics after 1995. Erbakan’s Islamist parties no longer secure electoral success, nor can his traditional Islamist discourse keep his party in harmony.

Conclusion

Majority of the Turkish Islamists no longer follow the *Milli Görüş* path. Those who left Erbakan’s party established the AKP, and came to power after the November 2002 parliamentary elections within a year after the AKP’s establishment. Many members of the newly established AKP found Erbakan’s Islamist ideology obsolete and inapplicable. The socio-economic bases of the new AKP no longer include the marginalized lower-middle classes of the shanty towns in larger cities and the conservatives of smaller

²⁸ Felicity Party (Turkish: Saadet Partisi).

²⁹ *Milli Gazete*, July 30, 2010.

³⁰ Azmeh cited in Gumuscu, Sert, “The Power of the Devout Bourgeoisie,” 957.

³¹ Philip Robins, “Turkish foreign policy under Erbakan,” *Survival* 39 (2) (Summer 1997): 89, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396339708442913> (accessed January 5, 2011).

³² Virtue Party (Turkish: Fazilet Partisi).

towns. The socio-economic bases of Turkish Islamist movement now include mainly students and the new middle class (but it does not necessarily include the working class and the peasantry). The newly emerging middle classes of the late 1980s and the early 1990s greatly enjoyed the liberal policies of Turgut Özal who implemented a heavy liberal economic policy like that of the current AKP's. This new class, dubbed as the *Anatolian Tigers*, constitutes the backbone of the AKP's electoral base. On one hand, in general terms, liberalism has reduced the ideological excesses of Kemalism, on the other hand, liberalism enabled the newly emerging Islamist non-state actors and mid-sized entrepreneurs to have more say in Turkish politics.

Similarly, TFP is no longer a field of secularization as the new Islamist groups inject their policy concerns and economic demands into the decision-making mechanisms of foreign policy making in Turkey. Through the intermingling of the 1980's and 1990's liberal agenda and the newly emerging Islamic economic and political actors, a new type of TFP approach is emerging. The direction and the nature of this newly emerging foreign policy approach, that is no longer secularist, will be determined by the new Islamic élite's successes and failures, but more importantly by their interaction with their political allies or foes.

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LIMITS OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY

Islam is a dominant religion in Turkey. However, Islamism has lost its appeal over the years. Although pockets of Islamist movements are still visible in Turkey, a successful political Islamist movement in the traditional sense is not a realistic expectation, for several sociological and historical reasons. This paper is going to analyze the major sociological and historical dynamics that impede the emergence of a successful Islamist party or movement in Turkey. Those dynamics are the legacy of Turkish modernization, the absence of a historical Turkish tradition of pure Islamic rule, and the secularizing tendencies of current Turkish Islamic groups.

The legacy of modernization

Turkey's modernization dates back to the XIX century, and its historical imprint is highly significant. Modernization has created both an élite and a social constituency. The modernized élite are well educated and have important instruments and secular allies (like the Turkish army) to amplify their messages. Therefore, there has long been a strong modernized élite to challenge any kind of Islamist rule in Turkey. A 2006 survey showed that 20.1% of respondents consider themselves to be laic.² In fact, CHP, the ultra-secular Kemalist party, won 19.41% of votes in the 2002 elections, and 20.88% in the 2007 elections.³ The rest of the vote is not homogenous: MHP, the secular nationalist party, won 8.35% and 14.27% respectively in those elections.⁴ According to a more recent survey, only 10% of the conservative respondents declared that "they demand Sharia." Even of AKP voters, 74% opposed a Sharia-based regime.⁵ Thus, the idea of an Islamist rule is not popular even among the large conservative (Islamic) masses.

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² Ali Çarkoğlu, Binnaz Toprak, *Değişen Türkiyede Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* [Changing religion in Turkey, Society and Politics] (İstanbul: TESEV, 2006), 29.

³ Republican People's Party (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)

⁴ Nationalist Action Party (Turkish: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi).

⁵ Yenişafak, 12 May 2008.

The absence of a historical tradition

Historical experience does not support an Islamist-like political regime in Turkey. In the Ottoman period, *raison d'état* was the supreme determinant that subjugated even religion. Unlike the theocratic regimes of past and modern Islamist states that prioritize *raison de religion*, the Ottoman model was politics or state-centered. That is, political considerations (*raison d'état*) shaped key decisions. A major reason for that was the absence of an independent, or “auto-cephalic,” as Berkes calls it, religious *ulema* with full autonomy.⁶ Halil İnalcık, the chief authority on Ottoman history, notes that political authority was always supreme among the Ottomans, and that it always overrode the authority of the religious *ulema*. İnalcık calls this Turkey’s “civil law tradition,” “civil” referring the non-religious.⁷ Thus, the *ulema* in Ottoman times wielded authority in the measure that the political authority permitted. In many cases, the religious *ulema* even played the “legitimizer” role for the political authority. When the *ulema* opted for clash, they were punished or purged. Several times, Ottoman sultans like Bayezid, Mehmed II, and Mahmud II confiscated the large land holdings of the *ulema* and distributed them to the military élite, thereby asserting the state’s supremacy over religion.⁸ In other words, unlike in the Iranian tradition, the *ulema* was a contingent class among the Ottomans. In Iran, the religious *ulema* has always played the key role, despite the political élite. In 1809, for example, *merce-i taqlid* Mirza Hasan Shirazi issued a religious decree and delegitimized a tobacco concession agreement signed by the Iranian Shah Nasrudin. Not even a remotely comparable act has ever occurred in Ottoman times.

The historical and philosophical reason for the differences between the Iranians and the Ottomans is accounted for by the Sunni-Shi’a split. Sunni political thought identifies political legitimacy in non-sacred fields, such as tradition, society and power. However, the Shi’a political thought rejects non-sacred sources of legitimacy, and recognizes the legitimacy only of the divine will, which is immune to human intervention. The Sunni legal tradition has always rejected the Shi’a supernatural legitimacy theory. In *Kitab al-Mustazhiri*, the prominent Sunni scholar Al-Ghazali refuted the Shi’a political doctrine that rejects societal legitimacy.⁹ This critical difference impeded the emergence of an auto-cephalic *ulema* in Sunni thought.

An independent *ulema*, and a history with a tradition of *ulema* independence, are the key elements of the successful Islamist agenda of the modern period. In fact, the autonomous *ulema* tradition in Iran should be seen as the historical root of the contemporary Iranian Islamism. Amr Sabet argues that if Iran had been a Sunni state, a revolution would not have taken place there.¹⁰ An independent clergy-like *ulema* can propose

⁶ Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma* [Modernization in Turkey] (İstanbul: YKY, 2004), 26.

⁷ Halil İnalcık, “Türk Devletlerinde Sivil Kanun Geleneği, [Tradition of Civil Law in the Turkish State]” *Türkiye Günü* 58 (November-December 1999): 6.

⁸ Gürsoy Akça, *Osmanlı Devletinde Bilgi ve İktidar* [the Ottoman Empire Knowledge and Power] (Konya: Palet, 2010), 43.

⁹ Farouk Mitha, *Al-Ghazali and the Ismailis: A Debate on Reason and Authority in Medieval Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2001), 27.

¹⁰ Amr G.E. Sabet, “Islamic Iran: A Paradigmatic Response to Modernity,” *The Iranian Journal of International Affairs* 7(1), (Spring, 1995): 70.

an Islamist political agenda with comparative ease. The absence of a successful Islamist movement in modern Turkey should be attributed to the absence of a Shi'a model of *ulema* in the Ottoman tradition.

The secularizing tendencies of Turkish Islamic groups

The term “secularizing trends” was first used by Elisabeth Özdalga. The point this term makes is that Turkish Islamic groups are likely to activate certain dynamics that set them into the ambit of secularism.¹¹ We borrow Özdalga’s term to display how various Islamic activisms are inherently feeders of secularism. We have two major arguments to support this thesis. The first links with the independent clergy-like *ulema* phenomenon discussed above, inasmuch as in contemporary Turkey, the gaining of traditional Islamic knowledge is not axiomatic in the process of Islamic socialization. In other words, Islamic groups do not produce an *ulema*-like élite, nor even membership, that has a command of traditional Islamic knowledge.

Islamic socialization generally refers to personal experience with an Islamic group, from first encounter to the final phase of becoming a very active member of that group. A typical Islamic socialization, being mostly an informal process, aims to Islamize the individual. However, this process operates mainly on the piety level. Thus Islamic socialization amounts to a piety-based transformation that produces the new individual who cares for Islamic values. However, this Islamic socialization does not equip with Islamic knowledge such as *fiqh* or *kalam*. The average person gains a beginner-level of Islamic knowledge on which that person’s pietism rests. No major Islamic group in Turkey has a socialization process that equips its members with sophisticated Islamic knowledge.

A typical functionary of an Islamic group (fundraiser, school director, journalist, preacher, etc.) cannot even speak or understand basic Arabic, and has not mastered any major Islamic discipline. To boot, the bulk of Islamist groups’ leaders in Turkey are far from being fluent in Arabic. Unlike in Iran, or to some extent, in Egypt, members of Turkish Islamic groups lack the basic intellectual instruments with which to speculate on typical Islamist agenda, such as Islamic government, Islamic justice or Islamic finance. So a typical member of an Islamic group in Turkey is a *layman*. This prompts the critical question: What is available to these laymen that can register as an effect on politics? Having no more than a piety-based Islamic education, the only mechanism available to them is derived from the *habitus* model. So when they rise to political positions, they bring only that model’s ethical values to it. And, having acceded to positions in the Turkish political context, they have *ipso facto* entered the ambit of secularism, and have therefore become active feeders of it.

The second secularization trend is more about the nature of the agents of Islamization. In general, Nazih Ayubi’s findings on the socio-economic bases of Islamic activism fit the Turkish case neatly. The mental geography of Islamic activism, as Ayubi traces it, includes students and the new middle class, but carefully excludes the work-

¹¹ Elisabeth Özdalga, “Secularizing Trends in Fethullah Gülen’s Movement: Impasse or Opportunity for Further Renewal?,” *Critique : Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 12(1), (Spring, 2003): 62.

ing class, and does not even recognize the peasantry.¹² The student is the major agent of Islamization in the Middle East, including in Turkey, for several reasons. First, the student – the future engineer, bureaucrat or other “professional” – is a strategic choice. Second, as many students are from small towns or the rural areas, they are naturally prone to traditional and religious values. Then, the need for financial resources invites the ancillary agent, the merchant, into the picture. Thus, put simply, Islamic activism works in the triangle of functionary-student-merchant. Yet this model is, by its very nature, a generator of the secularist dynamic: As an Islamic activist, the student enjoys a minimalist lifestyle in which it is easy to be vigilant on certain issues. The student’s life is minimalist both materially and non-materially. However, when the student marries and embarks on the professional’s way of life, that student’s worldview transforms: Responsibility, mission and motif come to be viewed on a new, adult’s perspective, the student’s perception having become obsolete.

The merchant undergoes a similar process. Unlike in the 1970s, most present-day Islamic merchants have experienced rapid economic expansion, and have emerged as Turkey’s new bourgeois class. Thus, both student and merchant are in a changing environment that necessitates a certain level of secularization. Their social contexts block the isolationist attitude that is *de rigueur* in successful Islamist activism.

At macro level, the inevitable flirt of Islamic groups with liberalism is also a secularizing factor, for two reasons. The first is that the liberal policies of major political parties do tend to gain the support of Islamic movements. Turgut Özal’s ANAP implemented a heavy liberal agenda like the current AKP’s.¹³ Liberal agenda have been beneficial, paradoxically, to the Islamic groups, as those agenda have both reduced the reach of the Kemalist state, and increased the role of non-state actors in politics. Similarly, liberalism opened Turkey to the world, which in the end created traumatic results for Kemalism, a closed, autarkic and authoritarian ideology (a similar argument can be constructed to account for the relationship between democratization and Islamization, or liberalization and Islamization). It is also true, and this is the second argument, that, for strategic reasons, Islamic groups have never been interested in the working class or in leftist ideologies. Unlike the student, the worker has never been the target of Islamic groups. This indifference to the labor movement led to the re-interpretation of the Islamic tradition in a classical liberal discourse (“liberal” not in the American sense, but meaning “in the way of the classical liberals of Europe”). Unlike in several Middle Eastern cases where Islam was interpreted from a socialist or leftist perspective, the major Islamic groups in Turkey have been content with a liberal interpretation.

Turkish foreign policy and the *habitus* effect

On the *habitus* model, the key unit of analysis is the replacement of the ultra-secular Kemalist agent with a new agent who comes from an Islamic background. Just like the ideological values of the former élite, the Kemalists, shaped TFP in the past, so the social and solidarity values of the current Islamic élite are the units of analysis that explain

¹² Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1993), 150.

¹³ Motherland Party (Turkish: Anavatan Partisi).

the recent shifts in TFP. Although the agent of these values has no external Islamist agenda, his package of values and priorities is new. Without an external Islamist agenda, the new Islamic agent is highly pragmatic. The historical pattern of TFP paradoxically increases this new agent's capacity: TFP was a kind of autonomous field, relatively free from societal influences, until as late as the 1990s. Typifying this absence of societal influences in that period of TFP were behaviors such as Turkey's recognition of Israel in 1949, the vote against Algerian independence in 1958, and the high level of military relations with Israel in the late 1990s.

Additionally, the Turkey of that period kept itself far from Muslim states, including its immediate neighbors like Syria. The just-cited instances of TFP behavior were protested on the streets by large masses. That those behaviors were possible at all was due entirely to the secular nature of the Turkish foreign policy élite and decision makers of the time. Ironically, it was this very élite-controlled, or autonomous, pattern that facilitated the new Islamic agent's takeover of the decision-making role in foreign policy after the AKP's accession to government.

The analysis of several factors is important to display how the *habitus* model allowed the new Islamic élite to transform TFP. First, the new Islamic élite do not share the traditional Kemalist ideology that had directed that tradition's perceptions of security, threat and the national interest. Yet the new Islamic élite, unlike the Islamists, do not reject the existing system *en bloc*; instead, they inject their values into it through a more pluralist agenda. Rather than pursuing an Islamist agenda, they aim to establish a cultural and political hegemony that is a persuasive alternative to the Kemalist one. The term "élite" refers here to the new actors with backgrounds of Islamic socialization who are currently prominent in politics and the bureaucracy, and in the universities and the media.

Since the AKP's rise to power, many important posts are held by prominent Islamic personalities, that is, by the new Islamic élite. The AKP has been in power in Turkey since 2002, with a huge majority in parliament. During its now nearly eight year-tenure, very long in a country where governments last less than 2 years on average, the AKP's appointments have greatly transformed the Turkish bureaucracy. For instance, the AKP appointed Ahmet Davutoğlu, a professor of international relations with a conservative background, as advisor to the Prime Minister on diplomatic issues. Then, though he was not a member of parliament, Davutoğlu was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a rare occurrence in Turkish politics. Another example is Kenan Gürsoy, a professor at Galatasaray University. Coming from a Rufai order (a branch of the Kadirî order in Turkey), Gürsoy was appointed to the position of Turkey's ambassador to Rome. Such appointments are more widespread in other institutions. Many members of the Islamic élite have become university rectors, general directors of various state institutions, even justices of the Turkish Supreme Court. Gradually, the Islamic élite came to occupy the most important posts of the Republic. Indeed, the rise of this élite has given effect to an Islamic notion of hegemony, spread by the process of socialization in daily life, in the Gramscian way. As Esposito says, the new élite have constructed an alternative public space within the state.¹⁴

¹⁴ John L. Esposito, "The Crisis in Turkey?," The Huffington Post, May 2, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-l-esposito/the-crisis-in-turkey_b_482829.html (accessed 12 August 2010).

This new élite, while creating their alternative ideological hegemony, also bring their perceptions and priorities concerning foreign policy. However, this process is powered by two conflicting dynamics: On the one hand, they remember the motifs they acquired in their Islamic socialization; on the other, they are affected by the secularizing trends discussed above, for upon accession to public office, they have to leave their safe Islamic spaces. The concept “neo-Ottomanism” might serve to illustrate how *habitus* has begun to influence TFP.

The shift from Kemalism to neo-Ottomanism took place under the leadership of Özal.¹⁵ Especially after the failure of the Islamist Erbakan, Özal gradually became the uncontested symbol of the new Islamic actor. The rise of Özal should be studied very carefully, for it facilitates an understanding of how the new Islamic élite want to keep themselves distinct from Islamism. For example, key names such as Tayyip Erdoğan feature frequently Özal in their political rhetoric. The role of this particular name-dropping is to signal that theirs is a continuum of the historical Menderes-Özal line, not of the Islamist Erbakan’s line. An election campaign poster of 2007 put Menderes, Özal and Erdoğan in the same frame. With apparently similar intent, a close advisor to Ahmed Davutoğlu wrote that Erdoğan’s policies are in fact the continuation of Özal’s foreign policy.¹⁶

In the late 1970s, Özal worked for Erbakan’s Islamist party. However, he left Erbakan and established his own party, which governed Turkey during the 1980s. Despite his political career in an Islamist party and his Naqshbandiyyah origin, Özal pursued a liberal agenda. Turkey applied for EC membership during his premiership. He never employed clear Islamist frames such as the Islamic common market or currency, but he championed Islamic values at personal level. His famous declaration, “I am a Muslim; the state is laic,” was the turning point that marked the establishment of an Islamic activism that is without an Islamist agenda.

Political discourse is also important in an analysis of the *habitus* model. Unlike the values of Islamism, Islamic values are transmitted or expressed implicitly. The actors do not make direct Islamic references when they communicate. This is not a tactical matter. It is due to the fact that the *habitus* model does not recognize a perfect model that exists “out there.” Rather, it underlines the importance of practice through socialization. As a result, major social or political references are made through secular concepts such as geography. For instance, Ahmed Davutoğlu said that the two permanent elements for a nation that do not change are its history and geography.¹⁷ The lack of interest in direct Islamic references marks the difference between the *habitus* model and the *politicus* model: it signals the conviction that the Islamic purpose should unfold in the Islamic context. As Ayubi says succinctly, the Islamists gradually divorced the body of Islamic texts from the social and political context and gave them an a-historical

¹⁵ Alexander Murinson, “The strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 42 no. 6 (November 2006): 946, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00263200600923526?journalCode=fmes20> (accessed January 7, 2011).

¹⁶ Bülent Aras, “Davutoğlu: Era in Turkish Foreign Policy,” *SETA Brief* 32. (May 2009): 6, <http://arsiv.setav.org/ups/dosya/20875.pdf> (accessed January 7, 2011).

¹⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy,” SETA Washington Branch, December 8, 2009, <http://arsiv.setav.org/ups/dosya/14808.pdf> (accessed January 7, 2011).

quality.¹⁸ On the *habitus* model, therefore, direct reference is not to any Islamic model, but to Turkish history and geography. As Somer notes, the important issue is to “create Islamic spheres,” and this is more important than dealing with law.¹⁹ Thus, the *habitus* model entails its own *praxis*, one that calls upon actors to socialize its values. An instance of that socialization in the Turkish case is in the promotion of liberal economics. The context of this *praxis* is what Smith calls the “moral community.”²⁰

New social coalitions

To describe how the new Islamic élite transform TFP, attention must center on the new mechanisms that link TFP and the masses through new social coalitions. In fact, the *habitus* model promotes the return to TFP of the social dynamics that were long repressed by the élitist-Kemalist structure. Analysis of the Islamic media and Islamic bourgeoisie will show how this is happening.

An important success of Islamic groups was to break the Kemalist monopoly of the media. Today, their share in media outlets (including TV channels and radio stations) slightly surpasses 50%. In most Anatolian towns, the Islamic media wield a monopoly. In addition to the existing conservative (Islamic) media (like Feza Journalism, Samanyolu Broadcasting, Ihlas Holding, and Albayrak Group), new conservative media have emerged (Çalık and Koza İpek Holding). Also, the existing conservative media has expanded significantly. This is due to the long AKP rule and the rise of the conservative bourgeoisie. Turkey’s most circulated daily, *Today’s Zaman*, is an Islamic newspaper. The new Islamic media has an agenda that runs in parallel with that of the new Islamic élite who are active in bureaucratic and political institutions. Unlike the former secular media that promoted the traditional secular foreign policy doctrine, the new one has its own perspective. In the late 1990s, Erbakan’s visits to Iran and Libya were criticized by the mainstream media almost *en masse*. However, the alternative media today is critical of Israel and is sympathetic with the promoters of close relations with other Muslim states. The link between the Islamic élite and the new media has added a new societal dimension to the TFP, and, more importantly, it has made the persuasion of public a requirement. The alternative channels that now transmit Islamic sensitivities to the formulators of foreign policy have increased significantly in number.

The nexus between the new media and the new Islamic élite is transformative for several reasons. First, the Islamic media legitimizes the Islamic élite’s actions, which increases their public leverage. Even the most controversial foreign policy decisions of the new Islamic élite, such as an invitation of a HAMAS leaders or the improving of relations with Iran, are now easily legitimized. Second, the Islamic media pay enormous attention to foreign policy issues. They are well aware of the critical relationship

¹⁸ Ayubi, *Political Islam*, 13.

¹⁹ Murat Somer, “Moderate Islam and secularist opposition in Turkey: implications for the world, Muslims and secular democracy,” *Third World Quarterly* 28 no. 7 (2007): 1278, https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/f09/Moderate_Islam.pdf (accessed January 7, 2011).

²⁰ Thomas W. Smith, “Between Allah and Atatürk: Liberal Islam in Turkey,” *The International Journal of Human Rights* 9 no. 3 (September 2005) : 308, http://www.researchgate.net/publication/233105189_Between_Allah_and_Atatrck_Liberal_Islam_in_Turkey (accessed January 7, 2011).

between foreign policy and regime survival. While the traditional Kemalist media give the world negative signals that complain about Turkey's Islamization, the Islamic media counterbalance this with their own signals that present current Turkish events as the symptoms of a burgeoning democratization. Third, the Islamic media contribute to the formation of popular new discourses on foreign policy. In the past, the secular élite had monopolized the foreign policy discourse. Unlike the secular discourses, the new Islamic discourses have introduced concepts such as Islam, the Ottoman past, Arabs, and Muslim brethren. Unlike the former secular discourse that used to present foreign policy as a purely interest-based process, the new Islamic discourse recognizes moral, religious and ethical values. Given their rising share in circulation, the Islamic media's new foreign policy discourse is very transformative. As a result, the new nexus between the media and the Islamic élite admits a public voice that is very assertively behind the Islamic élite, so much so that the traditional secular élite's former autonomy is effectively destroyed.

The second mechanism, the new Islamic bourgeoisie, the financial bedrock of Islamic activism, is in search of new markets that would keep this new bourgeoisie in working order as that mechanism. Both to guarantee their survival and to become globally effective, the Islamic bourgeoisie need new international markets, as the Western markets are already occupied or highly competitive. Also, the major Western companies and products have distributors among the traditional secularist companies in Turkey who have no link with Islamic activism. Thus, the new Islamic bourgeoisie's major demand from the government is that new areas where they can become effective be opened up.

This is essential for the Islamic political élite's own long-term survival. This cohabitation of the Islamic political élite and the Islamic bourgeoisie has become one of the most complex socioeconomic dimensions of TFP. Its economic and social demands spur Turkey's activism in new areas, such as the Middle East and Africa. For example, trade with African states has tripled in the last 3 years, reaching to \$18 billion in value. Most of the Turkish firms engaged in trade with Africa are middle-sized companies representing mainly the new conservative (Islamic) bourgeoisie.²¹ However, inclusion of the new Islamic bourgeoisie requires also the incorporation of their values. The Islamic political élite's foreign policy has to satisfy them both materially and ideologically. The traditional identity-interest nexus of TFP is now transforming, and refers increasingly to Islamic and cultural motifs. Turkey's new activism in the Middle East, and its unsympathetic policies towards Israel should be read as the product of this new dimension of TFP.

A brief glance at Gaziantep, a city on the Turkish-Syrian border, can appreciate how the new societal dynamics affect TFP. When Syria decided to open a consulate in Gaziantep, the expense of the consul's housing was carried by the local businessmen.²² A quick analysis of Gaziantep's exports will reveal the exact reason for the enthusiasm

²¹ *Milliyet*, August 8, 2010, www.milliyet.com.tr. Compare with "Turkey discovers Africa: implications and prospects," *Today's Zaman*, September 12, 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/todays-think-tanks_turkey-discovers-africa-implications-and-prospects_152938.html (accessed January 7, 2011).

²² *Tempo*, May 16, 2005.

this demonstrates. Of the six leading destination states (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the U.S., Syria, Germany, Iran) of Gaziantep's exports during the first seven months of 2010, four are Middle Eastern states.²³ Once a functional corridor was erected between Gaziantep and the TFP elite, it brought a highly pro-Middle East inclination to Ankara. The convergence of economic interests and ideological perceptions should not be ignored in the effort to understand how this process works. Trade with the Islamic world satisfies the new Islamic bourgeoisie both economically and ideologically. The emergence of such trade constituencies all over Turkey, including in the big western cities of Istanbul and Bursa, is important.

Conclusion

The evolution of the *habitus* model is predisposed to serious path-dependent results, which should in itself serve as a refutation of the tenet that there is a surge of Islamism in today's Turkey. Inevitably, the *habitus* model stimulates two different reflexes: that of the Islamic character of the new political elite, and the economics of the new conservative (Islamic) bourgeoisie. Although Islamic agents played the key role in introducing this new Anatolian bourgeoisie, the economic interests of this new class may come to dominate the ideological interests of the Islamic elite. In other words, the *habitus* model may experience a tension between the ideological interests of the Islamic political elite and the economic interests of the new conservative (Islamic) social groups. But then, the *habitus* model is rightly suspected of containing a discreet market-based secularization dynamic that can rationalize the ideological aspects of TFP. That is, a bargaining mechanism that can determine the Islamic tone of TFP is inherent in the *habitus* model. As long as their involvement in global markets is not limited, the social actors will be content with a pragmatist bargain between Islam and economic interest.

²³ Gaziantep'in Ürün ve Ülke İhracatı Artıyor [Gaziantep Products and Country's Exports Increase], Gaziantep Sanayi Odası [Gaziantep Chamber of Trade], August 16, 2010, <http://www.gso.org.tr/?gsoHaberID=2003> (accessed January 7, 2011).

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CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY: THE OTTOMAN LEGACY AND TODAY'S CHALLENGES

Introduction

The subject of this presentation is the civil society in Turkey, both in its historical dimension and modern times. A main goal of this analysis is a clear indication of historical and social roots of contemporary civil society institutions in Turkey, where nowadays there is nearly 150 000 different community organizations. Most of them are associations, foundations, sports organizations, unions and union trades.²

Essential role in creation of the civil society in Turkey always had the state, both during the Ottoman Empire and Republic times. However, over the centuries the Turkish state in general used to treat its society more like an object than a subject of state policy. Therefore, a history of the civil society in Turkey is primarily a history of a long process of emancipation of the society and its institutions from the tutelage of the state; the state that has its origins in the patrimonial nature of the Ottoman Empire and in the statist ideology of the Turkish Republic.

The analysis of the problem of the civil society in Turkey would not be complete without mentioning the specific social institutions of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey, which are brotherhoods and Muslim communities. Muslim brotherhoods were outlawed in 1925 but they have never ceased to play an important role in Turkish society. Within a time, Muslim brotherhoods not only maintained but also gained even more powerful political and social significance than they had in the days of empire.

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² Filiz Bikmen, Zeynep Meydanoglu, "Civil Society in Turkey: An Era of Transition," *Civicus Society Country Report for Turkey*, Turkish Foundation for the Third Sector TÜSEV (Istanbul: *Tükiye Üçüncü Vakfı Sector*, 2006), http://civicus.org/new/media/CSI_Turkey_Executive_Summary.pdf (accessed August 12, 2011).

In the first part of my article I present a debate about the very essence of civil society, including discussions concerning the existence of civil society in Muslim countries and in non-Western political systems. Then, I discuss the historical context of the emergence of civil society in modern Turkey. Currently, civil society in Turkey is largely represented by religious organizations, including Muslim communities due to the Muslim character of Turkish society. In the last section of this article I present a foundation and increase of today's activism of two, the most important Muslim communities in Turkey - the Nur movement and the community of Fethullah Gülen, both descended from *Nakşibendi* Brotherhood. Their foundation was a social respond to the repressive policy of the state towards religion and its institutions. An extensive network of formal and informal links as well as their independence from the state, both organizational and financial, and last but not least, its volunteer nature qualified these communities to include them to the analysis of the civil society in Turkey.

Civil society in Europe and its reception in non-Western systems

The concept of civil society is an ambiguous concept difficult to define. Jerzy Szacki writes in his essay on civil society that the concept in a visible manner lacks theoretical background (Polish: "niedoteoretycznione") and it is "sociologically underdeveloped."³

The modern renaissance of the idea of civil society was related to the collapse of communist dictatorships in Central and Eastern Europe at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s and the social and political changes in this part of Europe. However, he suggests that the rebirth of the idea of civil society should be perceived, somewhat more broadly, as an attempt to respond to the political stagnation of liberal democratic societies. Political autocracy, the growth of the welfare state followed by the growth of the bureaucratic apparatus kept the society incapacitated. As Edward Shils claimed that there is close affinity between civil society and the liberal-democratic society⁴ the idea of self-organization of civil society was seen as a way of deepening the processes of democratization and liberation of social energy.

However, analyzing the problem of the civil society in Turkey it should be noted first, that many researchers challenged the possible existence of civil society in non-western European societies. Second, the analysis of the problem of civil society also raises the question about the possibility of creating the real civil society in societies where dominant religious systems and social traditions deprive the individual its autonomy. The latter issue is particularly related to the problem of Muslim societies, which are seen, as it does Ernest Gellner in his essay on civil society, as a society that cannot be secularized. Since secularization is vied as the only way to generate liberal individuals who are *sine qua non* of civil society, this view rules out the possibility of its existence in the absence of secularizations.⁵

³ Jerzy Szacki, „Wstęp. Powrót idei społeczeństwa obywatelskiego,” in *Ani książę, ani kupiec: obywatel*, ed. Jerzy Szacki (Kraków-Warszawa: Znak i Stefan Batory Foundation, 1995), 6.

⁴ Edward Shils, „Co to jest społeczeństwo obywatelskie?,” in *Europa i społeczeństwo obywatelskie. Rozmowy w Castel Gandolfo*, ed. Krzysztof Michalski (Kraków-Warszawa: Znak & Stefan Batory Foundation, 1994), 20.

⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals*, (New York: Allan Lane, 1994).

Less categorical approaches to the problem of civil society in Muslim societies expresses Bernard Lewis, who notes that the ideas of the French Revolution as the first non-Christians ideas draw attention of Islamic philosophers and historians. Secularism and nationalism that were somehow both products of French revolution, were more or less successfully transferred to the political systems of many Muslim countries in two following centuries.⁶ Both of these ideas became the foundation of the creation of the Turkish Republic, which is the only Muslim country that performed a formal separation of the state from the Church.⁷ It should be also noted that ideas of secularism, though not expressed in any document, inspired most of the political and social reforms of the Ottoman Empire from the Tanzimat period up to the Young Turks Revolution in 1908.

The issue of secularization also deals with the problem of transferring both the values and social institutions of Western liberal democracies to the non-Western societies. John Gray in his essay about the decline of the expansion of Western liberal democratic model suggests that in Russia, Poland and other Central European countries, there will be a return, after the communist period, to their own cultural traditions that do not resemble Western models of liberal democracy.⁸ Although these observations relate mainly to European countries, it is worth considering the pertinence of these observations to other countries whose political regimes such as Turkey imitate European political and social institutions.

As I shall demonstrate later in this work, a detailed analysis of the image of civil society institutions in Turkey points to the validity of this concept also to the country where the most dynamic civil society organizations are linked to the promotion of religious life.

In view of these mentioned above I would like to draw attention the different conceptual approach of civil society in Middle Eastern societies. Dale F. Eickelman stresses uselessness of seeking in the Middle East social institutions exact correspondence with the formal institutions of "Western" civil society.⁹ The Middle East presents a complex web of social "institutions" which sustain order when the central governments are ineffective or oppressive like neighborhood, craft assassinations, Muslim brotherhoods and other ties which made orderly social life possible and not infrequently served to limit state incursions.¹⁰

In this approach I would draw special attention to the issue of Muslim brotherhoods (*tarikāt*) and their socio-political role in the Ottoman Empire and the in the Republic of Turkey. Brotherhoods, such as *Mevlevi*, *Nakşibendi*, *Bektaşî* from the very beginnings of the empire were an important element of its social fabric and they reached to all social strata.¹¹ The brotherhood was outlawed in 1925, and while some of them like

⁶ Bernard Lewis, „*Europa, islam i społeczeństwo obywatelskie*,” in *Europa i społeczeństwo obywatelskie. Rozmowy w Castel Gandolfo*, ed. Krzysztof Michalski (Kraków-Warszawa: Żnak & Stefan Batory Foundation, 1994), 152.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 154.

⁸ John Gray, „Od postkomunizmu do społeczeństwa obywatelskiego: powrót historii i zmierzch zachodniego modelu,” in *Ani książę, ani kupiec: obywatel*, ed. Jerzy Szacki (Kraków-Warszawa: Żnak & Funda Stefan Batory Foundation, 1995), 261.

⁹ Dale F. Eickelman, „*Forward*,” in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. Augustus Richard Norton, vol. 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), XI.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, XI.

¹¹ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: a Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 12.

Mevlevi recently lost the power and former splendor, others, such as *Nakşibendi* have found their own space despite limited religious freedom in Turkey.

When dealing with the problem of civil society in modern Turkey we cannot overlooked the civic potential of *cemaat* movements so is the Muslim communities formed in republican era that derives from older Muslim brotherhoods, mainly from *Nakşibendi* order. Both the power of their informal and grassroots structures as well as their ability to consolidate large groups around common goals their financial independence from the state should make us see these Muslim communities in the wider context of the of civil society in Turkey.

Jerzy Szacki suggests that current consideration of the civil society issue should be aimed on the one hand to release the idea of civil society from the excess of ideological contexts and, on the other hand, to clarify the substance of the theory.¹² In other words, Jerzy Szacki proposes to move from theory to empiricism as only analysis of the functioning institutions of civil society can bring us closer to the very meaning of civil society.

In this perspective, civil society is tantamount to the so-called third sector, representing the private organizations acting for public purposes. They are complementary to the first sector that is free market, where both actors and objectives of the action are public, and the second sector representing the government. This proposal allows us to focus on the present situation of civil society organizations in Turkey, where the extensive NGO sector representing all strands of society is a datum that cannot be denied, despite the many weaknesses and the repressive role of the state, which over the last decades constantly interfered in development of civil society organizations.

However, the problem of civil society in Turkey cannot easily be reduced solely to the analysis of present institutions of the third sector both due to the Muslim character of Turkish society and the different socio-religious and political context in they emerged. Consequently, to explain the conditions of functioning of a modern civil society in Turkey, one should use primarily historical perspective, taking into account the specific role of religious institutions in the history of the Ottoman Empire and strong patrimonial character of the Ottoman state.

The emergence and development of institutions of civil society in Turkey

Ethnically and religiously diverse Ottoman Empire was bounded by a strong state ideology in which the ruler was a the main source of legitimacy. The Ottoman rule (the sultan) sought to maintain his control not through mediatory associations or groups such as the nobility but rather through his “patrimonial bureaucracy.” The state remained above all local identities, and the rule’s bureaucrats had ostensibly but one loyalty: to the Ottoman sultan.¹³

Patrimonial nature of the authority of the Sultan was also expressed in the immediate suzerainty of the Sultan’s subjects and the lack of any intermediary institutions, distinguished by its political rights and personal property, which could challenge the

¹² Szacki, „Wstęp. Powrót idei społeczeństwa obywatelskiego,” 54.

¹³ M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford: University Press, 2003), 39.

authority of the sultan. All Ottoman citizens stood in a direct rather than mediated relationship to supreme authority. This missing link, we have termed "civil society."¹⁴

Foundation for the emergence of civil society in Turkey were laid down by the reforms of *Tanzimat* era. In 1939 the Edict of Gülhane, written by the leading reformer and foreign minister, Reşit Pasha, but promulgated in the name of the new sultan Abdülmecid II, promised, inter alia, the establishment of guarantees for life and honor and property of the sultan's subjects and equality before the law of all subject, whatever their religion.¹⁵

The culmination of the reforms of *Tanzimat* era was the adoption of the Turkish Constitution in 1976, which regulate the sphere of rights and duties of citizens and limited the autocratic authority of the sultan. Contemporary forms of civil society institutions flourished the Second Constitutional Period.¹⁶ In the next 10 years between 1908 and 1918, there were founded in 12 political parties, 37 associations, 157 chambers of commerce, and numerous organizations of small entrepreneurs, artisans and merchants.¹⁷ Turkish Republic, established in 1923, although formally guaranteed rights and freedoms of all citizens, in practice, eliminated most of the institutions of civil society that began to revive only after the introduction of political pluralism in 1946.

The general distrust which characterized the Kemalist political elites towards the civil society should perhaps, be seen in patrimonial nature of the social structure of the empire reproduced in a strongly statist model of state in the early years of the Turkish Republic. The civil society was not perceived as constitutive element of a democratic state but rather it was used for the implementation of state policy. The *coup d'état* in 1960, which was the clash of power between old and new social forces, was undertaken in the name of civil liberties, which at that time were subject to constant repression by the state.¹⁸ However, when the army once again reached for power in 1981 it eliminated all civil society organizations claiming that in years 1970-1989 highly polarized and politicized civil society institutions changed the country in political battlefield. The autonomy of civil society was challenged as it turned out to be only a façade that was hiding an authoritarian state.

However, as Binnaz Toprak notes, the last coup strongly consolidated politicians around the idea of democracy and civil society as the only political way that could effectively eliminate the threat of re-intervention of the army in civil government. The 1980s also brought huge economic boom that followed the government's liberal economic reforms of Turgut Özal. Economic liberalism and rapid social changes that affected Turkish society in 1980s created a positive climate for discussion about the role and place of civil society in Turkey. It was considered that their task was to create space for social dialogue and active participation for civil rights and liberties.

While in the previous period, between 1960-1980, civil society organizations represented ideologically oriented organizations, in the post 1980 era associational activity,

¹⁴ Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 11, no. 3 (June 1969): 279.

¹⁵ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 51.

¹⁶ Binnaz Toprak, "Civil society in Turkey," in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. Augustus Richard Norton, vol. 2 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 90.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 91.

in comparison, has been issue orientated¹⁹ interested rather in bringing to the public discourse the specific problems of social and legal matters like protecting human rights, the problems the Kurdish minority and many others.

Charitable organizations as institutions of civil society in Turkey

First of all it can be noted that the figures indicate a fairly well-being of civil society in Turkey. According to the *Civics Society Country Report for Turkey 2006* prepared by the Turkish Foundation for the Third Sector TÜSEV (Turkish: *Türkiye Üçüncü Vakfi Sektör*) in support of the initiative– CIVICUS-World Alliance for Citizen Participation for conditions of civil society in Turkey, the total number of organizations defined for the purposes of this report as a society organizations was 148 233, of which more than half (54%) operated in the legal form of associations, 39% in the form of cooperatives, and 3% in the form of foundations. Studies cited in the report relate to both the structures of civil society in Turkey, as well as its legal and economic environment.

The report also includes research on the values promoted by an organization such as democracy, tolerance, gender equality, which clearly involves the activities of civil society organizations in promoting the values of a democratic political order modeled on the liberal democracies of Western Europe. The report also indicates, although not providing exact statistics, on the dominant role of charities and charitable activities undertaken by individuals. The authors suggest that this interest in charity has its origins not only in Muslim piety but also in the practices of charitable foundations during the Ottoman Empire. Charity foundations – *vakfilar* – in Ottoman times not only helped the poor and needy, but also served a variety of social services such as education (Quranic schools, libraries) or the development of urban infrastructure (roads, water jets, ports). During all the Republican Era all foundation have been placed under the management of the newly-formed General Directorate of Foundations.

According to data from public opinion surveys on charity almost 80% of Turks are involved in charity work, although mostly in a form of direct assistance to the needy than the transfer of relevant organizations.²⁰ However, the money transferred to organizations are earmarked mostly for the construction of mosques and organizations promoting religious education.

Brotherhood and Muslim communities

As I mentioned above, the Muslim brotherhoods have played a vital religious, social and cultural role in the Ottoman Empire. Closer analysis of their importance and their place in the social structure of the Ottoman Empire exceeds the framework of this article. However, in the context of the problem of civil society in Turkey, it is worth noting the enormous religious authority which enjoyed the brotherhoods among the Ottoman elite as well as in the rest of the population of the empire. of the Muslim brotherhood

¹⁹ Ibid., 104.

²⁰ Bikmen, Meydanoğlu, "Civil Society in Turkey: An Era of Transition," 44.

gained political importance during the authoritarian rule of the sultan Abdulhamida II (1842-1918), which used them in his panislamic politics. Due to their religious and moral authority that could mobilize the Anatolian population in defense of religion, Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) used the strength of Muslim brotherhoods during the War of Independence (1919-1923) when in his speeches he called for defending the sovereignty and the rights of the Ottoman Muslim.²¹ The establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 was followed by an intense ideological struggle over its secular shape and its first victims were brotherhoods whose spiritual strength and strong social ties, especially among the rural population, was a source of danger to the new political regime. In 1925 all religious brotherhoods were abolished, their monasteries (*tekke*) and the places of worships (*türbe*) were closed.²² The consequence of strongly anti-religious policy was also the limitation of religious freedom. But an official ban put on the brotherhoods did not caused their actual elimination. On the contrary, *Nakşibendi* brotherhoods for example, one of the largest and most influential fraternities of the Ottoman Empire, elaborated new strategies of participation in public life. As a result it was *Nakşibendi* intellectuals, mainly Mehmet Zahid Kotku (1897-1980), to contribute in formation first Islamic parties in Turkey Political: National Order Party (Turkish: *Millî Nizam Partisi*) in 1970 and the National Salvation Party (Turkish: *Millî Selâmet Partisi*) founded in 1972.²³

However, one of the most remarkable social phenomena caused, inter alia, by banning Muslim brotherhoods was creation of new Islamic communities (*cemaat*) which has proposed a different way to the challenges of secularism advocated by the state. Below I will present two of them: the community of Nur (Nurcu movement) and Fethullah Gülen community.

Nur community (*Nurcu*)

The Nur community was founded by sheikh Said Nursi (1876-1960), whose theological reflection was focused on the reconstruction of Islamic society at the level of individuals for whom the ethical principles of religion should become a constitutive element of everyday life. His thoughts tended towards the possibility of people's religious self-education without the mediation of *ulema* and *Sufi* brotherhoods as the traditional interpretation of Islam could not meet the challenges of the modern world based on rational knowledge and social pragmatism.²⁴ Islam for Said Nursi was the primary source of ethical values and only an introduction to the discussion and further personal reflection that could help believers to understand themselves. Most of his reflections Said Nursi wrote in his work entitled *Letters of Light* (Turkish: *Risale-i Nur Külliyatı*), which were widely discussed and quickly become a tool for social resistance against the exclusion of Islam from the public. Sphere of life. The manuscript of *Letters of Light* was

²¹ Erik Jan Zürcher, "The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism," *International Journal of the Sociology and Science* 137 (1999): 81-82.

²² Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Turcja* (Warszawa: Trio, 2000), 123.

²³ Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 141.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 152-173.

copied and illegally distributed among many believers. The whole distribution network covered entire Turkey. Said's *Letters* were also intensively discussed in numerous reading groups called *dershane* (Turkish: class room).

The Nur community is called an internal community (*enfusi cemaat*), because its members follow Said Nursi's intellectual path in which faith is a subject of continuous, internal reflection of a believer. Although Said Nursi was under strong influence of the *Nakşbendi* brotherhood, he rejected its model of a community based on elements of Sufi tradition. He rather emphasized a need of careful and deep lecture of the Quran, conducted by a believer himself. With the passage of time, meetings in *dershane* have become something more than just gatherings for a religious discussion. In the absence of other possible manifestations of its beliefs, *dershane* took over the role of civic associations, in which people with similar convictions and often similar occupations or social status could develop a sense of community and build a network of personal contacts.

There are currently over 5000 *dershane*, conducting meetings at least once every 2 weeks, which builds up from 2 to 6 million members of the all community.

Fethullah Gülen community

One of the best known and most controversial communities in modern Turkish is certainly the community of Fethullah Gülen (1941-), a Said Nursi's student, who however, proposed a different vision of a religious community than his master. An essential element of Gülen's thought was an assumption that social activities should have a deep religious motivation. The aim of the emerging community was a reflection on Islam as a source of pro-social, and above all pro-state behavior.²⁵ In the initial period of its activity (the 1960s and 1970s), Fethullah Gülen avoided direct involvement in political activities. Instead of this he proposed his own understanding of nationalism, in which an essential element was the relations between Islam, Turkishness, and the state. This new approach to nationalism was an inspiration for Turkish politicians of the postwar generation who were interested in bringing into public a debate about the Islamic sources of civic ethics.

In the 1980s community entered the next phase of development and its aim was to increase activity in the public economic and political domain. The community had also developed a broad social and cultural activities to reach out to all sections of society, and to ensure its impact on the shape of public discourse on Islam.

Its influence in Turkish society F. Gülen community owes to skillful application of social strategies specific to secular social movements in order to achieve religious purposes. With the liberalization of the education system in the early 1980s community managed to bring to life its idealistic assumptions about the future education of social elites by funding a number of universities and an extensive system of scholarships for poor students. Fethullah Gülen community is quite varied and the close spiritual relationship linking teacher with its students make it similar to the old brotherhoods. Other elements however, like organized network of cooperation, participation of vol-

²⁵ Ibid., 179.

unteers, modern fund raising and financial independence make this community similar to the secular social movements.

After the coup in 1997 F. Gülen began to move away from nationalist slogans and began to consolidate under its direction various organizations, both religious and civil organizations, proclaiming the need both to deepen the democratic process in Turkey, including respect for human rights and the need for renegotiation relationship between the secular state and the right of Muslim majority to express freely their religious beliefs.

Conclusion

As I tried to show in this article on the civil society in the contemporary Turkey it is extremely important to consider its structure from the historical perspective in order to understand all mechanisms of social activism and mobilization in this country.

Although as A. R. Norton suggest there is no sufficient connection between civil society and the transition to democracy,²⁶ it is how to imagine civil society under undemocratic and authoritarian rules. The European Union perceives civil society as a inherent part of a democratization process in Turkey and it always stresses the importance of civic participation in political reform in this country.²⁷ The European Union expects from the Turkish government a better development of a dialogue between government and third sector organizations, but also provide financial and technical support to civil society organizations. This situation resembles to some extent the Polish situation, where in the first half of the 1990s rapidly emerged civil society organizations, mostly dealing with defense of civil rights and activities to deepen the democratization process, and whose principal source of financing were pre-accession financial support. Therefore, while we should appreciate the efforts of the European Union in its support of the NGO sector in Turkey, you should look at these actions as more of a disruption of the process of consolidation of civil society than its actual empowerment. By imputing a teleology to civil society as A.R. Norton says, politics is denied, and a degree of solidarity in civil society is presumed for which there is no empirical referent.²⁸ We should not look at the civil society as an ideal model that that could be implemented in each place of the globe but rather we should seek the inner social forces that participated in creating civil society. In such way we could see a plethora of organizations, both formal and informal, which step by step contribute to the civic emancipation of the Turkish society from the oppressive state. Yet I suppose that it is still unclear in which direction civil society in Turkey would go. Despite the formal secular model of the Turkish state we cannot neglect the force of Muslim majority that disguised in the form of civil society organizations could renegotiate Turkey religious neutrality.

²⁶ Augustus Richard Norton, "Introduction," in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. Augustus Richard Norton (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 6.

²⁷ *Turkey 2010 Progress Report accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council*, European Commission EU (November 9, 2010): 6-10 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf, (accessed August 12, 2011).

²⁸ Norton, "Introduction," 6.

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STABILITY FIRST – JORDAN’S DRIFT TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

Jordan is an almost entirely landlocked (with the exception of the small Red Sea port of Aqaba) Middle Eastern state without any serious natural resources, concerned with its water scarcity and sensitive socio-political environment. Apart from Israel, it also has common borders with Syria and Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Palestinian Autonomy. Therefore since 1940s Jordan has been both a scene of and a front state towards Arab-Israeli conflict, maintaining relatively good relations with the Israelis notwithstanding. It thus made Jordan serve as both a buffer state – support for which it received from oil-rich Arab countries and a Western ally in the region which ‘friendship’ was rewarded with a severe foreign aid from the United Kingdom and the USA.

Yet the historical evidence clearly presents Jordan as one of the most stable countries in the Middle East and, as A. Susser emphasizes, the only state “in the Fertile Crescent that has the same regime in power today as when it was established (...) 90 years ago.”² The regime’s survival has always been related to the strong support of the Arab Legion (later the Jordan Arab Army), the Jordan’s geopolitical centrality and extra-regional assistance aimed at securing the state from the threat of regional military intervention.³ It was also the effect of the rulers’ ability to address and adapt to evershifting internal and external conditions. Such strategy, with stability as its main purpose, would surely apply to the regime’s experience with democracy. This article thus examines the process of democratization in Jordan and its links with the state’s stability and security.

Unlike most of the polities in the Middle East, Jordan has a long tradition as the constitutional monarchy with a parliament in theory limiting the king’s executive power. The 1952 constitution, at the time perceived as liberal, guaranteed various personal freedoms (among all freedom of opinion and the right to free association, political parties included), direct elections for the Chamber of Deputies, and system of checks

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² Asher Susser, “Jordan: Preserving Domestic Order in a Setting of Regional Turmoil,” *Middle East Brief* 27 (2008): 1.

³ For a broader view on Jordan’s survival strategy see Bassel F. Salloukh, “State Strength, Permeability, and Foreign Policy Behaviour: Jordan in Theoretical Perspective,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (1996): 39-66.

and balances between the legislative and the royal court. The king's position was relatively strong notwithstanding – he was entitled to appoint the Senate, to appoint and dismiss government officials, to dissolve the lower house of parliament and call for new elections.⁴

Soon after the constitution emerged, however, the regime started to restrict the public sphere, fearing of the increasing support for Arab nationalism. The ruling elite was also aware that political freedom worked against its interests, such as maintaining alliance with the United Kingdom or close ties with Israel.⁵ First, the free association was significantly limited by issuing the *Law of Public Assemblies* (1953) and the *Political Parties Law* (1955). Accordingly, the communist political activity became illegal due to the *Law on Resistance to Communism* (1953) and the free press was constrained in effect of the *Press and Publication Law* (1953, 1955).⁶

Furthermore, the constitution allowed for the declaration of martial law and thereby king's rule by decree, a measure which was invoked in April 1957. It came as a response to anti-regime movement (coup attempt) among military as well as to domestic political opposition and threat of hostile neighbors' military intervention. Thereafter King Hussein called for American assistance under the Eisenhower Doctrine which gave the regime means to both secure the borders and calm the domestic scene.⁷ The civilian rule was brought back at the end of 1958, although by that time all political parties had been banned. Reintroduction of the martial law took place in 1967 on the eve of June War and it was followed by suspension of the parliament in 1974. In other words, the political opening of the early 1950s which was an answer to the monarchy's crisis after King Abdullah's death⁸ at the very first place, came to an abrupt end when it threatened the regime's survival, particularly its foreign policy interests.

In the 1980s the economic situation in Jordan, a semi-rentier state, started to deteriorate in effect of the structural decrease in oil prices worldwide, and, accordingly, a serious decline in private remittances by expatriate workers and official assistance from the Gulf states. Hence, facing budgetary deficits, weakening terms of trade and falling rates of growth, Jordan resorted to domestic and external borrowing.⁹ According to the 'rentier state' thesis, the regimes facing decrease in external sources of income are forced to seek domestic revenues (taxes) instead, what in effect leads to more demands for representational politics.¹⁰ In case of Jordan, first preemptive steps were undertaken already

⁴ Rex Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 25, no.1(1992): 76-77.

⁵ Michael B. Oren, "A Winter of Discontent: Britain's Crisis in Jordan, December 1955–March 1956," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22, no. 2 (1990): 173.

⁶ Ellen M. Lust-Okar, "The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: Myth or Reality?," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33, no. 4 (2001): 553-554; and see also: "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World," 77.

⁷ Salloukh, "State Strength, Permeability, and Foreign Policy Behavior," 45.

⁸ He was assassinated by a Palestinian nationalist in front of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in July 1951. For a more detailed account of the event and its outcome see: Mary C. Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the making of Jordan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 207-209.

⁹ Oliver Schlumberger, "Transition to Development?," in *Jordan in Transition 1990-2000*, ed. George Joffé (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), 226.

¹⁰ Ranjit Singh, "Liberalisation or Democratisation? The Limits of Political Reform and Civil Society in Jordan," in *Jordan in Transition 1990-2000*, ed. George Joffé (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), 75.

in 1984, when King Hussein reactivated the parliament with new elections scheduled for 1986. Nevertheless, as the political situation in the region further worsened – in spring 1986 the talks between PLO and Israel broke down, a year later the *intifada* erupted and in 1988 Hussein severed all administrative ties to the West Bank – the initial liberalizing thrust ceased.¹¹

Furthermore, when in 1988 Jordan's debt went as high as twice its GDP, the government had no other option but to turn to the international financial institutions to renegotiate and reschedule its debt. In return for a five-year plan for economic adjustment and stabilization, International Monetary Fund agreed to provide Jordan with \$125 million in credit, followed by another \$100 million loan from the World Bank. The conditions, however, were really harsh. Jordan was forced to cut governmental expenditures and subsidies, to impose a new sale tax, improve and expand the tax base in addition to public administrative reform, financial deregulation, trade liberalization and significant privatization.¹²

Even though the reforms aimed at ensuring future growth, employment and improving life conditions, the austerity programs in Jordan have harmed both middle class and the lower-income groups. Public services were reduced, interest rates were raised thereupon making borrowing more difficult and finally several subsidies were eliminated what led to the sharp increase in prices of fuel, food and cigarettes.¹³ The measures undertaken by government triggered riots in many parts of the country, the most severe taking place in the southern city of Ma'an, the traditional support base of the monarchy. The police intervention, which brought at least 17 people injured, only increased public anger. As Julia Choucair-Vizoso indicates, "although the rioters did not criticize the king or make explicit demands for democracy and civil liberties, they did call for the revocation of austerity measures, the resignation of government, new parliamentary elections, and the punishment of corrupt officials."¹⁴ Thus the regime faced three alternatives: (1) to cancel the economic stabilization program at the risk of future economic collapse, (2) to impose repressive measures against the population (including East Bankers – the bastion of the Hashemite monarchy) and enforce approval of the new economic realities and (3) to initiate the process of political opening in return for popular recognition of the austerity program.¹⁵ Confronting this legitimacy crisis and being aware of the economic situation, king Hussein was not eager to cease the stabilization program and therefore he dismissed prime minister and allowed for the political liberalization. In fact, he only reactivated the instruments abandoned in mid-1980s.

¹¹ Malik Mufti, "Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan," *Comparative Political Studies* 32, no. 100 (1999): 104.

¹² Hamid El-Said, "The Political Economy of Reform in Jordan: Breaking Resistance to Reform?," in *Jordan in Transition 1990-2000*, ed. George Joffé (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), 261-262; Curtis R. Ryan, "Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund," *Middle East Policy* 6, no. 2 (1998): 56.

¹³ Maen Nsour, "Governance, Economic Transition and Jordan's National Security," in *Jordan in Transition 1990-2000*, ed. George Joffé (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), 25.

¹⁴ Julia Choucair-Vizoso, "Illusive Reform: Jordan's Stubborn Stability," in *Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World*, ed. Marina Ottaway, Julia Choucair-Vizoso (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008), 50.

¹⁵ Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World," 90-91.

Once again democracy agenda became a tool to re-establish the monarchy's authority and bring back its stability, what seems to be consistent with the 'defensive democratization' concept. This notion explains that state attempts to prevent anticipated demands for political reform due to the crisis in the state itself. G. Robinson stresses that defensive democratization "can take place in the absence of class restructuring, economic growth, a vibrant civil society or any other *societal* phenomenon [and it is] state strategy to maintain the dominant political order in the face of severe state fiscal crisis."¹⁶ Then, in effect of the defensive democratization in Jordan, the first full parliamentary elections in more than 20 years were held in November 1989.

Even though the 1989 elections were called the most free and fair in Jordanian history by that time, there were several points of criticism. Since the political parties were still prohibited, the candidates for electoral seats ran on individual platforms, yet their ideological tendencies were publicly known. In addition, the official campaign period lasted only 25 days, therefore it was mostly beneficial for the individuals associated with the Muslim Brotherhood (the only established political organization in the kingdom) and those of tribal background. Furthermore, the 1986 electoral law amended only to eliminate the West Bank seats in parliament, provided the rural over-representation and quotas for ethnic and religious minorities: 9 (out of 80) seats were reserved for Christians (even though their 6% share of the total population should have guaranteed only 5 seats), and 3 for Circassians and Chechens. Finally, the voters were eligible to cast as many votes as there were seats allocated in their district and they were free to support one candidate with all their votes or to distribute them among many. Such electoral mechanism was designed to strengthen the bastion of support for the monarchy – the king expected the new Chamber of Deputies to be dominated by loyalists.¹⁷

The elections' outcome came as a surprise to both the public and the regime. The turnout was relatively low and disappointing – only around 40% of potential voters went to cast their ballots. The Islamists won 34 seats, of which 21 were taken by the Muslim Brotherhood, and the leftist candidates managed to secure 13 seats – it gave the political opposition a majority (59%) in the parliament. The loyalists won only 22 seats whereas the remaining 11 went to independents.¹⁸ The scope of the Islamists' victory made King Hussein accept their cooptation into government by offering them cabinet posts under Mudar Badran as a prime minister. Simultaneously, the king appointed a 60-person royal commission – representing all important political and social groups in Jordan – to draft a national charter to outline the framework for further liberalization.

¹⁶ Glenn E. Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30, no. 3 (1998): 389.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 392. See also Mufti, "Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan," 107; Scott Greenwood, "Jordan's 'New Bargain': The Political Economy of Regime Security," *The Middle East Journal* 57, no. 2 (2003): 254.

¹⁸ In the literature there is a slight disagreement on the exact outcome of the elections, particularly the turnout and the number of seats won by each group. The numbers above are quoted after Greenwood, "Jordan's 'New Bargain'," 254-255. For a differing statistics see, for instance: Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," 392; Lust-Okar, "The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties," 550; Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World," 93; Mufti, "Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan," 109 or Laurie A. Brand, "The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, no. 2 (1999): 53.

Julia Choucair-Vizoso emphasizes that in the process of preparing the charter “the government offered the opposition a basic proposition: If the opposition recognized the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy, the regime would allow a re-emergence of political party pluralism in Jordan under the power of the king.”¹⁹ The Islamists and leftists accepted the offer and the National Charter was eventually endorsed by all parties in December 1990, followed by king’s signature in June 1991. The Charter confirmed parliamentary monarchy as the political system of Jordan and acknowledged Islam as the state religion. At the same time, Islam was named only 1 of 4 equal sources of political legitimacy, next to *qawmiyya* (Arab nationalism), *wataniyya* (Jordanian nationalism) and universal norms. Moreover, the Charter affirmed political and intellectual pluralism (including the right to form political parties), tolerance and equality (e.g. equal rights before the law of men and women), democratic and private-property rights.²⁰

Meanwhile the cabinet shuffle brought 5 Muslim Brotherhood deputies to ministerial positions (education, health, justice, social affairs and *Awqaf*). Soon later, however, the Brotherhood declared its will to segregate sexes in all schools, an idea which was quickly overturned by King Hussein who dissolved the government. It did not stop the liberalization process notwithstanding. On July 7, 1991 king lifted the martial law; a year later the political parties were ultimately legalized. The 1992 *Political Parties Law* prohibited any financial or organizational foreign support for the parties, it also forbade any party member to claim a non-Jordanian nationality or seek foreign protection (both measures hindered Pan-Arabist and Islamist organizations). Nonetheless, for the first time in 35 years, the regime allowed for an explicit public political activity and opened the way for a secularist movement to challenge the power of the Islamists.²¹ By the time of the 1993 elections, more than 20 parties had registered, including the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood – the Islamic Action Front (IAF).

Essential for the liberalization process was also the *Press and Publications Law* (1992) which lifted some restrictions on print media and allowed for licensing several new newspapers. Concurrently, the law required all journalists to be members of the Jordan Press Club and it banned any news that: “offends the king or the royal family; insults Arab, Islamic or ‘friendly’ heads of state, or accredited diplomats in Jordan; is contrary to public morals; may offend the dignity of any individual or damage his reputation, or offends the armed forces and security organs.”²²

As early as 1991, the Jordanian monarch got involved in the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, rightly feeling that an active role would win him back the American financial and political support. He realized, however, that signing a peace treaty with Israel would meet a strong domestic opposition, then it was impossible to accommodate simultaneously negotiations with Israelis and increased political opening.²³ Hence,

¹⁹ Choucair-Vizoso, “Illusive Reform: Jordan’s Stubborn Stability,” 51.

²⁰ Mufti, “Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan,” 115; Robinson, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” 393-394.

²¹ Beverley Milton-Edwards, “Façade Democracy and Jordan,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 20, no.2 (1993): 199.

²² Robinson, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” 395-396.

²³ Russell E. Lucas, “Deliberalization in Jordan,” *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 1 (2003): 140.

the regime undertook several measures aimed at decreasing the influence of opponents, principally Islamists. First, king himself tried to discredit the Muslim Brotherhood accusing them of being “proponents of backwardness and oppression” and a vehicle for “interference by others in [Jordanian] affairs,” further underlining: “I wish to affirm our determination to stand up to those elements which seek to impair our country’s image and take us back to the past. And *if they outstep the limits* at which they ought to draw the line, *they will be faced with all that is necessary to protect democracy* and ensure that they are stopped in their tracks and redirected to the proper path.”²⁴

Consequently, the regime wanted to ensure that the parliament chosen in the elections scheduled for 1993 would be more eager to back the peace process. Therefore, soon after the parliament was dissolved in August 1993, a royal decree amending the electoral law was issued. It adopted the one-person, one-vote system which was meant “to improve the fortunes of candidates representing pro-regime constituencies and to weaken well-organized groups.”²⁵ At the same time, it did not change the districts system favoring the tribal areas and more, it granted 6 seats for the Bedouins, unsurprisingly the loyal monarchists. The amendment was followed by ban on public rallies and a rule forbidding public employees to campaign.²⁶

As expected, the election results brought the reverse in Islamists’ share of the parliament seats. It dropped from 34 to 22, out of which 16 went to the IAF. The leftist/nationalist candidates secured only 7 seats while the remaining 51 were taken by centrist and independent deputies.²⁷ Despite the results being contested on the basis of irregularities, they clearly showed the regime that it could count on a full parliamentary support for its pro-American and pro-Israeli policies. Moreover, they also confirmed that the regime was seriously interested in securing and stabilizing its foreign policy course (which also meant the regime’s survival) at the cost of setback to the political liberalization process.

When the final talks on the peace treaty were taking place, the IAF resumed its opposition to the coming normalization of relations with Israel. The government led at that time by Abd Al-Salam Al-Majali – former head of the Jordanian negotiation team – was not keen on letting the peace process being sabotaged, especially given the economic stakes concerned: debt forgiveness, bilateral aid and foreign investments.²⁸ Therefore the regime banned opposition rallies, censored the press, detained a number of outspoken activists and stripped Islamists of the state resources they had previously enjoyed. Despite all obstacles, the peace treaty was signed on October 26, 1994 and eventually ratified by the Chamber of Deputies by a vote of 55 to 23 with one deputy abstaining.²⁹

²⁴ King Hussein’s speech delivered to the Royal Staff and Command College on November 23, 1992. Quoted in Glenn E. Robinson, “Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan,” *The Middle East Journal* 51, no. 3(1997): 382. Emphasis added.

²⁵ Abla M. Amawi, “The 1993 Elections in Jordan,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 16, no. 3 (1994): 16.

²⁶ Greenwood, “Jordan’s ‘New Bargain,’” 256.

²⁷ Amawi, “The 1993 Elections in Jordan,” 23.

²⁸ Brand, “The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan,” 60.

²⁹ Robinson, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” 406; Mufti, “Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan,” 121.

Along limitation of the democratization process, the Jordanian government continued to undertake economic reforms designed by the International Monetary Fund. In August 1996 the regime implemented the second major adjustment Program which, above all, raised taxes and lifted domestic subsidies. Within few days the cost of bread had more than doubled what, similarly to 1989, enraged the public and triggered riots in the southern part of Jordan. This time, however, the monarchy reacted decisively and with use of an “iron fist” – the regular army and armored vehicles – restored order. It also blamed the external forces, among them Iraq under Saddam Hussein, for attempt to undermine Jordan's stability. A big part of the accusations (violating the *Political Parties Law* by maintaining foreign links) focused on the main secular leftist parties: the Progressive Arab Baath party, the Jordanian Arab Socialist Party, the Democratic Popular Unity and the People's Democratic Party; unusually the IAF was excluded from government's allegations.³⁰ Faced with constant calls for the resignation of government, the king dissolved the undergoing session of parliament. It was followed by prime minister Abd Al-Karim Kabariti's dismissal, though its main reason was Kabariti's public criticism of Netanyahu, not the opposition demands.

In fact that was the anti-Palestinian policy of Netanyahu's government that intensified tensions between the regime and its opponents: the 1996 “tunnel incident”, Israeli settlements on the West Bank, the Masha'al affair. All these successfully fed anti-normalization forces in Jordan which, in return, managed to close the Israeli trade fair in Amman in January 1997. Moreover, the professional associations – mostly aligned with the opposition – began to expel members cooperating with their Israeli counterparts. That is when the regime realized the threat of institutionalizing anti-normalization movement, not only to its policies but the monarchy's very survival. As the parliamentary elections were scheduled for November 1997, King Hussein initiated further limits on political freedom, hoping that it would avert opposition electoral gains.³¹ Next to the new restrictions on public assembly and freedom of speech, the government also decreed very suppressive amendments to the press and publication law. They introduced the draconian financial rules and licensing requirements for all papers to carry on with publishing. In consequence, some 15 independent and opposition weekly newspapers were suspended, many other were heavily fined.³²

An unprecedented unity among the opposition parties came as a result of the situation. Apart from the leftist and Islamist groups, also the liberal and centrist regime supporters (including two former prime ministers and several cabinet ministers) called upon king to repeal the press restrictions. They received support from international human rights organizations as well; particularly the Human Rights Watch was very critical of King Hussein.³³ Accordingly, the opposition announced its boycott of the forthcoming elections, blaming the regime's actions for creation a crisis in public confidence

³⁰ Ryan, “Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund,” 57, 60-63.

³¹ Lucas, “Deliberalization in Jordan,” 141.

³² Curtis R. Ryan, “Elections and Parliamentary Democratization in Jordan,” *Democratization* 5, no. 4 (1998): 184-185. For a broader view on the role of press restrictions in 1997 elections see Russell E. Lucas, “Press Laws as a Survival Strategy in Jordan: 1989-99,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 39, no. 4 (2003): 87-89.

³³ See “Clamping Down on Critics: Human Rights Violations in Advance of the Parliamentary Elections,” *Human Rights Watch/Middle East* vol. 9, no. 12 (October 1997).

and trust. The boycott was later described by the king as “the opposition parties choice [which] did not compromise his regime’s commitment to democracy and pluralism.”³⁴ Thus the elections were held without hesitation after a censored and banal campaign (e.g. all manifests of anti-Israeli content, such as posters or banners, were confiscated), and in result the 13th parliament of Jordan turned to be dominantly pro-regime, conservative and of tribal-background.

Only 6 seats were taken by independent Islamists and further 6 by leftist and Pan-Arab nationalists; barely 1 of the deputies represented a political party, all other ran as independents. What concerns the most is the scale of electoral fraud the regime committed. Many voting cards were reported stolen or lost. On the other hand, some voters received several cards so they could cast their ballots a few times. Later the government admitted it had noted some 120,000 duplicate names on electoral lists, albeit nothing was done to disallow the results and repeat the voting process.³⁵

Furthermore, the regime did not relinquish its gerrymandering policy, aimed at granting Jordanians of Transjordanian origin a bigger political weight than it actually came out of demographics. For instance, the Karak district, the regime’s support base, received 9 seats - 6 more than it would get under proportional representation. Likewise, the mostly Palestinian-populated second Amman district was allocated only 3 seats whereas it would be given 10 seats if all citizens were represented equally. Such manipulations perpetuated discouragement among the Jordanians of Palestinian origin whose turnout at the elections was relatively low – it did not exceed 30%.³⁶

The gap between the regime and public opinion further widened when King Hussein announced his desire to distance from Iraq, in aim to rebuild Jordan’s ties with the Gulf states and ally closer with the U.S., certainly ignoring the public pro-Iraqi sentiment. In February 1998, when the Americans engaged in political and potentially military confrontation with Iraq, the government prohibited pro-Iraq demonstrations. It also pacified the demonstrators after Friday prayers in Amman and Ma’an with use of force, accusing “external elements” for subversion.³⁷ Consequently reversing the liberalization, in August 1998 the regime issued a new *Press and Publication Law* which introduced restrictions and penalties even stronger than those of 1997. In the opinion of many journalists, it meant “full circle back to martial law” in terms of press freedom.³⁸ The problem of democracy in Jordan temporarily lost its importance, however, when a few months later King Hussein died after a long-term battle with cancer. In February 1999 his oldest son ascended to the throne as Abdullah II.

At the outset, the new monarch pledged his full support for the political opening, what was consistent with the expectations towards the young, Western-educated king. He initiated a ‘national dialogue’ within which the meetings with opposition parties

³⁴ Ryan, “Elections and Parliamentary Democratization in Jordan,” 186.

³⁵ Ibid., 186-187; Brand, “The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan,” 63.

³⁶ Ellen M. Lust-Okar, “Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan,” *Democratization* 13, no. 3 (2006): 463-464.

³⁷ Brand, “The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan,” 63-64; Sean L. Yom, Mohammad H. Al-Momani, “The International Dimensions of Authoritarian Regime Stability: Jordan in the Post-Cold War Era,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (2008): 48.

³⁸ Lucas, “Press Laws as a Survival Strategy in Jordan, 1989-99,” 91-92.

and professional associations were taking place, he requested the parliament to eradicate some of the press law restrictions, and finally, he criticized the administration's inefficiency and corruption. A sign of shift in regime's policy was marked during July 1999 municipal elections, in effect of which the opposition came to power in several districts. Even the IAF praised the elections as free and fair, despite some minor incidents. The voting nonetheless showed the continuing weakness of the party system in Jordan as most of the elected were independent candidates.³⁹

In fact, more than political reform, the implementing an economic modernization Program – trade liberalization, privatization and technological innovation – was of the royal interest. The undertaken market-oriented economic reforms cleared Jordan's way to join the World Trade Organization in 2000. The king's drift towards democracy did not last long however. With the outbreak of the *Al-Aqsa Intifada* in September 2000 and numerous consequent popular demonstrations against Israel came a halt to the process of political liberalization. The regime perceived the increasing unrest as a threat to both its security and Jordanian-Israeli peace. Therefore a ban on public demonstrations was issued and it was strictly cautioned by the government – when some 20,000 opposition protesters gathered in the Jordan Valley to show their discontent of the Israeli policy, security forces violently dispersed the crowd. Similar events took place in Amman in May 2001 and April 2002.⁴⁰

In June 2001 King Abdullah dissolved the parliament and called for new elections to be held in November. Meanwhile he decreed a temporary law on public assembly which made compulsory to acquire official approval of any meeting debating public issues. Accordingly, the new electoral law was issued in August – it enlarged the Chamber of Deputies to 104 seats, modified electoral districts into smaller entities and distributed extra seats equally among all districts, therefore petrifying the over-representation of rural areas. At the same time, king decided to postpone the elections for at least 10 months, officially to allow voters to adapt to new electoral system.⁴¹ As it has occurred, the king kept delaying the elections until November 2003. First, it was claimed to be essential to stabilize the state, hence several (nominally over 200) measures towards this 'stabilization' were undertaken. Among them was an amendment of the Penal Code which introduced severe penalties "for the publication of news that could damage national unity, incite crimes, spread hatred, undermine people's reputation or jeopardize stability through rumors or false information"⁴² and the temporary municipalities law which allowed government to appoint the head and half of the members of each municipal council.

³⁹ Curtis R. Ryan, "Political Liberalization and Monarchical Succession in Jordan," *Israel Affairs* 9, no. 3 (2003): 131, 133-135, 138.

⁴⁰ Yom, Al-Momani, "The International Dimensions of Authoritarian", 50; Lucas, "Deliberalization in Jordan," 142-143.

⁴¹ Greenwood, "Jordan's 'New Bargain,'" 264.

⁴² International Crisis Group, "The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratisation and Regional Instability," *MIDDLE EAST Briefing* (October 8, 2003): 6, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Jordan/B010%20The%20Challenge%20of%20Political%20Reform%20Jordanian%20Democratisation%20and%20Regional%20Instability.pdf> (accessed January 5, 2011).

Later on, however, it became obvious that such tactic gave the government a free hand in its full support for the Washington's 'war on terror' – all opposition parties, professional associations and student unions felt hostile against American military expansionism in the Middle East. Soon Jordan sent its troops on a peacekeeping mission to Afghanistan, involved in intelligence collaboration with the CIA and, finally, became a logistical asset for the Iraqi invasion in March 2003. In return, Jordan was granted a significant amount of the U.S. aid, both economic and military.⁴³

No matter the reasoning behind King Abdullah's actions, he was commonly criticized by the opposition for harming the credibility of the legislative process and accelerating the process of "de-democratization".⁴⁴ To calm the public opinion down and divert its attention from regional or foreign policy issues, the king launched the "Jordan First" initiative in October 2002. Its main focus were socio-economic features of public life: health, education, fighting poverty and unemployment, changing the status of women in the society, enhancing public freedom and transparency, participation in the internal political process and national unity.

Although there was a plethora of recommendations issued by the royally-appointed Jordan First Committee, merely few of them were implemented: 6 seats parliamentary quota for women, establishing the Ministry of Political Development to administer new democratic reforms and holding the elections in June 2003.⁴⁵ The polling has not changed the *status quo* notwithstanding – even though the voting was relatively fair and the turnout reached as much as 57% of eligible voters, the parliament maintained its tribal and conservative character. The IAF won 17 seats (among them was 1 woman – Hayat al-Musayni), 5 more went to independent Islamists and over a dozen to leftist and nationalist parties. At the first regular session of the parliament King Abdullah assured the deputies about his will to strengthen national dialogue and achieve democracy in the kingdom.⁴⁶ This words, however, were quite a resemblance of what the public heard in 1999.

The stalemate between the regime and its opponents continued until February 2005 when the king appointed an expert commission to create the National Agenda – a 10-year plan for comprehensive political and economic reform. This move revived popular hope for a serious democratic transition in Jordan. Unfortunately, it was not about to happen – the November 2005 hotel bombings in Amman and the January 2006 Hamas electoral victory on the West Bank once again elevated the internal security concerns back to the forefront.

By the time the National Agenda was revealed in December 2005, it considerably lost its relevance. Especially, if most of outlined aims and principles of political development depicted only general statements about the need to "enact the law to guarantee the freedom of political activity and ensure the protection of individuals and groups engaging in such activity [as well as] to achieve increased protection and greater respect

⁴³ Yom, Al-Momani, "The International Dimensions of Authoritarian", 50, 52.

⁴⁴ International Crisis Group, "The Challenge of Political Reform", 7.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 10; Yom, Al-Momani, "The International Dimensions of Authoritarian", 51; Greenwood, "Jordan's 'New Bargain'", 265.

⁴⁶ Curtis R. Ryan, Jillian Schwedler, "Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime? The 2003 Elections in Jordan," *Middle East Policy* 11, no. 2 (2004): 146-147, 149.

of human rights.”⁴⁷ Accordingly, ‘security concerns’ made the regime issue a very controversial antiterrorism law of August 2006,⁴⁸ a new *Law on Charitable Societies and Social Institutions* (2007) which can “deny NGOs licenses to operate, inspect, approve funding, install government-imposed management, and dissolve NGOs for a wide variety of reasons,” and a new *Political Parties Law* (2007). The latter introduced public funding to political parties depending on the number of seats won in local or parliamentary elections, at the same time raising the number of founding members required from 50 to 500 what in fact meant shutting down several minor parties.⁴⁹

In such atmosphere, at the end of July 2007 Jordan held its municipal elections – a prelude to the forthcoming parliamentary battle in November. Albeit there was a common belief that the Islamist would do particularly well, at the election day the IAF announced its withdrawal on the basis of extensive government-sponsored voting irregularities such as buying votes or ballot-stuffing. In return, the regime ran campaign against the IAF describing it as undemocratic and unpatriotic, and accusing the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership of collaboration with Hamas and Hezbollah. Likewise, the parliamentary elections were a scene of widespread vote-buying process as both local and international NGOs were restricted from monitoring the elections. Hence it came as no surprise that the IAF won only 6 seats.⁵⁰

Since early 2008 the prioritization of security has been used as an excuse to limit civil liberties and political freedom in the kingdom. First, there was an unsuccessful attempt of the government to introduce contentious civil society law in January. Another try came in July when the parliament endorsed the *Law of Societies* – it severely curtailed the NGOs freedom of action while giving the government the right to control and review their finances and work plans; the NGOs were also obligated to get ministerial approval for any foreign funding. The new law was thereafter signed by King Abdullah in September and came to force in December 2008.⁵¹ Eventually, an amendment of the law was issued a year later (September 2009), in effect of which some of the restrictions were cancelled, e.g. it eased founding a new NGO or revoked reporting on member lists. However, the most controversial provisions, including the government’s authority to freely reject registration or dissolve NGOs were preserved.⁵²

Due to the increasing dissatisfaction of the parliament’s work, on November 24, 2009 King Abdullah decided to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies; the new elections

⁴⁷ *National Agenda, 2006* quoted in Choucair-Vizoso, “Illusive Reform: Jordan’s Stubborn Stability,” 54.

⁴⁸ According to Amnesty International, “it did not conform to international human rights law and standards. The new law’s definition of ‘terrorist acts’ was too broad and could be used to criminalize membership of political opposition groups or other *peaceful* activities,” Amnesty International, *2007 Annual Report for Jordan*, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2007&c=JOR> (accessed November 9, 2010).

⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Shutting Out Critics: Restrictive Laws Used to Repress Civil Society in Jordan*, December 16, 2007, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/12/16/shutting-out-critics/restrictive-laws-used-repress-civil-society-jordan> (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁵⁰ Susser, “Jordan: Preserving Domestic Order in a Setting of Regional Turmoil,” 4-5.

⁵¹ Sameer Jarrah, “Civil Society and Public Freedom in Jordan: The Path of Democratic Reform,” The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, *Working Paper* no. 3 (2009): 8-9.

⁵² “Jordan – Societies Law Amended,” EUROMED Association, September 16, 2009, <http://euromedassociation.blogspot.com/2009/10/jordan-societies-law-amended-16092009.html> (accessed November 10, 2010).

were to be held towards the end of 2010. A day later he instructed the government to amend the electoral law so that the new elections are “a model of transparency, fairness and integrity, and a promising step in our process of reform and modernization, the aims of which are to achieve the best for our nation and to expand the horizon of progress and prosperity for Jordanians.”⁵³ The opposition welcomed royal decision and called for immediate free elections under new law. In response, several NGOs (including the National Center for Human Rights and National Democratic Institute for International Relations) formed a coalition aiming at campaign for improvement in the election law – the National Coalition to Reform the Legal Framework Governing the Electoral Process. Its recommendations not only suggested replacing the one-man, one-vote system with a mixed one, which would enable Jordanians to cast two votes: one for a national list and one for a candidate at the district level but also encouraging equal representation by redistricting and establishing an independent national institution to monitor the elections.⁵⁴

The new *Elections Law* of May 2010 contained only some of the recommendations: total number of the parliamentary seats increased from 110 to 120 with the women quota rising from 6 to 12; extra 4 seats were granted to underrepresented urban areas of Amman, Irbid and Zarqa; the previous multi-seats districts were re-designed into 108 smaller single-seat sub-districts; strict punishments for votes-buying were introduced along the expansion of the role of the political observers to assure fairness and transparency. Moreover, the law only slightly changed the *status quo* as it maintained to be biased towards tribal candidates in rural areas. That was the reason of the IAF’s announcement in July 2010 about its boycott of the forthcoming elections. Several Islamists, however, decided not to support the protest and run as independent candidates – among them were prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁵⁵

In the weeks leading up to the elections there were several incidents noted, mostly concerning arrests of the young people who were protesting against government and calling for an electoral boycott. There were instances of press censorship taking place as well. That is why Jordan once again caught attention of human rights activists, whose main concern was that the government did not comply with the International Covenant of Political and Civil Rights it voluntarily adopted in 2006: “Jordanian authorities are trying to delegitimize the opposition, but instead they are delegitimizing the elections. These recent incidents of censorship and arrests of critics cast doubt on the open contest of ideas necessary for the ‘transparent and fair’ elections King Abdullah promised.”⁵⁶

⁵³ “King directs government to amend Elections Law,” *Jordan Times*, November 25, 2009.

⁵⁴ Oraib Al-Rantawi, “Coalition Presses for Electoral Reform in Jordan,” *Arab Reform Bulletin*, April 14, 2010.

⁵⁵ Martin Beck, Lea Collet, “Jordan’s 2010 Election Law: Democratization or Stagnation,” *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.* (October 2010): 1, 3-5, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_20947-1522-2-30.pdf?101108101415 (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁵⁶ Christoph Wilcke, a senior researcher in Human Rights Watch’s Middle East and North Africa Division for Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Quoted in: Human Rights Watch, “Jordan: Ensure Free Election Campaign,” October 20, 2010, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/10/20/jordan-ensure-free-election-campaign> (accessed November 9, 2010).

The Election Day itself – November 9 – was an example of transparent, free and fair voting notwithstanding. It has also set a precedent in Jordanian history – for the first time the king invited international observers who joined national monitoring groups. Some of them indicated a paradox of the voting process being credible even if “the elections unfolded within a broader political system that lacks credibility.”⁵⁷ The official turnout reached 53% and among 120 elected deputies were 13 women. One of them, Reem Badran, became the first woman to win a seat in parliament through direct competition, not via quota system. King Abdullah called the parliamentary polls “an important step in Jordan’s democratic process in line with a vision of reform, development and partnership between the government and the legislature, which plays an essential constitutional role in the national development process.”⁵⁸

The past 20 years clearly showed that Jordan’s democratization process is mostly shaped by regime’s survival interests. That is why it firstly pursues the stability and security via often authoritarian measures and only afterwards it offers democratic rhetoric combined with multi-party politics (although with a very weak party system) and elections. It seems unambiguous that such strategy is able to work mostly due to the American support for the monarchy. In return for its pro-Western foreign policy and vital role it plays in the Middle East peace process, Jordan acquires American approval of limited liberalization and, accordingly, many restrictions of the civil society.

Nevertheless, the regime should not hesitate to speed up the opening process, especially if the after-1989 experience is lucid about constant popular support for the king. Surely, there are voices of discontent about Abdullah’s politics of patronage, none of them, however, call for demolishing the monarchy. As A. Obeidat rightfully remarks, “the government needs to balance between risks and needs – between security, human rights and democracy. It is all a matter of wise state management – you need a vision, a strategy and regulations.”⁵⁹ Extremely crucial is thus to accelerate the democratization process in Jordan as too slow reform may otherwise hit back the regime’s very survival. Even king himself noticed such a challenge when in September 2003 he spoke to the American public: “the leadership of the Middle East do not understand that 50% of the population is under 18, and if they do not get going to create some means for real political participation for these young people, they are going to have serious problems.”⁶⁰ If he only knew that his own words would prove to be prophetic.

⁵⁷ Michelle Dunne, “Jordan’s Elections: An Observer’s View,” *Carnegie Commentary*, November 17, 2010, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/11/17/jordan-s-elections-observer-s-view> (accessed November 20, 2010).

⁵⁸ “Elections a key step in Jordan’s development – King,” *Jordan Times*, November 10, 2010, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/elections-key-step-jordan%E2%80%99s-development-king> (accessed January 5, 2011).

⁵⁹ Quoted in International Crisis Group, “The Challenge of Political Reform,” 16.

⁶⁰ *The Washington Post*, September 21, 2003 quoted in International Crisis, “The Challenge of Political Reform,” 2.

III

DIMENSIONS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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BETWEEN INNOVATION AND REBELLION: MODES OF ADAPTATION OF YOUTH IN MENA COUNTRIES

As a unique social category youth has drawn the attention of international researchers and scientists only recently. Two interrelated reasons contributed to this interest. The first one is demographical – Middle East and North Africa is experiencing so called “youth bulge;” people aged 15-25 constitute a significantly large group, of at least 20% of the population (while children aged 0-14 – another 30%).² The second reason is social. As a bulge, sticking out on the age structure graph, youth need new provisions, especially jobs and housing, in order to transit to the other stage of life – adulthood, become independent and start their own families. If their needs are not met and it is unlikely that they be fulfilled in the future, youth can become a significant social actor eager to express their discontent and/or seeking other ways to cope with the situation.

Societies of the Middle East and North Africa have always been rather young demographically. Currently, people below 24 constitute around 50-60% of the Middle Eastern population including Yemen – 65%, Saudi Arabia and Iraq – 62%, Iran – 59% and Algeria – 57%.³ What makes a difference is the high proportion of youth in this age category – comparing to children – and their potential. The impact of youth bulge in the social structure is far from being unambiguous. While some authors point out that a disproportionately high rate of young people leads to social unrest or even violence,⁴ others speak about “demographic gift” – seeing in the new labor entrants a potential for economic growth.⁵ The article aims to discuss what is the impacted of recent social

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² Gunnar Heinsohn, *Söhne und Weltmacht. Terror im Aufstieg und Fall der Nationen* (Zürich: Orell Füssli Verlag, 2003), 14, <http://www.pseudology.org/Gallup/Heinsohn.pdf> (accessed August 31, 2011).

³ Graham E. Fuller, “The youth factor. The new demographics of the Middle East and the implications for U.S. Policy,” *The Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World Analysis Paper*. 3 (June 2003): VI, 2, <http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2003/6/middleeast-fuller/fuller20030601.pdf> (accessed August 31, 2011).

⁴ Heinsohn, *Söhne und Weltmacht*, 53.

⁵ “Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa - toward a new social contract,” *Middle East and North Africa - MENA Development Report*, The World Bank (Washington: The

changes on young people and present 3 short case studies which illustrate different modes of adaptation, based on the Robert Merton's anomie theory.

Middle Eastern anomie?⁶

Using Western theories to explain non-Western realities might often be misleading. It offers an easy and well-fitting explanation to social phenomena rooted in different cultural setting. Focus on similarities might lead to overlooking of cultural peculiarities. Having that in mind, Robert Merton's anomie theory seems to provide a good diagnosis for certain social processes in MENA countries.

In sociological thought two names might be linked to anomie theory. The first one is that of Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) who saw anomie as a lack of coherent social norms, which may lead to deviant behavior, including suicide. The second one, Robert Merton (1910-2003) applied anomie to a peculiar type of social setting, namely mismatch between cultural goals and institutionalized means. As empirical background for his anomie theory, Merton used American society. The pressure on individuals to pursue cultural goals – success, prestige, fame – was very high. The system offered institutionalized means that ought to enable individual to fulfil the cultural goals and at the same time were socially accepted. Educational system could serve as an example of such institutionalized means – if one studies hard one should be able to get a diploma from a good university, which will be the key to professional success and a promising career. However, often a state school is not enough for one's career, while studying in a prestigious university demands a tuition fee. So, even if trying very hard an individual is often unable to fulfil the cultural goals. And this is how the mismatch comes into force. Merton observed 5 different modes of adaptation:

- **Conformity:** pursuing cultural goals by institutionalized means, in other words – conforming to existing rules. Conformists build up the majority in the society and secure maintenance of the social order.
- **Innovation:** refers to fulfilment of cultural goals, but using different means, often contrary to prevalent norms. Innovations may be constructive and provide society with new capacities, or destructive – causing harm to the social order and lead to chaos. In the first case it could be e.g. discovering that the Earth revolves around the Sun, while in the second – bank robbery as a way to achieve high economic status.
- **Ritualism:** focuses on institutionalized means so much that an individual loses the cultural goal from his sight. He fulfils the norms without any deeper meaning, does what he ought to, without paying any attention to the end-result or his efficiency. Bureaucratic state institutions might be a good example.

World Bank, 2004), <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/3931432/unlocking-employment-potential-middle-east-north-africa-toward-new-social-contract> (accessed August 31, 2011).

⁶ The theoretical part of this section refers to Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," *American Sociological Review*, 3, no. 5 (October 1938): 672-682, <http://www.csun.edu/~snk1966/Robert%20K%20Merton%20-%20Social%20Structure%20and%20Anomie%20Original%201938%20Version.pdf> (accessed August 31, 2011).

- **Retreatism:** means that neither cultural goals nor institutionalized means are being fulfilled. An individual drifts away from the society out of inability or unwillingness to cope in any other way. A form of escapism could be alcohol.
- **Rebellion:** differs from all above presented modes of adaptation as it neither solely accepts nor declines existing goals and means. In fact rebellion transgressed these boundaries by declining cultural goals and institutionalized means and simultaneously offering new ones. In this way it differs from retreatism which ends at declining. Rebellion could be a hippy commune, which does not conform existing goals and means, but offers to its members new ones.

Merton's theory, even though founded in 1930s, provides a typology of adaptation modes that can still be used in order to explain certain processes taking place under rapid social changes. It will be used in the second part of the article. The next section will provide a background for this analysis by discussing the social changes that have been affecting the life of the youth in the last few decades.

The unfulfilled generation⁷

Since the 1950s/60s MENA countries have been implementing wide-ranging modernization projects, which led to significant improvements reflected by different social indicators. In 1980-2000 gross enrollment ratio rose by 10% points, while youth illiteracy rate decreased by 20%;⁸ life expectancy at birth was extended by 14 years, if compared to 1970s, and infant mortality ratio slipped to 85 for 1000 births.⁹ These changes translated into improvement of basic life qualities of many citizens. When it comes to youth, improved access to education brought self-awareness and provided new tools to define and pursue their goals.

However, the Middle Eastern modernization project – even though it brought significant changes – proved to be ineffective and insufficient in the long-term. As for now the region is still in transition. There are 3 dominant trajectories that have been shaping life of young Middle Easterners:¹⁰

- **Traditional:** predominantly in rural areas, where individual's life is determined by his family and local community. Access to education is limited, especially when it comes to girls. Young men work with other family members, either on

⁷ This part of the paper draws from a chapter of my forthcoming book: Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska, *Muzułmańska kultura konsumpcyjna: między Zachodem a Bliskim Wschodem* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, 2011).

⁸ "Better Governance for Development in the Middle East and North Africa. Enhancing Inclusiveness and Accountability," *MENA Development Report*, The World Bank (Washington: The World Bank, 2003), 108, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15077/271460PAPER0Be1ance0for0development.pdf?sequence=1> (accessed August 31, 2011).

⁹ "Making New Technologies Work for Human Development," *Human Development Report 2001*, United Nations Development Programme UNDP (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 10. 2001 http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/262/hdr_2001_en.pdf (accessed August 31, 2011).

¹⁰ Navtej Dhillon, Paul Dyer, Tarik Yousef, "Overview" in *Generation in Waiting. The Unfulfilled Promise of Young People in the Middle East*, ed. Navtej Dhillon, Tarik Yousef (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009), 13-16.

a farm or in a local crafts workshop. Young females get married early and work in the household.

- **Welfare:** related to the modernization process and increased role of the state in economy. The state provided the citizens access to basic social services, especially education and health. These changes translated into increased upward mobility of young people. Giant public absorbed new entrants to the labor market, mostly recent graduates – beneficiaries of the state-led education reform.¹¹ The system is grounded on a social pact between the state and society, in which the state provides the citizens with goods and services needed for survival, while the society is loyal to the state and accepts its authority.
- **Post-welfare:** being a negative consequence of the welfare state project, which proved to be ineffective in the long term. At the same time access to information and globalization improved opportunities of young people. If enterprising and skilled they can get a position in the private sector, or set up their own company and find their competitive advantage. If less successful, they build up the generation of excluded. As already mentioned, the welfare state failed – there are hardly any more jobs in the public sector, while their level of education was insufficient in order to try their luck in the emerging market economy or earn their living in any other way. At the same time their education and access to information is a factor that raises their awareness and expectations. They feel structurally deprived – with no opportunities despite their educational attainment.¹²

The post-welfare generation is in waiting – hoping to witness the end of the transition. Their life cycle has been disturbed as passing through consecutive life stages became much harder. Increased access to education is not followed by higher labor demand; quality of education does not meet the market demands; private sector in most countries is hardly developed and cannot absorb the growing labor force; public sector is overgrown and inefficient, so that it takes several years to get a job, while labor productivity does not translate into promotion. All this contributes to high unemployment rates, inflated predominantly by young labor entrants.

The average unemployment rate in MENA countries was in 2005 between 9% (Turkey) and 11-16% (except for the Palestinian Authority with 26,7%).¹³ This data does not include individuals employed part-time and so called unpaid family workers. Women and young people are 2 categories most vulnerable to unemployment. In Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia youth unemployment rate is twice as high as the average, in Iran – three times higher, while in Egypt – eight times higher.¹⁴

¹¹ Compare: Ahmed Fathy Sorour, „Egypt: a strategy for educational reform,” *Prospects* 27, no. 4 (1997): 1-8.

¹² On the other hand, according to a survey, youth from MENA states considers their economic situation as better than their Western peers. See: “Arab youth optimism about future surpasses that of Western peers,” *ASDA/A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey*, November 11, 2008, Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, <http://www.burson-marsteller.com/press-release/arab-youth-optimism-about-future-surpasses-that-of-western-peers/> (accessed August 31, 2011).

¹³ “Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in divided world,” *Human Development Report 2007/2008*, United Nations Development Programme (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 298-301, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/268/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf (accessed August 31, 2011).

¹⁴ Data from: *Millennium Indicators*, UN Stats, <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/>

One of the reason is the quality of education; young graduates – despite owning a high school or university diploma – lack skills and tools demanded on the labor market. Another reason is employment structure – in many MENA countries, especially monarchies and republics, the public sector constitutes the backbone of the economy. In 1950s–1970s it was the main provider of employment and guaranteed a stable and secure job, in which promotion depends on the number of years worked, rather than qualifications or productivity.¹⁵

Long term delay in entering the labor market has negative consequences for the psyche of young adults leading to frustration. Moreover, it delays transgression to sequential life stages such as financial independence or getting married. A survey carried out in mid-1990s in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Palestinian Authority revealed that young people are rather unsatisfied with their life and feel excluded. Alienation grows proportionally to education and support for fundamentalism.¹⁶ A new social category is growing – those who are excluded: young people who have too much free time, or rather no free time, as it is the opposite of being busy, usually with work or studying.¹⁷ Many young Middle Easterners spend their time on waiting to become adults. Among important indicators of adulthood are: starting one's family and being able to provide it. The key for successful transition is finding a job. Accumulating capital determines the possibility of establishing one's own household. This obligation has to be taken by young males, for whom earning their living became a significant factor of their cultural ideal. The situation of young women is only theoretically better – they are not expected to earn money, however their marriage depends on finding the right (and wealthy enough) spouse.¹⁸

Generation of excluded became aware of its painful situation thank to the partial success of the modernization projects of MENA states. It refers not to the lowest classes, but mostly to the lower-middle and middle class, which is more prone to frustration due to its social standing and mobility.¹⁹ It results in a cognitive dissonance felt in many aspects of their daily life: between their diplomas and lack of employment opportunities and/or a job below their qualifications; between willingness to start a family and lack of such possibility due to financial constraints; between awareness of economic and social realities in Western democracies and their own authoritarian one; between social norms and cultural patterns known from mass media and their own traditions; between their individualization and authority of elders, etc. In other words their frus-

¹⁵ Ilham Haouas, Mahmoud Yagoubi, *Openness and Human Capital as Source of Productivity Growth: An Empirical Investigation from some MENA Countries*, paper presented at the 5th International Conference of the Middle East Economic Association, March 10-12, 2006, 23, <http://www.mafhoum.com/press8/235E11.pdf> (accessed August 31, 2011).

¹⁶ Gema Martin Muñoz, "Arab Youth Today: The Generation Gap. Identity Crises and Democratic Deficit," in: *Alienation or Integration of Arab Youth. Between Family, State and Street*, ed. Roel Meijer (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000), 23.

¹⁷ Tomasz Szlendak, *Supermarketyzacja. Religia i obyczaje seksualne młodzieży w kulturze konsumpcyjnej* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2008), 73.

¹⁸ Katharina Lange, "Economic Change and Income-Generating Practices of Rural Youth in Northern Syria," in *Changing Values among Youth. Examples from the Arab World and Germany*, ed. Sonja Hegasy, Elke Kaschl (Berlin: Klaus Schwartz Verlag, 2007), 77.

¹⁹ Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, "The Challenges of Modernity: The Case of Political Islam," in *The Greater Middle East in Global Politics*, ed. Mehdi Parvizi Amineh (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2007), 212.

tration results from more than feeling of deprivation – it also refers to socio-economic and political conditions of their states.²⁰

The cognitive dissonance is also related to cultural values. In this case one can speak about normative asynchrony – while traditional cultural patterns and norms are still in force, simultaneously new patterns are being established, often resulting from globalization processes and contradictory to the traditional ones, leading to an internal conflict within the axio-normative system. This refers primarily to MENA countries with high urbanization and education level, that have been exposed to Western influences.

Dynamic social changes have widened the generation gap that divides young people and their parents. Young urban adults are often forced to live a double life – one at home, another in public. The first life runs around traditional norms, hierarchy and obedience to the elder family members. The second life has a different set of rules, often opposite.²¹ The generation gap has also a knowledge dimension – thank to state efforts and government educational programs young people have much better access to education, including higher education. According to a survey carried out among Moroccan students, only 13% of their father and 4% of their mothers had higher education. This indicates that many young people have a far higher level of education than their parents. Educational gap induces changes in traditional family relations. Parents do not constitute the predominant and authoritative source of knowledge transmission, and what is more, their authority becomes limited.²² In the GCC countries many autochthonous families employ nannies who are in charge of bringing up the children. Many of them are neither Arab nor Muslim, what limits the possibility of transmitting traditional GCC norms to the children. Since they are servants and depending on their employers they can hardly execute any authority. This leaves many GCC young adults undersocialized and unattended.²³

Modes of adaptation

There are many ways and strategies employed by young people in order to pursue their goals despite the constraints of everyday life. Out of these 4 cases have been selected. They represent different countries and refer to different modes of adaptation: innovation, retreatism and rebellion. Conformity and ritualism have not been included in the analysis as the first mode is the dominant and socially correct one, while the second reflects to some extent the realities described in the previous section – young

²⁰ Diane Singerman, “*The Economic Imperatives of Marriage: Emerging Practices and Identities among Youth in the Middle East*,” *Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper 6* (September 2007): 8, http://www.meyi.org/uploads/3/2/0/1/32012989/singerman_-_the_economic_imperatives_of_marriage-_emerging_practices_and_identities_among_youth_in_the_middle_east.pdf (accessed August 31, 2001).

²¹ Farag Elkamel, *Dialogue with the Future: Findings of a Study on Adolescents in Three Egyptian Governorates*, in: *Changing Values among Youth. Examples from the Arab World and Germany*, ed. Sonja Hegasy, Elke Kaschl (Berlin: Klaus Schwartz Verlag, 2007), 110.

²² Mokhtar El-Harras, *Students, Family and the Individuation Process: The Case of Morocco*, in: *Changing Values among Youth. Examples from the Arab World and Germany*, ed. Sonja Hegasy, Elke Kaschl (Berlin: Klaus Schwartz Verlag, 2007), 145.

²³ John R. Bradley, *Saudi Arabia Exposed: Inside a Kingdom in Crisis* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 92.

people pursuing education just for the sake of a diploma, without paying attention to its low quality and their prospects for employment. So they follow the institutionalized means but lose the goal, which would be in this case – becoming successful and/or independent on the labor market. Several studies have shown that success on the labor market in many MENA countries is not linearly correlated with the level of education. Often lower education (especially good vocational education) translates into lower unemployment rate.²⁴

The first case is an innovation and refers to various forms of marriage that exist next to the official one. As any extramarital affairs are deemed inappropriate and sometimes illegal, many young people who are unable to start their own families by founding their own households choose relationships which provide them with a substitute of a marriage. They follow cultural values as they try to remain intact with religious norms. The marriage substitutes are not deemed as univocally *haram*, even though they are controversial. This helps the quasi-spouses to feel no remorse for their behavior and enjoy some of practices reserved in the Islamic culture only for spouses – e.g. sex. One of such marriage substitutes in unofficial marriage, called *ʿurfi*, which is relatively popular in Egypt; according to Ministry of Social Affairs estimate around 17% of female university students are engaged in *ʿurfi* marriage.²⁵ *ʿUrfi* serves as a prelude of the real marriage and is concluded in secret, unofficially, only in front of two witnesses. As the average age of the first marriage in most MENA countries is high (on average as high as in Poland for both spouses), *ʿurfi* provides a way to partially start transgression into adulthood – one can have a spouse, even if the household and an official marriage contract including *mahr* are missing. It is an innovation as both “spouses” follow the cultural aim of having a legal official marriage, but they use different means to achieve it. As young people choose *ʿurfi* due to the financial burden of marriage, they are unable to follow the institutionalized means otherwise.

ʿUrfi is not the only type of marriage substitute known in MENA countries. Among more popular forms are *misyar* – known in GCC countries, an opportunity of having a second wife living on her own, or *muta* – a temporary marriage known by Shiites. These innovations are condemned by traditional *ulema*, which see them as legalized forms of cohabitation or even prostitution. At the same time their social standing is far higher than any informal intimate relation between man and woman.

The second case represents a mixture of innovation and rebellion and refers to so called *bad hejabi* – the art of wearing the Islamic headscarf so that it hardly reflects its symbolic meaning. Hijab is something far more than a piece of cloth one wears on the head.

The hejab is an institution with its own set of rules regarding women’s conduct and their actions and interactions, in particular with men. This meaning of the hejab is not distinct and separate from its dress form, rather it is its adjunct. An observant

²⁴ In Algeria and Tunisia over half of unemployed have basic education, but in Egypt – two out of three have secondary education, while in Jordan every third unemployed has an university diploma, see: “Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa,” 92.

²⁵ Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics. How ordinary people change the Middle East* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 134.

woman is covered and restrained. She is chaste and obedient in private and public: at home, she is a subservient wife, a sexual servant and a nurturing mother, and if single, she is at fault socially and sanctimoniously; outside the home, she is diligent in how she walks, what she wears, how she talks, sits, and smiles, and how she moves her body and displays her ornaments.²⁶

Hejab should protect woman from the eyesight of men and prove her modesty and dignity. If covered, she can move safely in the public space without being deemed as inappropriate. At the same time it can be used instrumentally as a cover for interactions with men. A woman in *hejab* can move freely, while the symbolic meaning of the piece of cloth speaks for her modesty, even if she enters in a behavior that would otherwise contradict it.

However, in the case of Iran, *hejab* is something more than a tool enabling women to enter the public space. Its obligatory nature gives it a different symbolic meaning. *Hejab* is being demanded by the state which enforces the image of modest, religious women. *Bad hejabi* provides a window for disobedience. By wearing colorful scarfs, tight coats and strong make up, young girls can redefine the meaning of *hejab*. Added to a fashionable and trendy outfit, a loosely tight *hejab* showing parts of hair, becomes a fashionable piece of cloth, enriching the look and charm of its owner:

A young woman wearing yellow stiletto heels, khaki Capri pants, and a lime green manto adjusted her fuchsia headscarf to ensure that her Gucci glasses sat neatly on her highlighted hair without pushing the headscarf too far forward or backward. It was perfect. As she ordered and ate her pizza, her headscarf did not move (...), and her elaborate makeup – which included pink, yellow, and green eye shadow to match her outfit; dark eyeliner; fake eyelashes; and bright red lipstick – also stayed intact despite sweltering heat of the un-air-conditioned food court. (...) Her friends' manto and headscarf combinations in reds, fluorescent blues, and shades of green complemented hers. (...) They were enveloped in a cloud of perfume and cigarette smoke, which perfected the image.²⁷

Also in other MENA countries there are fashionable Muslim women, who cover but still take care on how they look. However, a religious Muslim woman would rather not let her hair stick out of her scarf – even if also in a very fashionable way.

Young women in urban Iran, especially northern Tehran, made their *hejab* and outfit to a playful rebellion.²⁸ It enables them to show their disapproval for Islamization of the public space and enforcing religion by Iranian regime. They maintain the cultural aim – which is in this case wearing *hejab* – but equip it with different meaning. Maintaining the cultural aim puts *bad hejabi* as innovators, while challenging the original meaning – as rebels.

²⁶ Hamideh Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Revealing* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 212.

²⁷ Pardis Mahdavi, *Passionate Uprisings. Iran's Sexual Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 105.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.

The third case presented can be located on the Merton's modes of adaptation between retreatism and rebellion. It occurs in Saudi Arabia and is called *tafkhit*, which can be translated as the art of car skidding. For many years Saudi (and other GCC) society has been distracted from politics. By providing citizens with goods and services without willing any tax money in return, the state maintained its control over society, while the society was too lazy and comfort-loving to do anything about it. The energy of young people has been pulled into sports and youth clubs.²⁹ In Saudi Arabia the cognitive dissonance of young people spreads between the teachings of Wahhabism and the lure of popular culture, available through information technologies. Additional factor is that while the Wahhabis are generally against Western culture, the state is depending on collaboration with Western powers, especially the U.S.³⁰

Tafkhit provides a way to get rid of the tension, as car drifting and skidding is a dangerous and risky task. The drivers (*mufakhatin*) maneuver their cars in extreme ways – they run into each other causing artistic but also dangerous accidents, they do car stunts, either on an empty road, or within the traffic. Their meetings are held in secret, but there are usually many observers. The most famous *mufakhatin* post the videos of their stunts online. *Tafkhit* serves as a way to rebel against the social order but at the same time it is rooted in Saudi consumerism. Young Saudis destroy cars by few maneuvers – from a commodity that shall last for at least several days it becomes a one-time good, providing one-time fun.

Tafkhit emerged due to the lack of any alternative forms of spending free time by Saudi youth. It provides them with entertainment, but most of all emotions as they break many crucial social norms, by engaging in this activity: they use cars that often were stolen, they commit traffic offenses (and that is why are sometimes followed by the police), they engage in stunning and risk their lives, moreover they consume alcohol and drugs (both forbidden by Islam).³¹ *Mufakhatin* rebel against the system, but at the same time they do not present any alternative – except for engaging in *tafkhit*; all they do is expressing their frustration and looking for some fun and adrenaline. As this activity is dangerous and risky, and might even lead to deaths (*mufakhatin*, other drivers, observers – all are in danger), *tafkhit* could also be seen as a form of retreatism. It serves as a way to escape from the surrounding reality, often without taking into account possible consequences of an accident.

The last case could be considered as rebellion. It is common in many MENA countries, but most visible in Iran and Saudi Arabia, as in both countries heavy metal music is illegal. In popular opinion heavy metal is linked to Satanism and seen as blasphemous. That is why sometimes heavy metal fans were arrested. One of the biggest mass arrests took place in 1997 in Cairo, when 97 teenagers – mostly students living in upper-middle class districts – got arrested and charged with Satan worshipping. Their

²⁹ Ahmed Saif, "Deconstructing Before Building: Perspectives on Democracy in Qatar," in: *Reform in the Middle East Oil Monarchies*, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Steven Wright (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2008), 115.

³⁰ Bradley, *Saudi Arabia Exposed*, 90.

³¹ Abdullah al-Otaibi, Pascal Ménoret, "Rebels without a Cause?: A Politics of Deviance in Saudi Arabia," in *Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North*, ed. Linda Herrera, Asef Bayat (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 87.

rooms were searched and items such as music, skull gadgets and t-shirts were confiscated, while the mufti of Egypt, sheikh Muhammad Nasr Fareed, accused them of apostasy.³² In Casablanca dozen or so members of heavy metal bands and their fans were convicted for crimes against morality and religion.³³

The disapproving attitude of authorities towards heavy metal translates into the way heavy metal bands function. In Iran, music labeled as rock (which encompasses also heavy metal) is juxtaposed with legal music of pop, which became officially legalized after 1997. Rock performers usually record their songs in secret in basements, having only amateur recording equipment. The distribution network is also constrained – before Internet became popular and accessible, the main distribution channel were cassettes, recorded by the band and handed over to their fans, who passed them hand to hand.³⁴

The Middle Eastern heavy metal comprises Western elements – such as guitars and voice modulation – with Oriental ones – lyrics and some instruments. For performers and their fans it provides a mean to express their anger and frustration, and get rid of the tension. Many artists are university graduated, some of them have even doctorates. Their music is not only about the artistic expression but also about the content, which is sometimes political.³⁵ One of video clips to a song, “Baptized” of Iranian band ArthimotH presents a man bound to a chair, with electrodes attached to his body. Another man performs a surgery on his brain by removing the top part of the skull. Afterwards another man screams to the ear of the bound man words from some secret books, while the brain is eaten by a rat. At the end of the video clip the head is sewed up again. The song and the video reflect the Iranian system of control.³⁶

There are many heavy metal bands, but hardly any perform officially. Among the most famous are Nervecell (UAE), Bilocate (Jordan), Oath to Vanquish (Lebanon), or Saudi Wasted Land. Only recently some of MENA governments became more tolerant for local heavy metal bands. Since 2007 at the Desert Rock Festival in Dubai one day is devoted only to heavy metal.³⁷ This way a deviant behavior – which in this case would be performing heavy metal – is being institutionalized by the system. Heavy metal, while being a subculture and marginal in the musical scene, might lose its rebellious spirit.

³² Amr Hamzawy, “The French Expedition, Egyptian Satanists, and Lady Diana: Globalization and its Discontents,” in *Dissociation and Appropriation: Responses to Globalization in Asia and Africa*, Katja Füllberg-Stolberg, Petra Heidrich, Ellinor Schöne (Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische Buch, 1999), 199.

³³ “Moroccan heavy metal fans jailed,” BBC News, March 7, 2003, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2828049.stm> (accessed August 31, 2001).

³⁴ Laudan Nooshin, “The language of rock: Iranian youth, popular music, and national identity,” in *Media, Culture and Society in Iran. Living with globalization and the Islamic state*, ed. Mehdi Semati (New York; Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, 2008.), 72-74.

³⁵ Yursa Tekbali, “Heavy Metal Islam,” interview with Mark LeVine, Islam Online, April 23, 2008, <http://religionresearch.org/closer/2008/04/23/heavy-metal-islam-islamonline-net-news/> (accessed August 31, 2001).

³⁶ Mark LeVine, *Heavy Metal Islam* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2008), 198-199.

³⁷ “Dubai Desert Rock Festival 2009. Full Line Up Announcement,” http://www.metalstorm.net/events/news_comments.php?news_id=8034 (accessed August 31, 2011).

Conclusions

Life in transition and rapid social changes lead many young people to adopting coping mechanisms. Basing on the examples presented above one can draw several conclusions of a more general nature.

Prevalence and intensity of deviant behavior is related to the form of social control. In traditional communities the social system is inflexible and the force of social control is rather strong. Community members are eager to maintain the social order and the social system is reluctant to absorb changes. Exceptions to the rules are suppressed, but if they are strong enough they might cause severe changes in the social system. A flexible social structure on the other hand, is able to absorb deviances and gradually adjust to changes.³⁸ It also enables individuals to express their opinions and attitudes, even if they are contrary to the predominant patterns. Most of contemporary MENA countries lack mechanisms that could absorb changes so that they do not pose any harm to the social order in a long term.

Politically most of the regimes are authoritarian or semi-authoritarian, so that it leaves a limited space for expressing alternative views. However, some of them provide their citizens with limited opportunities of expressing their discontent. Egyptian *Kifaya* (Arabic: *Enough*) might serve as an example,³⁹ however in this case political liberalization proved to be another form of so called authoritarian upgrading⁴⁰ – cosmetic changes that provide the society with a glimpse of liberalization. On the other hand, the case of Iranian president elections of 2009 led to protests, which were becoming more and more violent, leading to arrests, harassments and deaths.

Selection of the cases based on availability. Therefore they cannot be representative for the whole country or region. Still it is much easier to find a colorful case of youth rebellion in Saudi Arabia or Iran rather than Yemen or Jordan. Two factors might explain this geographical distribution. The first one is the strength of social control – the stricter the rules, the more visible are any deviations. The second one is related to the type of society. The modes of adaptation reflect the urban nature and self-awareness of their performers.

The systems of MENA countries react to the existence of such adaptations differently. Liberalization of social norms is followed by Islamization of the public sphere started in the 1990s.⁴¹ MENA regimes occasionally punish the perpetrators, but far more often

³⁸ Levis A. Coser, „Społeczne funkcje konfliktu,” in *Współczesne teorie socjologiczne* ed. Aleksandra Jasińska-Kania, Lech M. Nijakowski, Jerzy Szacki, Marek Ziółkowski (Warszawa: Scholar, 2006), 480.

³⁹ Due to deepening economic crisis Egyptian government introduced several reforms that induced political liberalization. Among others there was more than one candidate running for the 2005 presidential elections, while the society was able to express its dissatisfaction through the *Kifaya* movement. These changes did not affect the political system as a whole, as it maintained the status quo easily. Rather they served as a safety valve – slackened by the regime in order to give vent to people's emotions. More at: Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska, „Ruchy kontestacyjne w Egipcie: wolność kontrolowana,” in *Wolność i odpowiedzialność. Wymiar ekonomiczny, społeczny i polityczny*, ed. Joachim Osiński (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie, 2009).

⁴⁰ Steven Heydemann, “Upgrading authoritarianism in the Arab World,” *The Saban Center for Middle East Policy - Brookings Institution Analysis Paper* 13 (October 2007): 1-2, <http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2007/10/arabworld/10arabworld.pdf> (accessed August 31, 2011).

⁴¹ Mona Abaza, *Changing Consumer Cultures of Modern Egypt: Cairo's Urban Reshaping* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006), 293.

they prefer to turn a blind eye. This way the safety valve – understood as an opportunity to express one's discontent – can fulfill its task: maintain social order. Most of the cases of rebellion presented above are too extreme to gain popularity among wider public, as they are too risky, dangerous or simply in bad taste. That is why trendy *bad hejabis*, speedy *mufakhatin* and heavy metal fans will remain at the margin of the society. What is more important for the regimes, is that they are unable to challenge the system. Not only they are too marginal, but also do not propose any serious alternative. They simply serve as a way of expression ones frustration and anger.

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RULING ARAB INTERNET: AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNET OWNERSHIP TRENDS OF SIX ARAB COUNTRIES³

Abstract

This body of research focused on answering the questions, “who owns Arab Internet media?” and “what are the implications of this ownership?” Grounding our theoretical framework within the Agenda-Setting Theory of McCombs & Shaw (1972),⁴ we conducted a critical empirical analysis scrutinizing major Internet service provider websites from 6 Arab countries: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, and looked specifically for trends such as monopolies, oligarchies, and investment in telecommunications companies by foreign and regional entities. Our results indicated that the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia are highly invested in Arab telecommunications. Furthermore, there is a strong economic and political link between Egypt, the U.A.E., Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and an inter-connection exists between companies from these countries. Other Arab countries such as Kuwait and Bahrain are also investing in regional ISPs. There is limited investment from outside of the region, but Orange Telecom (the commercial brand of France Telecom) dominates this foreign investment. The results also indicate that although there are no monopolies (with the partial exceptions of Bahrain and Syria), there are emerging oligopolies of Arab Internet media, specifically growing individually out of each of the countries we examined. Implications for these results indicate that inter-country oligopolies may potentially develop as more regional investors take control of Internet companies, and as more connections are made (such as with the Hariri family or other political and economic leaders, Saudi Oger, the Saudi Telecom Company, and the connection between Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia), more influence on control and regulation – as well as what is regulated and controlled – will be exerted.

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⁴ Maxwell E. McCombs, Donald L. Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36 (1972):176–187.

Introduction

Over the past decade, the Internet has emerged as a dominating medium for communication, commerce, and entertainment, one that has not ignored the Arab World. The Internet first came to the Arab World in 1991 when it was introduced to Tunisia.⁵ It then diffused throughout the MENA region as table 1 outlines:⁶

Table 1.

Country	Year when Internet was introduced
Tunisia	1991
Egypt	1993
Algeria	1993
The United Arab Emirates	1993
Kuwait	1993
Jordan	1994
Bahrain	1995
Lebanon	1995
Morocco	1995
Yemen	1996
Oman	1997
Qatar	1997
Saudi Arabia	1997
Syria	1997

As Adel Aladwani describes, “the Arabian market (...) is equal in size to that of the U.S.A., and in purchasing power to that of China and many other middle-income countries.”⁷ As the number of Internet consumers continues to grow each year, the potential that exists in the Arab World is astonishing. The number of Internet users in the Arab World rose from 15.8 million in 2004⁸ to 37.5 million in 2009.⁹ However, others contend that it is between 40-45 million users,¹⁰ while one report even purported that

⁵ Khalid Rinnawi, “Arab Internet: Schizophrenic Trilogy,” in *Arab Media: Globalization and Emerging Media Industries*, ed. Noha Mellor, Mohammed I. Ayish, Nabil Dajani, Khalid Rinnawi (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011), 123-148. See also: Deborah L. Wheeler, “The Internet in the Arab World: Digital Divides and Cultural Connections,” Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, June 16, 2004, http://208.112.119.94/guest/lecture_text/internet_n_arabworld_all_txt.htm (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁶ All information taken from: Rinnawi, “Arab Internet: Schizophrenic Trilogy,” except for Kuwait, which is taken from: Wheeler, “The Internet in the Arab World” and the United Nations Development Program (1993), and Lebanon, which is taken from United Nations Development Program, 1995.

⁷ Adel M. Aladwani, “Key Internet characteristics and E-commerce Issues in Arab Countries”, *Information Technology & People* 16, no.1 (2003): 9.

⁸ “United Nations Development Programme on Governance in the Arab Region,” *United Nation Statistical Yearbook*, Arab Stats, 2006, <http://www.arabstats.org/indicator.asp?ind=168&yr=2006> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁹ This statistic was retrieved from Internet World Statistics, “Internet Usage in the Middle East,” December 31, 2010, <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm> (accessed September 7, 2011).

¹⁰ Jawad Abbasi, “An Overview of the Arab Telecom and Broadband Markets, and the Broadcast Media Industry, in Addition to Insights into Usage Patterns of New Media,” Arab Advisors Group, Washington, 2009.

it is as high as 60 million.¹¹ With this continuously growing market – many of which are Arab youth – it is of no surprise that the amount of individuals, corporations, and governments wanting to profit from and regulate their Internet use is staggering.¹² Analyzing ownership trends of the Internet service providers (ISPs) in Arab countries is paramount to understanding: who and what is investing in Internet technology and infrastructure, how much Internet freedom can exist within a particular network, what socio-cultural and political forces might be effecting that freedom, and what kind of regional or international connections are being made as more countries and companies extend their economic hegemony over the Internet.

Statement of the research question and hypothesis

The research question that we explore is: who (or what) owns Arab Internet media – in particular identifying monopolies, oligarchies, and inter-Arab World and international connections – and what implications exist because of this ownership and these connections (if they do exist)? Our initial hypothesis was that Saudi Arabia was increasingly investing in the telecommunications industries of the region as it dominates the ownership of other Arab media such as television and printing.¹³ However, shortly after we began working we incorporated the ideas that not only was Saudi Arabia trying to gain influence over regional Internet networks, but many other Arab entities are vying to do so as well. Regardless of the “who” in this sense, the “what” is clear: the more control an individual or entity has, the more power and revenue is available. Although the secondary literature pertaining to this topic was very limited, our analysis of primary data proved to be sufficient at providing enough information for this exploratory empirical research. Before this is discussed in detail, however, it is crucial to define what an Internet service provider is, and highlight their powers and abilities.

ISP Overview

The population (unit of analysis) that we focus on in this study is the individual Internet service providers (ISPs) from each country. ISPs are for-profit companies that provide Internet access to customers in exchange for a monthly fee.¹⁴ Since these ISPs are business, if they are incorporated in the stock market, individuals, other companies, or governments can buy shares and invest in them. Understanding who is investing in ISPs is important because ISPs have a number of powers that directly affect their

¹¹ *Arab Knowledge Report 2009: Toward Productive Intercommunication for Knowledge*, Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation and the United Nations Development Programme, (Dubai: Al Ghurair Printing & Publishing House L.L.C., 2009), <http://www.arab-hdr.org/akr/AKR2009/English/AKR2009-Eng-Full-Report.pdf> (accessed June 11, 2011).

¹² One only has to go so far as to observe the amount of Internet service providers (ISPs) each country has. But the amount of economic and developmental (e.g., infrastructural) potential is huge!

¹³ Kai Hafez, “Mass Media in the Middle East: Patterns of Political & Social Change,” in *Arab Society and Culture: An Essential Reader*, ed. Samir Khalaf, Roseanne Saad Khalaf (London: Saqi, 2009), 452-461.

¹⁴ R. Kayne, “What is an ISP?,” Wisegeek, <http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-an-isp.htm> (accessed September 7, 2011).

subscribers. For instance, ISPs can monitor internet activity, and they have the ability to block content as Leonard Sussman reinforces by stating that key ways of censoring include: “devising Internet - explicit licensing and regulation, applying existing restrictive print and broadcast laws to the Web, filtering Internet content through control of the servers, or censoring electronic content deemed unacceptable after dissemination.”¹⁵ Furthermore, ISPs can block websites, limit bandwidth, or block access altogether.¹⁶ If a particular individual or a group has control over a telecommunications company/network and desires to restrict certain content, it directly affects the user; this highlights a strong relationship between ownership and control. This is highly relevant to the Arab World where many governments often regulate their Internet media (as well as other media), and regional powers looking to further implement their own agendas are investing into many Arab Internet and telecommunications companies.

Theoretical Framework

At the launch of the Beirut (Lebanon) Chapter of The Internet Society¹⁷ in October of 2010, the past COO of The Internet Society - Jon Mc Nerney – stated that no one owns the Internet. Paraphrasing him, he discussed how, on the contrary, “the People” own the Internet. We happen to disagree, however. The reason for this disagreement is reinforced by our theoretical framework, which is grounded in the Agenda-Setting Theory proposed by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw¹⁸ suggests that the perceived importance of issues and the type of content available are constructed and framed in a specific and deliberate way to implement the certain agenda of the media power in the general public. The public perceives what is being presented as information that is more factual, true, and real, and is thus more credible and more important.¹⁹ This theory relates to our work as Internet media regulators, regulations, policies, and access are often influenced by the owners of the individual companies,²⁰ so one may draw inferences

¹⁵ Leonard R. Sussman, “Censor Dot Gov: The Internet and Press Freedom,” *Journal of Government Information* 27, no. 5 (2000): 542.

¹⁶ Evidence of this is seen in reports coming out of multiple countries – most notably the United States – as the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) continues to battle service providers over the issue of “net neutrality.” Part of this battle includes discussion over how much regulatory power ISPs can exert over their clientele base. For more information, see the following articles: Cecilia Kang, “FCC chairman proposes increased regulation of Internet service providers,” *Washington Post*, May 7, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/06/AR2010050606160.html> (accessed September 7, 2011); Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Proposes Rules on Internet Access,” *The New York Times*, May 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/technology/07broadband.html?_r=0 (accessed September 7, 2011); Todd Shields, “FCC Reclaims Powers Over Internet Access Companies,” *Bloomberg*, May 6, 2010, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-05-05/fcc-to-regulate-internet-services-in-victory-for-google-over-comcast-at-t> (accessed September 7, 2011); Declan McCullagh, “Court: FCC has no power to regulate Net neutrality,” *CNET News*, April 6, 2010, <http://www.cnet.com/news/court-fcc-has-no-power-to-regulate-net-neutrality/> (accessed September 7, 2011).

¹⁷ The Internet Society (ISOC) is a Geneva-based, non-profit organization founded in 1992 whose mission is to provide leadership in Internet related standards, education, and policy. They seek to ensure the open development, evolution, and use of the Internet for the benefit of people throughout the world. For more information, see: <http://www.isoc.org>.

¹⁸ McCombs, Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media,” 176-187.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ See: Jeff Bercovici, “Sumner Redstone’s Birthday Wishes: Immortality, Omnipotence,” *Daily Fi-*

then that as increasing amounts of people are investing in Internet access, more control is being exerted by these owners with the intention to not only increase their financial assets, but influence public opinion, control content, and perpetuate their agenda(s).

Using Saudi Arabia as an example, even though Internet users to a large extent are their own gatekeepers, the Saudi Arabian government is explicit about the content they block. The Saudi Arabian Communication and Information Technology Commission (CITC) – the body responsible for regulating information and communication technologies in the Kingdom – state clearly on their website that, “[blocking content] saves many of them from all the harmful and offensive content [on] the Internet.”²¹ Rinnawi continues to articulate the gravity of political and cultural censorship by listing it as the first of the 6 main obstacles he presents facing/hindering Arab Internet,²² and also describing the variations of the types of Internet controls and restrictions each country employs that allows or restricts Internet freedom.²³ Other studies have documented the connection between ownership, regulation, and available content,²⁴ while additional literature exists highlighting the relationship between government regulation, heavy start-up costs, and limited ability for investment.²⁵ Leonard Sussman echoes this by underscoring how important Internet in Saudi Arabia is to businesses, yet key Saudi Arabian figures believe that Internet was delayed until technology “was available to bar access to information contrary to Islamic values and dangerous to our society.”²⁶ Moreover, he identifies the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) as what the Human Rights Watch called “the most wired country in the Middle East,” yet “the regional leader” in restricting access to websites.²⁷ Rinnawi reinforces this by stating: “(...) the Arab gov-

nance, May 27, 2010, <http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/media/summer-redstones-birthday-wishes-immortality-omnipotence/19494219/> (accessed September 7, 2011).

²¹ “Filtering Service in Saudi Arabia,” Communications and Information Technology Commission (CITC), last updated August 16, 2011, <http://web1.internet.gov.sa/en/general-information-on-filtering-service/> (accessed September 7, 2011).

²² He also includes expensive costs, poverty, illiteracy (digital illiteracy in particular), infrastructure, and language barriers. Furthermore, limited access, infrastructure limitations, few (if any) regulations or oversight (as well as watchdog groups such as those that exist in the U.S. and Europe) in existence governing company consolidation and mergers including the effect they have on the consumer, and much consumption, but little production (such as blogging) are also issues plaguing Arab Internet. See: Rinnawi, “Arab Internet: Schizophrenic Trilogy,” 9-10.

²³ *Ibid.*, 19-24.

²⁴ Rinnawi, “Arab Internet: Schizophrenic Trilogy;” Mamoun Fandy, (Un)Civil War of Words: Media and Politics in the Arab World. West Port (Greenwood: Publishing Group, 2007); Albrecht Hofheinz, “The Internet in the Arab World: Playground for Political Liberalization,” *International Politics and Society* 3, (2005): 78–96; Aladwani, “Key Internet characteristics;” Robert W. McChesney, & Dan Schiller, “The Political Economy of International Communications Foundations for the Emerging Global Debate about Media Ownership and Regulation,” *United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Technology, Business and Society Programme Paper* 11 (2003); Khalid M. Al-Tawil, “The Internet in Saudi Arabia,” *Telecommunications Policy*, 25 (2001): 625-632; Martin Cave, Robin Mason, “The Economics of the Internet: Infrastructure and Regulation,” *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 17 no. 2 (2001):188-201; Benjamin Compaine, “Myths of Encroaching Global Media Ownership,” *Open Democracy*, November 8, 2001, https://www.opendemocracy.net/media-globalmediaownership/article_87.jsp (accessed September 7, 2011).

²⁵ See: Rinnawi, “Arab Internet: Schizophrenic Trilogy;” Aladwani, “Key Internet characteristics;” Chukwuma U.Ngini, Steven M. Furnell, Bogdan V. Ghita, “Assessing the Global Accessibility of the Internet,” *Internet Research* 12 no. 4 (2002): 329-338.

²⁶ Sussman, “Censor Dot Gov,” 540.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

ernments attempt to do their best to be updated in the field of the telecommunications and the Internet. However, they did and still [are] doing their [best] efforts to restrain the development of the Internet in their countries.”²⁸

Methodology

To answer the research question stated previously, we decided to conduct a critical empirical analysis (document analysis) utilizing unobtrusive methods with the aspiration of finding links, relationships, and connections to other Arab individuals, Arab governments/countries, or international companies, organizations, or governments. We decided to focus on 6 countries because of the availability of the information we were accessing as well as the various geographic locations within the region, demographic consistencies, and the political and economic situations and influences: Egypt, Jordan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon.²⁹ We then searched for a listing of these countries’ Internet service providers (usually found on their Ministry of Telecommunications or some other related Ministry’s website).³⁰

We mapped out the ownership of each individual ISP by going to their website for that respective country, and scrutinized the websites with ambitions to discover who and/or what has shares in the company (usually found in the “About Us,” “History,” or the “FAQ” sections of the website. They may also have a corporate website dedicated to this information). We recorded the website URLs that we used (for instance, we took the URL down from the “About Us” section, as well as from a company who is invested in it, and/or a government website if a government is investing in it).

We also included the analysis of the “6 W’s” of each country’s ISPs (the who, what, when, where, why, and how). Although we mainly focused on the “who” and “where,” this focus included examining who owned the companies and what their nationality is, what other business or work they are involved in, where the company’s (and its parent’s or children’s companies) headquarters are located, when these companies were established (as well as other important dates and information related to ownership such as mergers and acquisitions), why are they investing in them, and how their ownership is connected to other individuals, governments, and/or larger companies. Part of the purpose of this was to look critically for connections between Arab countries/the Arab World, as well as with international governments and corporations.

We examined documents and annual reports from these websites and their owner’s websites when available to check for shareholders, acquisition(s), financial problems, mergers, executives, board-of-directors, and any additional relevant information. We were careful to also take note of the names and nationalities (if possible) from the corporate leaders (chairperson, CEOs, presidents, etc.) – and especially the board-of-directors for each company – or government officials in case of government investment/ownership. If the ISP was owned by another company then we would follow the “6

²⁸ Rinnawi, “Arab Internet: Schizophrenic Trilogy,” 1.

²⁹ Bahrain and Kuwait were not included, but are still discussed later in this work because of their connection with other Arab countries.

³⁰ The individual websites will be given with the results by country analysis.

W” process with the other company as well so that if we could link these names and these corporations/governments to any of the other ISP owners that we had previously found, we would consider the following questions:

- (1) Is there a connection?
- (2) Who is investing? (i.e., what individuals, companies, and governments, and what are their nationalities?)
- (3) What might their interests be? and
- (4) What are their professional backgrounds?

Lastly, if the website did not have ownership information, then we e-mailed them (going directly to the source) requesting access to any available information.

Results – overview of general trends

After experiencing considerable difficulties ascertaining information from the different websites in addition to *no* answers from 25 e-mails we sent to various ISPs and ISP owners (e.g., the Saudi Telecom Company) throughout the Arab World,³¹ we decided that the most prudent and efficient report of results could be refined to the most predominant ownership trends found among select major ISPs from the 6 different countries. Before discussing in-depth each of the 6 countries, some of the general trends we discovered in our analysis included: the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are highly invested in the MENA region’s telecommunications; interconnection exists between Egyptian, Jordanian, Emirati, Saudi Arabian, and Lebanese companies; there is limited investment from outside of the region.³² This is reinforced by the research of Aristomene Varoudakis and Carlo Maria Rossotto who concluded: “(...)foreign ownership is most severely constrained.”³³ Generally, there are 2-4 big, dominating companies followed by many smaller companies, but many of the present ISPs came about by the merger/acquisition of smaller companies forming a bigger company that is then bought by an even larger company.

We also observed that women hold very few management positions as the ISP organizational hierarchies are male dominated.³⁴ Lastly, we can divide each country into groups depending on their telecommunications investment trends. For instance, companies in Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. are investing into country’s telecommunications, while Lebanon and Jordan are being invested into. Egypt is both investing into other countries, and being invested into, while Syria is neither investing into other countries or being invested into (and why this particular phenomenon is occurring is discussed below).

³¹ In fact, many of these e-mails “bounced back” (having never even been received) even though the contact e-mail address listed on the website was often the e-mail correspondence link specifically for customer service and/or a company inquiry. An interesting occurrence that happened, however, was when we e-mailed one company whose e-mail “bounced back” to us with a question about rates of service, they promptly sent us the information we requested.

³² Of that outside investment, the majority of it comes from France via France Telecom through Orange, its commercial arm.

³³ Aristomene Varoudakis, Carlo Maria Rossotto, “Regulatory Reform and Performance in Telecommunications: Unrealized Potential in the MENA Countries,” *Telecommunications Policy* 28 no. 1 (2004): 59.

³⁴ The only company that had women on its management team was Batelco in Bahrain.

Results – Egypt

Egypt has one of the largest populations in the Arab World in addition to one of the oldest Internet networks in the region (introduced in 1993). In 2009, the Egyptian population was close to 80 million,³⁵ and of those 80 million, 16.65 million of them were using the Internet in 2009.³⁶ Although there was not an official Ministry's website page with the exact number of Internet service providers available, Egyptsites.com – a division of Emox, a Lebanese business and internal development company³⁷ – lists 24 Egyptian ISPs with websites. Of those 24 websites, we focused on interesting trends regarding three Egyptian ISPs.

The first included ownership trends of a major Internet service provider, Internet Egypt. Internet Egypt consolidated with another company called the Egyptian Company for Networks (EgyNet).³⁸ In October of 2008, Entisalat – a large telecommunications corporation based in the U.A.E. – acquired 100% of EgyNet (and thus, Internet Egypt).³⁹ This is interesting because it shows investment from the U.A.E. into Egypt.

The second company was LINKdotNET, one of the largest ISP in Egypt as well as the region with offices in Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Qatar, and Algeria.⁴⁰ A product of the merger of the first established ISP in Egypt (InTouch Communications) and Link Egypt in 2000,⁴¹ it continued its expansion in 2002 by acquiring eight other ISPs.⁴² Currently, Mobinil (the Egyptian Company for Mobile Services) is negotiating the acquisition of LINKdotNET from Orascom Telecom Holding S.A.E. (Orascom Telecom).⁴³ Orascom Telecom is an Egyptian-based telecom company with holdings throughout the region including Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and the Alfa mobile network of Lebanon, in addition to holdings outside of the region in Canada, Sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and North Korea.⁴⁴ This is significant because Mobinil is owned by Mobinil Telecom (51%) and Orascom Telecom (20%), with the remaining 29% [of shares] publicly floated. Mobinil Telecom is itself owned by France Telecom (71.2%) and Orascom (28.8%), but following an April 2009 ruling by the Interna-

³⁵ Although it is cited on the Internet World Stats website, their information is sourced from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Compare data from <http://www.internetworldstats.com/af/eg.html> and <http://www.itu.int/en/pages/default.aspx> (accessed September 7, 2011).

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Compare data from <http://www.emox.com/corporate/contact/> and <http://www.egyptsites.com/main/about.asp> (accessed September 7, 2011).

³⁸ http://www.internetegypt.com/Why_IE.html (accessed September 7, 2011).

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ <http://www.link.net/English/Linkcorp/About/Our History/> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ This is particularly interesting as well because according to the Orascom Telecom website (About Us: <http://www.orascomtelecom.com/about/Contents/default.aspx?ID=765>), Mobinil was Orascom Telecom's "first operation," and is "one of Egypt's five largest companies on Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchange ("CASE") in terms of market capitalization.." See: Reuters, "Mobinil is to Complete Deal to Buy LINKdotNET and Link Egypt by Mid-2009," Arab Finance, March 23, 2009, <https://www.arabfinance.com/news/newsdetails.aspx?Id=134439> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁴⁴ <http://www.orascomtelecom.com/about/Contents/default.aspx?ID=765> (accessed September 7, 2011).

tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Orascom was instructed to sell its stake in the holding company to [France Telecom].⁴⁵

According to the same website, the agreement also includes incorporating LINK-dotNET Egypt (which is still currently owned completely by Orascom Telecom) into Mobinil. Although difficult to digest, this is significant because the largest Internet provider in Egypt has a connection to a French telecommunications company. Moreover, to make ownership analysis even more convoluted, presently Mobinil Telecom is owned partially by Orascom Telecom (28.75%) and the French Telecom Group through Orange that owns the remaining shares (71.25%).⁴⁶

To further complicate the ownership situation, it was recently announced that the Russian telecom company VimpelCom⁴⁷ is merging assets with the Egyptian company Weather Investments.⁴⁸ This will entail VimpelCom acquiring the Italian mobile operator Wind, and 51.7% of Egypt's Orascom Telecom (in particular Orascom Telecom's Egyptian and North Korean operations). The Algerian government is discussing whether it will buy Orascom Telecom's Algerian operations.⁴⁹ The significance of this is apparent in increased presence of Russia in regional telecommunications, but overall it reflects a testament to the volatile and liquid nature of telecommunications ownership in the MENA region.

The third relationship that was found exists between TE-Data, Egyptian Telecom, and Vodafone. In 2001 TE-Data S.A.E. was established by (and is a subsidiary of) Egyptian Telecom "to act as its data communications and Internet arm."⁵⁰ Egyptian Telecom is a major Egyptian and regional telecommunications company⁵¹ that the Egyptian government originally owned, but began publicly trading in 2005 (although it is unclear how much the Egyptian government still owns).⁵² According to the TE-Data website, they are "Egypt's largest IP based data communications carrier"⁵³ that holds 61% of the market share.⁵⁴ TE-Data not only operates in Egypt, however, but in Jordan as well.⁵⁵ What is most interesting is that currently, Egyptian Telecom owns 44.95% of Vodafone Egypt,⁵⁶ the Egyptian branch of the multi-national, intercontinental telecom company Vodafone based in the United Kingdom.⁵⁷ Moreover, Telecom Egypt and

⁴⁵ http://www.telegeography.com/cu/article.php?article_id=32800 (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁴⁶ <http://www.MobiNil.com/aboutMobiNil/shareholder.aspx> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁴⁷ VimpelCom "owns Russia's second-largest mobile phone operator, as well as service providers in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam, and Cambodia." See: "Russia and Egypt Telecom Firms in \$6.6bn Deal," *BBC News: Business*, October 5, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11477861> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* For more information, see the official 2010 VimpelCom-Weather Press Release, <http://www.otelecom.com/media/PressRelease.aspx> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁴⁹ "Russia and Egypt Telecom Firms in \$6.6bn Deal."

⁵⁰ <http://www.tedata.net/web/eg/en/default.aspx?sec=25&pr=2> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁵¹ Including operations throughout Egypt and Algeria, see: <http://ir.telecomegypt.com.eg/Company%20Milestones.asp> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁵² <http://ir.telecomegypt.com.eg/Company%20Milestones.asp> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁵³ <http://www.tedata.net/web/eg/en/default.aspx?sec=25&pr=2> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁵⁴ <http://tinyurl.com/TEDataPressRelease> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁵⁵ See: **Results – Jordan** below.

⁵⁶ <http://ir.telecomegypt.com.eg/Company%20Milestones.asp> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁵⁷ http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/about/about_us.html (accessed September 7, 2011).

Vodafone are continuing to expand their partnership as well. This highlights increased cross-national alliances between a European-based global telecommunications corporation and a regional telecommunications powerhouse.

The last interesting ISP relationship exists between Yalla Egypt and the Mohammed Abdulmohsin Al-Kharafi & Sons Company (MAK Group) of Kuwait.⁵⁸ This is significant because it highlights a regional investment relationship, although it is small.

Results – Jordan

User statistics in Jordan continue to rise, and as of 2009, 1.6 million users exist.⁵⁹ Additionally, there are 11 ISPs⁶⁰ Out of these 11, we found interesting trends regarding four ISPs (not including the ISP “Cyberia” which is also in Jordan).

The first was Batelco (Bahrain Telecom) Jordan, a company that is 20% owned by Jordanians, and 80% owned by Batelco Bahrain (the “only major Bahraini telecom company”).⁶¹ This is a company that runs “significant operations” in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt,⁶² as well as in India.⁶³

The second included TE-Data-Jordan. TE-Data-Jordan is owned solely by TE-Data-Egypt S.A.E. whose major shareholder is Telecom Egypt, owning 92.50% of the total number of shares.⁶⁴ Until 2010, three national Egyptian banks (National Bank Of Egypt, Misr Bank, and Cairo Bank) held the other 2.5% of the shares of TE-Data respectively.⁶⁵ This “provide[ed] TE-Data-Egypt with a confident financial stability.”⁶⁶ Since January of 2010, however, Telecom Egypt “acquired the remaining 4.95% of TE-Data’s [shares], to have full ownership of its broadband subsidiary.”^{67, 68} The financial backing of a powerful and growing Egyptian regional telecommunications company (Egyptian Telecom) coupled with complete control over TE-Data-Jordan’s operations translates to a significant amount of financial resources and capital being invested into Jordan from Egypt, but also increased Egyptian hegemony and control over Jordanian Internet.

⁵⁸ <http://www.yalla.com/> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁵⁹ Although it is cited on the Internet World Stats website, their information is sourced from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Compare data from <http://www.internetworldstats.com/af/eg.html> and <http://www.itu.int/en/pages/default.aspx> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁶⁰ No information could be found on the Jordanian Ministry of Telecommunications website as to the official number of ISPs, <http://muoffaq.qabbani.net/?p=935> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁶¹ It is interesting to note, however, that in their Chief Executive Statement on the Batelco Bahrain website, they discuss competition: “In Bahrain, there are now over 75 operators holding 185 licenses. The intense competitive environment, combined with ongoing regulatory reform, is a great motivator to keep us innovating and improving for the benefit of our customers,” see: <http://www.batelcogroup.com/portal/en/49/chief-executive-statement.aspx> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁶² http://www.beta.batelco.jo/pages.php?menu_id=8 (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁶³ <http://www.batelcogroup.com/portal/en/49/chief-executive-statement.aspx> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁶⁴ http://www.tedata.net/new/tedata_jordan/en/outer.aspx?secId=72 (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ See: <http://ir.telecomegypt.com.eg/Company%20Milestones.asp> and <http://tinyurl.com/TEData-PressRelease> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁶⁸ This has not been updated on TE-Data-Jordan’s website, however.

The third trend consists of a smaller company called VTEL, but it is owned completely by VTEL Holdings, a privately owned U.A.E. company.⁶⁹ The fourth consists of Orange, the commercial brand of France Telecom alluded to previously. Apart from demonstrating a French influence in Jordan, it also highlights the trend of consolidation as the Jordan Telecom Company combined its four companies in 2006 under the aegis of being the sole integrated operator in Jordan before adopting the Orange name in 2007.⁷⁰

Results – Syria

The Syrian Arab Republic poses a completely different situation when compared to much of the rest of the Arab World. As of 2009, Syria had 3.565 million Internet users⁷¹ but as of May 28, 2010 the “official” website (the Ministry of Communication and Technology) stated there are only 2 “suppliers” (ISPs) of Internet in Syria.⁷² These 2 ISPs include Syrian Telecom that is owned solely by the government,⁷³ and SCS-Net (Syrian Computer Society Network) that is owned by the Syrian Computer Society.⁷⁴ Furthermore, as the OpenNet Initiative reports: “The telecommunications market in Syria is the most regulated in the Middle East and is among the least developed. State-owned Syrian Telecom (STE) owns all telecommunications infrastructure and has made some substantial investment to bring services to rural areas, but limited competition exists with private ISPs competing with STE in the Internet provision market.”⁷⁵

Together the Syrian Telecom and the SCS-Net provide a significant relationship because the Syrian Computer Society was founded by Bassel al-Assad,⁷⁶ and is undoubtedly still connected to his brother, the current Ba’athist President Bashar al-Assad (although it is not listed on the website). This essentially forms a power monopoly on the major Internet networks and the Internet infrastructure of Syria, controlled by the government, which is rooted in political and military hegemony. This leads to the Syrian government restricting, regulating, and controlling not only access and content, but also dissemination.⁷⁷

⁶⁹ <http://www.vtel.jo/?q=node/13> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁷⁰ <http://www.orange.jo/en/about-orange-jordan.php> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁷¹ Although it is cited on the Internet World Stats website, their information is sourced from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Compare data from <http://www.internetworldstats.com/me/sy.html> and <http://www.itu.int/en/pages/default.aspx> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁷² Information originally posted on the Ministry of Communication and Technology website, <http://www.moct.gov.sy>, but has since been removed or relocated.

⁷³ See: “Internet Filtering in Syria,” *OpenNet Initiative Report*, August 7, 2009, <https://opennet.net/research/profiles/syria> (accessed September 7, 2011), and in fact the Syrian Telecom website clearly states that Syrian Telecom: “(...) has the rights exclusively for telecommunications in all parts of the Syrian Arab Republic (...)” Compare data from <http://www.ste.gov.sy> and <http://ste.gov.sy/index.php?m=58> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁷⁴ <http://www.scs-net.org/portal/AboutSCSNET/tabid/53/Default.aspx> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁷⁵ “Internet Filtering in Syria.”

⁷⁶ <http://www.scs.org.sy/structureview.php?subtemplateid=4> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁷⁷ This is further reinforced by the banning of certain websites such as Facebook, YouTube, and online services such as Skype as well as many others claiming they are tools that can be used to communicate with Israel (this includes closely monitoring blog sites as well). Even though many of these bans and restrictions can easily be circumvented by proxies and other services, strong regulation of the Internet and what is

Results – The United Arab Emirates

As of 2009, the U.A.E. had 3.56 million Internet users⁷⁸ and only 4 Internet service providers (Oger Telecom, Etisalat, Du, and Precedence, although we only focus on the first three). One interesting point to note is that all of the ownership of the U.A.E.'s ISPs is limited to Emirati nationals (with the exception of Oger Telecom that allows for some non-Emirati nationals).

The Saudi Arabian-based Saudi Oger Group (which will be discussed in greater depth in the “Lebanon” section) controls Oger Telecom (based in the U.A.E.). Oger Telecom is a regional leader in telecommunications services, in particular in the Arabian Peninsula having (significant) operations in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, South Africa, and Turkey.⁷⁹

Etisalat is also invested in Saudi Arabia and Egypt (as discussed in the “Egypt” results).⁸⁰ According to Rinnawi, Etisalat was the first to connect the U.A.E. to the Internet, and he contends that they have “a monopoly over [the] telecommunications services in the U.A.E.”⁸¹ Our findings do not substantiate this claim, however, as Oger Telecom and Du (as well as Precedence) has a strong presence in the countries ISP market as well. This leads us to conclude that Rinnawi's data may simply be out-of-date.

Lastly, Du is a large, local, U.A.E.-based ISP with “over 50% of its senior management team and customer-facing staff [(as well as the board-of-directors) consisting of] U.A.E. nationals.”⁸² Additional information regarding ownership was not listed on their website, and could not be accessed.

Results – Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is also not-surprisingly an interesting anomaly as well. With over 7.76 million people using the Internet in 2009⁸³ and at least 50 licensed ISPs,⁸⁴ it would seem intuitive that competition is rampant and options are very diverse. But the providers with the most customers are all connected to the Saudi Telecom Company (S.T.C.) in

posted online (as well as in print, broadcast, and other media) is the norm in the Syrian dictatorship state. For more information, see: Associated Press, “Syria Tightens Controls on Internet Use,” *Asharq Al-Awsat*, March 26, 2008, <http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=5&id=12217> (accessed September 7, 2011); Abdullah Ali, “Something is Rotten at Syria's Ministry of Communications,” *Manassat*, November 27, 2007, ” <http://w.menassat.com/?q=ar/news-articles/2283-something-rotten-syrias-ministry-communications> (accessed September 7, 2011); and also see: “Internet Filtering in Syria.”

⁷⁸ Information retrieved from: <http://www.internetworldstats.com/me/ae.htm>, but although it is cited on the Internet World Stats website, their information is sourced from the Telecommunications Research Associates (TRA), <http://www.tra.com/> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁷⁹ <http://www.ogertelecom.com/about.html> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁸⁰ <http://www.etisalat.ae> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁸¹ Rinnawi, “Arab Internet: Schizophrenic Trilogy,” 3.

⁸² <http://www.du.ae/en/about/who-we-are> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁸³ Information retrieved from: <http://www.internetworldstats.com/me/sa.htm>, but although it is cited on the Internet World Stats website, their information is sourced from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (<http://www.itu.int/en/pages/default.aspx>).

⁸⁴ <http://www.internet.gov.sa/learn-the-web/guides/list-of-service-providers> (accessed September 7, 2011).

some way. The Saudi Telecom Company is the leading national provider of telecommunication services in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,⁸⁵ and it creates something similar to a monopoly,⁸⁶ at least exerting incredible amounts of control. The main contenders in the Saudi Arabian Internet service provider market (and the ones we primary focused on) are: Cyberia, AwalNet, SaudiNet, Nesma, Naseej, and Al-Alamiah Internet & Communications Co.

In 2002 Al-Alamiah Internet & Communications Co. and Naseej combined with AwalNet, keeping the AwalNet name.⁸⁷ In 2007, the S.T.C. bought AwalNet so that the S.T.C. now owns 97% of it.⁸⁸ The S.T.C. also owns SaudiNet,⁸⁹ and has a 35% share of Oger Telecom (based in the U.A.E.), which owns Cyberia,⁹⁰ and Cyberia owns Nesma.⁹¹ We will explore the connection between Cyberia, Oger Telecom, and the S.T.C. in the “Lebanon” section next.

Results – Lebanon

As of 2007, there were 16 official ISPs registered with the Lebanese Ministry of Telecommunications,⁹² and 945,000 Internet users in 2009.⁹³ Only 4 of the 16 official ISPs were explicit about their ownership on their websites. These included: FarahNet, Inconet Data Management (IDM), SODETEL, and Cyberia-Lebanon.

FarahNet is a small ISP that was started by two enterprising Lebanese men: Ghassan Assi and Fadi Hamad.⁹⁴ Inconet Data Management (IDM) is substantially larger being one of the biggest ISPs in Lebanon,⁹⁵ and is owned by GlobalCom Data Services,⁹⁶ a large Lebanese communications company based in Beirut. SODETEL is more divided, with 10% of their shares belonging to Telecom Italia, 40% belonging to France Telecom/Orange, and 50% belonging to the Lebanese Ministry of Telecommunication.⁹⁷

Cyberia is one of the largest ISPs in the region extending into Lebanon, Jordan, the U.A.E, and Saudi Arabia.⁹⁸ In 2006, Cyberia announced 25% ownership in the Abdali Communications Company (A.C.C.), the telecommunications division of Abdali In-

⁸⁵ <http://www.stc.com.sa/cws/portal/en/stc/stc-landing/stc-Ind-abtsaudtelc> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁸⁶ Eric M. Yunis, “Top ISPs in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Internet.com,” *ISP– Planet Market Research: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, February 19, 2003, <http://www.isp-planet.com/research/rankings/ksa.html>.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, as well as see: <https://www.zawya.com/printstory.cfm?storyid=ZAWYA20070417110129&l=110100070417> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁸⁸ <http://www.ameinfo.com/117042.html> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁸⁹ www.stc.com.sa (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁹⁰ http://www.cyberia.net.sa/about_us/about_us.asp (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁹¹ <http://www.nesma.net.sa/> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁹² <http://www.mpt.gov.lb/isplist.htm> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁹³ Information retrieved from: <http://www.internetworldstats.com/me/sa.html>, but although it is cited on the Internet World Stats website, their information is sourced from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). See: <http://www.itu.int/en/pages/default.aspx> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁹⁴ <http://www.farahnet.net/FarahNetProfile.pdf> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁹⁵ <http://www.idm.net.lb/about/index.asp> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁹⁶ <http://www.executive-magazine.com/getarticle.php?article=12825> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁹⁷ <http://www.sodetel.net.lb/aboutus.php> (accessed September 7, 2011).

⁹⁸ Dana Baradei, “Defrosting Cyberia,” *Jordan Business*, October 2006, <http://www.zawya.com/print-story.cfm?storyid=ZAWYA20061003092159&l=095314061030#ZAWYA20061003092159> (accessed September 7, 2011).

vestment and Development in Jordan that is investing in urban development in Amman.⁹⁹ Additionally, Saudi Oger – a company that specializes in construction, facilities management, real estate development, infrastructure development, printing, telecommunication, utilities, and IT services¹⁰⁰ is investing in the A.C.C.¹⁰¹ This is significant because Oger Telecom owns Cyberia,¹⁰² Oger Telecom is owned primarily by Saudi Oger (65%)¹⁰³ with the other 35% being controlled by the Saudi Telecom Company.

Significant Lebanese-Saudi investment relationships

One of the most notable relationships to mention echoes what Kraidy called the “Lebanese-Saudi Connection,”¹⁰⁴ but one that runs much deeper than reality television. Keeping in mind the connections between Cyberia, Saudi Telecom Company, Oger Telecom, and Saudi Oger, members of the Saudi Oger Board-of-Trustees include:

- Saad Rafic Hariri (the outgoing Prime Minister of Lebanon, and son of the deceased former Lebanese Prime Minister and billionaire businessman: Rafic al-Hariri) is the General Manager of Saudi Oger Ltd.,¹⁰⁵ is a member of the Board-of-Directors, as well as “the Chairman of Oger Telecom.”¹⁰⁶
- Bahaa R. Hariri¹⁰⁷ (oldest brother of Saad, Fahed, and Ayman).
- Mohammed Hariri is the cousin of Rafic Hariri, and is the alleged chairperson and executive committee member of Oger Telecom,¹⁰⁸ a Senior Vice President of Finance and Administration, and the Secretary General of the Board of Directors of Saudi Oger Ltd.¹⁰⁹
- Mouwafac Hariri¹¹⁰ is a cousin of Rafic Hariri, and is also considered a “key executive” for Saudi Oger.
- Ayman R. Hariri¹¹¹ (younger brother of Saad, Fahed, and Bahaa) is the Deputy General Manager and member of the Board of Directors of Saudi Oger Ltd.
- Fahed R. Hariri¹¹² is also a brother of Saad, Fahed, and Bahaa.

Other “key executives” of Saudi Oger include:

- Mazen Hariri¹¹³ is the Chief Financial Officer and a board member of Saudi Oger Jordan, and director of the Saudi Oger Training Institute.

⁹⁹ <http://www.abdali.jo/about.php> (accessed September 7, 2011).

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.saudioger.com/index.html> (accessed September 7, 2011).

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² http://www.cyberia.net.sa/about_us/about_us.asp (accessed September 7, 2011).

¹⁰³ <http://www.ogertelecom.com/default.html> (accessed September 7, 2011).

¹⁰⁴ Marwan M. Kraidy, *Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public Life* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

¹⁰⁵ http://www.saudioger.com/overview_board.html (accessed September 7, 2011).

¹⁰⁶ http://www.saudioger.com/overview_key.html (accessed September 7, 2011).

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ http://www.ogertelecom.com/Board_of_Directors.html (accessed September 7, 2011).

¹⁰⁹ http://www.saudioger.com/overview_board.html (accessed September 7, 2011).

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ http://www.saudioger.com/overview_key.html (accessed September 7, 2011).

- Basile Yared¹¹⁴ is a board member of the Directors of Saudi Oger Ltd., and Chairman of FRADIM the French affiliate of Saudi Oger Ltd. that represents the non-banking companies of the Hariri group. He is also a board member of BankMed (a major Lebanese bank¹¹⁵) and the MedGulf Insurance Company (a Lebanese company that has branched into the Arabian Gulf, in particular into Saudi Arabia and Bahrain¹¹⁶), as well as Solidere real estate company – the Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut Central District S.A.L., and An-Nahar newspaper in Lebanon.

Limitations

Even though Internet media is growing and changing, we did not find a substantial amount of secondary literature relevant to Internet ownership in the Arab World dated past 2004. Secondly, our sample was primarily convenient, and did not contain a random element. Many of the websites lacked information, in particular regarding ownership. Sometimes websites had broken links or would not load for unknown reasons. Furthermore, none of the e-mails we sent elicited a response by any of the companies. Lastly, some of the websites were in Arabic and did not have a mirror site in English (although Google Translate helped us to overcome this obstacle).

Implications and Conclusion

Internet media is a medium that is going to continue to expand through the world, affecting our lives by facilitating the ways we shop, communicate, connect, network, research, understand, and live ever more. This is not a phenomenon foreign or exclusionary to the Arab World. If money, power, hegemony, and control all have one thing in common, it is Arab Internet. Our findings reinforce the notion that there is a strong economic and political link between Egypt, the U.A.E., Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Other countries such as Kuwait and Bahrain are also investing in regional ISPs.

Finally, no monopolies exist (with the partial exceptions of Batelco in Bahrain, and Syrian Telecom and SCS-Net in Syria),¹¹⁷ but there are emerging oligopolies of Arab Internet media, specifically growing individually out of each of the countries we examined. These companies dominate their opponents, in particularly the smaller ISPs, frequently merge with other companies, and could lead to stifled competition if inter-country oligopolies develop. This is a topic that needs to be explored more thoroughly to reach a deeper conclusion. Moreover, more information needs to be gleaned – especially from the sources we could not gain access to – that could paint a more holistic and encompassing illustration of the economic and political connections that are constantly being made and re-forged in the Arab World as consolidation continues to happen.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ <http://www.bankmed.com.lb/Pages/Profile.aspx> (accessed September 7, 2011).

¹¹⁶ <http://www.medgulf.com/story.aspx> (accessed September 7, 2011).

¹¹⁷ See: Rinnawi, "Arab Internet: Schizophrenic Trilogy," 126-133. Although Qatar is not included in our analysis, Rinnawi additionally states that Qatar Telecom (the Q-Tel Company) has a monopoly over Qatari Internet.

Our results directly challenges the findings of Aristomene Varoudakis and Carlo Rossotto who concluded that: “MENA telecommunications markets remain less open to competition than elsewhere in the developing world [as] competition is hindered, private participation is scarce (...) while regulatory regimes do not support fair competition.”¹¹⁸ Although there is a concentration of ownership in certain Arab countries and high start-up costs¹¹⁹ – as well as concentration of other business-conducive resources such as political capital and connections¹²⁰ – can deter a potential entrepreneur or group to start a company, we argue that competition is not hindered for Arab investors as Egypt and Lebanon clearly demonstrate.

While certain Arab countries such as Bahrain or Jordan may have fewer Internet companies, or countries such as Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. may have dominating companies, it is inaccurate to apply their conclusion broadly to all countries within the MENA region. On the hand, it seems accurate that competition is hindered for companies that lie outside of the region, such as European or North American companies.¹²¹ Even this, however, is changing as seen by France Telecom (and more recently, by the Russian company VimpelCom) who is becoming a dominating force among providers of Arab Internet that may point to Varoudakis and Rossotto’s conclusions as simply being outdated.¹²²

Contextualized to the Arab World, the significance of understanding media ownership can be summarized with one word: potential; the potential for control, for setting/perpetuating specific agendas, for new and expanded revenues, and for infrastructure development. Furthermore, as the recent social and political uprisings in the region have illustrated, the Internet is a proxy-battleground of state hegemonic dominance, and the assertion of control and restriction of freedoms. Guns once signified power, but now it is information that dictates and equals money, power, and ultimately, control. As more influence from investors coming with agendas to fill takes hold in other parts of the region, there might be further serious challenges to Internet freedom, Internet security, and Internet development. This is also a two-way street that might lead to the destination of more control (e.g., such as Saudi Arabian political and *Wahabi* Islamic religious ideologies being transported into Lebanon via Lebanese Internet telecommunications investment), or less control (e.g., such as the opposite: “Western,” “liberal,” or “anti-Islamic” ideologies being transported into Saudi Arabia via Saudi Arabian Internet telecommunications investment). This is not farfetched as certain Arab countries are already dominant in other mediums, such as TV. The Internet is no exception, and regardless, however, one thing is certain: with the amount of political applications and financial investment in the Internet, it is a medium that is not disappearing in the Arab World anytime soon.

¹¹⁸ Varoudakis, Rossotto, “Regulatory Reform and Performance in Telecommunications,” 75-76.

¹¹⁹ See: Rinnawi, “Arab Internet: Schizophrenic Triloggy.”

¹²⁰ The Arabic term *wasta* refers to personal connections (and literally means “by means of”) that encompass all forms of political, economic, or social capital that an individual or group may access. This is a very important concept to achieving success in almost any endeavor or career in the Arab world as it alludes to nepotism and favoritism, and reflects widespread corruption.

¹²¹ This conclusion may have been particularly displeasing to the institution that commissioned and supported their research: The World Bank.

¹²² See: Varoudakis, Rossotto, “Regulatory Reform and Performance in Telecommunications,” 59. Indeed many of the mergers and acquisitions have only occurred recently since 2005. The study that Varoudakis and Rossotto conducted was done almost a decade ago (submitted 1 February 2002, and merely published in 2004).

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THE PARADOX OF EGYPT: ECONOMIC GROWTH VERSUS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Abstract

Since 1990, Egypt has been trying to reform and liberalize its highly centralized economy. The introduction of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ESRAP) played a major role in reviving the economy and stimulating economic growth. The government also launched several reform plans aimed at improving human development indicators. The UNDP estimates that Egypt has progressed and is on track to achieve several of its Millennium Development Goals. In this paper, we will use a cross-country panel data analysis in order to estimate economic growth as well as a human development, and also draw conclusions pertaining to the causal link between the two. We go through a comprehensive literature on cross country growth regressions³ as well as recent human development papers related to economic growth. Our regressions then allow us to single out Egypt and predict its economic growth and human development in the three different reform periods studied. We proceed by comparing the actual values of growth and development to our predicted values. Our findings point to a positive performance in terms of GDP growth, but a major underperformance in terms of human development in all three periods. We do find however, that human development is converging to its predicted value especially after the second reform period, but is still way-off its predicted values. We conclude from this analysis that Egypt's growth can be characterized as lop-sided with not enough atten-

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³ See: Kevin D. Hoover, Stephen J. Perezà, “Truth and Robustness in Cross Country Growth regressions,” *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 66, no. 5 (2004), [http://public.econ.duke.edu/~kdh9/Source%20Materials/Research/Truth%20and%20Robustness%20\(OBES\).pdf](http://public.econ.duke.edu/~kdh9/Source%20Materials/Research/Truth%20and%20Robustness%20(OBES).pdf) (accessed September 26, 2011); Carmen Fernandez, Eduardo Ley, Mark F.J. Steel, “Model uncertainty in Cross Country Growth regressions,” *Journal of Applied economics* 74, no.4 (2001) and Ross Levine, David Renelt, “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross Country Growth regressions,” *American Economic Review* 82, no.4 (1992): 942-63, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/papers/1992_AER_XCGrowth%20Reg.pdf (accessed September 26, 2011).

tion given to sustainable and comprehensive human development. Our policy recommendations are geared towards improving health, literacy, and poverty indicators through stimulating agriculture, job creation, facilitating access to health, as well as creating awareness programs throughout all of Egypt, and not just in specific areas.

Introduction

Over the past two decades, Egypt has been undergoing major reforms in an attempt to rectify its highly centralized economy. Of all the emerging economies in the region, it is Egypt that has been undergoing the most drastic reforms to its economy. Evidence of this would be it chosen as the top reformer in the world in ease of doing business.⁴ During the early 1990s, the establishment of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESRAP)⁵ accompanied by a series of Monetary Fund arrangements,⁶ which helped alleviate massive external debt and boost Egypt's macroeconomic performance, assisted Egypt in moving towards a more market oriented economy. As such, the period from 1991-2008 has come to be known as the "reform era" in Egypt. The most prominent of these reforms were:

- a) Structural changes;⁷
- b) The liberalization of trade;
- c) Capital market liberalization;
- d) Macroeconomic and tax reforms.

A detailed description of these reforms will be presented further on in this paper. It should be noted here that even though the "reform era" started in 1991, serious reforms and implementation did not start until 1996, which was later followed by a second series of significant reforms in 2004. All these reforms helped improve Egypt's main macroeconomic indicators as we will show later on with a few choice variables, but the question that arises here is how these reforms affected the welfare of the people in terms of human development? The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of economic growth on human development in Egypt as well as to see if there is another chain running from human development to economic growth, in order to see if human development has also contributed to the recent economic growth in Egypt following the reforms of the 1990s and 2000s. The purpose of our regressions is mainly to isolate the effects of human development and economic growth for the case of Egypt.

⁴ *Doing Business Report 2008: Comparing Regulation in 178 Economies*, the World Bank – the International Finance Corporation (Washington: The World Bank 2007, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB08-FullReport.pdf> (accessed September 26, 2011).

⁵ "Egypt: Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme," *Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER)*, May 15, 2000, African Development Bank Group, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Evaluation-Reports-_Shared-With-OPEV_/05092259-EN-EGYPT-ECONOMIC-REFORM-AND-SAP.PDF (accessed September 26, 2011).

⁶ The most important of these arrangements was a massive debt relief under the Paris Club arrangements in 1996, where foreign debt went down to \$30 billion. Another massive debt relief was followed in 1999 where external debt sharply decreased to \$28 billion.


⁷ Mostly in the form of decentralizing the economy as well as fighting corruption.

Before dwelling into the regressions we must first look into human development in Egypt starting from the year 1990. Since that period, Egypt has shown vast improvement in its human development indicators. According to the United Nations Development Programme,⁸ Egypt will achieve some of its Millennium Development Goals on a national level, especially in terms of poverty and health. However, many disparities still persist between different regions, and many of these areas still exhibit patterns of severe poverty and low levels of human development. Of particular interest to us is to see if these disparities have led to slower than predicted development in Egypt within the context of our regression model.

One of the tools that we will be utilizing in our empirical study is that of cross country regressions. The literature on this topic is vast and widespread and is mostly based on growth regressions. There is no consensus on one optimal model, but there is a widespread consensus amongst economists pertaining to the choice variables that have proven to yield effects on economic growth. A detailed review of this literature will be provided in this paper and will help us in constructing a model for economic growth and human development as well. Our aim is not to compare these two regression models (human development and economic growth) nor is it to add to the prevailing literature on the strength and significance of such regressions. We are merely interested in reiterating what has been said before pertaining to the existence of a dual- causal link between economic growth and human development, and through these models to extrapolate the effects on Egypt. We will be using a simplified catching up⁹ type framework in order to study the evolution of Egypt with respect to growth and development over the reform periods mentioned above.

Graph A


GDP per capita growth in % (1990-2008)



Data source: World Development Indicators

⁸ "Egypt's Progress Towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals 2010," The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), January 6, 2010, http://www.eg.undp.org/content/egypt/en/home/library/mdg/publication_2.html (accessed September 26, 2011).

⁹ We will be analyzing the residuals for each of the sub periods analyzed and see what pattern is emerging in the case of Egypt. Details of these methods are provided in the empirical results part.

Graph B

Data Source: International Financial Statistics

The representative literature points out to an increase in economic growth in these periods, which is something we expect to find in our regression analysis. However, what is of more interest to us is the effects of these reforms on human development. This framework will allow us to quantify this effect and attempt to see the degree to which the reforms have caused human development to change in Egypt. The consensus is that Egypt can be doing much better in order to promote development and we hope to back this up with our empirical analysis. We will attempt, in this paper, to give policy recommendations that will gear Egypt towards a more prosperous development program, that we feel will allow Egypt to further their economic growth and prosperity but in a more sustainable way.

Evolution of Human Development in Egypt

With the implementation of the ESRAP, Egypt had to take the appropriate measures to insure sustained human development and to reduce the social costs of decentralizing the economy. Egypt put in place the Social Development Fund which stimulates job creation and the improvement of the abilities of people looking for work. Furthermore, the National Development Plan from 2002 to 2007 reflected Egypt's intention to improve the welfare of its citizens and move closer towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as well as to continue to boost the economy.¹⁰

In this section, we will explore the evolution of human development trends in Egypt for the "Reform Era," in light of the Millennium Development Goals.

¹⁰ See: Sameh El-Saharty, Gail Richardson, Susan Chase, "Egypt and the Millennium Development Goals: Challenges and Opportunities," *Health, Nutrition, and Population Discussion Paper* (2005): 1-67, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/13796/317050HNP0EISahartyEgyptMDGsFinal.pdf?sequence=1> (accessed September 26, 2011).

Overall, Egypt has been able to reduce poverty and improve its human development indicators since 1990. However, there is still a lot to be done and a closer look at the situation reveals the existence of major disparities and inconsistencies, especially among different regions.

The first major goal of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is the reduction in poverty. The issue of poverty in Egypt is politicized, where leaders refuse to acknowledge the severity of the problem. Measuring poverty in Egypt has been largely controversial. The share of the population under the national poverty line was reduced from 24.3% in 1990 to 19.6% in 2005.¹¹ However, there are severe disparities between the regions. It is found that most of the poor in Egypt live in the Upper Rural region, where 63.5% were considered to be needy in this region in 2000. These severe differences can also be seen when comparing the top 5 ranking governorates to the bottom 5. According to the *Egypt Human Development Report 2008*,¹² the top 5 governorates' (Port Said, Suez, Cairo, Alexandria and Damietta) share of poor persons in their population ranged from as low as 2.4% in Suez to a maximum of 7.6% in Port Said in 2008. See Table A below.¹³

Table A

Rank	Governorate	Poor persons (as % of population)	Ultra Poor persons (as % of population)	Gini Coefficient	HDI
1	Port Said	7.6	0.9	34.1	0.753
2	Suez	2.4	0.7	28.8	0.751
3	Cairo	8.0	1.2	34.0	0.737
4	Alexandria	4.8	0.5	37.8	0.738
5	Damietta	2.6	0.2	25.3	0.739

Governorate	Poor persons (as % of total population)	Ultra Poor persons (as % of population)	Gini Coefficient	HDI
Fayoum	12.0	1.1	24.9	0.669
Menia	39.4	9.8	23.8	0.682
Assuit	60.6	22.7	24.8	0.681
Suhag	40.7	9.8	23.9	0.685
Beni Suef	45.4	11.8	25.7	0.697

In contrast, the bottom 5 governorates (Fayoum, Menia, Assuit, Suhag and Beni Suef) share of the poor ranged from 12% for Fayoum to a staggering 60.6% in Assuit. The report also showed relatively low Gini coefficients in these governorates

¹¹ If one were to use the upper national poverty line, we would get 49.27% in 1990 to 42.63% in 2000.

¹² Heba Handoussa, "Egypt's Social Contract: The Role of Civil Society," *Egypt Human Development Report 2008*, January 1, 2008, The Institute of National Planning in Egypt, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), http://www.eg.undp.org/content/egypt/en/home/library/human_development/publication_3.html (accessed September 26, 2011).

¹³ Ranking of Governorates uses HDI from *Egypt Human Development Reports*, various issues. Source: Indicators from "Egypt's Social Contract: The Role of Civil Society," *Egypt Human Development Report 2008*.

indicating prevalent and widespread low incomes and poverty (we must note here that a low Gini in the poor areas means high poverty because in a low income governorates, this would imply that most people have the same income which happens to be extremely low).

Furthermore, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that although Egypt may realize its poverty Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on a national level, many of its governorates are not expected to. What is more interesting is that Cairo, which is one of the top governorates, will see its poverty rate increase from 4.6% in 2005 to a staggering 7.6% in 2015. Also, from the 8 governorates that will not achieve their poverty MDG, 6 are located in Upper Egypt.

In terms of education, the situation has somewhat improved but Egypt could be doing better. The government has admitted the importance of improving education in the Jomtien Declaration of 1990¹⁴ and launched a program aimed at constructing schools in order to increase access to basic education, especially in the villages. Amongst other programs which were adopted was the Basic Education Enhancement Program in 1996,¹⁵ which was financed by the World Bank and the European Union in order to address basic education in disadvantaged areas. This program is aimed at encouraging education for girls and improving its quality. A 20-year program was also established in the late 1990s in an attempt to improve the quality and access to secondary education. Another long-term program, the Higher Education Enhancement Program was launched in 2002 and is expected to go on until 2017, and is aimed at improving higher education.¹⁶

In 2006, adult literacy rate was still at 66.39%, but still an improvement from the 55.58% level in 1996. The literacy rate for people aged between 15 and 24 reached 86.8% in 2005, up from 73% in 1990. Net enrollment ratio in primary education hit 94% in 2005, up from 86% in 1990. Even with this progress, the UNDP is not optimistic about Egypt achieving its education Millennium Development Goal.

Disparities are also observed between rural and urban areas. For example, the literacy rate in Cairo and Alexandria hit 91% in 2008, as opposed to Fayoum and Menia where literacy rates were 57.3% and 57% respectively. Literacy rates among girls show also severe differences, where 12 governorates including Port Said, Damietta and Suez are anticipated to reach the 100% target of the MDG, but others like Beni Suef, Fayoum and Menia didn't exceed 50% in 2005.

¹⁴ *World Declaration on Education for All* which was adopted during the World Conference on Education for All (Jomtien, Thailand, March 5-9, 1990), <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0009/000975/097552e.pdf> (accessed September 26, 2011).

¹⁵ *Egypt - Education Enhancement Program Project*, The World Bank, (Washington: The World Bank, 1996), <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1996/10/696174/egypt-education-enhancement-program-project> (accessed September 26, 2011).

¹⁶ *The Higher Education Enhancement Program*, The World Bank, (Washington: The World Bank, 2002), <http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P056236/higher-education-enhancement-project?lang=en> (accessed September 26, 2011).

Low literacy rates and school enrollments in most of the governorates can be explained by several economic and social factors. Low literacy and school enrollment rates are mostly seen in rural disadvantaged areas. In poor areas, there is a high cost for school enrollments, as children can no longer work. Also, traditions, low educational levels of mothers and low levels of awareness inhibit school attendance (especially for girls). In some areas, there is also a restricted access to education and literacy programs have proven to be inefficient.


During the reform period, Egypt also focused on the health sector. The government improved access to sanitation and safe water. Infant mortality rate was drastically reduced from 37.8 per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 19.1 in 2006. Maternal mortality ratio was also decreased from 174 in 1992 to 59 in 2006, for every 100,000 live births.

In 1998, Egypt launched the Health Sector Reform Program, which was reinforced between 2002 and 2007. Life expectancy at birth jumped from 62 years in 1990 to 70 years in 2008. While the government invested in child and maternal health, many problems seem to persist. Some areas seem to have insufficient access to health services. Disadvantaged persons are not covered by any type of insurance and there isn't enough financing for the Health Insurance Organization, which provides social insurance. Many inefficiencies also arise: some hospitals have low levels of occupancy, while others are overcrowded with doctors.


Concerning the labor market, Egypt has witnessed an improvement in the unemployment rate, which dropped from 11.7% in 1998 to 9.3% in 2006. The situation for wage and salary earners has also improved, "with an average increase of median real monthly earnings of 4% per annum."¹⁷ However, this amelioration has only affected employees and the unemployed looking for such a job. The situation for those working on farms or in household businesses and the self-employed, which made up 36% of employment in 2006, has deteriorated. This segment of workers suffered from a decline in real earnings, but also from an increase in its size, since many of the unemployed turn to household enterprises and farms in order to make a living. This increase in this section led to a decline in productivity and earnings. Also, the devaluation of the pound in 2003, led to a major increase in inflation levels, which had a significantly negative impact on the poor, since food prices in this period were affected the most. Inflation reached 11.2% in 2004 and a whopping 18.3% in 2008. The latest numbers were mostly due to the global food crisis which worsened the situation even more, for the disadvantaged.

In an attempt to see Egypt's performance in terms of human development, we estimated a modified human development index, by averaging adult literacy and life expectancy for all countries (the index is composed of 50% literacy rate and 50% life expectancy). The histograms below compare Egypt's modified human development index to that of the rest of the world, and to that of all non-developed countries as well for the three periods of reforms See graphs below.

¹⁷ Ragui Assaa, "Unemployment and Youth Insertion in the Labor Market in Egypt," in *The Egyptian Economy, Current Challenges and Future Prospects*, ed. Hanaa Kheir-El-Din, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008), 133-178.



Data source: Human Development Index



Data source: Human Development Index

Looking at the histograms, we notice that Egypt’s MHDI is improving. However, its performance is always lower than that of the rest of the world and that of non-developed countries. In our study, we will seek to prove further that even though Egypt is doing well in terms of economic growth, it is still behind in terms of human development.

Research methodology

1. Data and Model Construction

Our view focuses on Human Development (HD) as the central objective of human activity, with economic growth an important channel or tool to attain such development. Based on economic literature, we can verify that a dual chain does indeed exist between economic growth and human development.¹⁸ Thus our empirical study focuses on two main regressions. The first regression runs from economic growth to human development and the second running from human development to economic growth. These two regressions will further solidify the findings of the representative literature in that there exist a causal link between human development and economic growth. However, the main goal of these cross country regressions is not to reiterate what has previously been said, but rather to single out the effects of these findings on Egypt. In order to do this, we utilize cross country regressions spanning 90 to 136 countries¹⁹ from the years 1990-2008²⁰. Most of these countries are developing and under-developed countries.²¹ From these countries, we form 2 chains or regressions. Our data is taken from various sources which include: World Development indicators (WDI),²² International Financial Statistics (IFS),²³ Ed-Stats, World Health Organization (WHO)²⁴ and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Due to the fact that the reforms didn't officially start to kick in until 1996, which was then followed by further reforms in 2004, we have divided our data into 3 main groups. The first group spans the years 1990-1995, the second 1996-2003, and the last group 2004-2008.²⁵ We then run a fixed effects panel regression on this data for both models, the details of which can be found below.

2. Regression A: Economic Growth regression

Model Description and variable explanation:

$Y_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 X_{1t} + \alpha_2 X_{2t} + \alpha_3 X_{3t} + \alpha_4 X_{4t} + \text{uit}$ Where;

¹⁸ Ranis Stewart, Alejandro Ramirez, "Economic growth and human development," *World Development Report, Elsevier Science* 28, no. 2 (2000): 197-219.

¹⁹ Note: The fluctuation is mainly due to data availability.

²⁰ Due to data availability restrictions, we have grouped these years into 3 main groups.

²¹ We must point out that around 20 developed countries were included in the regression. However having compared our results with the same regressions but by dropping these 20 countries, we found no significant distortions in the regression. Thus we decided to keep the developed countries in our list mostly in order to solidify our argument and to increase the strength of our regression through added observations.

²² „World development indicators data," *World development indicators*, World Bank, March 13, 2010, <http://web.worldbank.org> (accessed September 26, 2011).

²³ "Time series Data," *International Financial Statistics (IFS)*, IMF, March 6, 2010, <http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/> (accessed September 26, 2011).

²⁴ "World Health Statistics," *World Health Organization*, March 20, 2010, <http://apps.who.int/ghodata/> (accessed September 26, 2011).

²⁵ Within each of these 3 groups we take the average of the period studied. i.e. for 1990-1995 we take the average GDP in that period and so forth.

α_0 : intercept

uit: Standard White noise error

Yit: gdpngrowth: gross domestic product per capita growth. This dependent variable is averaged over 3 periods from 1990 to 1995, from 1996 to 2003 and from 2004 to 2008.

X1t: ln_gdpnlag: the gross domestic product per capita level in log form for three years 1990, 1996 and 2004. This variable is lagged to take into account the convergence theory of growth. The neoclassical growth model encourages us to expect evidence of conditional convergence- that is, evidence that the further behind a country was, the faster it would grow.²⁶

X2t: mhdilag: is the modified HDI that we estimated using the average of life expectancy and adult literacy rate. It is taken for 3 years - 1990, 1996 and 2004. The MHDI is lagged in order to avoid simultaneity bias. From previous literature, we know that when initial level of adult literacy and life expectancy increase, GDP per capita usually tends to grow more. Human development is seen as affecting economic growth positively.²⁷

X3t: investmentgdp: is the averaged investment share of GDP over the 3 periods 1990 to 1995, 1996 to 2003 and 2004 to 2008. According the neo-classical growth model (Solow-Swan), investment is seen to have a positive effect on GDP growth. In fact, it is thought by many economists that this is the most integral channel by which growth is stimulated.

X4t: population: is the averaged population growth taken over 3 periods 1990 to 1995, 1996 to 2003 and 2004 to 2008. This variable is taken into account because population growth is seen to have an effect on per capita GDP, as GDP per capita is equal to GDP over the population level. Thus, this proves to be an important control variable, although literature gives inconclusive results pertaining to its effect on growth.²⁸

a) Running the GDP per capita growth regression

After running our panel regression²⁹ for economic growth, we get the following equation:

$$Y_{it} = -1.425936 - 0.557364 X_{1t} + 0.0704195 X_{2t} + 0.0770541 X_{3t} + 0.7418249 X_{4t}$$

(-1.23)³⁰ (-2.97) (3.27) (3.40) (4.37)

²⁶ N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, David N. Weil, "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May 1992, http://eml.berkeley.edu/~dromer/papers/MRW_QJE1992.pdf (accessed September 26, 2011).

²⁷ See: Stewart, Ramirez, „Economic growth and human development.”

²⁸ Robert J. Barro, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, *Economic Growth* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1995). See also Robert J. Barro, "Economic growth in a cross section of countries," *The quarterly journal of economics* 106, no. 2 (May, 1991): 407-443. Compare: Xavier Sala-i-Martin, "I just ran Two million Regressions," *The American Economic Review* 87, No. 2 (1997) 178-183, <http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/201.pdf> (accessed September 26, 2011).

²⁹ Some variables that were initially put in the regression like female secondary enrollment and the Gini coefficients were dropped, because they proved to be insignificant and were distorting the entire regression. Furthermore, there is not enough data for the Gini coefficients.

³⁰ The values in parentheses are the t-stats.

Regression Output A

Fixed-effects (within) regression	Number of obs	=	361
Group variable (i): year	Number of groups	=	3
R-sq: within = 0.0914	Obs per group: min =		113
between = 0.5946	avg =		120.3
overall = 0.1001	max =		125
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.0976	F(4, 354)	=	8.90
	Prob > F	=	0.0000

gdpngrowth	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
mhdi	.0704195	.0215515	3.27	0.001	.0280344 .1128046
investment~p	.0770541	.0226432	3.40	0.001	.032522 .1215862
ln_gdpn	-.557364	.187502	-2.97	0.003	-.9261218 -.1886061
population	.7418249	.1697266	4.37	0.000	.4080257 1.075624
_cons	-1.425936	1.157939	-1.23	0.219	-3.703241 .8513691
sigma_u	1.615306				
sigma_e	3.2369167				

The F-test in this regression is 8.9, which indicates that the regression is significant at the 1% level. Also the explanatory power of our test passes with an overall R2 of 0.1001 (10.01% explanatory power) and a R2 within³¹ of 0.0914 also. Although the R2 is not quite high, we are not interested here to add to the literature on cross-country regression and determine a perfect growth model. We are interested in providing a simplified growth model, based on the literature at hand and to isolate the effects on Egypt (i.e. one country). The effect of the individual left hand side variables are as follows:

- **GDP/N lagged (X1t)**: The t-stat here is equal to -2.97 indicating that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of the **ln_gdpn** is negative, which is in line with the theory that the higher the initial level of GDP, the less the economy is likely to grow. If the initial level of GDP per capita goes up by 1%, GDP growth will decrease by 0.55%.
- **MHDI lagged (X2t)**: The t-stat, 3.27, also indicates the significance of the coefficient at the 1% level. The MHDI is positive, indicating that when MHDI goes up by one unit, the GDP growth will increase by approximately 0.07%. Increasing levels of life expectancy and adult literacy will allow us to get a higher GDP growth.
- **Investment share of GDP (X3t)**: Again, the coefficient is significant at the 1% level with a t-stat of 3.40. The investment share of GDP is also positive, indicating if it goes up by 1%, then GDP growth will go up by 0.077%. Investments acts here as a channel for economic growth.
- **Population growth (X4t)**: The t-stat here is 4.37, indicating significance at the 1% level. The coefficient is also positive, with every 1% increase in population, pushing GDP growth up by 0.748%. According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin,³² positive cor-

³¹ Note: We are interested mostly in the R-squared within as we are testing for a cross country relationship.

³² See: Barro, Sala-i-Martin, *Economic Growth*.

relation between population growth and GDP growth can signal lower mortality rates (which are positively related to GDP growth). This would also depend on the age structure of the population.³³

b) Analysis of Egypt's economic growth

The regression above allows us to determine some of the channels through which economic growth is stimulated, which only backs up the previous literature relating those determinants to GDP growth, especially that of human development and GDP growth. Seeing that our cross country regression is made up of over 100 countries, then using a dummy variable to single out the effect of Egypt proves redundant and as such we turn to a simple catching up analysis. However, since the focus of this paper is on Egypt, we will proceed by using a simplified catching up framework for our analysis. We simply extrapolate the three predicted GDP per capita growth values for Egypt from our model over the 3 periods. The first predicted value is for Egypt from the years 1990-1995, the second is from 1996-2003, and the last one from 2004-2008. We then compare these predicted values from our model with the actual values in these periods and basically the difference of the actual values minus the predicted values (the residuals) will allow us to analyze Egypt's performance with respect to our proposed model (i.e. are they catching up to their predicted performance or drifting away). The table below summarizes these findings:

Period	Actual GDP/N growth	Predicted GDP/N growth	Actual-predicted
1990-1995	1.666392	0.5363976	1.129994
1996-2003 (Reform 1)	2.430757	1.027969	1.402788
2004-2008 (Re- form 2)	3.978908	1.915995	2.41326

Egypt's performance in terms of economic growth is always better than that predicted by our model. We can also notice that the difference between the actual and the predicted GDP per capita growth increases with time, especially in the last period (2004 to 2008), which saw the most substantial reforms. This is due to the fact that throughout this entire period, Egypt underwent significant reforms, especially in the periods following 1996 and 2003. In our model, the main channels through which GDP per capita growth is stimulated are MHI and investment share of GDP. Those two indicators did improve over time and would have pushed Egypt's economic growth to increase (as seen from the predicted values). However, we can see that Egypt did well beyond that, mostly due to exogenous

³³ Ibid.

positive shocks caused by the reforms that cannot be fully quantified by our model. This allows us to draw the conclusion that the ESRAP was very effective in terms of economic growth. In fact, Egypt is seen as one of the best emerging markets in the region and was voted a top reformer by *Doing Business Report 2008*³⁴ and *Doing Business Report 2009*.³⁵ But the question remains, how did this transition in terms of human development?

3. Regression B: Human development regression

Model Description and variable explanation:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1t} + \beta_2 X_{2t} + \beta_3 X_{3t} + \beta_4 X_{4t} + \beta_5 X_{5t} + u_{it} \quad \text{Where;}$$

β_0 : Intercept

u_{it} : Standard White noise error

Y_{it} : MHDl: Our left hand side dependent variable used in this regression is a slightly modified version of the HDI index. We basically take out the GDP factor and leave the other 2 variables and form an equally weighted index ($=0.5 \times \text{Literacy rate} + 0.5 \times \text{Life expectancy}$). So basically MHDl is our proxy for human development and is the basis of our first regression

X_{1t} : GDPgrowth lagged: The first of our right hand side explanatory variables is GDP/n growth rate lagged by 5 periods (i.e for first group 1990-1995, we use GDP growth for the years 1985-1989 and so forth). Growth contributes to Human development mainly through household consumption and government spending. In general it is believed that the higher the GDP growth of a country, the more of these resources available to contribute to households and thus human development.

X_{2t} : GDP/N: Another explanatory variable used for this regression is GDP per capita at level (i.e for the 1990-1995 period we used GDP/n at year 1990). It is generally believed that there is a convergence from initial level with respect to GDP growth. However, this convergence can also extend to other indicators and as such we use it with MHDl in order to see if there is a link with respect to where a country started out with and its evolution of human development.

X_{3t} : Female Schooling: Here we use female enrollment at the secondary level as our variable. This variable is lagged by 5 years, since we want to theoretically see the effects of a well-schooled female society on human development, and it is generally thought that on average females need at least 5 years from secondary school to start

³⁴ See: *Doing Business Report 2008: Comparing Regulation in 178 Economies*.

³⁵ *Doing Business Report 2008: Comparing Regulation in 178 Economies*, The World Bank – The International Finance Corporation (Washington: The World Bank 2008), <http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB09-FullReport.pdf> (accessed September 26, 2011).

³⁶ Our regression does not contain any variable containing social inequality mainly due to data unavailability for most of our countries (Gini coefficients). Also we did not see the need for any conflict dummy seeing that the data we needed was mostly only available for conflict free countries, and as such our regression represents those countries.

contributing to society and households. Furthermore the rationale for focusing on female school enrollment is the prevailing literature that indicates that when women control cash income, expenditure is more geared towards Human development inputs (i.e food and education). For example, in Gambia the larger the control of expenditure among women, the larger the calorie consumption among households.³⁷ Similar studies have yielded similar results in the Philippines³⁸ and Cote D'ivoire.³⁹

X4t: Population Growth: This variable is added as a control for our regression, mainly seeing that population growth can have adverse effects on human development. The literature points to, and especially in the case of developing countries, that excessive population growth can prove to be an adherence to proper human development. The literature points to, and especially in the case of developing countries, that excessive population growth can prove to be an adherence to proper human development. This is mainly through limiting social expenditures from reaching out to a representative portion of the public.

X5t: Gov. Education Spending/GDP: It is not only through GDP that human development may grow, but a more important channel exists here and that is the proportion of GDP devoted to social expenditures that contributed to development and those are mainly expenditures on Health and education. We use only expenditures on education mainly due to data unavailability for most of the countries used in our regression. As such we do not have a complete representation of the percentage of government expenditures on priority areas, but we settle for this variable as a close proxy.

a) Running the MHDI regression:

After running our panel regression for human development we are left with the following equation:

$$Y = 52.82 + 0.29068X1t + 0.0000346X2t + 0.352846X3t - 0.949592X4t + 0.1759X5t$$

(26.54)⁴⁰ (1.72) (0.52) (15.03) (-2.19) (0.58)

See Regression output B below for detailed regression output.

³⁷ Joachim von Braun, "Food Subsidies in Egypt: Implications for the Agricultural Sector," in *Food Subsidies in Developing Countries: Costs, Benefits, and Policy Options*, ed. Per Pinstrup-Andersen (Baltimore-London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).

³⁸ Marito Garcia, *Resource Allocation and Household Welfare: A Study of the Impact of Personal Sources of Income on Food Consumption and Health in the Philippines*, Thesis (Ph.D.), (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1990).

³⁹ Lawrence Haddad, John Hoddinott, *Gender Aspects of Household Expenditures and Resource Allocation in the Côte d'Ivoire*, (Oxford: Institute of Economics and Statistics-University of Oxford, 1991).

⁴⁰ Values in parentheses represent t-stats.

Regression Output B

```

Fixed-effects (within) regression              Number of obs   =   279
Group variable (i): year                     Number of groups =    3

R-sq:  within = 0.7221                       Obs per group:  min =    87
        between = 0.8379                      avg   =   93.0
        overall = 0.7239                      max   =   99

corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.0443                       F(5, 271)      =  140.83
                                                Prob > F       =   0.0000
    
```

	mhdi	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
gdpngrowth		.2906868	.1690239	1.72	0.087	-.0420801 .6234538
gdpn		.0000346	.0000668	0.52	0.605	-.0000969 .0001662
femalesecovt		.3523846	.0234414	15.03	0.000	.3062341 .3985351
population		-.949592	.4344526	-2.19	0.030	-1.804923 -.0942608
educationswg		.1759946	.3047824	0.58	0.564	-.4240477 .7760369
_cons		52.82163	1.99035	26.54	0.000	48.90311 56.74014

```

sigma_u | 1.1863538
sigma_e | 8.0057075
rho     | .02148796 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
    
```

```

F test that all u_i=0:   F(2, 271) =   1.59           Prob > F = 0.2049
    
```

The first thing we notice from the regression is that it passes the overall significance test with an F-stat of 140.83 which is significant at the 1% level. Also the explanatory power of our test is quite high with an overall R2 of 0.72 (72% explanatory power) and a R2 within⁴¹ of 0.72 also. As for the individual variables, we will see the effects of each in our regression:

-GDP growth Lagged (X1t): This variable yields a t-stat of 1.72 and is significant at the 10% level with a p-value of 0.087. Its coefficient is positive and carries a value of 0.29068 meaning that a 1% increase in GDP growth ultimately leads to a 0.29 increase in the MHDI index which further proves that there is indeed a channel for human development through economic growth which is in line with economic theory.

-GDP/N (X2t): This variable yields a t-stat of 0.52 indicating that it is not significant (not even at the 20% level). This implies that GDP at level does not prove to have an effect on human development. This implies that we find no convergence of human development to initial levels of GDP like in the case of GDP growth.

-Female Schooling (X3t): Female school enrollment (secondary level) proves to be extremely significant with a t-stat of 15.03 (significance at 1% level). It also yields a positive coefficient with a value of 0.3528 implying that a 1% increase in female school enrollment leads to a 0.35 point increase in the MHDI index. This is in line with economic theory that postulates that female education is an important channel through which human development is attained at the household and societal level.

-Population Growth (X4t): Population growth seems to be another significant variable with a t-stat of -2.19 (significant at 5% level). However this variable proves to be

⁴¹ Note: We are interested mostly in the R-squared within as we are testing for a cross country relationship.

negative with a value of -0.9495. This is also in line with theory disfavoring population implosion and writing it off as a bad effect on human development (especially in the case of developing countries). In fact according to our findings a 1% increase in population growth ultimately leads to a -0.9495 decrease in our MHDI index which is almost a whole point on our index.

-Gov. Education Spending/GDP (X5t): Our proxy for social expenditures by the government proves to be insignificant with a t-stat of 0.58. Although the regression does point out to a positive coefficient which would be in line with economic theory, no conclusion can be inferred from this variable. We must note here that we feel that the lack of data on health expenditures may be the reason why this variable proves inconclusive, as we feel that education spending alone cannot truly represent the expenditure patterns of governments on social issues.

b) Analysis of Egypt's human development

The regression above gives us a general outcome of the determinants of human development and allows us to solidify the fact that indeed there is a link going from economic growth to human development (as well as a link running from human development to economic growth as can be seen from our previous regression). But what we are interested in is to pinpoint Egypt in our study. As such, we turn to the same mode of analysis used in regression A. Basically we extrapolate the 3 predicted MHDI values for Egypt from our model. The first predicted value is for Egypt from the years 1990-1995, the second is from 1996-2003, and the last one from 2004-2008. We then compare these predicted values from our model with the actual values in these periods and basically analyze the differences and observe their evolution in the 3 time periods. In this way we have an analytical tool that helps us quantify the effects of Egypt's reforms on human development. The table below summarizes these findings:

Period	Actual MHDI	Predicted MHDI	Actual-predicted
1990-1995	57.08	73.27082	-16.18729
1996-2003 (Reform 1)	61.74	76.98199	-15.23351
2004-2008 (Reform 2)	69.31	79.114	-9.799957

The first thing we can notice from this table is the fact that Egypt's actual performance in human development is always under that of our predicted model. This implies that Egypt is always underperforming with respect to human development. However, we can also notice that this difference is decreasing from period to period as Egypt converges to its predicted value. It started out with a whopping 16 point difference in MHDI, but after the first reform period it went down to 15 points, and as of recently and with the second series of serious reforms, it has gone down to 9.8 points. The fact

that the values are converging to their predicted values is reassuring, however they still seem to be excessively underperforming. The reforms have had an effect and allowed Egypt to get closer and closer to their predicted values, but we must not forget that the trend for most countries in the post 1990s era was to focus on human development, so this feat no longer sounds impressive. We find that for a country that underwent such drastic reforms, insufficient attention is being paid to sustainable and comprehensive human development. We will be presenting some recommendations and needed rectifications for Egyptian policy in the last part of our paper.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Egypt's economic performance since the introduction of the *Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme* has been remarkable. It was able to come out of a period of an intensely centralized economy, slowdowns, and record high levels of inflation. Our first regression supports the notion that Egypt was able to significantly stimulate its economic growth. However, our second regression does not paint such a flattering picture for Egypt. Egypt was found to be underperforming in terms of human development, and in fact its growth could be considered as lop sided and focusing mostly on financial and economic growth. We find this to be detrimental to its long run prospects of sustainable and comprehensive growth.

With the massive structural and economic changes, Egypt also targeted human development indicators, and was able to improve a few main indicators. It even had breakthroughs in some areas, the most significant of which were:

- a) the reduction of infant and maternal mortality rates;
- b) the reduction of poverty in some areas;
- c) an increase in literacy rates throughout this period.

Nonetheless, we estimate that with the massive reform plans it established, Egypt should have been able to improve its human development in excess of what it actually attained. Many areas still suffer from poverty, low literacy rates and school enrollments as well as poor access to health. We estimate that it is not sufficient for Egypt to try and achieve its Millennium Development Goals in specific parts of the country, but it should also focus on improving the welfare of its citizens in the most disadvantaged areas.

The first step towards attaining such goals should be by acknowledging the problem of poverty and working seriously towards putting an end to it. Egypt should start targeting the most disadvantaged areas, especially in the Upper Rural part, which suffers from staggeringly low levels of human development and extreme poverty. This can be done by improving the financial situation of the people living in these areas through a more severe focus on job creation. Also, since many of the people living in these areas work on farms and household businesses, it should be noted that the government should work on stimulating these activities.

The government can facilitate their access to credit by establishing micro-credit programs in an attempt to create more synergy in these areas. It should also provide them with an outlet for their productions, in the form of an organized goods or trade market.

Furthermore, Egypt should start programs aimed at helping the agricultural sector, as many families rely on farming activities in order to generate their income.

By stimulating these activities and creating more job opportunities, this will not only have an effect on decreasing poverty levels and improving the financial situations, but it will also affect other areas of human development. In fact, the UNDP reports that one of the main reasons why school enrollments in disadvantaged areas are low is due to the high financial cost of school attendance, as children will no longer be able to work. We estimate that if the economic situation is improved in those areas, school enrollments will go up drastically which would create an economic cycle of sustainable and equal growth.

The government should also focus on creating awareness programs. These programs should be aimed at sensitizing the disadvantaged about the importance of education, as well as focusing on the introduction of birth control methods into these areas, seeing that overpopulation is one of the key problems hindering proportional growth in Egypt. It is also found that many of the disadvantaged areas still have predominant traditional mentalities, and that children (especially girls) are suffering from a serious lack of schooling and equal opportunities. Mothers, in particular, should be made more aware of the importance of education, as they are seen to have a major impact on human development, as we discussed earlier and proved with our regression.

Housewives should also be encouraged to work and start household businesses, and governments as well as NGOs should facilitate their access to credit through micro-credit programs. Concerning health, improving the economic situation of the disadvantaged will certainly have a positive effect as people will be able to access more health services and medical insurance. However, this role is left strictly to the government which should play a role in increasing the access and efficiency of its health services to all corners of the country. It is integral that more funds be allocated and dedicated to the improvement of governmental health care systems. Egypt should also work on improving the efficiency of its hospitals, as many of them have an oversupply of physicians, low bed occupancy rates, etc. Hospitals and health care facilities should also be established in the areas of extreme poverty that seem to be overlooked.

In conclusion, we can say that Egypt's economic reforms did not have the effect they should have had on human development. Although, the government did establish many reform programs concerning human development, it still proved to be extremely insufficient and lacking in proper and comprehensive planning and implementation. We would have expected a progress in human development similar or proportional to that of the economic growth. The government should also realize that an increase in human development also translates into an increase in economic growth opportunities as previous papers on this subject have shown,⁴² and as our regressions have also pointed out to. Thus, a more human development oriented government policy would also end up favoring them in the long run. Egypt should focus on increasing the welfare of its citizens in a more comprehensive way, in an attempt to match or come close to the success it has had in reforming its economy. It is every human beings right to have equal and ample access to all the tools that could lead to a successful and rewarding life, and we find Egypt to be failing in this aspect.

⁴² See: Stewart, Ramirez, "Economic growth and human development."

PROGRAMME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

**GLOBAL DILEMMAS OF SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

November 9, 2010 (Tuesday)

13:00-13:15 – INAUGURATION

Prof. ANDRZEJ MANIA, Pro-Rector of the Jagiellonian University

Prof. ANDRZEJ DUDEK, Vice-Dean of the Faculty of International and Political Studies

13:15-14:30 – Session 1 - Chair: Prof. Soli Shahvar

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST & AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS THE REGION

Prof. STEVEN EKOVIČH, The American University of Paris, France

The Relations Between United States and Qatar

Prof. RADWAN ZIADEH, Institute for Middle East Studies, Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University, USA

U.S. Policy to Promote Democracy in the Middle East

Dr MICHAEL EPEL, Department of Middle Eastern History, University of Haifa, Israel

Domestic Politics and Social Conflicts as Factors in the Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle Eastern States

Dr HAYSSAM OBEIDAT, The Institute of the Middle and Far East, Jagiellonian University, Poland

Factors of Stabilization of International Relations from Perspective of Development of the World Petroleum Market

MICHAŁ LIPA, ALEKSANDRA WILCZURA, The Institute of the Middle and Far East, Jagiellonian University

American Impact on the Stabilizing of the Egyptian Authoritarian Rule

14:30-15:00 – Coffee break

15:00-16:15 – Session 2 - Chair: Prof. Naushad Khan

IRAN AND IRAQ IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Prof. SOLI SHAHVAR, Director of the Ezri Center for Iran & Persian Gulf Studies, University of Haifa, Israel

The Dynamism of Foreign Policy Making in the Islamic Republic of Iran – New Meanings to Old Determinants

Dr BARTOSZ BOJARCZYK, Department of International Relations, Marie Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, Poland
Iran's International Status

Dr ALEKSANDER GŁOGOWSKI, Institute of Political Studies and International Relations, Jagiellonian University, Poland
Iran-Pakistan Cooperation After 1979 Revolution

Dr MARCIN GRODZKI
Migration of Christians out of Iraq – situation and perspectives

Dr MARCIN TARNAWSKI, Institute of Political Studies and International Relations, Jagiellonian University, Poland
Russia's Foreign Policy Towards Iran – Time for a Change?

16:15-17:00 – Discussion to sessions 1 and 2 - Chair: Dr Naushad Khan, Dr Jerzy Wójcik

17:00 Meeting with Prof. Adel Iskandar, Pierwszy lokal na Stolarskiej

19:00 Dinner

November 10, 2010 (Wednesday)

9:00-10:00 – Session 3 - Chair: Aleksandra Wilczura, Karolina Rak TURKEY'S FACTOR IN THE MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS

Prof. ALPER Y. DEDE, Department of International Relations, Zirve University, Turkey
On the Islamization of Turkish Foreign Policy

ANNA CHOMĘTOWSKA, Faculty of Journalism and Political Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland
Kemalism, nationalism, Islam – past and present discourse on Turkey's identity

PAWEŁ SUS, Institute of Political Science, University of Wrocław, Poland
The Conception of the "Strategic Depth" and the Future of Turkish Foreign Policy

PRZEMYSŁAW OZIERSKI, Political Scientist, Poland
Israel-Turkey Relations as the challenge to the NATO's Middle East Policy

10:00-10:30 – Coffee Break

10:30-11:15 – Session 4 - Chair: Dr Ewa Trojnar PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE PEACE PROCESS ISSUES

Dr KATARZYNA BRATANIEC, Krakowska Akademia im. A. Frycza-Modrzewskiego, Poland
Is Democracy possible in the Arab World? The Role of Political Parties in Contemporary Egypt and

Influence of Western Powers on Egyptian Democracy

Dr JERZY WÓJCIK, the Jagiellonian University, Poland
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process – 10 Years after Camp David

Dr IDO ZELKOVIZ, Department of Middle Eastern History, University of Haifa, Israel
Fatah, Hamas and the Virtual Battle for the Palestinian Hearts and Minds

ALEKSANDRA WILCZURA, Department of Middle Eastern History, Jagiellonian University, Poland
The Role of Civil Society in Democratization of Israel

11:30-12:15 – Discussion to sessions 3 and 4 – Chair: Prof. Naushad Khan, Dr Aleksander Głogowski

12:15-13:15 – Lunch

13:15-14:45 – Session 5 - Chair: Dr Katarzyna Brataniec
DIMENSIONS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Prof. SHARIF S. ELMUSA, Associate Professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Qatar
Egypt's Soft Power – Too Late for the Nile's Upstream Riparians?

Dr KATARZYNA GÓRAK-SOSNOWSKA, Warsaw School of Economics, Poland
Between Innovation and Rebellion: Modes of Adaptation of Youth in MENA Countries

FARHAD GOHARDANI, University of Durham, Great Britain
Tragedy of Confusion – The political economy of the enigma of socio-economic underdevelopment in the modern history of Iran

Dr MICHAEL MASON, Department of Geography and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, Great Britain; Dr MARK ZEITOUN, University of East Anglia, Great Britain; Dr ZIAD MIMI, Birzeit University, Palestine
Compounding Vulnerability - Impacts of Climate Change on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza

MICHAEL J. OGHIA, Department of Social and Behavior Sciences, American University of Beirut, Lebanon, HELEN INDELICATO, George Washington University, USA
Ruling Arab Internet: An Analysis of Internet Ownership Trends of Six Arab Countries

MACIEJ KIRSCHENBAUM, Warsaw School of Economics, Poland
Economic Migration to Qatar, Kuwait and UAE: from economic necessity to security threat?

14:45-15:30 Discussion to sessions 5 - Chair: Dr K. Górak Sosnowska, Dr Ł. Fyderek